If by changed you mean, "used it to paint the inside of an APC" then you are correct.
How did North Vietnam win the civil war (American Phase)?
As much as I hate Diem as a person, I must admit, his nationalist credentials (though few) are legit, and his tenure as President of SV only reinforced that.
I'd be interested in a timeline about a more competent Diem. I think him maintaining his earlier alliance with the CVT (rather than trying to sideline them in favour of the Can Lao Party's labour union) could have given him a real shot at resolving the woes of rural South Vietnam with minimal bloodshed.
The first fight between French regulars and Vietnamese regulars was in 1944. Granted, less open-field fight and more of two consecutive attacks/assaults on two separate outposts in the wild. The next serious fight was from 19 Dec 1946 to 19 Feb 1947, "Capital regiment" (wholly under-armed, under-numbered and other under- stuff) fulfilled the operation/strategic mission (to delay the capture of Ha Noi as long as possible). The one after that is mid-1947, when the regulars of Viet Nam (or rather, Viet Minh, France is re-building the "puppet" Vietnamese state at the moment) successfully repelled the assault of French (including riverine and airborne troops) into Viet Bac (the hilly/moutain area, north of Ha Noi).
And even then, before PRC starts shipping us weapon, we have initiated an attack against the French within their fortified positions. This was in 1950, "Operation Dong Khe" (in our tongue), or Battle of Route 4. Only after this operation that PRC started sending weaponry in any meaningful quantity.
Open secret by now. And I define "decisively turn the table" as actually launching a major attack (or create a situation) that force the French to step down.
Never heard of field Chinese troops actively fighting alongside Viet Minh/North Vietnamese (from 1950 to 1975 - that is 2 separate wars, mind you)
On another note, some whispers on the internet (translation: unverified, most likely false news) say that in Tet of 1963, Ho Chi Minh sent Diem a branch of cherry (the iconic pink flower of Tet in the northern region, its counterpart in the southern is a yellow flower). It can be interpreted as a signal of peace/truce (or something like that). No idea if Diem accepted or returned the gesture, though we do know that he has his mind changed permanently in November that year.
But the invasion wasn't reversed, only halted. Even as it was, this halting took over a month. Additionally, the ARVN performance in 1972, while still better then in 1975, and was then followed by six more months of bloody stalemate where the South was unable to roll back the gross majority of the Northern gains. Although a few cities were eventually retaken, half of the four northern provinces was permanently lost to the Communists, and would prove a "dagger to the heart of the South" in 1975. As for the ARVN, it's performance noticeably declined from it's peak in 1970. So we can tell it was in the process of getting worse in the early-70s (or, to be more accurate, regressing to their norm without the influence of American advisors), irrespective of the foreign aide situation. American material aid never affected the rampant corruption, deep politicization, and subversion by the Communists that were the root reasons for the ARVN's decay. Only the subordination of ARVN training, logistics, and personnel appointment to American military advisors did that and all that was gone after the American withdrawal since it couldn't work without significant troop commitment.
Similarly, in 1975, had the Americans sent in airpower the PAVN would have gone to ground after it's initial success, but by then they'd have already been in control of the Central Highlands, which the ARVN would not have been able to reclaim, and would have rendered the South indefensible. It means that the moment the next offensive kicked off, which would occur once the Americans drew down their air operations like they did after the end of the '72 air offensive, the South would've fallen faster then the Americans could even react. That was the North Vietnamese plan. That the Americans didn't intervene with airpower was a welcome surprise for them.
In all supplies available to the northern forces, the quantities were only a fraction of what the ARVN was "short on".
Erm, no. The ARVN fuel supplies were adequate to meet their needs. The problem was administrative, namely that the ARVN's logisticians were too busy engaging in black market activities or fleeing the country to bother arrange shipping for anything. The lack of foreign aide may be a useful scapegoat for the reasons for the defeat of South Vietnam in 1975, but the explanation doesn't hold up when one realizes that the North Vietnamese achieved everything they did with even less.
Further evidence can be found in the fact that in the places where the ARVNs leadership wasn't a bunch of corrupt political stooges, they gave the 1975 PAVN one hell of a fight.
Too illustrate the difference, we can look at two examples in the 1975 offensive of ARVN formations whose performance was on opposite ends of the spectrum: the 1st Division and the 18th
The 1st Division had a reputation of being the best in the ARVN after the successes of 1969/1970. This meant it was also the best equipped, best supplied… and also became the choice posting for the sons of the rich and powerful. Over the next five years, its formerly skilled officer ranks were replaced with pampered wannabe-generals. It was on the defensive perimeter around Hue when the Communists attacked. Despite outnumbering and outgunning the mere regiment attacking them, the division commander panicked after only 48 hours of fighting and surrendered the entire division, opening a huge gap in the ARVN lines, leading to the surrender of two other divisions and the rapid collapse of the entire defense of Hue. The Communists were so impressed with the readiness of the division to surrender that after only a brief 1 week "re-education" they put the 1st Division back to work moving supplies for their advancing Corps.
The 18th Division, by contrast, had a reputation as the absolute worst in the ARVN. It had formerly been the 10th, but was renamed as "Number 10" was Vietnamese slang for "the worst." This likewise meant it was at the bottom priority list for things like equipment, supplies, and replacements. The division had recently been assigned to the command of General Le Minh Dao. Dao was one of the best commanders in the ARVN, so good that the government identified him as a potential threat and shuffled him off to the 18th, which was basically a dead-end for his career. Dao whipped the 18th into shape, replacing incompetent officers, retraining the division, and rebuilding morale. The 18th was in the rear and took no part in the early battles around the Central Highlands, Hue and Da Nang - all disasters that saw the bulk of Vietnam's million-man army evaporate. By the time the Communists were advancing on Xuan Loc where the 18th had drawn up its lines there was little left to block the road to Saigon.
To date in the campaign other ARVN units had regularly folded in hours or days to smaller VPA forces, surprising even the Communists who had expected a stiffer fight. At Xuan Loc, the 5,000 men of the 18th faced an entire Corps of over 40,000. The Communists attacked, expecting an easy victory but were repulsed. They brought up more troops and attacked again, penetrating into the town before a series of ferocious counter-attacks again drove them out. They then pounded the town with heavy artillery and tried again in a masssive assault of tanks and infantry. After house to house and street by street fighting in which the infantry of the 18th knocked out dozens of T-54 tanks the VPA was again thrown back. When the 18th had been expected to maybe by a few days, it had now held for over a week.
The ARVN dared to hope that they might actually win, and plans were made to reinforce the 18th with the 1st Airborne Brigade, another of the South's elite formations. A massive helicopter drop was planned near Xuan Loc. Tragically the Ops Officer for the 1st Airborne sold the entire plan to the Communists, and the 1st Brigade dropped into one of the largest ambushes in history and was quickly annihilated.
With other ARVN units to the west breaking, half its strength casualties, almost out of ammunition, cut off and encircled with no chance of any reinforcement, the 18th's position had become hopeless. The VPA drew up six divisions around Xuan Loc and offered the 18th a chance to surrender. General Dao stalled through the day, and then in the night lead his the remnants of his division in a daring breakout to the south, punching through the Communist lines and escaping with his surviving troops to Saigon.
The bottom line is that the immediate reasons for the South's defeat in 1975 had less to do with the material situation and a lot more to do with poor political and military leadership which placed the ARVN in a very vulnerable starting position, and then proved utterly incapable of recovering after the initial setbacks.
Last edited:
I think my basic thesis stands. Nationalism was a big factor here. The more troops we sent in, the more it appeared to be a war between Vietnamese and Americans. They had had enough foreign domination and exploitation to make nationalism a powerful theme. We misunderstood this because we saw the world in ideological (communist versus free society) terms.
I'd like to nitpick a bit:
- The defending side has more than just the 18th Division. The number counts vary between sources but the lowest count, per reference from English wiki, put them at 12000 defenders. They also have support from armoured, air force, and some elite forces
- The attacking side of 40000 is on the whole operational theater (about 5~8km on the horizontal). Unknown force concentration in Xuan Loc alone. No air support (though assume moderate/standard AA)
Then, the only time someone perform well would be for a few hours on 30 April, where stiff fighting broke out at the gate of Sai Gon. The images of fallen T54 tanks (presumably with no infantry support) are public, and widely regarded as "just one step short of perfect victory".
I was actually intending to do a DiemSI but due to my financial state right now. It will just go into the bin of my unfinished timelines.
Last edited:
While this is a good post, I think it's worth noting that the entire section on the 1st and 18th divisions is copied from a post by IXJac on SpaceBattles, and this isn't immediately apparent.
When the U.S. left in January1973 the NVA wasn't occupying any cities in SV. After that it was a conventional war, and during that phase the U.S. Congress cut off aid. Most of the ARVN air force was grounded for lack of spare parts, ammo, and fuel were low, and no help was coming. The Soviets, and Chinese stepped up aid, and I believe the NVA had 14-18 divisions, with hundreds of tanks in support. They never used large numbers of tanks before, because they would've been destroyed by air power.
@ComradeH talked about the misconceptions relating to an army "unready, out of supplies, and left for dead", and that instead it was rather a well equipped army that simply lacked competence and was rife with corruption that it crumbled before the PAVN. I'm not exactly well versed in the "military history" play by play of the conflict, and Vietnam isn't my area of study, but I'm curious what the truth is
A good point. If your interested you need to study the subject. There are books about the period, from one side or the other. Talk to people who were involved, and sift though it all, before coming to you own conclusions. Then you'll still find the reasons for the defeat of SV were many, and very debatable. The point I was making, which is hard to refute was in the end the ARVN was abandoned by their American Allies, NV's Allies continued, and even increased aid. It's also clear the NVA was a more battle hardened army, under more ruthless discipline then the ARVN. The rest is open to debate.
The political competence of the DRVN/PRG ruling class, the excellence of their bureaucratic organisation, their capacity to best sell their political appeal to the majority nationality proletariat (other than the growing urban lumpen) and their capacity to operate their government deep within their opponents “territory” or in fact within their opponents government is uncontested. The corresponding excremence of the RVN is commonplace (if *rarely and partly* contested).
I know my opinion differs with correspondents here regarding the capacity of the DRVN/PRG to maintain the liberated areas and conduct 3-4 year offensives until 1989; we also differ on the probability of success of 1978, 1981, 1984, 1987 or 1990. I view both of these favourably.
Until 1990 it is a case of the VWP nomenklatura being unable to lose, and a matter of time before a General Offensive succeeds.
I think this is the core of their victory, despite Belisarius IIs points.
I know my opinion differs with correspondents here regarding the capacity of the DRVN/PRG to maintain the liberated areas and conduct 3-4 year offensives until 1989; we also differ on the probability of success of 1978, 1981, 1984, 1987 or 1990. I view both of these favourably.
Until 1990 it is a case of the VWP nomenklatura being unable to lose, and a matter of time before a General Offensive succeeds.
I think this is the core of their victory, despite Belisarius IIs points.
Not very sure about the "increased aid" for DRVN. The geopolitical landscape (translation: normalising between PRC and the US) means that the amount of aid to NV from the Communist bloc would decrease/get slower.
Still, I remember a tibid that even then, the total amount of aid sent to Saigon regime would still be higher. Hell. I even recall reading a newspaper article that early 1975, Saigon even sent a delegation team to the US, asking for a $700M support/aid package. Mind you, this is for (what would be) 6 months (ish). Meanwhile, according to this source (declassified info from CIA, pdf format), that $700M is almost the same as the total military support (equipment) sent by the Communist bloc from 1953 to 1967.
Still, the other 2 points are true. The Saigon regime is too dependent on the US to mount an operation (and sustain the war) by themselves.
marathag
Banned
It's really hard to actually gauge in US Dollars what WP,USSR and Chinese aid was sent, from Command Economies. Everything is arbitrarily priced, per the Soviets using CIA estimates to figure out what their own industry values were at