First of all: Stop that. Calling other viewpoints "asb batshit crazy" makes you come off as lacking both respect for the others and self-restraint. You are not automatically right if you keep pounding your points of view, and the others not wrong.
And that tells me what exactly? That the germans were quite certain that the frenchies will stab them in the back, given opportunity? And that it is therefore better to either procure a security or see to it that others back any promises made by them? Neither of them tells me that the germans were afraid, merely that they would not trust a promise given by the french without further security.
Moltke Jr. said many things. Blowing up a single sentence from a single letter into the CONFIRMED OPINION OF THE GREAT GERMAN GENERAL STAFF is disengnious at best.
That is a quite peculiar interpretation of the points you have stated. Maybe it was not so much "fear" as it was "mistrust". After all, redeploying armies takes time, and it is quite a difference whether or not a fortress is fully staffed or only a skeleton crew remains. It seems to me that you tend to see things under the lens of a severe germanophobia (that is, the germans can never win and they are always a threat). As for the why your points are factually wrong, the the post by
@NoMommsen for details, it serves no purpose to reurgitate them again.
I would not call a position on an issue under contention by several very knowledgeable posters with access to original documents "hogwash". And I expect a very, very thourough examination as to why and where the french would succeed in an endavour they failed so miserably OTL. That is to say, why should the battle of A-L play out any differently if Schlieffen is not carried out?
(Hint: it was demonstrated a few years ago that attacking on such narrow a front makes any sort of numerical or material superiority beyond the amount of OTL meaningless)