History Learner
Banned
I'm not that skilled yet haha. I'd like to think I'm starting to get the necessary knowledge, but not yet.
How easy would it be for Germany to capture Moscow in 1941?
- Thread starter jonmb
- Start date
I'm not that skilled yet haha. I'd like to think I'm starting to get the necessary knowledge, but not yet.
BlackDragon98
Banned
If the Soviet sub fleet and the surface ships was scuttled in Kronstadt then the Germans could start shipping stuff in by sea to the Baltic ports after they clear the naval mines.I don't think he'd have mattered that much around Moscow, but around Leningrad he supposedly saved the city from falling by controlling a panicking Voroshilov, who was trying to scuttle the fleet, thinking the city was about to fall.
Leningrad
When the German High Command encircled Leningrad it was a deliberate policy to eradicate the city’s civilian population by starving them to death. As winter set in and food supplies dwindled, starvation and panic set in. A specialist in battle psychology and the vital role of morale in desperate...books.google.com
There's nothing to stop them.
The question is should the Germans have continued the advance on Moscow in August, or send Guardian with the whole of Panzer Group 2 south into Ukraine. IMHO Army Group Center was unable to realistically do that. The infantry divisions were exhausted after the battle to close out the Smolensk Pocket, and were in need of rest, and refitting. AGC had advanced over 500 miles, far out distancing their supply lines. The Germans needed time to change the rail gauge, and make repairs to rolling stock. You have to recall the German Army was largely dependent on rail roads for transport, and supply. Most German Iandsers had to walk into Russia, just like Napoleon's Troops did. To just keep going without a pause would have been reckless.
There are two other reasons for an extended pause. One was the mass of Red Army Forces on the Right Flank of AGC. Pushing ahead, with depleted, and tired divisions, operating far ahead of their rail heads, while presenting an overextended flank would have been an invitation for a Soviet Counter Offensive. The other was that Panzer Group 4 was still operating under Army Group North, near Leningrad, and were not in position to support AGC in a final drive on Moscow.
The Panzer Troops were also being worn out, but had been spared the grinding attrition of having to destroy each Soviet Unit they'd encircled. Panzer Group 2 was weakened, but still had over 50% of it's offensive capability. To keep them idle, while AGC was regrouping would've been missing a golden opportunity to destroy the Red Army Forces in the Central Ukraine.
The initial operational plan for Barbarossa called for securing the flanks of Kiev, and Leningrad before advancing on Moscow. I think the Germans should have stuck to the original plan. Taking Leningrad, and closing off the Baltic would have been a huge strategic victory for the Axis. Gaining overland communications with Finland might have led to the fall of Murmansk, which would have been significant later in the war. Taking Ukraine deprived the Soviet Union of a major manpower, food, industrial, and coal producing region. As it was the Germans could've taken Leningrad if they wanted to in August, or early September, and still sent Panzer group 4 to join the attack on Moscow in late September.
Going after Moscow at the end of September was a good tactical idea, if the objective was to destroy the mass of Soviet Forces in front of Moscow, and not to take the city. They largely succeeded in that objective, and achieved one of the biggest victories of the war. Once the weather turned in mid October AGC should've fallen back to defensive positions for the winter. The Soviet Winter Counter Offensive hurt the Germans so badly because they'd made themselves so vulnerable, by trying to crawl to Moscow.
Hitler's greed, inconstancy, and gamblers addiction to making bad bets nullified the main strengths of the German Army. Their strengths were strong leadership, at all levels, tactical, and operational skill, and flexibility, their major weakness was logistical planning. Their underlining assumption in 1941 was that their tactical brilliance would overcome all the problems of space, time, and logistics that they had no rational solutions for. In short they were engaging in magical thinking, and Hitler was the most magical thinker of all.
There are two other reasons for an extended pause. One was the mass of Red Army Forces on the Right Flank of AGC. Pushing ahead, with depleted, and tired divisions, operating far ahead of their rail heads, while presenting an overextended flank would have been an invitation for a Soviet Counter Offensive. The other was that Panzer Group 4 was still operating under Army Group North, near Leningrad, and were not in position to support AGC in a final drive on Moscow.
The Panzer Troops were also being worn out, but had been spared the grinding attrition of having to destroy each Soviet Unit they'd encircled. Panzer Group 2 was weakened, but still had over 50% of it's offensive capability. To keep them idle, while AGC was regrouping would've been missing a golden opportunity to destroy the Red Army Forces in the Central Ukraine.
The initial operational plan for Barbarossa called for securing the flanks of Kiev, and Leningrad before advancing on Moscow. I think the Germans should have stuck to the original plan. Taking Leningrad, and closing off the Baltic would have been a huge strategic victory for the Axis. Gaining overland communications with Finland might have led to the fall of Murmansk, which would have been significant later in the war. Taking Ukraine deprived the Soviet Union of a major manpower, food, industrial, and coal producing region. As it was the Germans could've taken Leningrad if they wanted to in August, or early September, and still sent Panzer group 4 to join the attack on Moscow in late September.
Going after Moscow at the end of September was a good tactical idea, if the objective was to destroy the mass of Soviet Forces in front of Moscow, and not to take the city. They largely succeeded in that objective, and achieved one of the biggest victories of the war. Once the weather turned in mid October AGC should've fallen back to defensive positions for the winter. The Soviet Winter Counter Offensive hurt the Germans so badly because they'd made themselves so vulnerable, by trying to crawl to Moscow.
Hitler's greed, inconstancy, and gamblers addiction to making bad bets nullified the main strengths of the German Army. Their strengths were strong leadership, at all levels, tactical, and operational skill, and flexibility, their major weakness was logistical planning. Their underlining assumption in 1941 was that their tactical brilliance would overcome all the problems of space, time, and logistics that they had no rational solutions for. In short they were engaging in magical thinking, and Hitler was the most magical thinker of all.
I guess the majority question is why 1941? Smashing g the Kiev pocket was arguably the greatest German success of the war, and likely caused far more harm the Moscow ever would have.
Why not play it from the start with a 2nd offensive set for spring summer 42?
There are 3 main goals for the Germans:
1. Destruction of Soviet armies.
2. Denial of resources to the Soviets.
3. Shock and momentum.
Moscow may be important for rail lines and coordination, but wasn't exactly a resource hub. The bulk of the Soviet forces defending were list at Bryansk. Engaging in Urban combat to force the city will only harm #3.
Why not play it from the start with a 2nd offensive set for spring summer 42?
There are 3 main goals for the Germans:
1. Destruction of Soviet armies.
2. Denial of resources to the Soviets.
3. Shock and momentum.
Moscow may be important for rail lines and coordination, but wasn't exactly a resource hub. The bulk of the Soviet forces defending were list at Bryansk. Engaging in Urban combat to force the city will only harm #3.
Capture? Pretty unrealistic. Capture AND hold? Call the alien space bats.
The Germans just don't have anywhere near the logistical rope to get them all the way into Moscow and protect it from counter-attack. The only way they can actually take Moscow is if they do what they wanted, and annihilate the Red Army in the first 300 miles of advance and the Bolshevik regime comes crashing down like they expected so that they aren't meeting any human resistance after that first 300 miles. Even then, it's real hard for them to take Moscow in '41. Just fighting the terrain, the weather and the material limitations of German-held Europe is gonna be hard enough that even with zero Soviet resistance and zero Soviet Union, taking Moscow would more likely happen in '42.
The whole "German troops reached Moscow's suburbs" meme is technically true, but it is way overblown. They did not reach Moscow's suburbs in OTL in any semblance of fighting shape and the troops that got that close were too few to do anything useful.
fasquardon
History Learner
Banned
As I pointed out last page, XLI Panzer Corps in its advance to Kalinin advanced further to that position than the distance to Moscow against far tougher resistance than what was available before Moscow and within Moscow. Looking at Soviet reinforcements, they didn't reach a critical mass until December, meaning the Germans have six weeks to set up defenses and build up logistics. The Soviets, meanwhile, will be hindered by the lack of a comparable railway hub close by to make up for Moscow.
Set up defenses and build up logistics from what? The exhausted men? The dribbles of food, fuel, parts and ammunition that were reaching the front? The real war wasn't a HoI game.
Tver is closer to Germany than Moscow is. By something like 100km.
fasquardon
History Learner
Banned
Given those same men continued advancing under constant combat until a halt order was issued in November, I don't see that as an issue. They could switch to the defensive, build up fortifications and stockpile the logistics they used up over that month of continuous combat in the open.
Yes, but not from the position of the front as it was in October.
That doesn't matter. The logistics chain is still coming from Germany, and Memel is closer to Kalinin than it is to Moscow.
The halt order was given because by November the German (and allied) army was a ragged mess. The men were exhausted, most of the panzer divisions (whose strength should have been at around 150 tanks) were down to a few dozen tanks, the logistical train could only reliably support the German formations up to about Smolensk. They were in absolutely no shape to push on.
You think over 5 months of constant combat is easy on a man? Easy on the horses the man needs to keep eating, drinking and shooting? Easy on the machines that supplemented the men and the horses? It's a testament to the strengths of the German army and the absolute failure of the Soviets that they'd pushed as far as they did.
You're looking at one of the great miracles of military history and going "oh, that went well, I'm sure they could keep performing those miracles a couple months longer", and hey, it just doesn't work that way.
fasquardon
How do they attack with all most no fuel, or ammo? How do they dig in once the ground turns to mud, with impassable roads, or later when the mud freezes, has hard as rock? The Germans came close to destruction that winter. If the Red Army had concentrated in the center of the front, instead of dispersing their effort widely across the whole front, they might have destroyed AGC. They were fortunate that Stalin was almost as bad a general as Hitler. As it was the German Army never recovered from the defeat in front of Moscow. The Heer had only 8 full strength division left in the Spring. The 1942 offensive had to conducted by new, and rebuilt units, and only 1 Army Group could attack in 1942, the other 2 could only hold on to their overextended lines. Advancing to the Volga only made the long term situation worse.
Everyone who could have toppled Stalin had already seen exactly what kind of war the Germans were fighting. They knew fine well they'd hang separately if they didn't hang together.
And yes, Stalin could die. But the Germans would still be in Moscow with pretty much no food, no fuel, no ammunition and no horsefeed. And Stalin was always more of a team player than the popular myth has it. So I am pretty sure the Soviets could sort out their government well enough in the time it would take the Red Army to prepare to re-take Moscow.
Maybe. But the Germans would never accept. Hitler's number one goal in the war was to destroy the Jewish people entirely, and in his mind, the Soviet regime was a key part of the evil Jewish conspiracy to rule the world and destroy Germany. Hitler will accept the existence of an organized Soviet state when he accepts that Jewish people are as human as he is.
So about the time when hell freezes solid.
fasquardon
thaddeus
Donor
with Leningrad and Kiev in hand it might be possible to strike some type of deal?
they might have gotten the Soviets to ship millions of barrels of oil before one side or the other breaks the agreement, at least call into question whether the Allies would send L-L, and hopefully, from the Axis perspective, Stalin would start another purge.
Deleted member 1487
There are a lot of faulty takes here. First of all the infantry didn't get any rest in August-September because the Soviets attacked relentlessly during the period and inflicted more losses on German infantry in AG-Center than they experienced during the June-July period, especially because AG-Center was stripped of it's panzers and air support to send them to Leningrad and Ukraine.
The Panzer troops got no rest either, they were sent to Leningrad and Ukraine or were used to fight troops on the flanks like a corps of 3rd Panzer Group dealing with the Soviet 22nd Army. 2nd Panzer Army then as of October was the most worn down of all panzer armies that participated in Typhoon as a result and did the most poorly, including having to travel much further in the muddiest areas.
Also Smolensk was linked up to the rail network by early/mid-August, the 12th IIRC. What repairs to rolling stock were needed at the time? They were busy converting gauge and that was done rapidly behind the advance. Now the issue they had was capacity of the lines, which was an issue, but hardly an insurmountable one, as those lines did support 2nd and 3rd Panzer armies on moving north and south respectively while the rest of AG-Center fought a massive struggle to survive against the Soviet offensives to recover Smolensk throughout August and into September.
The Soviet armies on the southern flank were no threat because they were largely locked down confronting AG-South. Only Central Front was potentially an issue, but they could have been screened by 2nd Army, as Guderian's 2nd Panzer Army (different than 2nd army he was operating alongside) had neutered them by destroying 28th army on August 8th when taking Roslavl. 2nd Army was busy battering the rest of Central Front into pudding at the time as well, culminating in the Gomel pocket. 2nd Panzer wouldn't have been idle, they'd have been attacking east from Roslavl ITTL instead of south, just destroying different Soviet armies than IOTL.
4th Panzer army of AG-North didn't need to go against Leningrad if Moscow was the target in August, they could have also turned east to deal with the northern flank threat against AG-Center while the rest of AG-North stayed on the Luga line that they held as of August while waiting on 3rd Panzer army and it's air support to arrive.
The Germans did try to take Leningrad in August-September and failed. They isolated it before Hitler decided to spare his forces the cost of trying to storm the city, as he needed German forces intact for Moscow in October, but that decision was only reached in September as the city was being cut off via land. So it was a failed attempt IOTL and therefore ultimately wasted effort given the strategic goal of knocking out the USSR, which really could only be done by taking their capital and depriving them of their core infrastructure, political, and industrial center. Ukraine was important, but not nearly as important as Moscow, which was 10% of the entire industry of the USSR. That was just the city proper, not the entire Moscow-Upper Volga region which was upwards of 30% of Soviet industry and something like 50% of it's entire defense industry.
Also the Soviet Winter offensives didn't really hurt the Germans that badly, it hurt the Soviets vastly worse. They suffered at least 8:1 losses compared to the Germans using post-Soviet Russian official casualty numbers based on loss reports (the actual number might be 10:1 given the reporting problems the Soviets had at the time). They also suffered the highest proportion of dead relative to wounded in that period in the war relative to other quarters. Even given their 3:1 manpower advantage before the war started (not counting the 40 million people that the Germans had cut off from the USSR behind their lines) those are REALLY bad numbers for the Soviets. David Stahel's newest book on the Moscow Retreat is really eye opening, though he exaggerates Soviet losses in the text through some basic math errors.
The reason the Germans failed in 1941 to take Moscow was due to Hitler's faulty strategy of moving on the flanks instead of against the real center of Stalin's power. Hitler still thought that he could collapse the USSR by taking Ukraine, which we know to be incorrect.
Though there are flaws in the book, you should read "Enduring the Whirlwind" which gets into the nitty-gritty of German replacements. They did recover from 1941 and went on to launch a massive new offensive while defeating several major Soviet offensives in 1942, bringing the USSR to the brink of collapse. The difference is that in 1942 the US was in the war, the UK got a lot stronger and drew in more German strength to defend Germany from bombing, fighting in North Africa, and defending France and Norway against several attacks. Plus the fighting in the Mediterranean heated up and required more Luftwaffe attention; these other fronts became increasingly draining as the year went on. That's not even getting into Soviet mobilization and how much stronger they had gotten in 1942 despite their own losses in 1941. So the situation in 1942 was the result not so much of Germany getting weaker, but the Allies getting vastly stronger relative to Germany and her allies; the Wallied factor especially was very draining. Remove the Wallies from the picture and Germany would have undoubtedly defeated the USSR in 1942.
Another point to consider is that relative to June 1941 Germany had double the the front to man in the East; the border at the start of Barbarossa was slightly less than half the mileage of the front they had to man by early 1942. So even with the exact same strength as they had in June 1941 the Axis forces had less than half the troops per mile of front due to the increase in the scope of the front lines. On top of that they are then hundreds of miles from their border and supply hubs and have to build up an entire new rail system (due to differences in train sizes which means the entire infrastructure is no longer matching), including replacing thousands of locomotives lost to the Russian Winter for which they were not designed and as a result had burst their boilers in the cold. This resulted in Germany ultimately building more locomotives during WW2 than the US+UK+USSR combined! Meanwhile the USSR was on top of their core defense industry and had vastly fewer miles of rail lines to maintain, so could focus their resources much better than they could at the June 1941 border. And now their defense industry was fully mobilized and supported/sustained by US and UK aid, which was increasing heavily quarter to quarter.
So that means that despite Axis forces actually increasing in overall numbers and strength by Summer 1942 relative to June 1941 their strength relative to the Allies went down despite inflicting appalling losses to the Soviets and leaving them crippled for the rest of the war and honestly probably for the rest of the existence of the USSR (if you look at their post-war and pre-war growth rates they never really recovered and spent over a decade just getting back to their pre-1941 baseline). Germany meanwhile didn't hit their peak manpower and decline until Summer 1943, though they were effectively in terminal decline after the Soviet winter 1942-43 offensives and North African disaster, but that again was mostly a function of the expansion of the role of the Wallies in the war, which sapped an increasing amount of manpower and equipment from the East; even in 1944 had the Wallies evaporated for some reason the Axis forces on the Eastern Front could have doubled in manpower and equipment and at a minimum forced a stalemate. Remember even in 1945 over 9 million German troops surrendered on all fronts, while in 1944 the Ostheer was less than 3 million men not counting Axis minor allies.
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You make many valid points, and some reasonable assertions, but respectfully your also arguing both sides of the same case. Yes the Red Army was fiercely attacking AGC during August/September, but it was effectively fighting a mobile defense, which was the kind of battle the Germans had the most advantages over the Soviets in. The infantry divisions of AGC were in a better position to resume the offensive in late September then they were in mid August, and the Red Army was weaker after wearing themselves out attacking them.
The group of Soviet Forces North of Kiev wasn't tied down battling AGS, they had sizable reserves, and you can't just assume they would've taken a passive role during a Moscow Offensive. Destroying them was a Strategic objective in it's self, because in Clausewitz terms the Red Army was the Soviet Center of Gravity, rather then any logistical hub, no matter how important it might be. Hitler didn't think taking Ukraine would cause the fall of the Soviet State, he thought it was necessary for the future economic strength of the Nazi State.
For the same reasons destroying the Soviet forces defending Leningrad would've been worth the cost of deferring taking Moscow. Securing the Baltic would shorten the front, and turned AGN Eastward, rather then leaving it tied down in positional battles around Leningrad. If Panzer Group 4 had secured the area on the far side of Lake Lodoga, rather then going East toward Moscow Leningrad would have been truly cutoff, and would have fallen. Instead because of the Moscow obsession it was left has unfinished business, and a festering wound.
The Moscow centric strategy your suggesting would result in a wedge shaped advance pointed towards Moscow. The problem with this would be the same as the Napoleonic Strategy of 1812, a progressively weaker main army, with impossible extended flanks. The objective is the defeat of the Soviet Union, taking Moscow may be a step toward that, but it's not the goal. You yourself rightly pointed out that the further east the Germans advance the wider the front gets, and the less able the Germans are to cover it with their forces. Destroying the Red Army is the only means of victory, and the further east the Germans advance the harder that becomes. The new centers of Soviet Industry are much too far away for the Germans to ever reach, and even if they took Moscow, and the upper Volga region it would be impossible to hold it.
Yes the German Army survived the winter of 1941, but it was never the same again. It's numbers may have grown even larger, but their level of training began a progressive decline that never stopped, till the end of the war. The men grow older, and younger, and the training cycle grew shorter. At the same time the Russians got stronger, and better, and again as you point out Germans resources are being drawn to different fronts of the war. The Germans simply shot their bolt in 1941.
Deleted member 1487
AG-Center was fighting a mobile defense? Oh no. They didn't have mobile units with AG-Center for most of August and September.
Barbarossa Derailed. Volume 1: The German Advance, The Encirclement Battle And The First And Second Soviet Counteroffensives, 10 July-24 August 1941: Glantz, David M.: 9781911096092: Amazon.com: Books
Barbarossa Derailed. Volume 1: The German Advance, The Encirclement Battle And The First And Second Soviet Counteroffensives, 10 July-24 August 1941 [Glantz, David M.] on Amazon.com. *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. Barbarossa Derailed. Volume 1: The German Advance, The Encirclement Battle...
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The German divisions were substantially a bit weaker in late September than they were in early August, having suffered near 100k casualties with only a fraction replaced. Of course that wore the Soviets down more, but had the Germans advanced and waged a more mobile offensive they could have suffered far less than sitting still and getting beaten to a pulp trying to hold a line waiting for the flanks to be dealt with.
Source?
Central Front - Wikipedia
No the Red Army was no centre of gravity in 1941, because the Soviet regenerative abilities of reserves. The Germans destroyed some 200 Soviet divisions, but by the end of the year the Red Army had more divisions and mobilized manpower than they did in June! You couldn't defeat the USSR by destroying divisions, armies, or Fronts, you needed to go after the reserve generating apparatus, which was Moscow. It's a lot harder to generate new armies without the industry, infrastructure, and administration in Moscow.
Hitler did think taking Ukraine would topple the USSR AND fuel Nazi Germany, because it would deprive the Soviets of their core raw material base...which turned out not to be so core after all.
Except they tried and failed IOTL. You're right if they succeeded it would have been worth it, but they failed and by August it was no longer possible to take the city quickly or cheaply. 4th Panzer couldn't have done it on it's own, it required the air power and panzers of AG-Center to even get as far as they did IOTL, which was not far enough. Then they tried to cut the rail line from Moscow to Leningrad, which would have achieved the objective of starving the city, but even that failed in the face of winter and Soviet counterattacks. Certainly there was a different tact they could have tried instead, but that isn't what they did IOTL, so it was doomed to fail. Moscow was more important than Leningrad anyway, because if the capital fell then Leningrad would have largely been cut off from the rest of the USSR anyway, as the main line to Leningrad ran through Moscow, which ultimately makes the Leningrad diversion a fool's errand, because taking Moscow would have ultimately caused Leningrad to fall subsequently, though after a delay.
Stop with the 1812 analogy, there is nothing relevant in that example to 1941.
Moscow was the center of gravity of the USSR, even Stalin told Zhukov if Moscow fell he'd have to make peace at any cost. Even when considering evacuating during the October Moscow panic Stalin opted to stay because he realized if he left the city would fall and if it fell it would unravel his regime. Without Stalin there is no other leader waiting in the wings to fight on.
In many ways taking Moscow is like inserting an icepick into the brain of the USSR, so once it falls the ability to take it back is effectively gone, at least during the time frame that the Germans would being weak enough to not hold it in the face of a determined counterattack.
Soviet industry in the Urals didn't really get set up until 1942, the major arms boost largely came from mobilizing the factories in and around Moscow. By 1942 it's too late for the USSR to take back Moscow and they'd be denied the very factories they'd need to build the reserves necessary to take back the city in 1941 with the loss of Moscow. Losing the capital and UV area would be a death blow to Soviet industry in 1941 and only a fraction would remain to try and rebuild in 1942. The longer the capital is lost for the worse things get for the Soviets, especially considering the huge electrical infrastructure of the M-UV area that was irreplaceable for years. As it was IOTL even with the expansion of the Moscow resevior dam electrical station there was still rolling blackouts for Soviet industry into 1943. Losing that in 1941 means the power is shut off for the vital industry that is left.
Doesn't need to be, the Soviets had it worse and the Brits and US weren't a threat until late 1942. Defeat the Soviets before 1943 and there will be plenty of time to train up new forces. Despite the terminal decline of German manpower even in 1944 despite being grossly outnumbered and outgunned they still had enough experienced and trained forces to hold the Wallies in Normandy for months and fight the Soviets for another year.
The Soviet training raised up from it's nadir in 1941-42, but it never really got anywhere near the prewar standards, hence their heavy losses through 1944. Their best forces were the survivors who learned on the job and survived long enough to learn how to fight, which was a function of the increasing Wallied role in the war, which made the German forces in the East progressively weaker, as replacement men and equipment and the Luftwaffe were moved west instead. That's why taking Moscow in 1941 was so imperative. The Germans simply couldn't kill the Soviets fast enough to stay ahead of the curve, they needed to break the apparatus generating those reserves.
History Learner
Banned
It does matter, because that means its on the established logistics network; just being closer does not, in of itself, make something easier to supply. You have to factor in the available railways and road systems. As @wiking already pointed, the advance to Kalinin was the same distance from the existing front to Moscow, but over a worse network.
You didn't address the point I made, in that if the Germans kept fighting from October till November anyway, what does that matter? They're still expending the same resources and energy to do what they did IOTL but this time in terms of taking Moscow. Even better, once that is achieved, the Germans can fortify Moscow and rest, instead of further expending logistics and being out in the open exposed to the elements. One Zhukov's line is pierced and the NKVD security formations removed from the city, they also have a breathing space to rest.
History Learner
Banned
The Germans kept fighting for another month anyway, at both Kalinin and before Moscow, so obviously they were able to survive, no? Even better, once Zhukov's line is destroyed, they no longer how much heavy combat to endure until the Soviets can develop a winter counter-offensive, which the Germans can prepare for by fortifying in Moscow and stockpiling logistics, while resting themselves in much better conditions than OTL.
By mid-October, Soviet reserves were flooding into Moscow to deploy out into the new defense lines so regardless of what happens to the lines so there'd likely be a fight for the city itself. Taking Moscow off the march, as happened in Kalinin, would only happen if the Soviets screw it up, which they may or may not. The possibility is thus there, but the odds are not very good. Even as it was, the 90,000 men on the Zhukov line showed the ability to withstand the more powerful, if still overextended and exhausted, German assault and conduct a delaying mobile defense in good order so there's no guarantee the addition of a mere panzer corps would be enough to break it as opposed to merely driving it back a bit more.
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