How Crucial Was Trafalgar?

Of course Trafalgar did not end the Napoleonic Wars directly, certainly not on land ... not even at sea.
Trafalgar cost the French only 10 battleships directly (the Spanish actually suffered more), though 5 more were lost in its aftermath

Good points made here but missing the several areas where Trafalgar WAS crucial

Firstly, the crushing victory at sea in 1805 strengthened British resolve enough that their morale survived Bonaparte's successes on land later in 1805, 6 & 7

Pitt himself may have despaired after Austerlitz but his famous quote "Roll up that map of Europe, it will not be wanted these twenty years" proved to be too pessimistic. A fact that other Britons recognised after his death. (It was only 3 years before the wheels came off Bonaparte's dream, though it took another five for them to be crushed and another year before the "Corsican Ogre" was properly caged).

Secondly, the loss of the core of French Battlefleet was something Bonaparte spent treasure and diplomatic credit trying to repair. Even in 1814, with the Prussians and Russians approaching the Rhine he was writing to his Minister of Marine urging expenditure to complete a program that aimed at getting 104 modern battleships in Europe. (At that date the RN had ~ 100 with world wide commitments)

Thirdly, and most importantly, the reduction in the Ships of the Line available to their enemy allowed the RN to concentrate their resources in smaller cruisers and escorts.

The RN had in active commission
In 1794 14 3 deckers, 71 2 deck battleships, 20 smaller 2 deckers, 88 Frigates, 10 Sloops, 76 smaller escorts
In 1814 12 3 deckers, 87 2 deck battleships, 10 smaller 2 deckers, 121 Frigates, 25 Sloops, 360 smaller escorts

Of course, the numbers in active commission don't tell the whole story.
Most of the ships available in 1814 were new, larger more powerful designs, replacing vessels lost to the sea or simply worn out.
(In 1814 there were more than 80 other battleships still theoretically afloat but "relegated" i.e. storeships or prison hulks)

That enormous growth in protection ships would not have been possible without Trafalgar
and those ships made possible the final defeat of Bonaparte.
 
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If the Spanish fleet is intact after Trafalgar that could have interesting repercussions on the Wars of Independence in Spanish America
 
Of course Trafalgar did not end the Napoleonic Wars, certainly not at sea.
Trafalgar cost the French only 10 battleships directly (the Spanish actually suffered more), though 5 more were lost in its aftermath

Good points made here but missing the several areas where Trafalgar WAS crucial

Firstly, the crushing victory at sea in 1805 strengthened British resolve enough that their morale survived Bonaparte's lesser successes on land later in 1805, 6 & 7

snip

Of course, the numbers in active commission don't tell the whole story.
Most of the ships available in 1814 were new, larger more powerful designs, replacing vessels lost to the sea or simply worn out.
(There were more than 80 other battleships still theoretically afloat but "relegated" i.e. storeships or prison hulks)

That enormous growth in protection ships would not have been possible without Trafalgar
and those ships made possible the final defeat of Bonaparte.

I think you make a good argument but a word of caution on the growth of cruisers in the RN. At least some of that was driven by the needs of the RN in North America where the USN did not have any ships of the line of its own but it and US Privateers needed to be contained and US coastal and international trades likewise interdicted.

Also I note in your figures an increase in 3rd rate battleships of 16. Despite the moniker these are not nearly as divergent in firepower and manning requirements from 1st and 2nd rate ships as some appear to think. The third deck served more to provide space for an Admiral and his staff (small besides in this era) than extra firepower.
 
If the Spanish fleet is intact after Trafalgar that could have interesting repercussions on the Wars of Independence in Spanish America

The key factor in Spain's loss of Empire was the devastation and confusion from the Peninsular War,
brought on by Bonaparte's betrayal of his staunchest ally.

Assuming the surviving Spanish Fleet was stronger, but still blockaded by the RN in 1807 or 8,
that would have been an even greater incentive for Bonaparte to act and put himself in direct control of that resource.
(see his plans for the Danish Fleet thwarted in 1808)

Unless the Bourbons are better prepared (and have better backbone) I wonder how great the divergence would be.
 
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I think you make a good argument but a word of caution on the growth of cruisers in the RN. At least some of that was driven by the needs of the RN in North America where the USN did not have any ships of the line of its own but it and US Privateers needed to be contained and US coastal and international trades likewise interdicted.

Also I note in your figures an increase in 3rd rate battleships of 16. Despite the moniker these are not nearly as divergent in firepower and manning requirements from 1st and 2nd rate ships as some appear to think. The third deck served more to provide space for an Admiral and his staff (small besides in this era) than extra firepower.

All good points to consider, but note that 7 years elapsed after Trafalgar before the USA became an enemy.

From 1794 the RN was building new ships in response to French policy and abilities. It was the same in 1805.
In general, the French built big, manned heavily but still lost to RN ships provided the differences were not too great (See Sybille vs Forte)

These experiences resulted in basic changes to RN ship designs during both the Revolutionary & Napoleonic wars
  • the average British First Rate grew from ~ 100 guns to nearer 120 to match the French in battle
    (see L'Orient in 1799 cf HMS Caledonia in 1808).
    However, few extra above replacements were built because the RN needed numbers for flexibility.

  • Second Rates of 98 guns were kept (or replaced) but as you say mostly as flagships or on distant stations

  • For Third rates, the numbers of active vessels I have quoted are slightly misleading.
    In 1794 the RN was still preparing for war and had many ships in refit, repair or reserve.
    (especially battleships: 24 third-rates plus 8 three-deckers).
    So by 1814 the number of Third Rates had not grown as much as it first seems
    but importantly, their size and armament improved significantly.
    The small 64 almost disappeared and the 74 became the standard, supplemented by even larger captures.
    On many 2 deckers, Lighter upper deck guns were replaced by carronades with heavy throw weight.
    (As you say that makes them closer to the three-deckers of 1794 in combat power).

  • Fourth rates and Fifth rate two-deckers were known to be obsolete even in 1794
    (too weak for the line, usually too slow as a cruiser )
    They were retained mostly as command ships (like HMS Abergavveny of Mr Fitton fame)

  • Fifth Rate Frigates changed the most.
    in 1795 only 19 of 88 Frigates carried the 18lber while the rest were all 12lbers.
    None rated more than 38 guns most being 32s or 28
    (however, all RN ships had more than their rate counting all lighter pieces or especially carronades).
    in 1814 102 were 18lbers while only a dozen 12lb ships remained.
    Most were rated 36 or 38 & had replaced some light guns with carronades for a heavier broadside.
    There were 6 "super Frigates" with 24lbers rated 40+ guns, built/adapted in response to USN big Frigates
    Note however that the RN built heavy frigates before 1800 in response to similar French designs e.g. Pomone. (This included the razee 44 with 24lbers, HMS Indefatigable of Hornblower fame)

  • non-rated ships and even Six Rate post ships tended to be bigger and better armed
    including carronades as on the 18 gun brig that became so numerous

These RN shipbuilding practices simply continued and accelerated when the USN and American Privateers become a factor

Figures from: The Frigates, James Henderson
 
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Bonaparte's betrayal of his staunchest ally.
Staunchest is setting the bar rather low. Mostly Spain was a lukewarm, unwilling ally. In 1805, Spain started gearing up to join the latest coalition in opposing France, only to find France kicked Prussia's butt so quickly Spain was left demobilizing before it ever got mobilized and sputtering out excuses to Napoleon as to what all that was about. It showed Nap not only how unreliable Spain was, but how dangerous it was to leave Spain unattended.

But, yeah, Spain having a fleet would have been it even more attractive for a takeover. Portugal's fleet was a prize Nap eyed enviously in his attempted takeover there. It slipped out of port mere hours before French forces got there, protected by the British fleet (another tale of lousy allies, but that's another story)
 
Staunchest is setting the bar rather low. Mostly Spain was a lukewarm, unwilling ally.

You are rather missing the point.

yes Spain was "lukewarm" to what Napoleon wanted i.e total subservience to his commands
but compared to territory incorporated into France( Holland etc), governed by imposed French generals ( much of Italy etc), or nominally created but under French "Protection" ( Poland etc) , Spain was at least a semi-independent nation.

In the Revolutionary war, Republican France had declared war on Monarchist Spain
but in 1795 (?) Spain voluntarily switched sides - and to be fair to them - kept it that way till 1808 when betrayed

Bonapartes other "allies" (at various times most smaller German States, Austria, Prussia and even Russia) only did so under threat; usually after a drubbing and pillaging at the hands of the Grande Armee a year or so before!

so - on reflection, I think staunchest ally is still appropriate

In 1805, Spain started gearing up to join the latest coalition in opposing France, only to find France kicked Prussia's butt so quickly

On the contrary in 1804, Spain started gearing up to join France but was technically still neutral at that date.

In fact, Spain had signed a convention to pay Napoleon a lot of money each year until it did fight!
When Britain intercepted Spain's latest bullion convoy in October 1804, (an illegal act I'm afraid),
Spain had to declare war on Britain because it simply could not pay the agreed tribute.
Therefore long before Austerlitz or even Ulm in late summer 1805
Spain was fully in the war AGAINST the Coalition not JOINING it.



BTW Prussia did not fight in 1805,... I assume you mean Austria
 
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You are rather missing the point.

yes Spain was "lukewarm" to what Napoleon wanted i.e total subservience to his commands
but compared to Holland (incorporated into France), Italy (much governed by imposed French generals), or Poland (created under French Protection) etc etc Spain was at least a semi-independent nation.

In the Revolutionary war, Republican France had declared war on Monarchist Spain
but in 1795 (?) Spain voluntarily switched sides - and to be fair to them - kept it that way till 1808 when betrayed

Bonapartes other "allies" (at various times most smaller German States, Austria, Prussia and even Russia) only did so under threat; usually after a drubbing and pillaging at the hands of the Grande Armee a year or so before!
Hi
so - on reflection, I think staunchest ally is still appropriate



On the contrary in 1804, Spain started gearing up to join France but was technically still neutral at that date.

In fact, Spain had signed a convention to pay Napoleon a lot of money each year until it did fight!
When Britain intercepted Spain's latest bullion convoy in October 1804, (an illegal act I'm afraid),
Spain had to declare war on Britain because it simply could not pay the agreed tribute.
Therefore long before Austerlitz or even Ulm in late summer 1805
Spain was fully in the war AGAINST the Coalition not JOINING it.



BTW Prussia did not fight in 1805,... I assume you mean Austria
I meant 1806. Spain was tired of being bullied by France into being more active in the war(s). Spain was on the verge of switching sides yet again, and had started mobilizing troops, but the shocking speed of Napoleon's victory over Prussia and the 4th coalition had Spain retreating from that idea. Although they came up with a pretext of mobilizing to put down domestic discontent, Nap saw through it and decided Spain couldn't be trusted.

You quite eloquently wrote exactly why Spain as 'staunchest ally' is such a low bar.

Spain didn't quite voluntarily switch sides in 95 or 96. After a decent start to War of the Pyrenees, they were getting the snot beat out of them. They cried uncle, fearing horrible losses, switched sides, but only nominally aided the French and mostly only did so when coerced. In the War of Oranges, Spain was told to invade, or be invaded. Still, Spain did the bare minimum in the war and eagerly accepted Portugal's defeat when they could have gotten so much more (This also ticked off France). It was more or less the same thing in 1807, although here Godoy was duped into thinking he would gain personally. Godoy merely allowed France entry into Spain, where part two of the invasion turned on Spain.
 
I meant 1806.

If it was 1806, well then yes that would be the Prussians.

and of course, that change of date renders my own comments on Spain's policy in 1804-5 irrelevant. :happyblush
and yours about Godoys proclamation of mobilisation in 1806 are quite true
Except I had read that the excuse given to Boney was that the forces were to be for use against Britain
at which Boney promptly coopted some 14,000 of the best Spaniards for use in Eastern Europe.

Further, Spain actively participated in the French invasion of Portugal in 1807 and not just collaborated by allowing the French forces to pass through as Spanish apologists would prefer to remember.
(IRRC the division of forces attacking was ~ 25K French under Junot aimed at Lisbon: ~25K Spanish aimed at Porto)

So, on balance, Spain was STILL acting as an effective Ally to Napoleon (in so much as he had allies not tributaries)
when he betrayed them in 1808 by trying to seize direct control of the nation.

Please feel free to disagree ... though perhaps we should start a separate thread, as we are well past Trafalgar

Likewise, in a separate issue, I think perhaps your post was blurring the timeline before 1800 as well :confused:

in 95 or 96 ... they cried uncle, fearing horrible losses, switched sides

The key point here is switched sides. French successes on land had knocked other nations out of the First coalition (Treaty of Basel) but only Spain went further and joined France (Second Treaty San Ildefonso, specifically aimed at Britain ... with aggressive not defensive aims for the Spanish )

IMHO that justifies my initial use of voluntarily switched sides

but only nominally aided the French

It seems a bit impractical of the French revolutionaries to ... what was your wonderful image, ah yes ... beat the snot out of them and yet immediately expect effective action from those defeated armies against their former allies.

Even Napoleon was more reasonable. On occasion, he enforced a surrender, a treaty of subservience but he gave his victims a time to recover a bit before demanding direct military aid in another campaign
(See Battle of Wagram & Treaty of Schonbrunn in 1809 and the Austrian contribution in 1812)

In any case, Spain gave rather more than nominal aid on the Naval side from 1796 till 1802
(See Battle of St Vincent 1797 or actions in the Gut 1801 )
and was also involved outside Europe
(mostly on the defensive against minor British naval/amphibious projects it is true)
France even required Spain to transfer battleships to make good their losses at the Nile
(part of Third Treaty of San Idelfonso 1800)


In the War of Oranges, Spain was told to invade, or be invaded.

True, but what you do not mention is that this was not in 1796 at the end of War in the Pyrenees
but not until 1801 after 5 years of "alliance"
Of course, this was demanded by Bonaparte who had overthrown the French Government and made himself dictator

and of course, Spanish power, especially naval power, had been eroded by years of heavy defeats at sea, a (fairly) tight blockade and interception of trade from the RN.

It was more or less the same thing in 1807

LOL ... or perhaps as a British Parliamentarian may say
"I refer the Honorable Gentleman to the answer previously given"
 
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Derek Pullem

Kicked
Donor
A loss at Trafalgar for the British wouldn't have resulted in an invasion of Britain. So in that sense it wouldn't immediately change the Napoleonic wars.

But it would reduce the chances of an effective British intervention in the Peninsula in 1807, even assuming the success at Trafalgar doesn't bolster the Bourbons in Spain. So more likely that Godoy doesn't fall out with Napoleon and there is no invasion of Spain in 1808. Even if some kind of Spanish Civil War does happen between pro-French and reactionary Spanish forces, It might be more difficult for Britain to intervene effectively with half the countryside against them.

No Peninsula war would mean Napoleon's reserves are much greater and possibly enough to weather an alt-1813 campaign.
 
No Peninsula war would mean Napoleon's reserves are much greater and possibly enough to weather an alt-1813 campaign.

No war in Iberia (or more likely, a rebellion that is crushed) butterflies a ton of events - it's hard to predict the rest of the Napoleonic Wars altogether. The Fifth Coalition probably never happens.

It’s really hard to get a French/Spanish victory at Trafalgar though. They are not prepared to do battle.
 
F/S winning OTL Trafalgar is a tough row to hoe, but avoiding it isn't. I seem to recall that the French commander opted for brash action (taking the fleet out) when he got word that he was being replaced. If F/S goes out at a different time, with a different commander, perhaps the winds favor them. Perhaps they survive enough to learn and improve, so that they can present some sort of credible threat. What if there simply is no Trafalgar at all, and the morale boost/deflation (depending on which side you are on) doesn't happen? Iberian relations may change. Perhaps Spain doesn't show signs of switching sides, which changes Naps OTL view of them as non trustworthy. The butterfly theory posits that small changes ripple larger and larger.
 
F/S winning OTL Trafalgar is a tough row to hoe, but avoiding it isn't.

True ... avoiding the OTL Battle of Trafalgar can be achieved in many ways - even if we restrict ourselves to those POD that predominantly favour the French & Spanish rather than the British

The first and easiest POD is aborting the whole "Trafalgar" campaign.

That could occur if Bonaparte aborts his invasion plans early (after all he changed it at least 3 times in OTL)
and in fact abandoned the invasion months before the fight at Trafalgar itself.

More likely is if Nelson and the RN Mediterranean squadron manages to block Villeneuve's OTL escape from Toulon

If either of these happens the RN is left to continue its widespread tasks of Blockading major ports and hunting any elements that do escape.

FYI in March 1805 this included (counting Battleships alone):
  • Holland (9 French & Dutch battleships): not part of OTL Trafalgar
  • Brest (21+ French) : blocked in OTL by RN Channel Fleet
  • Rochefort (~3 -4 French): at least 2 escaped to join Villeneuve in the West Indies
  • Ferrol (4 French + 8 Spanish):
  • Cadiz (1 French + 18 Spanish): freed by Villeneuve after his escape. 1F + 6S Joined V in the WI.
  • Cartagena (6 Spanish): left behind when V passed as without orders to join
  • Toulon (11 French): Villeneuve command. the only major force to escape blockade
  • at large in West Indies (5 French under Missiessy) ironically recalled before V.'s escape
 
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[snip]A loss at Trafalgar for the British wouldn't have resulted in an invasion of Britain. So in that sense it wouldn't immediately change the Napoleonic wars.

I must agree here, even if the RN loses (which isn't likely given the state of training between the English and French/Spanish fleets) there's too many other ships and crews to take their place. The main thing a loss would mean is that the French have a fleet in being that has to be watched and prevented from trying an invasion, which means less intervention elsewhere. This can only help Bonaparte but it won't get him to Blighty...
 
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