How does a Nazi victory at Stalingrad effect the policy of unconditional surrender

Would the Western Allies decide to refrain from committing to the policy of unconditional surrender if the Soviets were in serious trouble? Lets say Stalingrad and most of the soviet resistance in the Caucasus had collapsed by January, 1943. Its clear a Second front is needed immediately in 1943 to take the pressure off the soviets and prevent a further collapse. However, there is no certainty they will succeed and if the Soviets fall apart before or after a failure then it leaves the allies in a bind. Sure, they could try again but they will face a greater amount of the Nazi military as well which means higher casualties. So, taking all that into account, would the Allies opt to leave the door open to a negotiated settlement or not?
 
To my knowledge the allies were not yet able to launch a major second front in Europe in early 1943; they were still fighting in Africa, and needed a lot more supplies and preparation. The Soviets on the other hand, would've been deprived of Caucasus oil in this scenario, and would've effectively lost. They'd probably seek to negotiate and make a separate peace, just like at Brest-Litovsk. I think the allies, after gaining the upper hand in the Mediterranean, at sea and in the air, would've fought on, until, perhaps by late 1944, mounting casualties caused voters to dump FDR.
 
The US/UK have no way to force Stalin to do anything, if he thinks the USSR and his grip on power is in serious trouble and thinks the US/UK is making the USSR do the brunt of the fighting he might consider a separate peace with Germany to give himself some breathing room. Hitler would probably be the biggest obstacle by making ridiculous demands on a peace treaty with the USSR that could force Stalin to fight on.
 

Deleted member 1487

Would the Western Allies decide to refrain from committing to the policy of unconditional surrender if the Soviets were in serious trouble? Lets say Stalingrad and most of the soviet resistance in the Caucasus had collapsed by January, 1943. Its clear a Second front is needed immediately in 1943 to take the pressure off the soviets and prevent a further collapse. However, there is no certainty they will succeed and if the Soviets fall apart before or after a failure then it leaves the allies in a bind. Sure, they could try again but they will face a greater amount of the Nazi military as well which means higher casualties. So, taking all that into account, would the Allies opt to leave the door open to a negotiated settlement or not?
IOTL the policy was announced by FDR without consulting anyone because he thought victory was now inevitable after the Stalingrad victory and Allied mounting success in Tunisia. So if Stalingrad falls quickly and the Soviets burn themselves out by launching premature counterattacks on the flanks and suffering heavy losses without inflicting OTL losses on the Axis forces, then it is likely FDR doesn't make that announcement out of the blue. Things look pretty bad and like Russia might lose, which if they don't push the Germans back from the Volga and Caucasus in 1942 they are going to have some serious problems in terms of food come 1943. LL is already maxed out and if the Axis is able to start interdicting shipments via the Caspian sea then the Soviets are in real trouble. Especially if Stalin does make a peace deal, one that Hitler would accept, then I cannot see Unconditional Surrender being on the table.
 
Things look pretty bad and like Russia might lose, which if they don't push the Germans back from the Volga and Caucasus in 1942 they are going to have some serious problems in terms of food come 1943. LL is already maxed out and if the Axis is able to start interdicting shipments via the Caspian sea then the Soviets are in real trouble.

Right, without oil from Maikop and Baku, all Soviet tank, fighter etc production is useless scrap iron.


Especially if Stalin does make a peace deal, one that Hitler would accept, then I cannot see Unconditional Surrender being on the table.

A potential problem is Adolf's hubris, especially if he takes the Caucasus and its oil. Confident he'll soon have all of Russia he may not agree to any peace short of surrender.
 
0. Depends on what you mean "Nazi victory at Stalingrad". Possession of Stalingrad by itself was pretty meaningless. Even if Nazis had managed it while the window of opportunity was open (say late August 1942) they were still incredibly overextended. 300 plus miles of front thinly held by poorly armed Romanian, Hungarian and Italian troops. And the Red Army had learned how to defend. The Nazis 1943 summer offensives only went 20 miles east. (vs 400 miles east in 1942 and 700 miles east in 1941).

1. Still if you mean the Nazis can cut off flow of oil from Baku,etc. or even capture it and use the oil well that's a big change. Would definitely delay the inevitable allied win.

2. Roosevelt's formula of demanding "unconditional surrender" was, above all, actually commitment to Stalin - i.e. no separate peace. He and Marshall were desperate to invade France to honor that promise. There was no way US+Britain could have beaten the Nazis without Russia by 1945. Red Army accounted for over 90% of German soldiers killed.

3. Domestically the "unconditional surrender" formula played well in maintaining morale. But FDR was dead before the policy was completely realized.

4. FDR knew that Nazis were bigger danger. US committed 75% (or more) of 'effort' to beating Nazis. And with the remaining 25% US still beat the Japanese - with help from everyone- but US was main offensive force in southwest and central Pacific.

5. So I think FDR would have to committed whatever it took to keeping Russia in the war.
 

Deleted member 1487

Right, without oil from Maikop and Baku, all Soviet tank, fighter etc production is useless scrap iron.
How do you figure? Caucasian oil is 70% of Soviet production, even with the remaining 30% they could run both their economy and military, albeit perhaps with more restrictions of fuel usage.

A potential problem is Adolf's hubris, especially if he takes the Caucasus and its oil. Confident he'll soon have all of Russia he may not agree to any peace short of surrender.
Sure Adolf is and will always be the problem for peace. Though if he is really concerned about the fight in the West he might consider taking a favorable deal if offered.

2. Roosevelt's formula of demanding "unconditional surrender" was, above all, actually commitment to Stalin - i.e. no separate peace. He and Marshall were desperate to invade France to honor that promise. There was no way US+Britain could have beaten the Nazis without Russia by 1945. Red Army accounted for over 90% of German soldiers killed.
Huh? First of all the USSR at most accounted for 75% of German military casualties, not over 90%, which doesn't factor in economic damage done by the Wallies nor the role of Lend-Lease and the naval war; they drew off of 50% of German military production to fight them starting the minute Barbarossa began, as the naval and air war, plus defending occupied Europe and fighting in the Mediterranean cost more to the Nazi war economy than the Eastern Front throughout the conflict.

Though unconditional surrender was favorable to Stalin for the post-war, it was not a policy formulated at the point it was thrown out by Roosevelt to reporters at the Casablanca conference and caught both Stalin and Churchill by surprise when they found out:
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/casablanca
It was more of function of his hatred for Nazism and wish not to create another 'stabbed in the back' myth by negotiating an end to the war. As a signal to Stalin about no separate peace that was at best and afterthought. Mostly it was just Roosevelt running his mouth out of turn.

http://ww2today.com/24th-january-1943-roosevelt-calls-for-unconditional-surrender
The President’s account to Hopkins seems however conclusive.

“We had so much trouble getting those two French generals together that I thought to myself that this was as difficult as arranging the meeting of Grant and Lee – and then suddenly the Press Conference was on, and Winston and I had had no time to prepare for it, and the thought popped into my mind that they had called Grant “Old Unconditional Surrender”, and the next thing I knew I had said it.”
 
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