How does Japanese army doctrine develop differently in a world without a second Sino-Japanese War?

[Myth]

How much did Japanese military development in the leadup to WW2 -- doctrinally, organizationally, materially -- develop in the way it did because of the ongoing war with China?

Without an invasion of China in 1937, do some tactical approaches or weapons systems considered suitable against the Chinese fall by the wayside or get replaced? Which ones? Are some weapons or approaches never developed at all? And what is put in their place?

 

[Gillan1220]

Assuming Europe still goes to war, Japanese military attaches in European cities would probably be observing how the war progresses. The problem with Japan was their lack of resources to get better war materiel and clinging on to outdated ideals or doctrines.

 

[Vabasion]

Doctrine is well and good but if you can’t back it up with production and money it’s not gonna account to much. Throw shells not men, have a 1000 bomber raids hitting the enemy homeland every single night, control the seas, have an excellently supplied and trained armed force, train enough pilots to man tens of thousands of aircraft. Amazing. But you can’t make any of it.

Japan, like Italy doesn’t have a robust industrial base to wage a modern war against equal or more powerful opponent.

 

[Gillan1220]

Doctrine is well and good but if you can’t back it up with production and money it’s not gonna account to much. Throw shells not men, have a 1000 bomber raids hitting the enemy homeland every single night, control the seas, have an excellently supplied and trained armed force, train enough pilots to man tens of thousands of aircraft. Amazing. But you can’t make any of it.

Japan, like Italy doesn’t have a robust industrial base to wage a modern war against equal or more powerful opponent.

Especially not against the USSR, the U.S., and the British Empire. Japan waging war with a scarce pool was their downfall.

 

[Vabasion]

Especially not against the USSR, the U.S., and the British Empire. Japan waging war with a scarce pool was their downfall.

Pretty much. Top it off with inter service rivalry reaching comical levels to the point the army had to actually build its own ships and transports because navy refused to transport them, supply them or escort them. Honestly the imperial Japan should have been spending the thirties or early 40s purging it’s military.

 

[Myth]

Doctrine is well and good but if you can’t back it up with production and money it’s not gonna account to much. Throw shells not men, have a 1000 bomber raids hitting the enemy homeland every single night, control the seas, have an excellently supplied and trained armed force, train enough pilots to man tens of thousands of aircraft. Amazing. But you can’t make any of it.

Japan, like Italy doesn’t have a robust industrial base to wage a modern war against equal or more powerful opponent.

This is quite true, but it didn't stop Japan from trying to figure out ways to compensate for their weaknesses within their very limited means anyway.

I should add: I'm not trying to imply that the war against China was responsible for Japan making stupid choices in doctrine / weaponry / etc., and I didn't create the thread as a "Fix the Japanese military" project.

Rather, I'm just interested in the limited question of which changes the war in China specifically was responsible for in the Japanese military, and what would have been different without the war.

 

[Gillan1220]

Pretty much. Top it off with inter service rivalry reaching comical levels to the point the army had to actually build its own ships and transports because navy refused to transport them, supply them or escort them. Honestly the imperial Japan should have been spending the thirties or early 40s purging it’s military.

Not to mention too that the Empire of Japan entered the empire-building game late. While we have the British, Belgian, French, Spanish, Dutch, and Portuguese building empires since the 16th century, Japan only entered it in the late 19th century. Empires were already slowly dying by the dawn of the 20th century.

One could argue, how come America did not collapse when she too entered the empire-building game late (after it took Puerto Rico, Cuba, Guam, and the Philippines from Spain in 1898)? Well that's because America has the resources, manpower, economy, and the industrial might to do so.

Japan needed oil from the outside. Cut-off the oil and then their war machine was on fumes. Not even Siberian, Malayan, and DEI oil would have kept the Japanese war machine from running.

 

[Vabasion]

This is quite true, but it didn't stop Japan from trying to figure out ways to compensate for their weaknesses within their very limited means anyway.

I should add: I'm not trying to imply that the war against China was responsible for Japan making stupid choices, and I didn't create the thread as a "Fix the Japanese military" project.

Rather, I'm just interested in the limited question of which changes the war in China specifically was responsible for in the Japanese military, and what would have been different without the war.

Yes but compensating weaknesses is not what doctrinal change implies. Army is not so much a reflection of doctrine as much as doctrine is reflection of the army and the nation. Japan could have a theoreticians talking about mechanized forced sweeping trough enemies in quick encirclements and isolating millions to be taken prisoners. But Japan doesn’t have the metal for tanks or ships capable of transporting said tanks from mainland to where they are needed. Japan can’t have heavier artillery, it’s factories are not tooled for it, it’s logistics can’t handle it and the areas they fight in can’t support it either. And on it goes. Japanese “primitive” fighting style with outdated norms, neo Bushido, bayonet charges are what Japan was capable of at the time. I don’t think any side, no matter how evil or incompetent enters a war hoping to lose or ignoring good ideas despite of how obvious they may be. China wasn’t a mistake theoretically. Japanese treatment of other Asians as subhumans and worse than foreign colonial powers is the mistake.

Not to mention too that the Empire of Japan entered the empire-building game late. While we have the British, Belgian, French, Spanish, Dutch, and Portuguese building empires since the 16th century, Japan only entered it in the late 19th century. Empires were already slowly dying by the dawn of the 20th century.

One could argue, how come America did not collapse when she too entered the empire-building game late (after it took Puerto Rico, Cuba, Guam, and the Philippines from Spain in 1898)? Well that's because America has the resources, manpower, economy, and the industrial might to do so.

Japan needed oil from the outside. Cut-off the oil and then their war machine was on fumes. Not even Siberian, Malayan, and DEI oil would have kept the Japanese war machine from running.

I’ll be honest never understood much why Japan and Dutch didn’t fight more. Seems like a natural expansion path.

 

[Gillan1220]

I’ll be honest never understood much why Japan and Dutch didn’t fight more. Seems like a natural expansion path.

Another POD of this is Germany takes the Philippines from Spain. Come by WWI and Japan takes the Philippines from Germany along with the Marianas and the Caroline Islands.

In OTL, Japan did support Filipino revolutionaries against Spain and then also against the Americans. The Empire attempted to send 10,000 Murata rifles to the First Philippine Republic but the ship sank in a storm off the coast of Shanghai. As early as 1895, Japan's expansionism was getting clear after it took Formosa from the Qing Dynasty.

 

[Myth]

Yes but compensating weaknesses is not what doctrinal change implies. Army is not so much a reflection of doctrine as much as doctrine is reflection of the army and the nation. Japan could have a theoreticians talking about mechanized forced sweeping trough enemies in quick encirclements and isolating millions to be taken prisoners. But Japan doesn’t have the metal for tanks or ships capable of transporting said tanks from mainland to where they are needed. Japan can’t have heavier artillery, it’s factories are not tooled for it, it’s logistics can’t handle it and the areas they fight in can’t support it either. And on it goes. Japanese “primitive” fighting style with outdated norms, neo Bushido, bayonet charges are what Japan was capable of at the time. I don’t think any side, no matter how evil or incompetent enters a war hoping to lose or ignoring good ideas despite of how obvious they may be. China wasn’t a mistake theoretically. Japanese treatment of other Asians as subhumans and worse than foreign colonial powers is the mistake.

Right, and I'm not arguing with any of that.

But the war in China presumably gave Japan a particular type of combat experience, just as (e.g.) Khalkhin Gol did. Armies usually learn from these types of experiences, for good or ill, and they tend to have an effect on how the army develops. Even when the armies have limited resources -- as, say, the Japanese and Italians did -- their divergent experiences, needs, and "lessons learned" will lead them to develop in different directions. Japan, Italy, and Poland were all on the resource starved end of the military spectrum, but they didn't all fight, train, or organize themselves identically.

So this isn't really a question of why the Japanese Army didn't develop into panzer divisions. It's about what tweaks you'd expect in a hypothetical Japanese Army with no Chinese combat experience.

(Two examples of different learning experiences sticking with an army: Britain developed an emphasis on marksmanship after the Boer War and from the NW Frontier that gave their professional soldiers a small advantage at the outset of WW1. Conversely, the Chinese Nationalists didn't need to worry about many enemy aircraft fighting the early Communists, so the Nationalists didn't develop discipline in keeping their camp fires inconspicuous until the Japanese taught them differently in the 30s.)

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Looking specifically at Japanese infantry tactics: There the influence dates back of course to the warrior traditions of Japan, closing with the enemy for close combat ect.. but note not all the Samuri or medeival warrior traditions were promoted. Skill with the bow was not adapted to modern hyper marksmanship as with the British in the early 20th Century. Unlike the Navy which looked to Britain for naval modernization the embryonic Japanese Army turned to France, which had the best reputation mid 19th Century. From that they acquired the idea of 'Elan' 'Cran', the shock tactics of the Revolutionary & napoleonic era, and rapid action. This worked or seemed to. vs the Koreans, Chinese, and Russians to 1906 the concept of shock close assault appeared validated. The value of firepower and good planning were evident and accepted, but so was the value of a bayonet charge.

The inability of Japans industry to provide the high firepower or mechanized formations in quantity left Japans army leaders looking towards their human capitol. Brilliant infantry tactics were one solution,m but the question is what are brilliant tactics. Against bandits, the Manchurian local forces, Chinese Warlord soldiers, or other ill trained and led conscripts. The concepts of the "Bamboo Spear" tactics worked well. Disrupt the enemy with some light precision delivers supporting fires: snipers, MG, mortars, & light cannon... While individuals and small groups infiltrated the enemy defense. At the right moment a series of bayonet charges with hand grenades and swinging swords would panic the demoralized enemy. The experience of the China Incident seems to validate this. While a few well led KMT formations did give the Japanese Army a hard time, the other 90% of the fighting was the model presented for designing low cost doctrines.

This worked till it didn't. Against the ill trained formations the Brits fielded in Mtaylasia, the entrain Philippines Army, or the bulk of the Dutch in the DEI the Bamboo Spear proved successful. There were warning signs, but there was little the average IJA commander could do. Some tried, but the resources were not there. So, against Australians led by veterans of the Great War or the Mediterranean cockpit, or Marines again led by veterans of bush fighting in Nicaragua & Hati the spear broke. Disciplined and well trained soldiers were entirely different matter from hungry abused and neglected Chinese peasant boys.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Pretty much. Top it off with inter service rivalry reaching comical levels to the point the army had to actually build its own ships and transports because navy refused to transport them, supply them or escort them. Honestly the imperial Japan should have been spending the thirties or early 40s purging it’s military.

The idiots who forced the China Incident should have been recalled to the Emperors presence and a awarded a sword to their necks. Unfortunately there were powerful elements in the homeland who supported them. At the top were the Zaibatsu who had decided economic expansion had to be accelerated by conquest. The individuals in the Army who favored & instigated the war with China & related adventures were usually connected to the Families at the center of the Zaibatsu. Sons and cousins, or close life long friends of the sons and cousins. Post war the US hanged select Army officers and military/politicians. But, the other leaders behind the mess, the owners and controllers of Japans industrial economy were left unmolested and led Japans economic resurgence in the 1950s.

 

[Myth]

This worked till it didn't. Against the ill trained formations the Brits fielded in Mtaylasia, the entrain Philippines Army, or the bulk of the Dutch in the DEI the Bamboo Spear proved successful. There were warning signs, but there was little the average IJA commander could do. Some tried, but the resources were not there. So, against Australians led by veterans of the Great War or the Mediterranean cockpit, or Marines again led by veterans of bush fighting in Nicaragua & Hati the spear broke. Disciplined and well trained soldiers were entirely different matter from hungry abused and neglected Chinese peasant boys.

Seems a bit ironic that the Marines gave them such a rough handling, since Marine doctrine itself grew out of facing colonial opponents in rough bush or jungle terrain, as you mention. (Although the Marine solution seems to have been loading the infantry up with more automatic firepower courtesy of Thompsons, BARs, etc.)

 

[Father Maryland]

Pretty much. Top it off with inter service rivalry reaching comical levels to the point the army had to actually build its own ships and transports because navy refused to transport them, supply them or escort them. Honestly the imperial Japan should have been spending the thirties or early 40s purging it’s military.

The fact that the IJA operated it's own aircraft carriers (well technically aircraft transports) and it's own large long range submarines (Not combat models but cargo subs for resupplying cut off Japanese island garrisons. ) has always made me laugh.

Yes but compensating weaknesses is not what doctrinal change implies. Army is not so much a reflection of doctrine as much as doctrine is reflection of the army and the nation. Japan could have a theoreticians talking about mechanized forced sweeping trough enemies in quick encirclements and isolating millions to be taken prisoners. But Japan doesn’t have the metal for tanks or ships capable of transporting said tanks from mainland to where they are needed. Japan can’t have heavier artillery, it’s factories are not tooled for it, it’s logistics can’t handle it and the areas they fight in can’t support it either. And on it goes. Japanese “primitive” fighting style with outdated norms, neo Bushido, bayonet charges are what Japan was capable of at the time. I don’t think any side, no matter how evil or incompetent enters a war hoping to lose or ignoring good ideas despite of how obvious they may be. China wasn’t a mistake theoretically. Japanese treatment of other Asians as subhumans and worse than foreign colonial powers is the mistake.

I’ll be honest never understood much why Japan and Dutch didn’t fight more. Seems like a natural expansion path.

Ehh presumably because for a couple centuries both sides found the arrangement at Dejima to be too profitable to risk. And by the time the Japanese after the Meji restoration started building the capacity to actually wage wars at long range and conquer new territories (and feasibly beat the dutch) the DEI were in effect protected by the British and the RN who didn't want the islands to fall into any other powers hands. In the hands of the relatively small, weak, and poor Netherlands the DIE couldn't really make much of a difference on the world stage. The Dutch had long since stopped being imperial rivals of Britain. In contrast if anyone else was to get them then it might very well strengthen that country enough to make themselves a legitimate rival to Britain.

Not to mention too that the Empire of Japan entered the empire-building game late. While we have the British, Belgian, French, Spanish, Dutch, and Portuguese building empires since the 16th century, Japan only entered it in the late 19th century. Empires were already slowly dying by the dawn of the 20th century.

The Belgians only tried to enter the imperialism race in the late 1800s. And even then it was limited to the Congo and was a pet project of the monarch rather then the country as a whole for the first two odd decades.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Seems a bit ironic that the Marines gave them such a rough handling, since Marine doctrine itself grew out of facing colonial opponents in rough bush or jungle terrain, as you mention. (Although the Marine solution seems to have been loading the infantry up with more automatic firepower courtesy of Thompsons, BARs, etc.)

There were some solid reasons behind that. Unfortunately I'm out of time this morning

 

[Leander]

Seems a bit ironic that the Marines gave them such a rough handling, since Marine doctrine itself grew out of facing colonial opponents in rough bush or jungle terrain, as you mention. (Although the Marine solution seems to have been loading the infantry up with more automatic firepower courtesy of Thompsons, BARs, etc.)

In colonial conflicts against low quality troops both approaches work pretty well because they both ultimately boil down to shock tactics: Either in the form of close assualt charges favoured by the japanese, or the overwhelming firepower approach exemplified by US forces. The problem is that the japanese lack the material base to adopt the later method and as such had to make do with the former.
Against better trained opponents that can better resist shock tactics, close assaults become much more dangerous and costly, as could be seen in the beginning stages of the great war, where the French doctrine of "Elan" which was, as several people have noted, pretty similiar to the japanese approach in ww2 , lead to staggering casualties in the face of determined and well armed and coordinated resistance.

Overall im not sure how much influence the absence of the second Sino-Japanese war realy has on Japanese doctrine as it was mostly developed from their experiences fighting the russians much earlier. The japanese would lack the experience gained during the later war so that their ideas might stay more theoretical and less codified, but even if they observe an alt-ww2 unfolding in europe they lack the abilities to adopt a european or american style doctrine of either mobile armored spearheads or firepower supremacy.
If they still think their main opponent will be the chinese or second-rate colonial forces the doctrine they have serves them well enough, against a stronger or more modern opponent they might try to adopt either a more defensive or more naval focused approach, but thats only speculation on my part.

 

[Myth]

There were some solid reasons behind that. Unfortunately I'm out of time this morning

If you ever do get the opportunity to elaborate in the days ahead, I'd be very interested to hear it.

 

[General Tirpitz]

The war in China did influence the IJN's thinking on the usage of air power and led to quite few changes in their carrier doctrine. On a very fundamental level, the number of people in the IJN who recognised the importance of air power increased quite significantly and there developed a greater understanding of different tasks airplanes could do. The concentration of air power also became something the IJN started to emphasise and this was coupled with the development of escort tactics, something which hadn't got much attention before. There were also changes to logistics and maintenance, which although still not that good compared to the US, would have been even worse without changes which were implemented during the war in China.

 

[Anime Ninja]

Another POD of this is Germany takes the Philippines from Spain. Come by WWI and Japan takes the Philippines from Germany along with the Marianas and the Caroline Islands.

In OTL, Japan did support Filipino revolutionaries against Spain and then also against the Americans. The Empire attempted to send 10,000 Murata rifles to the First Philippine Republic but the ship sank in a storm off the coast of Shanghai. As early as 1895, Japan's expansionism was getting clear after it took Formosa from the Qing Dynasty.

I have a timeline like that in mind.

Spain sells Philippine basing rights to Germany for ships as Spain sees the writing on the wall and a war with the US is coming. The war breaks out, German "claims" all of the Philippines as a protectorate. No Dreadnaught race as Germany goes cruisers first as they have to protect their Pacific holdings.

WW1 starts different, mostly Russia & France vs Japan & Britain. Then to add to the Chaos, Germany & Spain jump in not as allies of Britain & Japan but as trying to knock out France & Russia. Or something crazy like that.

I just need time to write it.

 

[BobTheBarbarian]

The China campaign generally had the effect of the Japanese invasion forces opting for several alterations: 1) lighter organization (less heavy equipment due to poor infrastructure) 2) the creation of Independent Mixed Brigade (at first as a stopgap and then as a permanent fixture in their army) and finally 3) "Type C" line of communication divisions that were simply meant to hold territory rather than conduct active offensive operations. Later on several of these "third string" units were given artillery and other attachments for Ichi-Go. Leland Ness has a lot to say about this in his book, "Rikugun."