How can you plausibly get a WWI 'East first' strategy?

You wa t to call it mistrust?
Actually, I would call it "Rubbing two braincells together". Révanche has been official french policy since 1871 and few, if any, people would trust the French to keep their word when opportunity presents itself. Therefore, the additional securities demanded would make it impossible to take the opportunity. The fact that they were never presented to the french government speaks volumes about the german expectation on french behaviour. Namely that they will, no ifs, not buts, no whens, declare a war if a chance of victory presents itself. Therefore, they are treated accordingly.

But wait, aren't you the one with the sweeping assertions and proclamations? The burden of proof is on you. You assert and assert and assert, and the others present proof of opposing view and counterargument. And yet, you reply to me who disgresses only in interpretation. Can't touch the others, can you? If you can, prove it. And I am still waiting on the proof from the other thread where you so sweepingly asserted that the French would roll over a line the failed to penetrate OTL. Even worse they hurt themselves quite badly attempting to do so.Maybe you need a map for illustration of on how narrow a front the french would need to break through. This thread has a good one. Mind you, this is the day and age of "Attaque à outrance", the shell crisis and little to no fortress-buster artillery on the attacker side and a fortified border and difficult terrain on the defender side. In hindsight, it is little surprising to see the French failing badly. And yet, you proclaim loudly and certainly that they will break through and occupy all the Rhineland in a matter of day. Maréchal Joffre, is that you?
Fine but if the mistrust isn't backed by fear, it doesn' matter
Only if the Germans are afraid of what the French wi do does mistrust matter
Really? Ever heard the term "opportunity cost"? I'd reccommend you read the various military theorists, starting with Clausewitz and Sun Tzu who go on at length about the interrelation of opportunity and victory.
If the Germans thought they could hold the West with four armies against a hostile France, why not put four armies in the West and go East?
Knock out France, then deal with the Russians. Although this points out how far out your "The Germans are afraid of the French" argument is. You don't make a plan which relies on knocking out the weaker enemy first to free up all forces for the harder foe, if you are afraid of said weaker enemy.
If the French stay neutral, your spared an enemy If they break their word, you can stil
Defend yourself.
To consider such a thing in the first place, you need a minimum of trust. And since "Révanche!" and black-coloured A-L on school maps and so an and so forth, such trust was inexistent. The only thing the german army trusted the French to do was to attack. Therefore, the demand for securites which would make a betrayal impossible. It is very german, I suppose. "Geordnete Verhältnisse" and all that.
Instead, the Germans take this East first idea and reject it
See the rest of the thread for why this absolute statement is false.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
snip

In one scenario I choose the simple expedient of having Wilhelm choose to not invade Belgium without too much reason to why. Maybe that is high handed but the POD does seem within the vacillating of our dearest Kaiser. Whether that stands to scrutiny in these discussions is another matter. But to then assure the British are not going to war still requires more than merely no invasion of Belgium in my opinion, maybe not a big push, but something needs to be discussed and offered to settle it. To get us to shift weight eastward requires more than hindsight, I argue we need to find the forks in the road and likely some accidents.

It would be ideal if Germany possessed a stronger strategic vision and had made greater preparations but that is another debate my friend!
Thank you for the thumbs up! I prefer to have at least some rationale rather than mere sleight of hand, I think the quality of discussion here deserves a little meat on the bone we pick with.
IMHO the approach to "serve" the OP with a rather "accidental" choice of Kaiser Bill - or any other "accidental" happening/POD - would be most sufficient.

Anything else that would/could offer some "better", more thorough preparation, materiell as well as mentally would require a much earlier POD with a lot to change and ... a lot changed, that probably might avoid a World War 1 at all ...
However, it would be quite speculative.
An "East First" by "accident" would be IMO much easier to be thought through, At least ... a lot of what happened IOTL was never thought of or even be possible ... i.e. like the duration of more than 4 years.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
snip
While the German military were fully aware of the likelihood of a long war, civilian preparation for such was non-existent.
In that I would only partially agree. At least they actually HAD a financcial preparation, that lasted to serve Germany well until beginning/midth of 1916.

The laws (4 or 5 IIRC) to "re-regulate" finance, i.e. abandoning of the gold standard ... and its camouflage were all prepared since the 2nd Morocco crisis and were all implemented at the Reichstags-session on 4th August 1914.

Btw, the "enactment"-law for the Reichsrat to regulate economics without the Reichstag was something inserted into one of the mentioned laws on the "last moment".
The outprints for the members of the Reichstag had to be redone on Monday 3rd August.
Source : the Reichstags-protocols in which the president has to point at this especially.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
Without the Germans plunging through Belgium, ...

... the Anglo-French forces
... British continued involvement ...

.
... and here I have my biggest problems.

Without the "rape of Belgium" or any agressive german action ibn the west I struggle to see Britain being part of the party from sometimes within 1st week of hostilities. But the longer the battles last on the continent I struggle even more to "draw" the Brits into the game, not finding a plausible "cause of war" ... beside handwaving.

I would be VERY pleased, if someone comes up with a plausible chain of events, that draw Britain "in" after an initial - though France-friendly - neutrality in the conflict.
 
... and here I have my biggest problems.

Without the "rape of Belgium" or any agressive german action ibn the west I struggle to see Britain being part of the party from sometimes within 1st week of hostilities. But the longer the battles last on the continent I struggle even more to "draw" the Brits into the game, not finding a plausible "cause of war" ... beside handwaving.

I would be VERY pleased, if someone comes up with a plausible chain of events, that draw Britain "in" after an initial - though France-friendly - neutrality in the conflict.

It does seems Britain would have some kind of ultimatum (OTLs don't invade Belgium) before declaring war on Germany. But here Germany isn't doing anything right away, perhaps shuttling first or second army east, perhaps waiting for a French invasion of Belgium, or waiting for the Austrians to actually occupy Belgrade.

If the Germany eventually plunges across the Russian frontier a few weeks later (perhaps in response to Russian armies invading Austria), and Russia loses these frontier battles, perhaps Britain gives Germany the ultimatum to settle up and make peace now or ELSE, but yeah handwaving.

Regardless, a delay of some weeks in a Britain DOW, has some serious benefits to Germany, bringing merchants home, stacking stuff in the colonies, bringing reservists home or to the colonies, crash importing strategic supplies, fitting out armed merchant raiders and putting them on the high seas. War is now going to be unpleasant and long with no moral high ground.

So it almost seems an reasonable British cabinet has to declare war along with the French and Russians right from the get go. Perhaps it can be explained that the DOW is just a natural extension of so far failed negotiations over Serbia, we still can make peace if a deal can be reached, at first we just blockade and pick up colonies.
 
... and here I have my biggest problems.

Without the "rape of Belgium" or any agressive german action ibn the west I struggle to see Britain being part of the party from sometimes within 1st week of hostilities. But the longer the battles last on the continent I struggle even more to "draw" the Brits into the game, not finding a plausible "cause of war" ... beside handwaving.

I would be VERY pleased, if someone comes up with a plausible chain of events, that draw Britain "in" after an initial - though France-friendly - neutrality in the conflict.

I admit to not knowing enough of the deeper thinking to truly predict the Liberal leadership vote here, but I agree that without Belgium the Asquith government can more easily fall away from the war. It may force Grey to resign and others once she does, I still think the UK neutralizes the Channel to France's salvation but no BEF, at most a cold shouldering of Germany but not a true blockade. For myself I had to either have the hawks in the Liberal Party accept a divided party and plunge ahead on their fear of German "domination" rhetoric or look at the possibility of the Greeks intercepting the Ottoman battleship released to her by a neutral Britain, this provoking a war in the Aegean and drawing in the UK to back the Greeks with France in the thick of it, Germany falling out to the Ottoman side. The topic has been debated here as to plausibility and such, taking it as a real possibility opens the door for a British entry on the side of "civilization" yet. I have not found any others to date.
 
I still don't understand why people think Britain's involvement was a 'touch and go' thing that Germany could make plans around her non-belligerency.

In the 1900s Britain:
  • Aligned to Japan to assist in the Pacific.
  • Reached Ententes with France and Russia over outstanding colonial issues, paving the way for Alliance.
  • Named Germany her #1 naval threat, abandoned the 2 Power Standard and instituted the 60% rule where the RN must be 60% larger than the German Navy.
  • Developed new classes of capital ship and then undertook and won a Naval Arms Race against Germany
  • Reformed her Army and equipped it with modern weapons with the idea of forming and Expeditionary force
  • Reorganised her Navy and developed a mobilisation plan for a major European war
  • Opposed Germany at several international crises before WW1
  • Undertook Staff talks with France about deploying an Expeditionary force, which became the Army's only plan
  • Reached an agreement with France where the RN would guard the French Channel coast
  • Conducted a practice fleet mobilisation in July 1914, but never de-mobilised and sent the war fleets (Grand, Channel, Med rather than 1st, 2nd 3rd which were peacetime administrative divisions) to their war stations before war was declared; ie Britain was first to mobilise!
Germany is supposed to ignore all of this and develop plans based on the hope that all this inertia will come to nought? The evidence people use that it might come to nought; a bit of mutual vacillation on the part of a couple of leaders over 2 or 3 days that in the end went exactly as Germany had assumed it would from at least 1912 and as early as 1908?
 
It looks like some people are giving tactical priority (exploitation of the poor state of russian armies in comparison to Germany's) over strategic objectives.

In turn I'd say you are prioritizing operational-strategic objectives over actual strategic objectives. Keeping Britain and the US out of the war and giving Russian and French decisionmakers the option to believe that the war was not an existential question for them were actual strategic priorities, not optimal unit deployment.
 
Keeping Britain ....... out of the war

That's not something that was decided by the initial mobilisation-offensive, but rather by years of political and diplomatic actions and events that a few telegrams/phone calls in the chaos of mobilisation isn't going to overcome.
 
That's not something that was decided by the initial mobilisation-offensive, but rather by years of political and diplomatic actions and events that a few telegrams/phone calls in the chaos of mobilisation isn't going to overcome.

I don't really disagree with you, but it makes a difference.

Actual strategic thinking would have been to see that relations with Britain were bad but reparable and worked harder to have avoided an avoidable war until the fixes could have been made.
 

BooNZ

Banned
I would be VERY pleased, if someone comes up with a plausible chain of events, that draw Britain "in" after an initial - though France-friendly - neutrality in the conflict.

Sorry, nothing definitive. I agree if the Germans remain substantially on the defensive in the west, there is no rational reason for the British to immediately declare war and/or throw themselves immediately into the action, especially for a nation that strived to maintain a free hand. However, I would expect Britain to do everything short of declaring war and/or shipping troops to the continent. I would expect the Germans at that point would be bending over backwards to keep Britain neutral. I would expect Britain from 1915 would start to pressure the French to seek peace to preserve at least the territorial status quo in the west. This is what I think is the most likely scenario if Belgium is not invaded.

However, notwithstanding the above, I do think it is entirely possible for Britain to fall into the war. Bunches of old white guys huddled in a room do not always choose the best options, since the strength of opinion and gravitas can sometimes carry the day - and the British war party were a very vocal and motivated minority. The British might also act on incorrect information i.e. assume the Germans are actually to invade Belgium. As you know, I am a firm proponent of appeasement and hand wave the British into the war to save forum member tears...
I still don't understand why people think Britain's involvement was a 'touch and go' thing that Germany could make plans around her non-belligerency.

From various commentaries on ANZUS, there is a significant distinction between very, very good friend and an ally. The British Foreign Office leading the British Franco-Philia charge before the war did not represent mainstream Britain, nor those making the call on Britain entering the war. In the absence of an alliance, the British would make a decision in the best interests of Britain and if Germany is focusing on Russia it is difficult to see how those British interests would be served by rushing into the fray.

Notwithstanding the above, from a German planning perspective it would be prudent to assume British belligerence being the worst case scenario, irrespective of the more recent Anglo-German diplomatic niceties. I would go further and suggest in the prudence in their planning may have gone further and assumed Belgium belligerence, since with my limited imagination, that is the only rationale reason for the Germans to invade Belgium.

Can you explain for me the role of a belligerent Britain if Belgium is neutral?
 
Can you explain for me the role of a belligerent Britain if Belgium is neutral?

Financier, naval blockade, land campaigning on the periphery of Europe, you know basically everything they did IOTL without having ~50 divisions in France.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
... lookling for a possible way to "insert" Britain back into the gam,es after initail neutrality :
  • where to sold the russians their grain from the Black Sea ports ?
  • was Britain IOTL a BIG purchaser of russian grain or was its "share" on russian grain rather low and they got their grain from elsewhere ?
(think of getting them into the war via the Ottoamns closing the straits and thereby "threatening" Britains food base.
IMO it should be something, that copuld be sold to the british public as something "esential".)
 
... lookling for a possible way to "insert" Britain back into the gam,es after initail neutrality :
  • where to sold the russians their grain from the Black Sea ports ?
  • was Britain IOTL a BIG purchaser of russian grain or was its "share" on russian grain rather low and they got their grain from elsewhere ?
(think of getting them into the war via the Ottoamns closing the straits and thereby "threatening" Britains food base.
IMO it should be something, that copuld be sold to the british public as something "esential".)

Russian grain wont do it IMO. Far too easy to switch suppliers and buy from the US.
 
I still don't understand why people think Britain's involvement was a 'touch and go' thing that Germany could make plans around her non-belligerency.

In the 1900s Britain:
  • Aligned to Japan to assist in the Pacific.
  • Reached Ententes with France and Russia over outstanding colonial issues, paving the way for Alliance.
  • Named Germany her #1 naval threat, abandoned the 2 Power Standard and instituted the 60% rule where the RN must be 60% larger than the German Navy.
  • Developed new classes of capital ship and then undertook and won a Naval Arms Race against Germany
  • Reformed her Army and equipped it with modern weapons with the idea of forming and Expeditionary force
  • Reorganised her Navy and developed a mobilisation plan for a major European war
  • Opposed Germany at several international crises before WW1
  • Undertook Staff talks with France about deploying an Expeditionary force, which became the Army's only plan
  • Reached an agreement with France where the RN would guard the French Channel coast
  • Conducted a practice fleet mobilisation in July 1914, but never de-mobilised and sent the war fleets (Grand, Channel, Med rather than 1st, 2nd 3rd which were peacetime administrative divisions) to their war stations before war was declared; ie Britain was first to mobilise!
Germany is supposed to ignore all of this and develop plans based on the hope that all this inertia will come to nought? The evidence people use that it might come to nought; a bit of mutual vacillation on the part of a couple of leaders over 2 or 3 days that in the end went exactly as Germany had assumed it would from at least 1912 and as early as 1908?

Indeed, I struggle with the notion that Britain indeed merely needs Belgium to join, otherwise she is contented. I think the Cabinet would split on anything less, Belgium gave adequate cover and even then the dissent was not fully muzzled. Thus I have attempted to add some warm water to thaw Anglo-German mistrust further, enough to help ease the Belgian is inviolate leap. I still have the UK effectively a hostile neutral, shunning Germany, black listing her, giving credit and supplies to France, keeping the HSF out of the Channel, supporting Greece and pressuring Italy. It is now a balance. In fairness it wanks up the British a bit, but then I have the UK step in to loan heavily to Russia, loans that evaporate post-war, and her economy does not get near as much boost because France is more independent. Britain has a different economic problem post-war, not as dire, but still no easy sailing.
 
Indeed, I struggle with the notion that Britain indeed merely needs Belgium to join, otherwise she is contented.

Britain didn't do most of that stuff with Belgium being the invasion route in mind, indeed most of it was done when Germany had a multitude of plans, the Belgium route became the only option in 1913.

I still have the UK effectively a hostile neutral, shunning Germany, black listing her, giving credit and supplies to France, keeping the HSF out of the Channel, supporting Greece and pressuring Italy.

That was what Germany assumed from 1908 to 1912.

Once Britain had conducted staff talks with the French from 1911 and made the Channel naval agreement in 1912 Germany decided that no matter what happened Britain would be a combatant in the Franco-Russian war. The SF through Belgium became Germany's only campaign plan the year after.
 
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