How did armies fight during the 17th and 18th centuries?

Random question, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, how did armies fight? Did they fight mainly using artillery, or was there still cavalry charges and men fighting using swords and pikes and such?
 
In 17th century European armies consisted of mainly pike squares, with musketeer minority on sides. Cavalry made an essential part of all armies during this time period, charging enemy flanks and often deciding fate of battles. Artillery was also heavily present most advanced European armies. These were mobile cannons that fired from back rows and and were instrumental in disrupting enemy formations and causing chaos.


During 18th century these pike squares gradually transformed into wide and thin lines and musketeers became the majority and later completely replaced pikes wih bayonets. Guns during the early modern era were pretty inaccurate, that's why armies were concentrated and fired all at once. Artillery became ever more numerous throughout the course of the 18th century.

I'm by no means an expert in this field so corrections will be appreciated.
 
In 17th century European armies consisted of mainly pike squares, with musketeer minority on sides. Cavalry made an essential part of all armies during this time period, charging enemy flanks and often deciding fate of battles. Artillery was also heavily present most advanced European armies. These were mobile cannons that fired from back rows and and were instrumental in disrupting enemy formations and causing chaos.


During 18th century these pike squares gradually transformed into wide and thin lines and musketeers became the majority and later completely replaced pikes wih bayonets. Guns during the early modern era were pretty inaccurate, that's why armies were concentrated and fired all at once. Artillery became ever more numerous throughout the course of the 18th century.

I'm by no means an expert in this field so corrections will be appreciated.

Alright interesting thanks
 
In 17th century European armies consisted of mainly pike squares, with musketeer minority on sides. Cavalry made an essential part of all armies during this time period, charging enemy flanks and often deciding fate of battles. Artillery was also heavily present most advanced European armies. These were mobile cannons that fired from back rows and and were instrumental in disrupting enemy formations and causing chaos.


During 18th century these pike squares gradually transformed into wide and thin lines and musketeers became the majority and later completely replaced pikes wih bayonets. Guns during the early modern era were pretty inaccurate, that's why armies were concentrated and fired all at once. Artillery became ever more numerous throughout the course of the 18th century.

I'm by no means an expert in this field so corrections will be appreciated.

That's not quite accurate with regards to infantry. Thickets of pikes girded by men armed with arquebuses or early muskets -- such as the tercios of Imperial Spain at its zenith -- were certainly the norm at the start of the Seventeenth Century, but they reached their peak during the Thirty Years War and began to decline in relevance thereafter as the thinning of the ranks continued and greater numbers of firearms proliferated. Pikes were eliminated for the most part by 1720 with the perfection of socket bayonet, but even that was invented somewhere around 1690.
 
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That's not quite accurate with regards to infantry. Thickets of pikes girded by men armed with arquebuses or early muskets -- such as the tercios of Imperial Spain at its zenith -- were certainly the norm at the start of the Seventeenth Century, but they reached their peak during the Thirty Years War and began to decline in relevance thereafter as the thinning of the ranks continued and greater numbers of firearms proliferated. Pikes were eliminated for the most part by 1720 with the perfection of socket bayonet, but even that was invented somewhere around 1690.

Alright interesting, and by the French Revolutionary wars? Was it mainly infantry and guns, or was there still some cavalry? Where would the aristocrats be? As officers in the rear?
 
In many ways, the Napoleonic Wars actually marks the height of heavy cavalry, once they start coordinating well with horse artillery; they had the thunder of cannon as their sabres, to paraphrase Napoleon. Practically speaking, this meant charging towards infantry to force them to form square, which makes a good concentrated target for the horse artillery. Unsupported infantry in column could be torn to shreds like at Marengo, and Murat's corps relentlessly hounded the Prussians after Jena. Infantry are still the core of any large force in the French Revolutionary/Napoleonic period, but it's all about combined arms.

Regarding aristocrats, while most commanding officers in the Coalition armies would be officers, they were honor-bound to fight at the head of their men; at Borodino, no fewer than 23 generals were killed or wounded. In the pre-revolutionary French army, though, there was a massive surplus of officers relative to actual positions; somewhere around one general for every four hundred soldiers. They didn't have an assigned place in the battle line.
 
In many ways, the Napoleonic Wars actually marks the height of heavy cavalry, once they start coordinating well with horse artillery; they had the thunder of cannon as their sabres, to paraphrase Napoleon. Practically speaking, this meant charging towards infantry to force them to form square, which makes a good concentrated target for the horse artillery. Unsupported infantry in column could be torn to shreds like at Marengo, and Murat's corps relentlessly hounded the Prussians after Jena. Infantry are still the core of any large force in the French Revolutionary/Napoleonic period, but it's all about combined arms.

Regarding aristocrats, while most commanding officers in the Coalition armies would be officers, they were honor-bound to fight at the head of their men; at Borodino, no fewer than 23 generals were killed or wounded. In the pre-revolutionary French army, though, there was a massive surplus of officers relative to actual positions; somewhere around one general for every four hundred soldiers. They didn't have an assigned place in the battle line.

Alright interesting, so at this point it would be expected for most officers to lead from the front? if the King was to lead into battle, would he be expected to lead from the front, or from the reserve?
 
The French army for example, the AUstrians and the Prussians

Short answer: During this period most of the fighting was done by the infantry, with cavalry and artillery in supporting roles.

Long answer: At the beginning of the period (roughly 1600 to 1650) infantry was roughly two thirds pikemen, armed with a ten-to-twelve foot pike, and one third musketeers, armed with a matchlock musket. All also carried swords (and often daggers) for close combat with other infantry. The pikemen would form up in rectangular blocks with musketeers in smaller blocks on either flank and often a screen of musketeers in front of the pikemen. Because of the inaccuracy and unreliability of the matchlock musket most infantry combat was at very short ranges (fifty meters or less). When infantry entered into melee with other infantry the musketeers would drop back behind the pikemen or switch to sword to support them. If threatened by cavalry the pikemen would form a hollow square with the musketeers and nearby artillery sheltered inside. The emphasis is on melee combat with musketry very much in a supporting role.

Cavalry were armed with wheelock pistols and sabres; they would ride up to enemy formations, fire their pistols, then ride back to reload before riding forward again (a maneuver known as the caracole, after a common dance of the period). If the opposing formation was disorganized, artillery, or other cavalry they would charge them with sabre as well, but avoided charging formed infantry, against which they had little effect.

Artillery were either light bronze guns (3 lbrs, usually) deployed forward of the infantry and used to bombard opposing infantry at the beginning of the battle, or heavier bronze or iron guns deployed to the flanks or rear of infantry formations in support. In both cases the gunners would abandon their pieces if threatened, taking refuge with nearby infantry until the immediate danger had passed. Both types were drawn by draft animals and were usually not moved during the battle.

During the next period (roughly 1650 to 1700) first came the advent of light guns drawn by horse teams, known as gallopers; these could be easily repositioned during the battle, unlike earlier guns, so were more flexible. As muskets improved in quality the proportion of muskets to pikes increased; by 1670 the proportion was roughly two thirds musketeers and one third pikemen. Toward the end of this phase flintlocks began to replace both matchlocks and wheelocks; the flintlock's greater accuracy and reliability pushed engagement ranges to roughly one hundred meters. The introduction of first plug bayonets, then socket bayonets, rendered pikes unnecessary and they disappeared by 1700.

By 1700 the standard formations and tactics for the next hundred and fifty years are established. The infantry, in long lines several ranks deep, armed with flintlock musket, socket bayonet, and a sword; the cavalry, armed with flintlock pistol and/or carbine and sabre, in much the same roles as before, having abandoned the caracole in favor of more effective shock tactics; the artillery, with newer, lighter, and more mobile guns, able to reposition as needed, but filling the same supporting role as before. The emphasis now is on musketry and cannon fire, with infantry and cavalry charges employed to finish off weakened and/or demoralized opponents.

To answer your question about differences between the various national armies, in practice most used the same weapons and tactics; any differences were minor. What did matter was training and discipline; the better trained and more disciplined armies had large advantages both in maneuver and in combat.
 
Alright interesting, so at this point it would be expected for most officers to lead from the front? if the King was to lead into battle, would he be expected to lead from the front, or from the reserve?

From the front in all cases. Picture the 17th or 18th century battlefield; masses of men marching to and fro, volleys of muskets and cannon roaring, huge clouds of dust and smoke obscuring the view. A general at the rear would have no real idea what was going on and would be relying on what others reported to him; reports which might well be outdated or inaccurate by the time he got them. To be effective he has to see for himself what is happening, and that requires him to be at or near the front. An added benefit is that the troops can see him there as well, allowing him to inspire them by word and action. And what holds true for generals is even more true for lower ranked officers.

The case of a king or other titular ruler is slightly different, since that ruler has other responsibilities as well; if he is killed or captured the consequences could go well beyond those of a military defeat. Gustavus Adolphus' death arguably stalled the Protestant campaign in the Thirty Year's War, causing that conflict to drag on far longer than it otherwise might have, to give one example. The risk might outweigh the reward in this case.
 
From the front in all cases. Picture the 17th or 18th century battlefield; masses of men marching to and fro, volleys of muskets and cannon roaring, huge clouds of dust and smoke obscuring the view. A general at the rear would have no real idea what was going on and would be relying on what others reported to him; reports which might well be outdated or inaccurate by the time he got them. To be effective he has to see for himself what is happening, and that requires him to be at or near the front. An added benefit is that the troops can see him there as well, allowing him to inspire them by word and action. And what holds true for generals is even more true for lower ranked officers.

The case of a king or other titular ruler is slightly different, since that ruler has other responsibilities as well; if he is killed or captured the consequences could go well beyond those of a military defeat. Gustavus Adolphus' death arguably stalled the Protestant campaign in the Thirty Year's War, causing that conflict to drag on far longer than it otherwise might have, to give one example. The risk might outweigh the reward in this case.

There's a fairly good discussion of this in the The Mask of Command as it relates to Wellington. I'd add that, as Keegan rightly phrases it, the choice of the general is not if he should lead from the front, but when he must do so. For Wellington, the answer was as often as not, because of precisely what you describe.
 
1) When? - there is a significant difference between 17th and 18th centuries armies, as previous posters noted 2). Where? You seem to mean western European style armies. I'm not an expert, but I think that, for example, Ottoman tactics were somewhat different - I'm not sure if Janissaries ever fought as pikemen (although they sometimes used spears); janissaries, and to some degree Eastern-European infantry (Polish, Hungarian, Russian) relied more on their firepower and their own cavalry against enemy horsemen. In early 17th century there was a period were western style cavalry also used more often their firearms than swords or sabers, ineffective against pikemen; it was changed by Gustavus Adolphus who had observed how ineffective that tactics was against quick charges of Polish cavalry.
 
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From the front in all cases. Picture the 17th or 18th century battlefield; masses of men marching to and fro, volleys of muskets and cannon roaring, huge clouds of dust and smoke obscuring the view. A general at the rear would have no real idea what was going on and would be relying on what others reported to him; reports which might well be outdated or inaccurate by the time he got them. To be effective he has to see for himself what is happening, and that requires him to be at or near the front. An added benefit is that the troops can see him there as well, allowing him to inspire them by word and action. And what holds true for generals is even more true for lower ranked officers.

The case of a king or other titular ruler is slightly different, since that ruler has other responsibilities as well; if he is killed or captured the consequences could go well beyond those of a military defeat. Gustavus Adolphus' death arguably stalled the Protestant campaign in the Thirty Year's War, causing that conflict to drag on far longer than it otherwise might have, to give one example. The risk might outweigh the reward in this case.
Alright interesting, so for a king it depends on rewards versus risk and whether he trusts his subordinate commanders
 
tbh I would advise looking up the military tactics of Prince Eugene, the Duke of Marlborough, and Napoleon. Read in depth and you will also get an understanding of their adversaries' tactics, and what the general maxims of the period were in Western and Central Europe.
 
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