OTL WW2, after the Butt Report revealled how incompetent BC navs are, Winston, Prof Fred Lindemann (Lord Cherwell), & Sir Charles Portal agreed to a policy of attack on German morale by consciously bombing civilians (euphemistcally called "dehousing" by Lindemann). No study of its effectivenes was ever done, & it resulted in fairly enormous aircrew losses (on the order of 500,000). At the same time, BC had the ability to carry out mining missions (codenamed Gardening), which suffered losses so low they were actually used for training, & which could be done much more often than city bombing, very often on days city bombing was impossible due to weather.
So suppose Winston has qualms about violating the Hague Convention. (Whether this would really
be a violation is an open question, IMO, but leave that aside.) Suppose BC relies on mining (including in canals & rivers?), & bombing canals & railyards? It's been suggesting it could've had serious impact on the delivery of coal, which was main fuel for power production. Moreover, the German electrical grid did not have the flexibility to "move" power from place to place. How does that impact German weapons production? How soon do shortages of coal shut powerplants? How soon does that shut factories? How do canal bombing/mining impact delivery of supplies to factories? How dependent were, say, fighters on the arrival of props, or tanks on ball bearings? How does this kind of campaign impact delivery of weapons & supplies to the front(s)? And how does that affect the action at the front? A certain amount of "scavenging" is inevitable; the typical divsion could survive loss of about 35% of its usual supply. How soon would a campaign like this reach that level?
FYI, I'm thinking of incorporating a campaign like it in something I'm working on, so...thanx in advance, all.

