How could France hold in 1940, and what would be the aftereffects?

So, how could France hold its own against Germany during the Battle of France, and what would occur because the French kept fighting?
 

The Dude

Banned
I once made a thread positing that the French could have built the Maginot Line to the English Channel. The reason they didn't do this OTL was because they did not want to alienate Belgium. Belgium eventually still broke any close ties with France, but by then it was too late. If they had basically said, "screw Belgium, we're building it", then they likely could've finished it. Since the Maginot Line was one of the best defensive structures of all time, to the point where the Germans were only able to take it after cutting the French off from supply and attacking from behind, while most of the defenses were front-oriented. If the Maginot Line stretched from Alsace-Lorraine to the English Channel, there is a good chance that Germany would not be able to break through.
 
More importantly, define "hold." Can Paris fall but France has to keep fighting, or do the French have to hold Paris, or...?
 
Well if the French could move enough troops up to the Sedan to hold the Germans then there is a chance that the breakthrough that took place in OTL will fail and the British and French would be able to fall back far enough to strengthen the defensive line.
 
So, how could France hold its own against Germany during the Battle of France, and what would occur because the French kept fighting?

The Germans could also keep to the original plan which was basically a modified Von Schlieffen Plan. Their superior tactics allow them to advance quite a bit and they take Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg before getting stuck on the Somme river out of exhaustion after fighting through the bulk of the French army.

Germany is supplied by the Soviet Union, but Stalin cuts off supplies and attacks in the east in late 1940. German army is superior, but outnumbered with most of its cream units are stuck in France and so the Red Army advances using sheer weight of numbers. Germany surrenders somewhere in 1941.

I don't know about the peace treaty although I suspect Stalin will establish puppet regimes in Poland (and possibly Czechoslovakia) while seriously addressing the faults of the Red Army. I assume Italy stayed neutral which means it will end up much like Francoist Spain. This means fascism will remain a tolerated ideology and that fascists will try to clearly distinguish themselves from National-Socialism. On France and Britain, I don't know for sure.
 
All aboard the Butterfly train! So, how far back can we go for the POD?
1925 ish
I once made a thread positing that the French could have built the Maginot Line to the English Channel. The reason they didn't do this OTL was because they did not want to alienate Belgium. Belgium eventually still broke any close ties with France, but by then it was too late. If they had basically said, "screw Belgium, we're building it", then they likely could've finished it. Since the Maginot Line was one of the best defensive structures of all time, to the point where the Germans were only able to take it after cutting the French off from supply and attacking from behind, while most of the defenses were front-oriented. If the Maginot Line stretched from Alsace-Lorraine to the English Channel, there is a good chance that Germany would not be able to break through.
It also would have alienated Britain, but I like this idea. Thanks for the help.:)

More importantly, define "hold." Can Paris fall but France has to keep fighting, or do the French have to hold Paris, or...?
I'd like to keep Paris, but if you've an idea to keep the French fighting after the fall of Paris, we'd love to hear it.
Well if the French could move enough troops up to the Sedan to hold the Germans then there is a chance that the breakthrough that took place in OTL will fail and the British and French would be able to fall back far enough to strengthen the defensive line.
I like this idea as well.
 
Paris Russia

How about Paris gos the way of Russian citys. Retreating French troops dig in near and in Paris. There is a fight for Paris. German fources could even win. They would loose so many men and so much material that other operations would be postponed. As a result there is no O******** S** L***.
 

Cook

Banned
I once made a thread positing that the French could have built the Maginot Line to the English Channel. The reason they didn't do this OTL was because they did not want to alienate Belgium. Belgium eventually still broke any close ties with France, but by then it was too late.



The deciding reason why the Maginot Line did not extend to the English Channel is because of the close proximity of French industry to the Belgian border. In 1940, as in 1914 the heart of France lay between Paris and Brussels. The Maginot Line could not run north of the French industrial region without crossing the Belgian Frontier; it could only go through the industrial region or south of it.
In the advent of war the alternatives would have been watch the industrial areas pounded to pieces or abandon them to the enemy before the fighting even started.
 
Read Charles de Gaulles theories on the French military post-WWI. Basically he called for a more mobile army that you know, actually incorporated tanks and airplanes. He didn't call for a Blitzkreig style army per se, but he did go down the same path that many German strategists did. He understood the value in a mobile army that did not fight World War One all over again. This mobile army would be far better positioned to fight it out with the German Panzers in Northern France. That, combined with a Stalingrad-esque Paris and maybe Lenningrad-style Dunkirk could possibly blead the Germans pretty bad, allowing for a Russian attack and British support.
 

Cook

Banned
The greatest failing of the French Army in 1940 was in command and control and their understanding of modern tactics. The first is because they had conspicuously failed to keep pace with improvements in technology and the second can be laid squarely at the feet of the great obstacle to French defence thinking; the Maginot Line.

The French Army in 1940 had a command and control system that was little better than it had in 1918 and was quite possibly worse. The Orders were usually sent by dispatch riders. The headquarters of the Commander in Chief of the French Army, General Gamelin, did not even have a radio. When asked about the lack a radio he said that it might have revealed the location of his HQ. Prior to the German offensive reports were taking up to 48 hours to reach Gamelin’s headquarters and his orders another 48 hours to reach front line commands. So even before the massive disruption of the German attack the French were struggling to respond to something at their front in less than 5 days. In five days the Germans were able to conquer Holland, reach the outskirts of Brussels and reach Montcornet; half way to the English Channel!

Had the French had a more satisfactory communications system they might have been able to respond to the German attack better. Their army was very limited in motorised transport; the French armies of 1940 for the most part literally marched north into Belgium, but the bulk of the German Army was likewise limited in motorised transport so this was not disastrous handicap.

In 1933 Colonel Charles de Gaulle published his book ‘Towards a Professional Army’. The title alone is clear proof of de Gaulle’s lack of talent when it came to winning friends and influencing opinions; if you want to persuade your military superiors to change their ideas it does not help to start by implying that they are unprofessional. The senior commanders of the French Army were so incensed that they ordered that all future articles or lectures by serving officers needed to be approved by them prior to publication, effectively quashing discussion.

The armoured and motorised force proposed by de Gaulle had another problem getting funding; the Maginot Line. French Politicians did not want to spend large sums on money on an armoured force when they had already spent an enormous sum on the border defences. Critics asked if this new force was to be put in front of or behind the Maginot Line. Nevertheless by May 1940 France did manage to field three armoured divisions, or more correctly three ‘light mechanised divisions’ consisting of one tank brigade, a motorised infantry brigade, a regiment of artillery and a regiment of armoured cars and assigned the role previously occupied by the cavalry; reconnaissance and scouting. Had they been given the principle counter-offensive role of the Army things might have been different; had they been tasked with promptly attacking the German breakthroughs at the bridgeheads over the Meuse they could have made things very difficult for the German Panzer divisions, possibly even stalled the German offensive. But that would have required prompt responses to events by the French High Command.

The German Panzer offensive was directed through the Ardennes region, a region the French ruled out as a rout of attack because of its hilly nature, narrow and poor quality roads. When they did attack the result was an enormous traffic jam behind the German spearheads, a highly visible, very vulnerable, traffic jam that was actually reported by French reconnaissance aircraft flying over the area. The reports were discounted because they did not conform to French High Command’s expectations of where the German attack would come.

If the German river crossings of the Meuse had been promptly met by armoured forces, and the panzer and truck convoys behind, stuck on the narrow and twisting roads of the Ardennes been bombed and strafed by the French air force the entire offensive could have died there and then. Instead the crossings and the convoys were unhindered by air attacks.

Not only did the French Air Force high command ignore reports of tanks moving through the Ardennes but following the Luftwaffe attacks on French Airfields on the first morning of the attack a very large number of French Aircraft were flown south to airfields out of range of German attacks without any record being kept of where they were being sent. So although the French had aircraft as good as the Germans, and in numbers actually greater than the Germans, they at no stage had air superiority over the battlefield or even came close to challenging German air superiority.

As to the Maginot Line itself, most of its armaments were facing forwards and could not provide all round defence and it did not contain large numbers of troops ready to counterattack any German breach in the line; so once it had failed anywhere and the Germans were in behind the line it was doomed and the troops left manning static defences facing the wrong way. Besides which the Maginot Line could be built all the way to the English Channel without cutting through French industrial and mining areas; so the Germans didn’t need to breach the French defences, they just drove around them.

Without the Maginot line the French could have been exploring the best use of tanks right from the end of the First World War. Instead of large numbers of slow moving tanks spread amongst the infantry they could have had an armoured spearhead at the front of their army, and would have had the money to afford ten or more armoured divisions in 1938 when Hitler had only three. With such a balance of forces the Munich conference could have had a very different outcome and a German offensive in 1940 would never have eventuated.
 
Easiest POD: Belgium's previous king (King Albert) doesn't die in a mountain climbing accident in 1934 at age 59. King Albert keeps Belgium in alliance with the French. I would have to look into Belgian politics to be sure, but I believe it was his successor that instituted the rather deluded policies that pretty much insured that most of Belgium would get fought over. If Belgium continues in alliance with France, and allows French troops to be stationed in Belgium, then the French don't have to make a dash into Belgium and risk a meeting engagement with the Germans. The Germans have to attack Belgian fortresses that actually have enough men to defend them. Belgium and France get to actually plan their defenses rather than improvising under the pressure of German attack. The French army had many faults, but if it got a chance to set up defenses and register artillery the regular divisions (as opposed to the B-Series reserve units that took the brunt of the German attack historically) were very tough on the defensive.

Next easiest: The French somehow bluff the Germans into going into Belgium on the French timetable rather than the German one. I did a scenario where they managed that for my AH newsletter several years ago. The key here is that the Luftwaffe of 1940 was a fair-weather air force. The Germans historically chose a time of extended cloudless weather for their attack. If the French could force a German attack to happen during an extended period of bad weather that would go a long ways toward neutralizing German air superiority. So how could the French have pulled that off? Some kind of intelligence scam indicating that the Belgian government had secretly agreed to let the French in, plus French troop movements that appeared to confirm that. Of course trying to pull something like that would be incredibly risky for the French. If Belgium finds out about it the implications would be extremely bad for the French.

Next easiest: (might of might not have been sufficient) The French do a better job designing the Moraine-Saulner 406 or get the Dewoitine 520 into production quicker. The MS406 was the main French fighter in the early going of the war, but was inadequate and they were in the process of converting from it to the Dewoitine 520 at the time of the German attack. A substantial portion of the French fighter squadrons were in the process of conversion when the Germans attacked, which magnified the German air superiority in the first few crucial days of the attack. Getting radar into service with the French early enough that they knew how to use it effectively would have helped too.

Things that might not have been enough but would have helped: The French don't do the Breda variant of the Dyle plan. The Breda variant sent seven of the best French divisions, including the best of their light armored divisions (DLMs) all the way across Belgium and into the Netherlands. That would have been a great place to have them if the Germans had followed their original plan. As it was, it put half of what would have been the French central reserve about as far from the action as it could have gotten. If that light armored division had been lurking around Sedan, especially with an impetuous general like Giraud in charge of it, the Germans would have probably been a bit more wary of leaving open flanks. The DLMs were formed from the old French cavalry and were much more mobile-minded than most of the French army. They proved themselves to be a match for a panzer division on the defensive, though they didn't have the offensive power of a panzer division.
 
The French actually had not one but two types of armored divisions. The DLMs grew out the cavalry and was based around the Somua S35, which was actually a pretty decent tank, though they also used Hotchkiss H35/H39s, which were inadequate--decent armor, but generally a low a low velocity 37 mm gun with very little anti-tank capacity. The French had three DLMs and they acquitted themselves reasonably well in the fighting.

They also had three DCRs initially and formed another one after the German attack started. DCRs were, kind of a heavy armored division. DCRs were built around the B1 series of French heavy tanks. The French put an enormous amount of effort into getting B1 tanks into mass production, but none of the pre-war DCRs did much to justify all of that effort. Part of the problem was that the DCRs were very recent formations. You can't expect to put a bunch of random guys into tanks and have them work together as a division. Another part of the problem was that DCRs were visualized as a means of bashing in part of a static line, not as a breakthrough and exploitation formation.

And that's probably more than you wanted to know about French armored formation.
 

Archibald

Banned
Plenties of P.O.D are possible - from March 1936 to late June 1940 !

Rule of thumb: the french army was not well organized, but it had the numbers. By contrast the Wermacht (and Luftwaffe), before the Czech invasion and the Skoda takeover, were laughable.

If a war ever break out before September 1938, the french wins by the number. A slow, inefficient and bloody victory, but a victory by overwhelming numbers.

Fight for the Czechs in September 1938 would make an awesome timeline. The Germans are pretty much f...ed out without Skoda's panzers.

From 1939 onwards Germany is superior. Yet that doesn't mean a garanted victory.

Any change (even minor) during the phony war can change history. I remember some excellent timeline (on a french forum) where Gamelin is fired early March 1940. Butterflies result in late May stalemate.

May 13, 1940: early crossings of the Meuse by the Germans was quite lucky - lot of luck in fact. Only a handful of soldiers crossed the river, but together they managed to knock out some bunkers - and create an embryonic bridgehead.

May 15, 1940: a stronger counterattack from Stone and Le Mont Dieu
(15 km south of Sedan bridgehead: the Germans called the place a 1940's Verdun. It's says all.)

After that continental France is essentially lost: nothing can stop the Wermacht reaching Abbeville and trapping the Allies in northern france.

But the legal governement - what's left of the 3rd Republic - can chose to move to Algier and resume fighting in north Africa - making Vichy and Petain power moot.
The power struggle between De Gaulle and Petain reached a climax around June 14 1940 - deciding of the country fate. Or the governement moved to Algier, resumed fighting, and remained on the Allied side (De Gaulle); or the governement returned to Paris and peace was made with the Germans (Petain.. well, you know)
 
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