How far could the USA expand

Is an American East India Company possible? IOTL, there were large amounts of Sino-American trade even before the Opium Wars thanks the US having Appalachian ginseng, which was in high demand from China thanks to its potency. If the various trading companies with China are instead united as an "American East India Company", is it possible that trade with Asia can turn into similar ad-hoc colonialism as with the European companies?
 
And how will they hold it? OTL demonstrates that Mexico is willing to fight a long war against would-be rulers. The best bet is that the US annexes most of Mexico, but leave a rump state in control of its core territory.

The scenario herein presented was to have the U.S. utilize local support and leadership co-opted into the American structure and to annex Mexico before its national identity had formed. As for the French example, I would point out they made their effort with just 50,000 men across the Atlantic while backing a Monarch that managed to alienate not only the Liberals but also the Conservatives, meaning he had no real base of support. Even still, they came extremely close to outright winning and the main reason they didn't is the U.S. aided the rebels extensively.
 
As for the general question presented of maximum expansion, Western Canada, Cuba and all of Mexico are what I see as definitely possible, with Okinawa, Central America, and some random colonies as also possible.

For Western Canada, I'd recommend Seward's Attempt to Annex British Columbia, 1865-1869 by David E. Shi (Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 47, No. 2 (May, 1978), pp. 217-238):

The Oxford professor, Goldwin Smith, who later emigrated to Canada, advised Seward that Canada "seems likely (unless our statesmen adopt a different policy) to fall into your hands of itself, perhaps before you want it." The London Times echoed Smith's assessment, reporting that Britain would not object if Canadians wished to join the United States, but if a union was promulgated by force, Her Majesty's government would protest. This was a common view of British scholars and politicians, who had little faith in Canada's future and even less regard for her aspirations for dominion.
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Between Russian America and Washington Territory lay the British colony of British Columbia. Until 1858 the area had been an underdeveloped and sparsely populated region, serving primarily as an outpost for the Hudson's Bay Company. In that year, however, the discovery of gold brought an influx of American miners. This rapid growth led to the formation of the Crown Colony of British Columbia. Its boundaries extended from the summit of the Rocky Mountains on the east to the Pacific Ocean and the Gulf of Georgia on the west, and from the Finlay branch of the Peace River and the Nass River on the north to the 49th parallel on the south. Vancouver Island remained a separate colony until 1866.

British Columbia's rapid growth and prosperity, however, quickly subsided. By 1865 the colony was in a state of decay, a "poor, struggling, bankrupt colony on the edge of things."' As the gold deposits were depleted, the populace began to drift away, leaving less than 10,000 inhabitants in 1866, three-quarters of whom were of British or Canadian origin. Moreover, since the Hudson's Bay Company owned the territory from the head of the Great Lakes to the Rocky Mountains, the colony remained isolated from the rest of Canada East and West. Consequently, the British Columbians, especially those on Vancouver Island, maintained closer economic and social relations with the western American territories and states than with either Canada or Great Britain.

The belief among many colonists that the Home Office had abandoned them further contributed to their sense of isolation and frustration. During the Civil War, British Columbia alone of the British North American colonies was left undefended. Rear Admiral Joseph Denman informed the Admiralty that the colony did not warrant protection: "I would consider it would be greatly for the interest of England to divest herself of these possessions by any means consistent with honor and with justice to the English settlers." Denman's comments were symptomatic of a general spirit of Little Englandism emerging in Great Britain during the 1860s, a spirit that caused great concern among the colonists in British Columbia.

In such an unstable situation, growing support among the colonists for annexation to the United States represented a logical development. Many were painfully aware of the prosperity and lower taxes prevalent in the neighboring American states. Agitation for annexation began in 1866 and remained a prominent issue for several years. Vancouver Island emerged as the center of support for the movement, particularly the port town of Victoria.

Seward learned of the support in British Columbia for annexation from several sources. In January 1866, he received an extensive report from E. H. Derby, a congressional investigator. Citing the rising discontent among the colonists in British Columbia, Derby suggested that Great Britain cede its Pacific territory to the United States as payment of the Alabama claims:

If Great Britain desires to propitiate this country after all that has occurred, would it not be her true policy to cede to us a portion of her remote territories, valuable to us, but of little value to her? Were she to cede us Vancouver's Island and British Columbia ... might she not easily bring our claims to a peaceful solution...

Seward responded favorably to Derby's suggestion. After sending the report to the Senate for consideration, he began negotiations with Great Britain on the subject.

Discussions concerning the Alabama claims had begun immediately after the Civil War. The main issues were Great Britain's recognition of the Confederacy and her building of Confederate privateers. By 1866 the negotiations had reached an impasse. Seward wanted Britain's policies judged before a neutral arbitration court. Lord Russell refused, arguing that his country's actions were beyond the jurisdiction of any foreign court.

In June 1866, Russell's government fell. As the Conservatives assumed power, conditions appeared favorable for reopening the negotiations. In a lengthy dispatch to the new government, Seward listed the American claims against Great Britain for her part in building the privateers. Lord Stanley, the new Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, finally replied in November, professing his willingness to accept arbitration of the American claims, apart from those involving the right of the British government to recognize a state of belligerency. Seward countered in January 1867, stressing that the individual claims represented only a small part of the much greater losses caused by British actions which had prolonged the war. He implied that he was holding Great Britain responsible for indirect damages that could produce enormous claims. Apparently following the plan outlined earlier in Derby's report, Seward hoped to raise the claims high enough to convince British officials to agree to a quid pro quo settlement, ceding British Columbia in exchange for the claims.

For several months prior to this last dispatch, Seward had been receiving additional evidence from British Columbia indicating substantial support in the colony for annexation. Allen Francis, the American consul in Victoria, reported in September 1866 that "the people of Vancouver Island, and of British Columbia, are almost unanimous in their desire for annexation to the United States." He included an article excerpted from the Victoria Evening Telegraph of September 5, 1866, which characterized British Columbia's relations with the United States as being closer "than our relations with any of the colonies." Two weeks later a public meeting in Victoria voted to request Great Britain to permit annexation to the United States.

Without British Columbia, the Trans-Canada won't get built and thus Western Canada will likely remain sparsely populated with one of the mains settler demographics being American ranchers who were a constant concern of Anglo-Canadian authorities in the area, especially given that their only rail connects to the rest of Canada were dependent upon the United States and that many communities likewise looked to their American counterparts for leadership and security.

As for Mexico, my always trusty citation is The Slavery Question and the Movement to Acquire Mexico, 1846-1848 by John D. P. Fuller, The Mississippi Valley Historical Review Vol. 21, No. 1 (Jun., 1934), pp. 31-48:

Between October, 1847, and the following February the theme of the story underwent considerable alteration. By the latter date, as noted above, the National Era was advocating the absorption of Mexico, insisting that it would be free territory, and citing along with other evidence, Calhoun's opposition to annexation as proof that the anti-slavery interests had nothing to fear from extensive territorial acquisitions. In other words, the National Era was convinced that if there had been a "pro-slavery conspiracy" to acquire all Mexico, it could not realize its ends even though the whole country were annexed. This conviction seems to have come largely as a result of the propaganda, which was streaming from the northern expansionist press and the opposition of Calhoun.The editor probably reasoned that since Calhoun was opposing absorption the expansionists at the North must be correct. If the main body of the anti-slavery forces could be converted to this point of view, the movement for absorption which was growing rapidly at the time would doubtless become very strong indeed.

Care should be taken not to exaggerate the anti-slavery sentiment for all Mexico. It is evident that some such sentiment did exist, but there was not sufficient time for it to develop to significant proportions. The Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo had already been signed in Mexico when the National Era took up the cry of all Mexico with or without the Wilmot Proviso. In a short while the war was over and whatever anti-slavery sentiment there was for all Mexico collapsed along with the general expansion movement. Had the war continued several months longer it is not improbable that increasing numbers from the anti-slavery camp would have joined forces with those who were demanding the acquisition of Mexico. Their action would have been based on the assumption that they were undermining the position of the pro slavery forces. It was, not to be expected that those abolitionists, and there were undoubtedly some, who were using the bogey of "extension of slavery" to cover up other reasons for opposition to annexation, would have ever become convinced of the error of their ways. They would hold on to their pet theory to the bitter end.

To summarize briefly what seem to be the conclusions to be drawn from this study, it might be said that the chief support for the absorption of Mexico came from the North and West and from those whose pro-slavery or anti-slavery bias was not a prime consideration. In quarters where the attitude toward slavery was all-important there was, contrary to the accepted view, a "pro-slavery conspiracy" to prevent the acquisition of all Mexico and the beginnings of an "anti-slavery conspiracy" to secure all the territory in the Southwest that happened to be available. Behind both these movements was a belief that expansion would prove injurious to the slavery interest. Had the war continued much longer the two movements, would probably have developed strength and have become more easily discernible. Lack of time for expansionist sentiment to develop was the chief cause of this country's, failure to annex Mexico in 1848. Even as it was, however, there might have been sufficient demand for annexation in February and March, 1848, to have wrecked the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo had it not been for the opposition of pro-slavery Democrats led by Calhoun. Their attitude divided the party committed to expansion in the presence of a unified opposition. Whatever the motives which may be attributed to Calhoun and his friends, the fact remains that those who feel that the absorption of Mexico in 1848 would have meant permanent injury to the best interests of the United States, should be extremely grateful to those slaveholders. To them not a little credit is due for the fact that Mexico is to-day an independent nation.

I'd also include The United States and Mexico, 1847-1848 by Edward G. Bourne in the The American Historical Review, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Apr., 1900), pp. 491-502 as he largely came to the same conclusions as this aforementioned work did. The Knights of the Golden Circle: The Career of George Bickley by Ollinger Crenshaw likewise from The American Historical Review (Vol. 47, No. 1 (Oct., 1941), pp. 23-50) as well as Buchanan's Proposed Intervention in Mexico by Howard Lafayette Wilson (Vol. 5, No. 4 (Jul., 1900), pp. 687-701) are also informative reads on the subject.
 

Brunaburh

Gone Fishin'
The US aversion to Catholics didn't stop it from buying French Louisiana, conquering half of Mexico, conquering Spain's remaining overseas colonies (Cuba, Puerto Rico, Dominica, Guam and Philippines, all adding to a dozen million Catholics) and colonising Panamanian territory to create its canal. One can add William Walker's conquest of Nicaragua, even if it's not exactly annexation to the US.


-The US starts as a country about the size of Portugal.
-Ends up almost as big as all of Europe without taking into account Alaska and other overseas territories.
-Yet its principles of self-determination stop it from expanding
That doesn't seem congruent.

I agree with you in your main point, but it is worth noting that the Louisiana purchase + the Annexation of the Mexican wilderness brought a Catholic population of less than 200k in total under American control. This was in an area the size of the EU. They were then swamped by Protestant incomers, as was very much the plan.

Areas too far away, or where the local population could not be swamped, were not admitted to the Union (and still aren't, see PR). US overseas territories were managed in a pretty typical colonial way and not integrated with the metropolis, you can get more colonies easily, but I don't think that is what the OP wants. A bigger America, i.e. areas which are democratically represented by the US government, is contingent on very big things happening elsewhere. A British revolution in 1905 or something like that. You could easily get Baja California and Coahuila though, they fit the low population criteria, also the border with Mexico could probably be pushed just inside the habitable zone south of the border deserts.
 
Make Manifest Destiny more popular.

Have a larger US that annexes Canada in the Revolution, peacefully settles slavery, and then takes the Northern half of modern day Mexico in 1848 and Yucatán after it asked to be ruled. Take Central America in the 1870s, some of it after being asked to be annexed (even though unpopular), and ultimately build the canal. Admit the conquered lands in Central America as states but otherwise leave them alone beyond the canal. The US takes the Dominican Republic in 1870 as Grant consider OTL, which eventually results in an occupation of Haiti.

English is mostly dominant in the annexed Mexican territory by 1900, along with a small majority in Quebec. Mexico is surrounded, completely fails as an independent state, and becomes dominated by American business interests, which eventually leads to Mexico entering some kind of trade and customs agreement with the US. This leads to Mexico getting annexed in the early 1900s. Cuba is either conquered or purchased from Spain at some point where America isn’t too tied down.

America is stuck fighting a series of major insurgencies from 1850-1930. But without a Civil War, with the add on of Canada, and doing this slowly, America is able to afford it. The US grants representation to the people of its conquered lands in most cases by quickly granting statehood, even though it is unpopular in most of the country. The Federal government is ultimately content to allow most states a great deal of autonomy as long as they do not rebel and respect property rights. By 1930 independence is largely recognized as impossible, if not a negative.

The US keeps its borders open to Europeans until the 60s here as much of OTL Latin America did. This gives the US more people for its open space, a racial whitening policy, and keeps the political/demographic/net economic balance in whiter hands. This gives America an extra 40 million immigrants which creates an extra 160 million people by today.

Gradual economic development occurs in the conquered territories. By 1930, most of the Latin American territory has living standards comparable to Southern Italy. By 1960, all of these states have Malaria and several other Tropical Diseases eradicated, fully literate populations, and would have high income status if independent countries, and crashing fertility rates (which converge with the national average). The areas speak Spanish, but still have a large English speaking sub population. Most revolutionary fervor is lost on people with TVs and reasonable expectation to retire one day.

From 1960-present internal immigration brings lots of old white people to the Tropical areas. The US has lots of immigration from all over the world, but pretty strictly enforced laws preventing illegal immigration, keeping the Hispanic population down while introducing a sizable population that doesn’t really care if Mexico used to be independent a century ago. This also makes English more prevalent, albeit still not as widely spoken as Spanish. The actual Latin population is relatively small from having replacement level TFR the last 50 years, which makes the impact immigrants have bigger. Because of these factors, America by the 1970s no longer need implicit force to keep the territories inline because a majority of people legitimately don’t desire independence anymore.


Wildly unrealistic and needs dozens of PoDs, many with minuscule chances, to all happen. But it gets an American North America, the dream of every Ameri-wank. Feel free to pick apart how unrealistic this is, but I’ll be wiping my Red, White, and Blue sweat off with my cheeseburger while you do.
 
The scenario herein presented was to have the U.S. utilize local support and leadership co-opted into the American structure and to annex Mexico before its national identity had formed.

National identity didn’t exist (though Humboldt did record that the people of Spanish America did view themselves as “Americans” separate from Spain), but the people of Spanish America viewed themselves as proud subjects of the King of Spain to the extent that Napoleon’s deposition of the Spanish Bourbons resulted in the Peninsular War as well as the formation of juntas across Spanish America loyal to the Bourbon king. Bear in mind that Hidalgo’s rebellion proclaimed its loyalty to Ferdinand VII. I really don’t see how the US gets over that intense loyalty.
 
National identity didn’t exist (though Humboldt did record that the people of Spanish America did view themselves as “Americans” separate from Spain), but the people of Spanish America viewed themselves as proud subjects of the King of Spain to the extent that Napoleon’s deposition of the Spanish Bourbons resulted in the Peninsular War as well as the formation of juntas across Spanish America loyal to the Bourbon king. Bear in mind that Hidalgo’s rebellion proclaimed its loyalty to Ferdinand VII. I really don’t see how the US gets over that intense loyalty.

Namely because things like the Conspiracy of Machetes was real.
 
Namely because things like the Conspiracy of Machetes was real.

The thing is, that was only a conspiracy supported by a few people. The idea of independence was unthinkable by most people in Spanish America before the Peninsular War, with the exception of a few radicals. IOTL, one reason behind the Latin American wars of independence is because the Spanish Constitution of 1812 was an extremely liberal one, enough that it alienated conservatives - and make no mistake, Spanish America was more conservative than Spain itself. I think it’s very telling that the largest revolt in this period in Spanish America was the Comunero revolt in New Granada, which was fought more against new taxes than for independence.
 
Probably the entire Pacific could be gained by the US, outside of places like New Zealand and Australia. If the US ended up on the opposite side of a war with Britain and/or France, then a lot of the Pacific would likely pass into American hands. IOTL alone the US could have gained the entirety of Samoa as well as the Solomon Islands--the US has a legal claim on Sikaiana in the Solomons, and if the US had taken that claim up in the 1890s, then much of the Solomons would likely have been American.
 
Something like this:
Canadian_States_noram.png
 
Problem with that is Great Britain ...If the US tries to go for Latin America so early, it will only get dissolved if not outright recolonised.
In the 1800s, maybe. In the 1900s, it seems like nearly every country in Central America, plus Cuba, Haiti, & the Dominican Republic, wanted in, but Congress wouldn't go for it. What would it take to change that? (Not to mention the Virgin Islands in WW1 & Turks & Caicos in WW2.)

Winning the War of 1812 (1842 in Newfoundland :openedeyewink: ) is harder than it looks, but if the *U.S. achieves it, you probably get all of OTL Canada. (Good chance HBC sells to DC, & it & OTL BC comes under NWC stewardship until statehood.) You may get Alaska, too--or you may get a Pacific war, with Russia unwilling to sell, given it's still a valuable seal, whale, & fur source, & not yet a crushing economic burden. The issue of denying Alaska to Britain, which arises with British-controlled Canada, may also not arise, making a sale less likely TTL.

You probably get a handful more states around 49-52 North, & a handful lf very large, very lightly-populated "northern territories" in the northern part of OTL Canada--& that's unlikely to change, no matter when they're taken by the *U.S. (As I understand U.S. statehood requirements, most of this area will never reach the minimum population.)
Apparently, there is a (slim) chance that the US could have purchased Rupert's Land. This one is a lot more unlikely, but hey...
It may be more likely than you think. HBC by 1870 was getting pretty eager (desperate?) to sell off Rupert's Land, & HMG got the deal of the millennia on it. Why would HBC (independent of HMG, recall) quail at selling to DC if HMG demurred?
 
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