How did the Soviet military compare to NATO in the 1980s?

First it clearly wasn't their natural element, like taking a hippo to the Derby, and it apparently relied very much on landing massive forces with helicopters. By late 80s NATO was in a good position to counter that and many engegement showed how vulnerable the helicopter was, and anyway most of the tanks taken out in a WWIII would probably not have been taken out by other tanks but by mines and various munitions delivered by artllery and air - or by running out of gas and supplies.

I'm not so sure. Mostly this was the Soviets adapting to their experience in Afghanistan - where the Soviets had learned just how bad their second rate formations were.

As such, in the 80s people on both sides were wondering if the Soviets would lose WW3 by running out of first rate formations just short of conquering Europe, and then seeing the second rate formations melt in front of even a mauled NATO.

If the Soviets had seen the overall quality of their forces improve, being a hippo at the Derby could still be an improvement for them.

Carter kept defence spending sort of static 1977-80

As I remember, this is exactly why his champions like him - he kept funding flat in the sort of economic and political climate where funding would usually be declining.

Personally, I am not convinced that a different president in the 77-80 period would have made terribly different decisions about military funding or which blunders to blunder into.

fasquardon
 
According to Tom Clancy in Red Storm Rising, NATO wins hands down against the Soviet red shirts.

Which is chiefly notable because Clancy and Larry Bond tested key aspects of the storyline on Harpoon.

Even so, they did not have the full benefit of what we know now about how NATO and Soviet systems of the time actually performed in combat.

Still, in the main, I expect that as far as Germany is concerned, it is not too far off base (especially with a U.S. stealth fighter strike at the outset) for what a ground war in 1985-88 would have looked like. The Soviets could have reached the Rhine in 1980. They need some real breaks to pull it off 5-8 years later.
 
An almost-entirely-apocryphal summary rule-of-thumb that was arrived at in the early 90s with the help of enough bitter to float a Type 22 frigate was:

1980 - 3rd Shock Army rolls across the norddeutscheplein and only stops for McDonalds before reaching the North Sea; it all ends in fire when the Soviets cross the Rhine and the French push the button.

1983 - 3rd Shock Army grinds brutally into the Netherlands; it all ends in a ceasefire-in-place when the Soviets reach the Rhine but have wrecked most of their Cat A formations and expended their forward caches of fuel and ammunition to get there, and NATO air superiority constrains resupply so much that they don't try to cross it. Equally, the REFORGER convoys have taken significant losses and much of the prepositioned equipment has been destroyed by air strikes or overrun before it can be used.

1986 - 3rd Shock Army wonders whether there's something wrong with their bloody tanks; it all ends in fire when NATO crosses the Vistula and the Soviets push the button.

The RKKA was a conscript army on a 2-year stint. NATO strategists thought that this would adversely affect the duration of its decision loop and its ability to display initiative and respond to changing field conditions. Soviet strategists thought that this wouldn't matter because a) quantity has a quality all its own and b) the career officer corps would manage the initiative thing for long enough that they would be in Paris before it became an issue anyway.

I think you've nailed it.

EDIT: 1986 ends in fire when NATO crosses the Elbe, or at most the Oder. But maybe you were writing for punch there.
 
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I'd thought the post Vietnam turn-around owed more to Carter than Reagan?

fasquardon

I'm about as far a thing as you'll find from a Jimmy Carter fan, but even I must concede: the military buildup began in Carter's last years; and the draw down that preceded it began under Nixon and Ford - and not all of it was the result of the wind down of the war in Vietnam.

Carter came into office having campaigned to reduce defense spending by 6%, and get to a balanced budget by 1981. But that began to shift as even Carter (and, more to the point, the Democratic controlled Congress) began to react with growing alarm to Soviet assertiveness in 1979-80. The FY 1981 defense budget (Carter's last one) increased DoD spending by $8.1 billion.

One other difficulty was that high inflation was eating up a lot of what increases were parceled out in the late 70's.

Likewise, all those systems that came on line in the 80's had begun their development in the 70's (sometimes, admittedly, in spite of Carter, who was obsessed with the idea that there was too much duplication among new weapon systems). The M1 Abrams and Bradley FV began development in 1972; the A-10 in 1970, the F-15 in 1969, the AH-64 in 1973. Reagan supercharged spending; but his timing was fortuitous in that he had all these new weapons systems just coming into production that he could accelerate.

Anyway, as the chart below (from the Heritage Foundation) shows, even the "Carter Era of Neglect" shows an upward slope in its later half. At the least, Heritage ought to call it the "Nixon-Ford-Carter Era of Neglect."



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I'm really surprised that I'm having so much trouble finding primary sources for this, because I was able to find them rather easily on Google just last fall. But, being a damned fool, I did not bookmark them. Now the same search terms I used back then have been shuffled out of the algorithms, apparently.

So for now, I'm left with secondary sources, at least for the moment. But I did find one that provides some information...



https://battlemachines.wordpress.com/2015/04/12/countdown-to-tank-battles-of-iraq-and-t-72s-failure/

Most of this coincides with what I recall reading on my primary sources. There's someone I would really like to ask for help on this (a naval historian who runs a website on military history), but I am unable to reach him. I suspect he may have died late last year, but do not know for sure.

At any rate... my recollection from what I have read about this before is that several NATO countries tested Cold War T-64s, T-72s, and even T-80s against NATO anti-tank weapons of that period. In these tests, 80s-era NATO tanks had to close to ranges of less than 1500 (and possibly even 1000 meters) to penetrate the frontal armor of contemporary Soviet tanks with anything other than a lucky shot. Even the early-60s T-64 basically swallowed up anything NATO could fire at it, and one test in particular that stands out in my memory showed that (unless they hit a weak spot) a Chieftain couldn't penetrate the frontal armor on a T-64 until they were within 800 meters - by which time the Chieftain is probably not only dead, but the fire is probably already going out. The CIA said that a primary design requirement for Soviet tanks in the period was that it resist frontal penetration by any NATO 105 mm round at any distance greater than 500 meters. I'm not sure they succeeded at this goal, but - they certainly had some reason to believe that they had.

I'll try to find more primary sources on this, and hopefully this thread will jog the memories of more knowledgeable posters.

For what it is worth... When I spoke to individuals during the mid 1980's who's job descriptions involved potentially having to fight Soviet tanks they explained to me how they were expecting to have to hit the latest Soviet Tanks several times in order to destroy them.

After the Cold War ended I also had conversations with individuals who expected to have been fighting Soviet Tanks had the Cold War gone hit and they explained to me that they expected to have to engage the latest Soviet Tanks from the sides.

Edit to Add... I also recall seeing an online account of the firing trials of the Germans in the 1990's against various former East German armoured vehicles. I can't seem to that find now either.
 
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The T-72 is the same as to the T-34 design philosophy, highly upgradeable over many years. However, its success still depends on its own power such as with automated fire control (I don't think the USSR ever got that) etc.

Despite the fact their T-72s clearly did have stuff like automated fire control.

Battlrsight was a perfectly valid option given their circumstances, even advantageous.

I think you are not grasping what I am saying: the Iraqis battlesights were not used. They were not trained to use them. I have specifically cited a scholarly book which says this. Your waxing about the supposed failure battlesights on the T-72 presupposes the Iraqis crews were actually bothering to use the battlesights. They clearly were not. I mean, yes it would clearly have been advantageous for the Iraqis to have been able to use them... but they weren't able to use them, so in the end it was an advantage that existed solely on paper.

I think they couldn't allow for something under 1000 meters with the rangefinder for the T-72.

Baseless supposition. Most tank engagements in Central Europe would be taking place under a kilometer so there would be no reason for the Soviets to not allow something for under 1,000 meters for their rangefinders.

I believe it is 40% of starting numbers before the number of losses leads to ineffectiveness.

15% in the US Army, actually. The Soviet proportion is higher. Your claim was that the US had destroyed an entire division on the Highway of Death but the numbers clearly do not support that.

It doesn't have to target command nodes specifically, merely the war's main objectives in the words of one Soviet general. It is supposed to ideally target division level assets or above I think, though.

Which it clearly didn't succeed at: the example shows that the Iraqi High Command was able to talk with their corps, army, and division level assets just fine, something which wouldn't have been possible had they been destroyed.

And all that is available to anyone attending any US military college because that stuff has been published. Glantz whole focus was to study that stuff in the military.

Stuff from the Cold War is available now. It wasn't at the time nor is stuff from the Russian Federation now really readily available in the West, although we're able to catch glimpses.

it apparently relied very much on landing massive forces with helicopters.

Heliborne assault was merely one way with which the Soviets intended to get major forces into NATO's rear areas. Commando, paratroop, and fast moving forward detachments of considerable combat power moving ahead of the main body were others. It was also not something they introduced in the late-80's, but developed quite early on in response to their observations of the NATO debate that was formulating AirLand Battle. Furthermore, it is inaccurate to say the Soviets were reliant on it. Both they and NATO in fact identified several key weaknesses in AirLand Battle.

One such weakness was that AirLand Battle assumed a gradual commitment of Soviet strength against NATO defenses, thereby allowing air power time to reduce Soviet command and control, and interdict and delay Soviet reserves. The problem with this assumption was that NATO's defenses were deployed far forward and in relatively little depth. Unless the Soviets could be prevented from gathering forces before a war broke out (but NATO doctrine assumed they would be the attackers, and didn't pay more than lip-service to the idea of a pre-emptive invasion), the Soviets would not have needed to rely on forces arriving from the rear, or a deeply echeloned attack, but instead could have sought a decisive battle in the border region before the effects of NATO airpower on their rear echelons could be fully felt.

Another weakness the Soviets intended to exploit is that AirLand Battle also placed heavy reliance on near perfect intelligence in order to identify key targets quickly, and then on superlative command and control able to quickly task forces to destroy them - highly ambitious goals, based on the technology and C3I nets of the day, and what we know of the capabilities of airpower today. The Soviets noted that their emphasis on decoys and deception at all levels would have complicated NATO targeting immensely, particularly with 1980's technology and command structure. Since NATO were relying heavily on taking out Soviet command nodes and key "mobility assets" (engineering vehicles, bridgelayers and the like) with their new wonder weapons in order to slow their advance and gain the initiative, this was a significant point of potential failure. And NATOs experience in Serbia ultimately showed just how effective these techniques could be...

In the end, AirLand Battle assumed NATO would be able to quickly seize the initiative and then defeat the Soviets in battles of their choosing where they would target key nodes rather than allow battles of attrition - yet NATO intended to let the Soviets strike first and they drilled relentlessly to be able to respond in battle faster than we could, sacrificing tactical flexibility for sheer speed, trusting that this would disrupt all NATO's vaunted but highly complex all arms co-ordination. Letting your enemy take the initiative (militarily a bad idea, but politically necessary in this case) and then relying on taking it back off him is a very risky plan, particularly if he has the potential to react and move faster than you do, and your forces are deployed in limited depth. This serious concern was generally countered within NATO not by doctrinal arguments, but by pointing to the declining state of Soviet soldiery and assuming their skills would fall well short of those needed to perform as their doctrine demanded. While this was possibly true, NATO's own skills at co-ordinating their own ambitious groupings of forces were at the time themselves open to debate. So it was a somewhat shaky foundation on which to base their chances.
 
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I think you are not grasping what I am saying: the Iraqis battlesights were not used. They were not trained to use them. I have specifically cited a scholarly book which says this. Your waxing about the supposed failure battlesights on the T-72 presupposes the Iraqis crews were actually bothering to use the battlesights. They clearly were not. I mean, yes it would clearly have been advantageous for the Iraqis to have been able to use them... but they weren't able to use them, so in the end it was an advantage that existed solely on paper.
Battlesight is one of two gunnery techniques I think. The Iraqis definitely were firing their main guns at US tanks so it was one or the other. Zaloga says they used battlesight when firing at US tanks. By the way Zaloga says that Iraqi exports were equipped with that laser rangefinder. So I do think this gives us some idea of what a battle between NATO and Warsaw Pact tanks would look like. But it said in what @That Damned Fool posted that Kontakt-5 works against kinetic energy penetrators like the M829A2 APFSDS, which taken with the aforementioned range required to defeat the Soviet armor (which is an immense advantage that could well tip the scale) changes things.

Baseless supposition. Most tank engagements in Central Europe would be taking place under a kilometer so there would be no reason for the Soviets to not allow something for under 1,000 meters for their rangefinders.
I don't think Iraqi tanks had an issue with it anyways as far as I am aware so fair enough. Syrian T-72s were having good battle results against Israeli tanks including the Merkava. I would fully expect the T-72 to do well at those ranges, the historical examples are likely there. Even the battle of Grozny in 1994 could have the needed examples.

15% in the US Army, actually. The Soviet proportion is higher. Your claim was that the US had destroyed an entire division on the Highway of Death but the numbers clearly do not support that.
There are other casualties figures that go far higher than yours that I have seen. As far upwards as 10,000 whether or not that is true.

Despite the fact their T-72s clearly did have stuff like automated fire control.
I don't see how the fire control system for the 125 mm T-72 gun would be. It did not have automated dual axis main gun stabilization like the M1A1, nor was there automated fire control data input. This is not even getting into discrepancies with sensors like thermal, but the Iraqi T-72 did not have the range of the M1A1 in the first Gulf War. I suspect the Soviet T-72 would likely meet the same fate as the Iraqi T-72s were it not for the ERA armor it has as much as Gorbachev chalked it up to Iraqi training and not the T-72 itself. Edit. Those same Iraqis who were probably trained by the Soviets.
 
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Battlesight is one of two gunnery techniques I think. The Iraqis definitely were firing their main guns at US tanks so it was one or the other. Zaloga says they used battlesight when firing at US tanks. By the way Zaloga says that Iraqi exports were equipped with that laser rangefinder.

That the Iraqi tanks had range finders is well establishrd. That the Iraqis crews usually comprehensively failed to utilize them is also well established. Zaloga fell into the same trap that you are: he noted the tanks sent to the Iraqis had rangefinders so they must have used them. Pollack actually went and did the research which showed that frequently Iraqi crews didn't know their tanks had such features, much less how to use them. Basically, your ascribing a level of competence to Iraqis tank crews that didn't exist.

I don't think Iraqi tanks had an issue with it anyways as far as I am aware so fair enough. Syrian T-72s were having good battle results against Israeli tanks including the Merkava.

Uh... no they didn't? The Syrian armor was generally trounced by their Israelis counterparts. And again, the reason generally lay in the crews, not the armor.

Even the battle of Grozny in 1994 could have the needed examples.

I rather doubt a battle in which the 1990s Russian Ground Forces, which was so starved of funds and spirit that it had trouble feeding their soldiers much less training them, failed at executing anything resembling combined arms is applicable to the Red Army in the early or mid-1989s.

The most likely place you'll find Soviet equipment performing during the Cold War well between two forces of roughly similar skill and resources are the Indo-Pakistani Wars.

There are other casualties figures that go far higher than yours that I have seen. As far upwards as 10,000 whether or not that is true.

Sounds pretty BS...

I don't see how the fire control system for the 125 mm T-72 gun would be. It did not have automated dual axis main gun stabilization like the M1A1, nor was there automated fire control data input. This is not even getting into discrepancies with sensors like thermal, but the Iraqi T-72 did not have the range of the M1A1 in the first Gulf War. I suspect the Soviet T-72 would likely meet the same fate as the Iraqi T-72s were it not for the ERA armor it has as much as Gorbachev chalked it up to Iraqi training and not the T-72 itself.

This ignores that not only were these tanks monkey-models and crewed by incompetents, but that the terrain in Central Europe is radically different then that in the deserts of the Middle East.

Those same Iraqis who were probably trained by the Soviets.

Nope, the Iraqis largely trained themselves. The Soviets did supply technical advice in the form of manuals and such, but this information was generally hoarded by mid-level officers and not passed down to the lower ranks for training. The same thing tends to happen to US-backed Arab forces today, BTW.
 
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I don't see how the fire control system for the 125 mm T-72 gun would be. It did not have automated dual axis main gun stabilization like the M1A1, nor was there automated fire control data input. This is not even getting into discrepancies with sensors like thermal, but the Iraqi T-72 did not have the range of the M1A1 in the first Gulf War. I suspect the Soviet T-72 would likely meet the same fate as the Iraqi T-72s were it not for the ERA armor it has as much as Gorbachev chalked it up to Iraqi training and not the T-72 itself. Edit. Those same Iraqis who were probably trained by the Soviets.
Last I checked, even the base model Soviet T-72 from 1973 had a 2E28M 2-axis stabilizer, and the Iraqi export variants infamously didn't even have power turret traverse. That alone would guarantee a much different result than the Gulf War. Thermal sensors were inferior to the Abrams' for the original T-72 and T-72A, but the T-72B had a much improved thermal sight that was close, if not the equal, to an Abrams. In any case, the T-80U had sights that were every bit the M1A1's equal.
 
Last I checked, even the base model Soviet T-72 from 1973 had a 2E28M 2-axis stabilizer, and the Iraqi export variants infamously didn't even have power turret traverse. That alone would guarantee a much different result than the Gulf War. Thermal sensors were inferior to the Abrams' for the original T-72 and T-72A, but the T-72B had a much improved thermal sight that was close, if not the equal, to an Abrams. In any case, the T-80U had sights that were every bit the M1A1's equal.

Can the T-72 fire while moving at high speed because I definitely don't think it is capable of it. I have seen the T-72 exports traverse and they are not some slow thing and I don't know why the USSR would sell them without the traverse. No one would buy it. The T-72 export has hydraulic stabilization but is usually left off until contact becomes probable which in the case of the Iraqis means they may not have even had it on. In no small part due to failure of the Iraqi recon elements covering the approaches to the main body to alert this main body of the US advance. The traverse rate cannot be put to maximum as the stabilization will turn off in thr exports but it is not slow. Thermals are important for the gun range, but I know that the T-72B did not have the range of the M1, so what you say cannot be accurate. Otherwise where is it shown to have that kind of range. THnis is still contingent on ability to mass fire for successful battle outocomes, attributed directly to skill. The battle of Brody is a case where this did not happen as one historical example.

Skill differentials, opposing error, and technology that is what is mostly about in tank battles. In synergy.

That the Iraqi tanks had range finders is well establishrd. That the Iraqis crews usually comprehensively failed to utilize them is also well established. Zaloga fell into the same trap that you are: he noted the tanks sent to the Iraqis had rangefinders so they must have used them. Pollack actually went and did the research which showed that frequently Iraqi crews didn't know their tanks had such features, much less how to use them. Basically, your ascribing a level of competence to Iraqis tank crews that didn't exist.
Pollack says something about them not using the 'computing sights'. I see no where where they explain how they reached this conclusion (especially for the Tawakalna divison) or where it says that Iraqis didn't know these things existed. It is the standard battlesight range that the Soviets use, so presumably they knew how to do manual input. Not to mention Iraqis did on occasion hit their targets.

The T-72 fire control system does not calculate the lead of the target meaning it relies entirely on skill in order to hit something that is actually movIng.

The TPD-K1 is accessed through the primary fire control sight. The laser rangefinder reticle is clearly visible unles the Iraqis didn't turn it on, it would be hard to miss.

I cannot understand how the Iraqis could know how to use the autoloader and know how to fire but somehow not know how to use the laser range finder which itself is completely automated and requires no manual input.

That being said, at the US National Training Center the T-72 equipped OPFOR almost always wins so, yes, you do have a point about the Iraqis shouldering some of the blame.

Nope, the Iraqis largely trained themselves. The Soviets did supply technical advice in the form of manuals and such, but this information was generally hoarded by mid-level officers and not passed down to the lower ranks for training. The same thing tends to happen to US-backed Arab forces today, BTW.

There are news articles saying how Soviet military experts were training the Iraqis even after Kuwait.

Uh... no they didn't? The Syrian armor was generally trounced by their Israelis counterparts. And again, the reason generally lay in the crews, not the armor.

This wasn't even against the M1A1 that they were losing ~70 T-72s at a time, however, painting the Syrian army with a broad brush and saying every battle failing was due to exactly this reason. That is unconvincing without circumstantial evidence with a overall view Battle by battle. It is plausible that we cannot find one instance where the users of the T-72 have been able to unlock the technological opportunity for battlefield success becsuse on every occasion they were totally unprepared. It is also possible there was no technological opportunity to begin with.

There ar however things that can be done to negate the US tech. If the T-72 is properly dug in it will be hidden from thermal sensors. Similarly the Soviet ERA would negate the range advantage of the M1 and most importantly stifle its lethality.

I rather doubt a battle in which the 1990s Russian Ground Forces, which was so starved of funds and spirit that it had trouble feeding their soldiers much less training them, failed at executing anything resembling combined arms is applicable to the Red Army in the early or mid-1989s.

Because these were not the same forces that were only a couple years back in the Soviet military under arms, I am not seeing how training would be the issue. And what combined arms will the USSR have? I don't think they will have the advantage of air to land Battle like the US will in destroying recon forces etc. Nor will they not have the terrible reality of Apache helicopters working for them rather than against them.

This ignores that not only were these tanks monkey-models and crewed by incompetents, but that the terrain in Central Europe is radically different then that in the deserts of the Middle East.
True, exactly as the Soviets learned during WWII when they entered Germany. Terrain is undeniable a part of the equation For battle success but it isn't all of the equation. US tank procedures were based entirely around fighting the USSR in Germany, so I don't see how this could for example guarantee a Soviet success in battle. TThe ERA armor on the other hand might guarantee it, but the terrain was not the deciding factor in 73 Easting for example.

The most likely place you'll find Soviet equipment performing during the Cold War well between two forces of roughly similar skill and resources are the Indo-Pakistani Wars

But not the T-72, even in 1999

Sounds pretty BS...

Yours doesn't even make sense. 800 casualties is less than the number of vehicles you said were destroyed

And as to the Iraqis. Moral and training is not itself the complete explanation if you take that argument. These kinds of loss rates were not even seen in WWII. Three SS panzer divisons destroying 144 Soviet tanks while losing only 6 of their own is actually better than the loss ratios suffered by the Iraqis.

There is a absolute danger in the enemy having surprise. Tank battles could be over very quickly and even a delay of seconds caused by confusion and misdirection can result in crippling losses. However, against US technology including stabilized main guns and an effective range of 3000 meters (the T-72 isn't even 1,800)? Such mistakes prove catastrophic. T-72s are essentially forced into immobility because they can not naviagte at high speeds while also being able to fire their main gun, and so they are easy to hit and the M1 is not easy.
 

Redbeard

Banned
Heliborne assault was merely one way with which the Soviets intended to get major forces into NATO's rear areas. Commando, paratroop, and fast moving forward detachments of considerable combat power moving ahead of the main body were others. It was also not something they introduced in the late-80's, but developed quite early on in response to their observations of the NATO debate that was formulating AirLand Battle. Furthermore, it is inaccurate to say the Soviets were reliant on it. Both they and NATO in fact identified several key weaknesses in AirLand Battle.

One such weakness was that AirLand Battle assumed a gradual commitment of Soviet strength against NATO defenses, thereby allowing air power time to reduce Soviet command and control, and interdict and delay Soviet reserves. The problem with this assumption was that NATO's defenses were deployed far forward and in relatively little depth. Unless the Soviets could be prevented from gathering forces before a war broke out (but NATO doctrine assumed they would be the attackers, and didn't pay more than lip-service to the idea of a pre-emptive invasion), the Soviets would not have needed to rely on forces arriving from the rear, or a deeply echeloned attack, but instead could have sought a decisive battle in the border region before the effects of NATO airpower on their rear echelons could be fully felt.

Another weakness the Soviets intended to exploit is that AirLand Battle also placed heavy reliance on near perfect intelligence in order to identify key targets quickly, and then on superlative command and control able to quickly task forces to destroy them - highly ambitious goals, based on the technology and C3I nets of the day, and what we know of the capabilities of airpower today. The Soviets noted that their emphasis on decoys and deception at all levels would have complicated NATO targeting immensely, particularly with 1980's technology and command structure. Since NATO were relying heavily on taking out Soviet command nodes and key "mobility assets" (engineering vehicles, bridgelayers and the like) with their new wonder weapons in order to slow their advance and gain the initiative, this was a significant point of potential failure. And NATOs experience in Serbia ultimately showed just how effective these techniques could be...

In the end, AirLand Battle assumed NATO would be able to quickly seize the initiative and then defeat the Soviets in battles of their choosing where they would target key nodes rather than allow battles of attrition - yet NATO intended to let the Soviets strike first and they drilled relentlessly to be able to respond in battle faster than we could, sacrificing tactical flexibility for sheer speed, trusting that this would disrupt all NATO's vaunted but highly complex all arms co-ordination. Letting your enemy take the initiative (militarily a bad idea, but politically necessary in this case) and then relying on taking it back off him is a very risky plan, particularly if he has the potential to react and move faster than you do, and your forces are deployed in limited depth. This serious concern was generally countered within NATO not by doctrinal arguments, but by pointing to the declining state of Soviet soldiery and assuming their skills would fall well short of those needed to perform as their doctrine demanded. While this was possibly true, NATO's own skills at co-ordinating their own ambitious groupings of forces were at the time themselves open to debate. So it was a somewhat shaky foundation on which to base their chances.

Of course heliborne assault wasn't the only element in the new WAPA doctrines, but reliance on such units and doctrines to give the feverishly wanted speed of advance was remarkable, and IMHO then and now more expression of desperation than capacity. The Soviets had built a great number of shiny and very expensive Hinds and other helicopters - and if you have a hammer everything appear like nails. Afghanistan sure put a lot of thought around in the Soviet leadership, but it also proved how vulnerable those new shiny flying knights were to some hillbillys with Stingers.

Concerning "the initiative" I think not having it was mainly a political problem and not so much a military. Everybody were concerned if politicians in time would react in time to possible threats, but I take that was also a contributing reason behind the new NATO doctrines in the 80s. Nobody expected to have time to establish traditional frontlines of units arranged in depth. Instead equipment and doctrines were developed to swiftly focus tremendous (non-nuclear) firepower at exactly the enemy spearhead. Tanks were just one and I'll claim secondary element in this, new ammunitions for artillery and air force being much more important.

We also knew back then about the "fast moving forward detachments". One of the plans was so to simply land a handful of cargo planes in Copenhagen Airport, unload a couple of companies in light vehicles and race to the Government quarters in central Copenhagen. If absolutely no warning was given that could probably succeed and would result in some delays in the law making process (to the relief of some) and various ceremonial duties but Government wouldn't stop functioning - there had been plans for such situations since the late 1940s. If OTOH just an hours notice was at hand, the Homeguard companies of Amager (the island south of Copenhagen where the airport is situated) would take up their positions incl 84 mm Carl Gustav RL rifles and MG42s. The road cross 100 m from my house would be one of the "contact points" and there would still be a couple of miles and several "contact points" to the bridges over the harbour.

In many ways a similar plan succeeded for the Germans on 9th of April 1940, they simply sailed into the harbour and unloaded troops to occupy Copenhagen. They could do that because both the army and the navy had been ordered to stay put, probably because the politicians already had given up any military resistance. It has never been proved, but in my mind there is no doubt.

This basic mistrust in getting the political decisions quickly enough had resulted in the so called "Forholdsordre" from 1952 (Operation order) after which any military unit or person should not await orders in case of hostilities but without hesitation fight back and initiate mobilisation. The commanders of each Homeguard Company also had authority to on their own mobilise their company. Each man then had arms and ready ammo at home. At the end of the Cold war the Homeguard had a total of about 65.000 men under arms, but some would be only fit for guard and observation duty.
 
Some very interesting reads in previous posts regarding soviet tank capabilities among other details. Just to comment on a few things that i have a little bit of idea about, namely aircraft. Let's touch the assertion of NATO air superiority: while this depends on when in 1980 we are comparing soviet and NATO forces, bare in mind that in the eighties the main NATO light fighter, the F-16 did NOT had any kind of BVR capability! This being faced with thousands of MiG-23s and growing numbers of MiG-29s, all which could fire against the F-16 at will from BVR range. I'm not even mentioning the Su-27, and no doubt PVO units of MiG-25, MiG-31 and Su-15 that will very likely also be involved in combat, mainly defence of rear areas. Of course, this is a very simplistic image, but the point is, the F-16s would be always put on the defensive even before the air combat started.

Secondly, remember the anectodal evidence of the supposed effectiveness of US missiles, for example the AIM-9M could be decoyed by flares from a MiG-25 in AFTERBURNER, and the AIM-7M could be easily fooled as well. Also don't forget the soviet HMS system and the HMS slaved R-60M and R-73 missiles. The west only learned about these systems and their true capability in the nineties (and they were, just like with the tanks, shocked at what they found). But in a hypothetical 1980s conflict, they would have learned the same lessons in combat, namely, after losing hundreds of planes in dogfights before realizing the soviets have something they didn't knew about. Also, to just brandish the soviet (and WP) pilots as poorly trained and inferior and easy victims for the super-duper trained americans and NATO is shortsighted to say the least, not to mention somehow judging soviet aircraft effectivenes through the arab-israeli conflicts or Desert Storm, which is even more shortsighted. Like i'm sure it is the case everywhere, not every soviet pilot was an ace, but they were well trained in their tactics, flying 100-120 hours a year on average, and they would have overwhelmingly done their best for their country. Same goes for other WP countries surely. I do recall reading some interesting tidbits in other places from peoples who served in WP air forces, like for instance tactics to fight against the F-15 (which was recognized as superior) in the MiG-21 and MiG-23, for instance though simultaneous attacks from different directions, using the guns to fire chaff to confuse the APG-63, etc etc. I'm sure others with more knowledge can tell us more.

The point is though, it's not that the soviets were better or that they didn't had any weaknesses, of course they did, it's just that the americans and NATO pilots and aircraft where nowhere near as superior as they thought they were (or some think they were today). Imo, one of the biggest weaknesses of the WP air forces was that the soviet allies were not receiving the latest aircraft and were not upgrading their existing aircraft as often as the soviets did. For instance, WP air forces were still flying MiG-21s with RP-21 radars and RS-2US (and in many cases R-3S missiles of the Vietnam war era), both long gone from soviet first line service, and probably not in service at all. If they would have had a comprehesive program to upgrade the WP MiG-21M/MFs at least (forget about the older PF/PFM, they were due to be retired soon anyway, it's enough to just wire them for more modern missiles) to MiG-21bis standard with RP-22 radar and R-13M, R-60 and R-3R, and why not even R-73 missiles, coupled with more modern RWR, radio, navigation system and chaff&flare dispensers, would have been a welcome boost.

Oh and no one seems to have mentioned the utterly formidable sovier air defences, in the eighties they would have already systems that for the most part US and NATO did not met in combat not even today (and they go ape about whenever Russia is selling them to some countries US/NATO brand as enemies), namely the S-300, the Buk, Tunguska, Tor, advanced MANPADS, and a whole range of ECM systems that were never exported and probably were hardly known to the west back then, not to mention latest upgraded variants of the SAMs that were indeed met in combat in the seventies. The idea that the 59 F-117s could make a noteworthy dent in the soviet defences is also far fetched to say the least, like they would just serenely fly at will in soviet airspace with absolutely no worry at all. I'm sure you recall how that went in Serbia.

All in all, i agree with what some say that NATO and WP will just bleed eachother dry without either gaining any significant advantage... but after that no one would be left to know how it ended.
 
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Secondly, remember the anectodal evidence of the supposed effectiveness of US missiles, for example the AIM-9M could be decoyed by flares from a MiG-25 in AFTERBURNER, and the AIM-7M could be easily fooled as well.

Presumably NATO aircraft could also decoy Soviet IR AAMs with flares?

How easily decoyed was the AIM-7? I somehow doubt a Soviet pilot knowing one was incoming wouldn't be sitting in his cockpit thinking about how piss easy the next minute or so was going to be...
 
Imo, one of the biggest weaknesses of the WP air forces was that the soviet allies were not receiving the latest aircraft and were not upgrading their existing aircraft as often as the soviets did. For instance, WP air forces were still flying MiG-21s with RP-21 radars and RS-2US (and in many cases R-3S missiles of the Vietnam war era), both long gone from soviet first line service, and probably not in service at all.

The Warsaw Pact outside the Soviet Union had very low military spending - around 1% of GDP each, at a time when the Soviets were spending around 10% of GDP on the military and Britain and France were spending 5% of GDP on the military.

I can't help but think they weren't really interested in fighting WW3.

A situation where the minor Warsaw Pact members were spending similar portions of their national budgets on the military as NATO would be an interesting one. Not only is the WP more formidable, but it is also far less Soviet-dominated.

fasquardon
 
Some very interesting reads in previous posts regarding soviet tank capabilities among other details. Just to comment on a few things that i have a little bit of idea about, namely aircraft. Let's touch the assertion of NATO air superiority: while this depends on when in 1980 we are comparing soviet and NATO forces, bare in mind that in the eighties the main NATO light fighter, the F-16 did NOT had any kind of BVR capability! This being faced with thousands of MiG-23s and growing numbers of MiG-29s, all which could fire against the F-16 at will from BVR range. I'm not even mentioning the Su-27, and no doubt PVO units of MiG-25, MiG-31 and Su-15 that will very likely also be involved in combat, mainly defence of rear areas. Of course, this is a very simplistic image, but the point is, the F-16s would be always put on the defensive even before the air combat started.

Secondly, remember the anectodal evidence of the supposed effectiveness of US missiles, for example the AIM-9M could be decoyed by flares from a MiG-25 in AFTERBURNER, and the AIM-7M could be easily fooled as well. Also don't forget the soviet HMS system and the HMS slaved R-60M and R-73 missiles. The west only learned about these systems and their true capability in the nineties (and they were, just like with the tanks, shocked at what they found). But in a hypothetical 1980s conflict, they would have learned the same lessons in combat, namely, after losing hundreds of planes in dogfights before realizing the soviets have something they didn't knew about. Also, to just brandish the soviet (and WP) pilots as poorly trained and inferior and easy victims for the super-duper trained americans and NATO is shortsighted to say the least, not to mention somehow judging soviet aircraft effectivenes through the arab-israeli conflicts or Desert Storm, which is even more shortsighted. Like i'm sure it is the case everywhere, not every soviet pilot was an ace, but they were well trained in their tactics, flying 100-120 hours a year on average, and they would have overwhelmingly done their best for their country. Same goes for other WP countries surely. I do recall reading some interesting tidbits in other places from peoples who served in WP air forces, like for instance tactics to fight against the F-15 (which was recognized as superior) in the MiG-21 and MiG-23, for instance though simultaneous attacks from different directions, using the guns to fire chaff to confuse the APG-63, etc etc. I'm sure others with more knowledge can tell us more.

The point is though, it's not that the soviets were better or that they didn't had any weaknesses, of course they did, it's just that the americans and NATO pilots and aircraft where nowhere near as superior as they thought they were (or some think they were today). Imo, one of the biggest weaknesses of the WP air forces was that the soviet allies were not receiving the latest aircraft and were not upgrading their existing aircraft as often as the soviets did. For instance, WP air forces were still flying MiG-21s with RP-21 radars and RS-2US (and in many cases R-3S missiles of the Vietnam war era), both long gone from soviet first line service, and probably not in service at all. If they would have had a comprehesive program to upgrade the WP MiG-21M/MFs at least (forget about the older PF/PFM, they were due to be retired soon anyway, it's enough to just wire them for more modern missiles) to MiG-21bis standard with RP-22 radar and R-13M, R-60 and R-3R, and why not even R-73 missiles, coupled with more modern RWR, radio, navigation system and chaff&flare dispensers, would have been a welcome boost.

Oh and no one seems to have mentioned the utterly formidable sovier air defences, in the eighties they would have already systems that for the most part US and NATO did not met in combat not even today (and they go ape about whenever Russia is selling them to some countries US/NATO brand as enemies), namely the S-300, the Buk, Tunguska, Tor, advanced MANPADS, and a whole range of ECM systems that were never exported and probably were hardly known to the west back then, not to mention latest upgraded variants of the SAMs that were indeed met in combat in the seventies. The idea that the 59 F-117s could make a noteworthy dent in the soviet defences is also far fetched to say the least, like they would just serenely fly at will in soviet airspace with absolutely no worry at all. I'm sure you recall how that went in Serbia.

All in all, i agree with what some say that NATO and WP will just bleed eachother dry without either gaining any significant advantage... but after that no one would be left to know how it ended.
A few points

-My understanding is that the CIA had obtained technical data about (at least some of ?) the newer Soviet Aircraft radars so I suspect NATO ECM would have been initially quite effective in negating the Soviet BVR capabilities.

-I suspect in practice BVR engagements would have been of limited use for either side over the central front and the maneuverability of the F16 and similar air craft would have been usefull. My gut is also telling me that in close in combat that the NATO radars and ECM systems would probably have the edge over their Warsaw Pact counter parts. Details such as (at least some) NATO radar systems having close range modes for precise aiming of air to air gun fire with pulse to pulse frequency agility, combined with the information the CIA had (apparently ?) obtained about (at least some of ?) their Soviet counter parts would likely have given NATO the edge in my view.

Pilot training may also have played a role.
 
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The Warsaw Pact outside the Soviet Union had very low military spending - around 1% of GDP each, at a time when the Soviets were spending around 10% of GDP on the military and Britain and France were spending 5% of GDP on the military.

I can't help but think they weren't really interested in fighting WW3.

A situation where the minor Warsaw Pact members were spending similar portions of their national budgets on the military as NATO would be an interesting one. Not only is the WP more formidable, but it is also far less Soviet-dominated.

fasquardon

Actually, according to RAND, East German military expenditures had reached over 7% of NMP (net material product, roughly equivalent to GDP) by the 1980's.

It's also true, however, that there were limitations by Soviet policy, and more particularly by difficulties encountered by Warsaw Pact members, which worked to limit military spending, or more accurately, worked to limit it in particular ways. The Soviets DID want other WP members to spend substantially on their militaries - more than most apparently would have desired otherwise - but was also not too desirous to see its junior members become too powerful within the alliance - especially East Germany. However substantial the force size of most Warsaw Pact militaries, they had longer delays in purchasing the latest Soviet fighter aircraft and tanks than did, say, India and Syria.

As for East Germany: the first RAND study above notes, the GDR was encountering increasing difficulties maintaining its levels of spending on the military, due to a faltering economy, growing demands for higher standards of living, growing opposition to militarization of GDR society, and a shrinking pool of 18 year olds.

P.S. While it's still hard to nail down the data on Soviet military spending in a reliable way, they were almost certainly spending substantially more than 10% of GDP on defense. A CIA estimate a decade after the dissolution of the USSR estimated that it fluctuated between 14% and 16% of GDP in the 1980's.
 
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Imo, one of the biggest weaknesses of the WP air forces was that the soviet allies were not receiving the latest aircraft and were not upgrading their existing aircraft as often as the soviets did. For instance, WP air forces were still flying MiG-21s with RP-21 radars and RS-2US (and in many cases R-3S missiles of the Vietnam war era), both long gone from soviet first line service, and probably not in service at all. If they would have had a comprehensive program to upgrade the WP MiG-21M/MFs at least (forget about the older PF/PFM, they were due to be retired soon anyway, it's enough to just wire them for more modern missiles) to MiG-21bis standard with RP-22 radar and R-13M, R-60 and R-3R, and why not even R-73 missiles, coupled with more modern RWR, radio, navigation system and chaff&flare dispensers, would have been a welcome boost.

I see you just made the same point I did, only in greater detail.

And it's a telling point. The fact that the Soviets were apparently consistently more willing to sell the latest fighter jets in their inventory to more distant (and less formally allied) states like India than they were East European allies makes it hard to avoid the conclusion that they were reluctant to have militaries on their border with weapon systems that were too advanced. Of course, the result, as you say, was that overall Warsaw Pact air defenses were weakened as a result. But given what we now know about Warsaw Pact war plans, it seems what Moscow mainly wanted out of other WP armies was something in the vein of auxilliary forces, which would primarily take care of rear area defenses.

The idea that the 59 F-117s could make a noteworthy dent in the soviet defences is also far fetched to say the least, like they would just serenely fly at will in soviet airspace with absolutely no worry at all. I'm sure you recall how that went in Serbia.

I don't think F-117's would have been completely invulnerable. But I do think the Soviet air defenses would have struggled to neutralize them.
 
P.S. While it's still hard to nail down the data on Soviet military spending in a reliable way, they were almost certainly spending substantially more than 10% of GDP on defense. A CIA estimate a decade after the dissolution of the USSR estimated that it fluctuated between 14% and 16% of GDP in the 1980's.

The crux of it all is how you price the goods and services that made up the Soviet military-industrial sector. Soviet fictional prices made trouble for the Americans as well. 14-16% is a reasonable number at least.

I don't think F-117's would have been completely invulnerable. But I do think the Soviet air defenses would have struggled to neutralize them.

The real question is whether they could together blow a hole in Soviet defenses that other US forces could exploit.

The F-117s might have been glorified kamikaze planes, but if they could unload on suitably high-value Soviet targets before they were identified and destroyed, they could play a decisive role in WW3, potentially.

fasquardon
 
I see you just made the same point I did, only in greater detail.

And it's a telling point. The fact that the Soviets were apparently consistently more willing to sell the latest fighter jets in their inventory to more distant (and less formally allied) states like India than they were East European allies makes it hard to avoid the conclusion that they were reluctant to have militaries on their border with weapon systems that were too advanced. Of course, the result, as you say, was that overall Warsaw Pact air defenses were weakened as a result. But given what we now know about Warsaw Pact war plans, it seems what Moscow mainly wanted out of other WP armies was something in the vein of auxilliary forces, which would primarily take care of rear area defenses.



I don't think F-117's would have been completely invulnerable. But I do think the Soviet air defenses would have struggled to neutralize them.
I'd argue that the Soviets would also have struggled to neutralize the threat posed by F111's and Tornados. A single Tornado or F111 could do significant damage to high value target with PGM's.

If the targets were important enough I could see NATO being prepared to accept signifant losses so long as high value targets were being destroyed. (Ie. 4 aircraft take off, 2 or 3 come back after each mission that destroys a high value target.) By most standards inflicting 25 to 50 percent attrition would be an outstanding performance for an air defence system but when a single aircraft can destroy a target it isn't really good enough in my view.

Combined low level attacks by Tornados and F111's combined with high altitude attacks by F117's could have been very hard for the Soviets to deal with in my opinion.
 
Can the T-72 fire while moving at high speed because I definitely don't think it is capable of it. I have seen the T-72 exports traverse and they are not some slow thing and I don't know why the USSR would sell them without the traverse. No one would buy it. The T-72 export has hydraulic stabilization but is usually left off until contact becomes probable which in the case of the Iraqis means they may not have even had it on. In no small part due to failure of the Iraqi recon elements covering the approaches to the main body to alert this main body of the US advance. The traverse rate cannot be put to maximum as the stabilization will turn off in thr exports but it is not slow. Thermals are important for the gun range, but I know that the T-72B did not have the range of the M1, so what you say cannot be accurate. Otherwise where is it shown to have that kind of range. THnis is still contingent on ability to mass fire for successful battle outocomes, attributed directly to skill. The battle of Brody is a case where this did not happen as one historical example.

Skill differentials, opposing error, and technology that is what is mostly about in tank battles. In synergy.

The T-72B had a 1200m thermal range when in active thermal mode (I.E. with IR illuminator) and an 800m image intensification range in passive mode. I'm not sure what the M1's range was. Of course, that's only the thermal range, in regular daytime sights the range is 4,000 meters with the Svir missile, easily as much if not greater than an M1's gun range.

In terms of gun stabilization, the T-72B can indeed fire while on the move with a 2E42-2 stabilizer, accurate to within 0.5 mil on the vertical axis and 0.9 mil on the horizontal axis while moving. It's not quite accurate enough to hit individual people, but it can definitely hit a tank in the open while moving at moderate ranges.
 
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