I know this question has been brought up about Japan in the Pacific War, but exactly how far could Italy go of conquering Africa in World War II? This is assuming Rommel wins El Alamein, what areas of Africa could Italy conquer if they had held out against the British when they attacked Sudan and Kenya in late 1940? Also could they have gained anything important for the war, e.g. resources, strategic points, etc. Would South Africa be a concern?
How far could Italy have gone in WWII?
- Thread starter Yuhi33
- Start date
Waste of resources. They dont have the technology for it.
Logistically though wasnt El Alamein already stretching the supply lines to the brink?
Interesting question. Italy lacked the industrial capacity to fight a modern global war but it was still a decent power. Had it used its (limited) resources better, it could have done much, much better. People look at the myth of silly Eye-ties surrendering in droves but forget the problems facing the Italians and they still put up some of the hardest fighting in the desert.
The Italian army was largely geared to fighting against the French or the Balkan nations. So its equipment was rather light (light, portable guns, light tanks etc.). It was also largely non-motorized.
But their main problem was Mussolini. Probably the stupidest war leader in history (he made Hitler seem the epitome of rationality), Mussolini started out by invading France on the spur of the moment (afraid Hitler would finish off the French before he got in on the peace deal) so the Italian army which did so badly against the French alpine forts were hurled forwards without proper planning (on the other hand, it was a criminal neglect of the Italian officers not to have prepared contingency planning for just such a situation).
He then ordered his forces to attack Egypt but starved them of trucks and medium tanks. These were available but were earmarked for other adventures (mostly in the Balkans).
As the army in Egypt was floundering, Mussolini ordered yet another hasty invasion of Greece but not before making sure the Greeks would now about it. Which led to yet another predictable defeat.
And as the war in the desert became more protacted in '41-'42, Mussolini insisted on sending (most of his best) troops to Russia to support Hitler.
By spreading his meagre resources on too many fronts, defeat was preordained.
So how far could they have gone with better strategy?
The Italians should have sent a decent force to Libya instead of large masses of infantry. With proper logistics and better tanks (the trucks and tanks were available so we are not talking about ASB-ing the Italians in ersatz Germans riding license produced Tigers), they would have had a very good chance of taking Egypt. For much of 1940 and 1941, Britain was not in a very good position strength-wise. It only reached a (field) strength of 220,000 during (Second) El Alamein and had about 40,000 in 1940. The bulk of the Italian army should have been able to deal with them, had they concentrated their forces on that campaign, especially in 1940-1941.
With Egypt (and parts of the Middle East/Horn of Africa) safely secured, a concerted push into the Balkans would have been feasible, taking those countries the Germans would allow them.
And that is as far as the Italians could go IMO. Kick the British out of Egypt and take the Balkans.
The Italian army was largely geared to fighting against the French or the Balkan nations. So its equipment was rather light (light, portable guns, light tanks etc.). It was also largely non-motorized.
But their main problem was Mussolini. Probably the stupidest war leader in history (he made Hitler seem the epitome of rationality), Mussolini started out by invading France on the spur of the moment (afraid Hitler would finish off the French before he got in on the peace deal) so the Italian army which did so badly against the French alpine forts were hurled forwards without proper planning (on the other hand, it was a criminal neglect of the Italian officers not to have prepared contingency planning for just such a situation).
He then ordered his forces to attack Egypt but starved them of trucks and medium tanks. These were available but were earmarked for other adventures (mostly in the Balkans).
As the army in Egypt was floundering, Mussolini ordered yet another hasty invasion of Greece but not before making sure the Greeks would now about it. Which led to yet another predictable defeat.
And as the war in the desert became more protacted in '41-'42, Mussolini insisted on sending (most of his best) troops to Russia to support Hitler.
By spreading his meagre resources on too many fronts, defeat was preordained.
So how far could they have gone with better strategy?
The Italians should have sent a decent force to Libya instead of large masses of infantry. With proper logistics and better tanks (the trucks and tanks were available so we are not talking about ASB-ing the Italians in ersatz Germans riding license produced Tigers), they would have had a very good chance of taking Egypt. For much of 1940 and 1941, Britain was not in a very good position strength-wise. It only reached a (field) strength of 220,000 during (Second) El Alamein and had about 40,000 in 1940. The bulk of the Italian army should have been able to deal with them, had they concentrated their forces on that campaign, especially in 1940-1941.
With Egypt (and parts of the Middle East/Horn of Africa) safely secured, a concerted push into the Balkans would have been feasible, taking those countries the Germans would allow them.
And that is as far as the Italians could go IMO. Kick the British out of Egypt and take the Balkans.
Italy was not up for the job in being a conquering state. The Abesinian campaign should have learned that even against a third world nation, the Italian millitary was vulnerable adn not to be compared with the might of the Great Powers Germany and the UK for instance.
In the Spanish Civil War the Italian aid to the Nationalists was also a bit disappointing, as the supporting troops and units proved to be less than those of the Germans and the opposing French and Russian units suporting the Republicans. Mussolini should have learned from these experiences and rebuilding the armed forces first, before going on the offensive again.
In the Spanish Civil War the Italian aid to the Nationalists was also a bit disappointing, as the supporting troops and units proved to be less than those of the Germans and the opposing French and Russian units suporting the Republicans. Mussolini should have learned from these experiences and rebuilding the armed forces first, before going on the offensive again.
No really, Italy should have worked on oil from Libya and restructuring/re-educating it's military, one way or another, none which are completely ASB with a mid-30s POD. Not declaring war on the Allies immediately (as in declaring war on France just to grab a few plains and a port) and executing a better plan for Greece may prove more fruitful than OTL.
Actually, read LongVin's 1936 TL, though it has Italy not being in bed with Germany.
Actually, read LongVin's 1936 TL, though it has Italy not being in bed with Germany.
Italys problem in Africa was a lack of logistical infrastructure in the rear areas. Tripoli and Benghazi were limited to 4 or 5 ships and the railways were very limited so the supplies had to be moved by truck. In contrast Port Said, Suez and Alexandira were big ports and all were linked by a railway that extended to Mersa Matruh, 60 miles from the border.
Solve these problems and Italy becomes a lot more formidable in Africa.
Solve these problems and Italy becomes a lot more formidable in Africa.
Italy needs to build a modern infrastrucutre in Libya - more transfers between the inland highland and the coastal stretch is needed. A modern railroad and water pipeline would help a lot.
With enough dedication, the Italians can probably concentratre 110 medium tanks (M11/39). 50 armoured cars (AB-40, Lancia IZ, AB-611 etc) and 300 tankettes (L3/35 and L3/38) in Libya supported by lots of artillery and ~60 000 men motorised infantry while the San Marco Marines and the two airborne battalions take Malta.
One of their problems is the superiority of the Royal Navy in night fighting, the superiority of the Royal Air Force (Hurricanes against CR.42s is no real match!) and their inability to concentrate properly.
Italy had the capacity to supply and fight well at one (limited) front. Without the adventure in Greece, they could probably have done a lot better against Egypt.
With enough dedication, the Italians can probably concentratre 110 medium tanks (M11/39). 50 armoured cars (AB-40, Lancia IZ, AB-611 etc) and 300 tankettes (L3/35 and L3/38) in Libya supported by lots of artillery and ~60 000 men motorised infantry while the San Marco Marines and the two airborne battalions take Malta.
One of their problems is the superiority of the Royal Navy in night fighting, the superiority of the Royal Air Force (Hurricanes against CR.42s is no real match!) and their inability to concentrate properly.
Italy had the capacity to supply and fight well at one (limited) front. Without the adventure in Greece, they could probably have done a lot better against Egypt.
Ah yes, infrastructure is a biggie. I basic but efficient rail network across just even the coastal regions of Libya would have helped a great deal.
Ranoncles and von Adler pretty much got it, but a little more clarification should be added.
Italy needed six major things (among a score of minor) in order to have been an effective fighting force even given its severe limitations.
1. A singular strategy limited to a single front. Already well described by others, so I'll just reiterate: Malta, Egypt. Both could have been taken in 1940 without too much of a stretch.
2. Logistics logistics logistics. And not just infrastructure but organization. Each branch had a separate port authority and procedure. Get a single organized logistics plan for the ports alone and you vastly improve the supply problems.
3. Inter-service Cooperation. The absolute refusal of the three branches to work together was criminal. The navy refused to sortie to assist in the Med...the role it was designed for. The RA only started really working on anti-shipping combat once the war was going.
4. Acquisition Policy and Quality Control. It's criminal how slow and inept both the design and production of of weapons were. Lead times were so ludicrous the military was afraid to ask for updated equipment figuring 25% solution now beats waiting years for anything. The inept, squabbling Fascist bureaucrats did not help to improve things at all. It's similarly criminal how flagrantly the armaments companies shafted their own nation. Ships went to sea with scrap-iron for armor plate, shafts that broke, and shells/barrels that varied up to millimeters off of spec. The vulnerability of the tanks is well known.
5. Military Organization. From the top down. Commando Supremo should have been just that: a supreme command. Not an office that kindly suggests that their subordinate generals do a mission. Better organized fighting forces rather than the massive numbers of untrained mobs in understrength regiments purposefully organized to look like a large force on paper.
6. The simple ability to learn from experience and implement the freakin' lessons. When your primary anti-tank gun proves continually unable to do significant damage to the lightest enemy tanks it's time to develop a new one. See #4.
Plus there are dozens of others: get rid of the at-best 1914 mentality that ruled the army and navy, actually fund and implement at the earliest opportunity programs like radar (Italy had some of the best prototype radar pre-war!), the Miale/Frogmen navy divers, and Airborne (Folgore), etc., actually put radios in your vehicles, and far too many others to list.
An Italy that seizes Malta and Egypt and establishes local Med. naval superiority in the early part of the war is quite plausible given British strength in the region at the time. In the long run they still lose; the game was over with PH and even the UK alone could have eventually overrun them. But the embarrassing fiasco that was OTL could have been avoided, IMO.
PS: I urge everyone to read Knox's Hitler's Italian Allies. It's only 200 pages but really concisely describes why Italy did so poorly in the war.
Italy needed six major things (among a score of minor) in order to have been an effective fighting force even given its severe limitations.
1. A singular strategy limited to a single front. Already well described by others, so I'll just reiterate: Malta, Egypt. Both could have been taken in 1940 without too much of a stretch.
2. Logistics logistics logistics. And not just infrastructure but organization. Each branch had a separate port authority and procedure. Get a single organized logistics plan for the ports alone and you vastly improve the supply problems.
3. Inter-service Cooperation. The absolute refusal of the three branches to work together was criminal. The navy refused to sortie to assist in the Med...the role it was designed for. The RA only started really working on anti-shipping combat once the war was going.
4. Acquisition Policy and Quality Control. It's criminal how slow and inept both the design and production of of weapons were. Lead times were so ludicrous the military was afraid to ask for updated equipment figuring 25% solution now beats waiting years for anything. The inept, squabbling Fascist bureaucrats did not help to improve things at all. It's similarly criminal how flagrantly the armaments companies shafted their own nation. Ships went to sea with scrap-iron for armor plate, shafts that broke, and shells/barrels that varied up to millimeters off of spec. The vulnerability of the tanks is well known.
5. Military Organization. From the top down. Commando Supremo should have been just that: a supreme command. Not an office that kindly suggests that their subordinate generals do a mission. Better organized fighting forces rather than the massive numbers of untrained mobs in understrength regiments purposefully organized to look like a large force on paper.
6. The simple ability to learn from experience and implement the freakin' lessons. When your primary anti-tank gun proves continually unable to do significant damage to the lightest enemy tanks it's time to develop a new one. See #4.
Plus there are dozens of others: get rid of the at-best 1914 mentality that ruled the army and navy, actually fund and implement at the earliest opportunity programs like radar (Italy had some of the best prototype radar pre-war!), the Miale/Frogmen navy divers, and Airborne (Folgore), etc., actually put radios in your vehicles, and far too many others to list.
An Italy that seizes Malta and Egypt and establishes local Med. naval superiority in the early part of the war is quite plausible given British strength in the region at the time. In the long run they still lose; the game was over with PH and even the UK alone could have eventually overrun them. But the embarrassing fiasco that was OTL could have been avoided, IMO.
PS: I urge everyone to read Knox's Hitler's Italian Allies. It's only 200 pages but really concisely describes why Italy did so poorly in the war.
Italy fought on the wrong side in WWII.
What if insteadof declaring war against the allies in 1940, Italy continues to build up industry and logistics.
Germany still conquers France and Vichy France is set up.
Would Germany allow for a neutral Italy?
1941 - With the Balkans and Greece remaining neutral along with Italy, Germany declares war on USSR. Barbarossa isabout assuccessful as OTL.
1942 - US enters war against Axis. Britain secretly contacts Italy for entrance into the war. In exchange for entrance, Italy to obtain Dalmation coast. Germany is defeated at Stalingrad but still has strong presence in Russia.
With no torch in Africa, Allies opt for Husky in Norway. Successful landing and eventual liberation of Norway. Allies also start build up in Egypt as talks with Italy progress. IfItaly enters war, Allies to immediatly supply troops and planesto guard nortern Italy from German offensive.
1943 - After buildup in Egypt, allies land in Yugoslavia and build up. Allies also place armies in Italy as Italy declares war on Germany.
1944 - Drive through Italy to southern France, drive through Yugo to Hungary. Germany surrenders.
There are now five powers occupying Germany. Italy's occupation zone is in Austria. Italy keeps Dolmation coast and dominates in Balkans. Italy graduallybecomes democracy like Spain. Italy remains strong anti communist and is very active to counter Soviet moves. Since no real fighting went on in Italy other than some border battles with Germany,Italian Indsry still in tact. Italy is major partof allies and NATO. Aids in represing communism in Balkas, Greece, and Turkey.
Is this at all possible? Would Gerany allow Italy to be neutral for so long?
What if insteadof declaring war against the allies in 1940, Italy continues to build up industry and logistics.
Germany still conquers France and Vichy France is set up.
Would Germany allow for a neutral Italy?
1941 - With the Balkans and Greece remaining neutral along with Italy, Germany declares war on USSR. Barbarossa isabout assuccessful as OTL.
1942 - US enters war against Axis. Britain secretly contacts Italy for entrance into the war. In exchange for entrance, Italy to obtain Dalmation coast. Germany is defeated at Stalingrad but still has strong presence in Russia.
With no torch in Africa, Allies opt for Husky in Norway. Successful landing and eventual liberation of Norway. Allies also start build up in Egypt as talks with Italy progress. IfItaly enters war, Allies to immediatly supply troops and planesto guard nortern Italy from German offensive.
1943 - After buildup in Egypt, allies land in Yugoslavia and build up. Allies also place armies in Italy as Italy declares war on Germany.
1944 - Drive through Italy to southern France, drive through Yugo to Hungary. Germany surrenders.
There are now five powers occupying Germany. Italy's occupation zone is in Austria. Italy keeps Dolmation coast and dominates in Balkans. Italy graduallybecomes democracy like Spain. Italy remains strong anti communist and is very active to counter Soviet moves. Since no real fighting went on in Italy other than some border battles with Germany,Italian Indsry still in tact. Italy is major partof allies and NATO. Aids in represing communism in Balkas, Greece, and Turkey.
Is this at all possible? Would Gerany allow Italy to be neutral for so long?
Eurofed
Banned
Quite true, but a good Italian performance could easily tip the stategic balance so much that the Allies are stalemated on the conventional level and America has to use nukes to breach the defenses of "Fortress Europe".
Bad Britwank/Sovietwank. The UK alone, kicked out of Malta and Egypt and losing naval supremacy in the Med to a strong Italy, would be very hard-pressed to do anything more nasty to the Axis than continuing a bombing campaign of questionable long-term efficacy without the USAF. A UK-alone successful Torch is very questionable, and a UK-alone invasion of Italy or France is deep-end ASB. As for the Soviets, without America, in all likelihood they wholly exhaust their manpower reserves when they reach to the 1939 borders at the very best.
1) Italy didn't know Libya had oil.
2) Italy lacked the necessary equipment for looking for oil in Libya, the only way Italy could have gotten rich on oil would be if they found it by accident.
This is plausible with a different leader (coughmysignaturelinkcough), but Mussie'd never going for this. Germany will probably allow a neutral Italy since it offers an easy outlet to the sea for trade. The UK in turn might consider violating Italian neutrality to complete their blockade.
Maybe. The RM isn't going to stop Torch and once the Allies are in N.Africa the writing is on the wall. The RN is still superior to the RM in every respect: size, ability, doctrine...eventually they force the Gibraltar straights and retake the Med.
Unless, of course, the loss of Egypt leads to No Confidence vote for Churchill and negotiated settlement.
Ignores both the scale of the RN's superiority and the sheer numbers available from the Empire. They will eventually have to come in through the ME or Sudan, but Italy's days are numbered without Wehrmacht help. Of course this seriously delays the war...
I agree that Invading northern France is pushing it, but the "soft underbelly" still holds. Much mroe difficult, but far from ASB. Recall also it was Brit logistics that made Normandy possible and three of five beaches there were UK/Canada.
My bet is on negotiated settlement without the US involved, but I think with Germany tied up in the SU the writing is on the wall.
Note also the word "could have" in my sentence. Not "would have".
Subsurface oil was discovered, but not the deep wells of Fezzan. No Libyan oil before 1950's, most likely.
I would say that Geekhis Khan has neatley listed the most important points. When considering the italian performance in WW2, you should always bear in mind that was a country which had entered war without preparation and the means to fight a long war. Mussolini declared war thinking that it would have been a brief affair, few months at best, not a five year bloodshed.
Another point I would add is the necessity to streamline military production toward the better models even if expensive. Someone has already cited the CR42 as subpar fighter. But the contemporary Macchi MC200 was far better, for example and his successors, the MC 202 and MC 205 was perfectly on par with any other allied fighter.
Only taking in account several logistical and industrial improvments, which presuppose a POD in 1937 at very least.
Great Britain could have ousted italians from Africa alone, operation compass demonstrated that beyond doubt. It's not a britwank at all, noting how a fast moving army could have divided and destroyed the slower italian army. Though UK alone never had the manpower necessary to stage a continental invasion, but english could have tried to invade Sardinia or Sicily in the hope to provoke a moral breakdown in Italy.
A UK without american land lease is completely another matter. In this case the british would have ended asking for peace.
Another point I would add is the necessity to streamline military production toward the better models even if expensive. Someone has already cited the CR42 as subpar fighter. But the contemporary Macchi MC200 was far better, for example and his successors, the MC 202 and MC 205 was perfectly on par with any other allied fighter.
Only taking in account several logistical and industrial improvments, which presuppose a POD in 1937 at very least.
Great Britain could have ousted italians from Africa alone, operation compass demonstrated that beyond doubt. It's not a britwank at all, noting how a fast moving army could have divided and destroyed the slower italian army. Though UK alone never had the manpower necessary to stage a continental invasion, but english could have tried to invade Sardinia or Sicily in the hope to provoke a moral breakdown in Italy.
A UK without american land lease is completely another matter. In this case the british would have ended asking for peace.