God have mercy on the poor souls behind the Alaska class.
https://weaponsandwarfare.files.wordpress.com/2017/07/de9404de75bc114f09759da90ccd2fe2.jpg?w=584
Lutzow (rear) and Admiral Scheer at Wilhelmshaven in 1939. Both ships survived until April 1945 when crippled (Lutzow) or destroyed (Scheer) by RAF bombing. Whats the difference?? Deutschland class…
weaponsandwarfare.com
From the same citation as comes the photo...
On 8 January 1930 the Naval and Military Record remarked that, both strategically and tactically, the ship presented a factor impossible to ignore: Germany had proved to the world that major increases in battleship size were superfluous and bore no relationship to calculations of battle effectiveness, and on 22 January, in the same periodical, Sir Herbert Russell observed that the new type seemed to him to be the battleship of the future, combining the qualities of a battleship with those of a cruiser. By abandoning much conservative tradition out of sheer necessity, German warship designers had changed naval strategy: the Panzerschiffe soon underpinned oceanic commerce-raiding policy.
The admiral who was CNO when those (^^^) started bobbing around was this guy.
Admiral William V. Pratt - United States Navy
He had to come up with an answer to the armored cruiser/raiders the Germans appeared to be building.
Think of where he sat as a responsible naval officer?
The USN had no scouting force worthy of the name. Remember that the first aircraft carriers were four years old and the USN was testing a whole slue of concepts from scouting to actual battle method with the two good ones they had.
--There was no such thing as radar.
--The last of the USN armored cruisers had been stricken in 1930.
--The USN heavy cruiser force was just starting to ramp up. What was there afloat in 1930?
--NOTHING. The Pensacolas and the Northamptons (9 of them) were an emergency program built to
a. Bodyguard the aircraft carriers,
b. Chase enemy commerce raiders.
They come into service between 1929 and 1934.
Meanwhile the General Board has to
figure out the German armored raiders right now. Not in 1941 when the wonders of naval aviation, the heavy cruiser force and radar are out of the land of concept and being turned into actual artifacts.
This is from where the 30 cm bore gun armed "battlecruiser" comes. It is a first class cruiser to supplement the second class heavy cruiser force as a commerce protector and commerce destroyer.
The requirement was pegged at what the Germans were perceived to be doing. 6 Nassaus were to be replaced by Lutzows? Six American "battle cruisers" would be there to meet them.
Pratt figured somewhere around 1935-1938 would be the dates in service.
He left the Alaskas as a legacy paper program for his successors because Congress was not going to fund capital ship tonnage into those program ships. The WNT and LNT were also inhibitors. Figure 1935 onward.
Admiral William H. Standley - United States Navy
He did not want them. He believed in better enemy dying through naval airpower.
So who pushed for them?
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy - United States Navy
By now...
Gneisenau and Scharnhorst sighted
and
WW2Ships.com: Dunkerque Class Battlecruiser
Are afloat.
Why would the FRENCH be part of Leahy's calculations?
Force de Raid, (1è escadre), Marine Française, 03.09.1939
Force de Raid - Wikipedia
The ostensible reason for Dunkirk and Strasbourg at Brest was because they were the only equivalents to the Scharnhorsts for speed, armor and gunpower among the Franco-British. But think like an American admiral and wonder about the South American trade routes from the Atlantic sea frontier ports? Well... TORCH illustrates the reason.
Now should Leahy and after him Stark (Both of whom I consider to be derelict in their duties as Bu-Ord and CNO in succession, when they were the actuals, but for
a whole host of interlocked reasons that have to do with major failures to prepare for Atlantic Sea Frontier, Caribbean Sea, South American SLOCs defense and of course the shambles of the Pacific War and the material and personnel failures to get the PACFLT ready.) be blamed for the wastage of steel and personnel and MONEY to build the Alaska and Guam with what they knew from 1938 onward?
No. What they knew was that the naval world was still battleship-centric and that it was the gun that decided issues at sea. Never mind that they were total IDIOTS, they thought they had a lot of evidence from the North Atlantic actions such as Denmark Strait and River Plate or even Narvik. clear up to Pearl Harbor that it was the battle-line; supported by the scouting force (aircraft carriers)
instead of the other way around as the naval war college was screaming at them at the time.
How are aircraft carriers supposed to protect the trade lanes against surface raiders? You use cruisers to do that work.
Actually you use long range maritime patrollers to guard against surface raiders (Again the NWC is screaming this little giblet of naval wisdom from 1835 forward as a lesson learned from the fleet problems at the top of their lungs at whoever will listen.).
Now, as ships, were the Alaskas botched? As a slapdash panic build in 1939 forward, since the money is there, and something has to hit the water in a hurry before Congress stops feeding the money tree? Sure one can say that is the case. When you consider that C and R and Bu-Eng has to work up detail work for 400 vessels for Senator Carl Vinson's wet dream and now the Europeans are shooting at each other and Murphy, we need a Navy because France is GONE! The clowns who Spring-sharped the Alaskas were not America's best and brightest. Those bright people were sweating over building a naval air force and trying to get the subs down the Mississippi River and out through the Great Lakes.
The Alaskas were left to the second raters to draft out to the requirements. How did they do? Well, neither Alaska or Guam was sunk, and their charges were bodyguarded and not sunk either (USS Franklin was one of their charges.). Their foreign equivalents were blasted into scrap.
Could the wastage be invested better? Sure. Want another couple of Iowas? How about two dozen Balaos? Or a complete Essex? That is what you could do instead if you were Foresight War perfect. But given the gonzos in charge (GICs) present and the knowledge base and the resource pools available, the Alaskas were about as good as could be expected. 1943? Yeah, it makes no sense from lessons learned to build them after those lessons learned, but that is 1943 and you still have politics, so they are going to be built. Just two of them.
McP.
Edit: 1835 should be 1935.