How can you plausibly get a WWI 'East first' strategy?

An interesting discussion. I do believe though even a Germany even where everybody is fully mobilized still has political/military leverage. Germany has a fearsome military reputation, is known to practice the art of war seriously. Aggression attacking such a country is a high risk move even for a fully mobilized Russia and France.
 

BooNZ

Banned
A very cogent rebuttal to the notion that the "Schlieffen Plan" was simply stupid, despite our now hindsight clarity, at the time it does offer a means to an end.
I agree with your assessment of the quality of the rebuttal, but my opinion the 'Schlieffen Plan" was simply stupid has not moved.

To answer the OP I think one needs to alter the ground work for war in Europe in a few keys areas at minimum. One, you need to have Germany either forced to look East "first" or make the Russian planned offensive look more menacing. Two, you need to have Belgium simply be inviolate in German planning, perhaps a UK more effective in making its belligerence hinge on Belgium with that being an unacceptable development by Germany. Three, a recognition that the war can last beyond the limited objectives and contained timeframe as expected, in other words a Germany backstopping its planning with a long timeline plan, a multi-front war spanning years not simply a campaign season or two. To get a viable war in the East but only defense in the West you are looking at changing some of these persons, much of their actions and probably a few key events. This war may not spark at an assassination or it might spark faster with a more decisive opening of the war by Russia in response to A-H, or something else entirely. At bottom there is likely more to it than any one POD, it may be an involved chain of events that set up a different war.

If we take another look at the stand-off between the Kaiser and Moltke J, I understand Moltke J was said to have felt 'very alone' during the altercation. Some commentators have suggested the altercation 'broke' Moltke J. Given the winner of the OTL East-West debate was close to collapse, I don't think we need a particularly onerous POD for Germany to decide not to invade Belgium.

The German military do not appear to have been fully sharing their assessments of potential military outcomes with their civilian counterparts. While the German military were fully aware of the likelihood of a long war, civilian preparation for such was non-existent.
 
I agree with your assessment of the quality of the rebuttal, but my opinion the 'Schlieffen Plan" was simply stupid has not moved.

If we take another look at the stand-off between the Kaiser and Moltke J, I understand Moltke J was said to have felt 'very alone' during the altercation. Some commentators have suggested the altercation 'broke' Moltke J. Given the winner of the OTL East-West debate was close to collapse, I don't think we need a particularly onerous POD for Germany to decide not to invade Belgium.

The German military do not appear to have been fully sharing their assessments of potential military outcomes with their civilian counterparts. While the German military were fully aware of the likelihood of a long war, civilian preparation for such was non-existent.

in these discussions we can only make headway using our invaluable hindsight, after all we are discussing alternatives, but the trick is to temper ourselves into the foresight needed to make the changes more than just speculative on our part. Walking through the OTL invasion of Belgium and subsequent sweep into France strikes me as the gravest of gambles and out of step with how the German staff thought through its problems, it gives too many traps and requires too many breaks to make me love it. So stupid might be our hindsight talking but we agree that it has a rocky road to success and Moltke's bets failed.

In one scenario I choose the simple expedient of having Wilhelm choose to not invade Belgium without too much reason to why. Maybe that is high handed but the POD does seem within the vacillating of our dearest Kaiser. Whether that stands to scrutiny in these discussions is another matter. But to then assure the British are not going to war still requires more than merely no invasion of Belgium in my opinion, maybe not a big push, but something needs to be discussed and offered to settle it. To get us to shift weight eastward requires more than hindsight, I argue we need to find the forks in the road and likely some accidents.

It would be ideal if Germany possessed a stronger strategic vision and had made greater preparations but that is another debate my friend!
 
In one scenario I choose the simple expedient of having Wilhelm choose to not invade Belgium without too much reason to why. Maybe that is high handed but the POD does seem within the vacillating of our dearest Kaiser. Whether that stands to scrutiny in these discussions is another matter. But to then assure the British are not going to war still requires more than merely no invasion of Belgium in my opinion, maybe not a big push, but something needs to be discussed and offered to settle it.

In this case all you need is for Wilhelm to believe not invading Belgium will keep the British and their navy on the sidelines. Maybe they will or maybe they won't and the how and when they enter the war is another issue. What matters is what Wilhelm believes.
 
In one scenario I choose the simple expedient of having Wilhelm choose to not invade Belgium without too much reason to why. Maybe that is high handed but the POD does seem within the vacillating of our dearest Kaiser. Whether that stands to scrutiny in these discussions is another matter. But to then assure the British are not going to war still requires more than merely no invasion of Belgium in my opinion, maybe not a big push, but something needs to be discussed and offered to settle it.

In this case all you need is for Wilhelm to believe not invading Belgium will keep the British and their navy on the sidelines. Maybe they will or maybe they won't and the how and when they enter the war is another issue. What matters is what Wilhelm believes.

Thank you for the thumbs up! I prefer to have at least some rationale rather than mere sleight of hand, I think the quality of discussion here deserves a little meat on the bone we pick with.
 
Thank you for the thumbs up! I prefer to have at least some rationale rather than mere sleight of hand, I think the quality of discussion here deserves a little meat on the bone we pick with.

He decides he doesn't want war with England because:

1. He doesn't want his beautiful fleet to become irrelevant
2. He doesn't want Germany's newly acquired colonies to be written off from the start.
3. He doesn't want to go to war with a country his army can't defeat.
4. He doesn't want to give his English cousins the satisfaction of painting him as some sort of international bandit.
5. All of the above.

Again, maybe London joins the war anyhow. The point is that Wilhelm decides not invading Belgium will keep them on the sidelines and the reasons above make that a good thing.
 
The whole use our mobilization speed advantage to beat the French before the Russians could mobilize was bad politics.

All Russia has to do to put Europe to war and flames is mobilize her army. For Russia and Austria mobilizing is just political escalation, for Germany its instant war.

Germany in 1914 doesn't need war. Its a large populous country with leads in industries like electronics and chemicals, The borderlands with mixed populations or German minorities are under her control, or they are in counties where Germans have high political status (Austria, even Russia).

Her longest boundaries are not in dispute (1815 Congress of Vienna), none of the powers want more Poles.

She has a colonial empire that is just starting to turn a profit in places after much sunk money invested.

Germany should have adopted a defensive strategy in both the east and west. She has a fearsome war reputation which can achieve much politically without having to use it. If the French and Russians fully mobilize and invade, Germany can defeat the invasion (likely Britain remains neutral).

Likely with such a strategy, the Serbian crisis ends with the Austrians in occupation of Belgrade (only) and an international conference.

Can the German navy defeat/draw the Franco-Russian navies though, or will they be ground down by a blockade? I don't know enough about the balance of forces there.

An East-First strategy might happen if WWI was delayed till the 1920s, and Russia's rail capacity is a lot scarier than in Schleieffen's day.
 
Can the German navy defeat/draw the Franco-Russian navies though, or will they be ground down by a blockade? I don't know enough about the balance of forces there.

An East-First strategy might happen if WWI was delayed till the 1920s, and Russia's rail capacity is a lot scarier than in Schleieffen's day.

The Russian Baltic Fleet was weak in 1914, although later in the year they will gain the Gangut's. Even then they spent much of the war behind minefields, the numerical superiority of the HSF was too great. The HSF can't really get at the MN, the British didn't want the Germans running down the channel. The Germans, might be able, if they take enough colliers, to go the long way around England, but still have to reach landfall somewhere to actually recoal, and then find the MN to fight them. All in all there isn't much the HSF and the MN can do to each other, geography being what it is. The Russians on the other hand, are at risk against the German HSF.
 
The Germans (and French) recognized there were no good options available for the French to attack across the German-French border.

The French had plenty of commanders who had not figured that out - as evidenced by Plan XVII and rivers of cran being poured into each generation of French officers at St. Cyr right up to 1914.
 

BooNZ

Banned
It was a big gamble, yeah, but there are some aspects of this gamble that must be taken in consideration:

German strategic thinking considered that russian mobilization (together with the french one, in the context of the franco-russian alliance) represented an existential threat to Germany because they considered themselves unable to fight both countries in a conventional two front war. To correct this grim possibility, in the absence of a political understanding between the parts, the german plan offered a "solution": should Russia not stop it's mobilization, Germany should act before it's complete. Taking advantage of it's infrastructure and organization, Germany would mobilize and first, seize the initiative and catch the enemy armies flat footed. If Germany waited forever and no political solution came, the general staff considered they'd be doomed because they'd be unable to match the numbers and fight a fully organized and mobilized franco-russian combinee. The german successes during the Battle of Frontiers happened because they were better prepared to preempt the initiative from the french.

Where did you get the Germans did not believe they could fight Russia and France in a two front war? Using mobility offered by railways and interior lines was the cornerstone of German thinking in the decades following 1871. The prospect the Germans might be outnumbered on both fronts was recognized as a potential future problem, but I'm not aware of the Germans concluding it was an impossible scenario.

Prior to 1905 the most often mooted solution to Germany having to face a two front war was to use superior mobility to defeat its enemies in detail, most often by way of counter attack as close as possible to German supply lines. That is more-or-less the opposite to seizing the initiative and catching enemy armies flat footed. To recap, the 'Schlieffen Plan' was the antithesis to traditional German military doctrine.

The German success during the Battle of the Frontiers arose because the German understood the inherent tactical advantages of defensive positions, while the French had been too thoroughly indoctrinated with the cult of the offensive, without the requisite tools to make it work. The OTL Battle of the Frontiers is representative of what would happen if Belgium was not invaded, except on a grander, bloodier scale.

As outlined above, the decision Moltke had to make was a difficult one: unleash the Schlieffen Plan and expect that Germany makes good strategic gains...or do nothing and hope for a political understanding, knowing that a few days later the military solution (should Germany's enemies choose that) would be unwinnable. To be honest, Moltke, indeed, waited, to the detriment of the timetables, more than necessary. The moment Russia started to mobilize and then refused to stop, Moltke had just two choices, do nothing and for the best (and since the military situation would be unnatenable, Germany and Austria would need to make every political concession asked from them), or unleash "Schlieffen".

If the Germans 'do nothing', the natural consequence is an enlarged yet condensed Battle of the Frontiers and a chain of Tattenbergs in the East. The biggest problem for the Germans is containing victory disease, but scarcely untenable.

In my opinion, Moltke's mistakes wasn't necessarily at choosing to enact the plan but the transfer of two corps to East Prussia. According to their strategic thinking, the war in the East wasn't as relevant as the West, so, even if Germany lost few more miles in the East, in the grand scheme of things that wouldn't affect the conduct of the war. By stripping the Western Front from two army corps, however, Moltke contradicted his own philosophy - he put concrete strategic objectives on jeopardy in the West to further seek tactical adventures in the East (which is, by the way, the antithesis of "Schlieffen Plan"). Such a faulty application of logic and gross contradiction of his own plans can only be explained by his emotional breakdown.

The assumption is dependent on those transferred corps being deployed in the correct place to make a difference and in a condition to do so, despite the German logistics through Belgium being stretched to breaking point. Further, the Germans did not merely need victory at Marne, they needed a decisive victory, without which they have control of the battle field but little else. It should be noted Moltke J declared the war lost on the eve of the Battle of Marne.

In my opinion the Germans rolled an unreasonable number of sixes in the opening months of the war and any plan that requires them to continue to do so is flawed.

I perfectly agree with you. He should had have the calm to access the situation and proceed accordingly but we know, as outlined above, that after he moved two corps to the East, he wasn't emotionally sound as required.

Aye

I think an often overlooked content of the german plan is that the germans can't rule out british involvement and soon or later, even if Germany defeats Russia, she'll need to turn West to fight the decisive battle against France. Let's assume it's mid 1916, you managed to defeat Russia but now you are at war with both France and Britain (and a bunch of countries Britain will bring to war as well...) and you don't hold a single inch of french soil...ah..you are still blockaded as well. So, what Germany can do to win the war in this scenario? It actually looks far worse than OTL.

If Belgium is neutral, how wouldl Britain contribute to the Entente war effort. Without a German invasion of Belgium, I cannot see how the British, French or Russians will achieve any battlefield victories before 1916 - a possible exception in Mesopotamia. Do you think Britain has enough pieces of silver to get Italy into the war if the A-H pre-war armies are substantially intact and Russians are already hastily retreating. What countries do envisage Britain would call to join the British effort to save the Russian autocracy?. With no German PR disaster in Belgium, a neutral Italy and a neutral Belgium, any British blockade will be far more difficult from a logistical and political perspective to implement - a blockade that was ineffectual before 1916 in any case.

If France initially shoulders the burden of the continental war in the west, what will be left of the French army in 1916 after their insane offensive doctrines have run their course. Essentially in 1916 you would likely have an exhausted France and Ottoman Empire, while the British, Germans and A-H are all substantially stronger than 1914. Is Britain really going to roll the dice against two continental powers at the peak of their game? More likely Britain will cut its losses and seek and early and separate peace to maintain as far as possible the status quo in the west - Russia would be shoved under a bus.

The French had plenty of commanders who had not figured that out - as evidenced by Plan XVII and rivers of cran being poured into each generation of French officers at St. Cyr right up to 1914.
Aye
 

BooNZ

Banned
In this case all you need is for Wilhelm to believe not invading Belgium will keep the British and their navy on the sidelines. Maybe they will or maybe they won't and the how and when they enter the war is another issue. What matters is what Wilhelm believes.
I may have mentioned this once or twice before, but if Belgium is neutral, the British army is substantially unemployed and the British boats do not have wheels. Britain becomes the most fearsome cheerleader on the planet.
 
The Russian Baltic Fleet was weak in 1914, although later in the year they will gain the Gangut's. Even then they spent much of the war behind minefields, the numerical superiority of the HSF was too great. The HSF can't really get at the MN, the British didn't want the Germans running down the channel. The Germans, might be able, if they take enough colliers, to go the long way around England, but still have to reach landfall somewhere to actually recoal, and then find the MN to fight them. All in all there isn't much the HSF and the MN can do to each other, geography being what it is. The Russians on the other hand, are at risk against the German HSF.

I would agree, the pre-Dreadnoughts seemed sufficient to block the Russian Baltic fleet, with mines, submarines and torpedo boats (later aircraft) doing the rest. If Germany wants she likely can force the Russians to fight or be sunk in harbor, worse she might threaten the fleet by land. This is why I suspect Germany invests in Finnish independence here. Delay the war a few years and Germany gets more serious about her Baltic forces.

The Germans in a war against France is blocked by the RN and cannot navigate the Channel, but might yet develop its submarines and build cruisers to interdict trade to France, it likely suffers and can never cut France from Algeria but learns how to fight the trade war nevertheless. I would doubt the HSF battle line ever departs the North Sea or even port. Germany might pursue the aircraft carrier instead. Blockade of France is not a priority, getting neutral trade in to Germany, and here also the Netherlands and Belgium is more vital a task for the HSF. How odd that she runs convoys of neutral and German merchantmen through the North Sea to guard against French submarines and the occasional cruiser? Now Germany is the champion of the neutrals and keeping the food flowing to poor Belgium as France does the dastardly doings. The poor RN watches as the Imperial Navy steams proudly in defense of "Freedom of the Seas." And here she might get a lot of political backing from the USA. This why these scenarios interest me, the tables are not so rigidly set, they can be turned and events might stand on their proverbial heads.
 
He decides he doesn't want war with England because:

1. He doesn't want his beautiful fleet to become irrelevant
2. He doesn't want Germany's newly acquired colonies to be written off from the start.
3. He doesn't want to go to war with a country his army can't defeat.
4. He doesn't want to give his English cousins the satisfaction of painting him as some sort of international bandit.
5. All of the above.

Again, maybe London joins the war anyhow. The point is that Wilhelm decides not invading Belgium will keep them on the sidelines and the reasons above make that a good thing.

To placate the "all of Europe goes up in flames" challenge I leaned on the Greco-Turkish war inside this war scenario, dragging the British into an Eastern Mediterranean war and sideshow. I put the BEF's 6 regular divisions into play anywhere from France to the Thrace and beyond, soaking up the rest of the regulars, ANZAC, Canadians and Indian formations until the whole Empire got mud on their boots. The pessimist in me let Italy stay neutral and the USA hammer down on its neutral rights to keep the cargo moving into Europe at great profit. Now Wilson mediates the peace and the CPs are not evil ne'er do wells but gray hatted [good/bad] guys.
 
If the Germans 'do nothing', the natural consequence is an enlarged yet condensed Battle of the Frontiers and a chain of Tattenbergs in the East. The biggest problem for the Germans is containing victory disease, but scarcely untenable.

It is "victory disease" that leads me to see the Germans stumble once the war is effectively won, i.e. a stalemate with France bled and Russia reeling. Here the offensive urge takes hold and Germany squanders the opening to negotiate a peace to its slight advantage. Any offensives to the West falter and to the East out stretch the logistics train. Here we might the end the war close to the map pre-B-L in the East and the tiniest sliver of France in German hands, the OE is bloodied and A-H seriously wants out but not desperately. The West might be more armistice than peace, more proto-cold war for a number of years but the East is fragile, the Czar may fall, the Russians might collapse or the pressure ends just shy of breaking. No true civil war, no USSR, no nightmare fuel for the World War Two. Messy, rocky and unsatisfying cold peace that thaws in time? And here the British Empire might have missed it, the OE too, or Italy, likely the USA and Asia might be a safer place in the long run. No global depression, no ideological break, a delay in many things but hopefully saner or more thoughtful process to end imperialism, and all the things we dread in our 20th Century and beyond.
 

BooNZ

Banned
It is "victory disease" that leads me to see the Germans stumble once the war is effectively won, i.e. a stalemate with France bled and Russia reeling. Here the offensive urge takes hold and Germany squanders the opening to negotiate a peace to its slight advantage. Any offensives to the West falter and to the East out stretch the logistics train. Here we might the end the war close to the map pre-B-L in the East and the tiniest sliver of France in German hands, the OE is bloodied and A-H seriously wants out but not desperately. The West might be more armistice than peace, more proto-cold war for a number of years but the East is fragile, the Czar may fall, the Russians might collapse or the pressure ends just shy of breaking. No true civil war, no USSR, no nightmare fuel for the World War Two. Messy, rocky and unsatisfying cold peace that thaws in time? And here the British Empire might have missed it, the OE too, or Italy, likely the USA and Asia might be a safer place in the long run. No global depression, no ideological break, a delay in many things but hopefully saner or more thoughtful process to end imperialism, and all the things we dread in our 20th Century and beyond.

Without the Germans plunging through Belgium, 1914 and 1915 are going to be exceedingly bleak for the Entente. The French will be bleeding themselves white against increasingly robust and narrow German defensive lines, while early Russian losses will be esaserbated by significantly more Germans, a vastly stronger A-H and a neutral Italy. Unless the Anglo-French forces attempt to chance their arm through the Ardennes (madness), I believe the CP would continue to focus on the Russians at least until 1916. From 1916 the direction of the war becomes less certain - the British probably have a decent sized army and both the British and French have sufficient heavy artillery to seriously press the German positions and have paid for a lot of expensive lessons. The beating Russia and France receive over the initial 18 months means the advantage to the CP powers is anything but slight, but mistakes can fritter some of that advantage.

However, my guess would be the British would want to settle before the (seamingly invincible) German Armies pivot west.

The opening 18 months raises potential friction in the Entente between Great Britain and Imperial Russia - Russia will be hurting far worse than OTL and the inability of the Anglo-French forces to commit significant German forces to defend a narrow German-French border is not going to be popular in Russia. In Britain, if the Germans are substantially on the defensive in the west, the rationale for British continued involvement will be questoned. With the French being bled white in the west and the Russians being thrashed in the east, the British might conclude it would be better to negotiate while there is still leverage - specifically before Russia collapses. Britain would want to retain the status quo in the west (or similar) and would be happy to sacrifice Russian interests to achieve this.

Among the CP powers, there is likey to be tension over the spoils - specifically Poland. OTL A-H military performance resulted in A-H becoming dependent on Germany, but in this scenario the Russians will be under pressure and the qualitative differences between A-H and German forces may not be apparent if the Russias are in full retreat. Conrad's obsession with the offensive may result in impressive territorial gains, coupled with consequently higher A-H causaulties than the Germans, both making a strong case for significant A-H compensation in Russian territory/treasure.

Based on German thinking around Mitteleuropa, there would be moderates in Germany keen to re-establish good relations with the British and thereby avoid the potential of a trade war.
 
An important point here is who declared in the West? Did Germany still DoW France or more likely did France DoW Germany in a case of Alliance?
For me that could very much influence how the war is percived. If it is France, then they loose much of the moral boosters and international backing. As both sides can claim the involvement is because they hold to their treaties. And Imo France will be in a worse situation moral wise as the need to defend and reclaim (actual) French soil is not there. The war may proof unpopular and while the economic situation may be better it could worsen depending on how the neutral see the war.

And if the Germans are not seen as a clear agitator of the war, then I could even see a divide in the USA. Something on the lines of Lafayette vs. Steuben... so the Entente (with or without Britain) may find itself in worse staits as the war moves on.
 
First of all: Stop that. Calling other viewpoints "asb batshit crazy" makes you come off as lacking both respect for the others and self-restraint. You are not automatically right if you keep pounding your points of view, and the others not wrong.
And that tells me what exactly? That the germans were quite certain that the frenchies will stab them in the back, given opportunity? And that it is therefore better to either procure a security or see to it that others back any promises made by them? Neither of them tells me that the germans were afraid, merely that they would not trust a promise given by the french without further security.
Moltke Jr. said many things. Blowing up a single sentence from a single letter into the CONFIRMED OPINION OF THE GREAT GERMAN GENERAL STAFF is disengnious at best.
That is a quite peculiar interpretation of the points you have stated. Maybe it was not so much "fear" as it was "mistrust". After all, redeploying armies takes time, and it is quite a difference whether or not a fortress is fully staffed or only a skeleton crew remains. It seems to me that you tend to see things under the lens of a severe germanophobia (that is, the germans can never win and they are always a threat). As for the why your points are factually wrong, the the post by @NoMommsen for details, it serves no purpose to reurgitate them again.

I would not call a position on an issue under contention by several very knowledgeable posters with access to original documents "hogwash". And I expect a very, very thourough examination as to why and where the french would succeed in an endavour they failed so miserably OTL. That is to say, why should the battle of A-L play out any differently if Schlieffen is not carried out?
(Hint: it was demonstrated a few years ago that attacking on such narrow a front makes any sort of numerical or material superiority beyond the amount of OTL meaningless)

You wa t to call it mistrust?

Fine but if the mistrust isn't backed by fear, it doesn' matter

Only if the Germans are afraid of what the French wi do does mistrust matter

If the Germans thought they could hold the West with four armies against a hostile France, why not put four armies in the West and go East?

If the French stay neutral, your spared an enemy If they break their word, you can stil
Defend yourself.

Instead, the Germans take this East first idea and reject it
 
Without the Germans plunging through Belgium, 1914 and 1915 are going to be exceedingly bleak for the Entente. The French will be bleeding themselves white against increasingly robust and narrow German defensive lines, while early Russian losses will be esaserbated by significantly more Germans, a vastly stronger A-H and a neutral Italy. Unless the Anglo-French forces attempt to chance their arm through the Ardennes (madness), I believe the CP would continue to focus on the Russians at least until 1916. From 1916 the direction of the war becomes less certain - the British probably have a decent sized army and both the British and French have sufficient heavy artillery to seriously press the German positions and have paid for a lot of expensive lessons. The beating Russia and France receive over the initial 18 months means the advantage to the CP powers is anything but slight, but mistakes can fritter some of that advantage.

However, my guess would be the British would want to settle before the (seamingly invincible) German Armies pivot west.

The opening 18 months raises potential friction in the Entente between Great Britain and Imperial Russia - Russia will be hurting far worse than OTL and the inability of the Anglo-French forces to commit significant German forces to defend a narrow German-French border is not going to be popular in Russia. In Britain, if the Germans are substantially on the defensive in the west, the rationale for British continued involvement will be questoned. With the French being bled white in the west and the Russians being thrashed in the east, the British might conclude it would be better to negotiate while there is still leverage - specifically before Russia collapses. Britain would want to retain the status quo in the west (or similar) and would be happy to sacrifice Russian interests to achieve this.

Among the CP powers, there is likey to be tension over the spoils - specifically Poland. OTL A-H military performance resulted in A-H becoming dependent on Germany, but in this scenario the Russians will be under pressure and the qualitative differences between A-H and German forces may not be apparent if the Russias are in full retreat. Conrad's obsession with the offensive may result in impressive territorial gains, coupled with consequently higher A-H causaulties than the Germans, both making a strong case for significant A-H compensation in Russian territory/treasure.

Based on German thinking around Mitteleuropa, there would be moderates in Germany keen to re-establish good relations with the British and thereby avoid the potential of a trade war.

My goal is to sideline the UK when possible but if the UK is at war then I allow for Italy to join the Entente here, mitigating much of the advantages to the CP and reducing the contributions of A-H in the East. Otherwise we get the "Germanwank" critiques. Very possibly we get the OE involved, which cuts Russia's supplies, and some greater "third" front in the Mediterranean since the British have more troops with less to do in France. I think this war ends in virtual stalemate, aside from some territory gained in the East, by end of year 1916, potentially going one last gasp in 1917 where the Entente run into a cash crisis and Russia begins to unravel. That is where I have the war brought to a negotiated end.

I tend to agree on the UK wanting out before the real costs pile up but I usually leave the UK in to the bitter end as I think the mood in the UK is that Germany will crush her unless the Entente "wins." It takes a clear "loss" to get the British to yield, but the morale at home should be gloomy with a war less black and white, good versus evil in tone.

If we sit Italy out, or wank the CP let them stay in the Alliance, then I think your scenario is realistic. Here the OE likely sits neutral but hostile to the Russians, the A-H navy will mount a rather leaky blockade (tighter if Italy joins) in the Aegean but I think it will make supply erratic enough to drag the Russians. Bulgaria is a possible partner in dismembering Serbia and holding Greece and Romania neutral. Here I think the war looks increasingly grim for the Entente by 1916 despite having lost no ground in the West and possessing adequate supplies to continue the war. I feel the Russians are under tremendous pressure in this war. As to territory, I agree, the Germans likely focus on the Baltic region with its German minority, likely invest more in Finland and if smart leave Poland to A-H. If the CPs push into Ukraine then Germany likely gets influence there to compensate for Poland. Overall I think Germany is content with an enlarged Customs Union and potentially huge trading zone using the Reichsmark and giving Germany the sort of trade zone it needs to gain economies of scale. Within a decade I think the worst ham handed post-war actions are righted and Eastern Europe is settling into a long upward development cycle.
 
An important point here is who declared in the West? Did Germany still DoW France or more likely did France DoW Germany in a case of Alliance?
For me that could very much influence how the war is percived. If it is France, then they loose much of the moral boosters and international backing. As both sides can claim the involvement is because they hold to their treaties. And Imo France will be in a worse situation moral wise as the need to defend and reclaim (actual) French soil is not there. The war may proof unpopular and while the economic situation may be better it could worsen depending on how the neutral see the war.

And if the Germans are not seen as a clear agitator of the war, then I could even see a divide in the USA. Something on the lines of Lafayette vs. Steuben... so the Entente (with or without Britain) may find itself in worse staits as the war moves on.

And that is a huge soft factor, without violating Belgian neutrality I think Germany is not so simply cast as the villain. That will play upon the moral and morale influencing belligerent and neutral alike, perhaps most of all the USA. The large German minority in the USA can not so easily be muzzled or cowered. The push to white wash America into an Anglo-Saxon only culture may not even get off the ground. It is a massive butterfly waiting to flap away in the coming decades. Imagine a more multi-lingual and diverse culture in the USA fifty years before and leading up to the 1960s? The whole civil rights struggle may be very different where German, Italian and Irish have staked out the rights for minorities and respect for "different" ethnicity. Americans were recast as merely British, indeed the Revolution had plenty of others, our position on the war is likely open to a change, we may see the British efforts to interdict our trade as even more warlike than OTL, the issue was swept away but here it might provoke a deep divide between the UK and USA. Even our affinity for France may falter if France lashes out into Belgium for example.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
snip

It looks like some people are giving tactical priority (exploitation of the poor state of russian armies in comparison to Germany's) over strategic objectives. The war in the East, politically and strategically, isn't as important as the war in the West, and OTL proved it.

snip

- they planned to fulfill their strategic objectives in the west and then reach an accomodation with Russia, either by further waging the war or seeking a political solution, according to the circunstances presented by the uncertainty of the Eastern Front.
... if only the german ... "leadership" - political as well as military - would have HAD any "strategic" thoughts at all.



THX to Schlieffen and Moltke after him all the military had was a preferred opening operation, without any idea at all of what would/could/should happen after this first 4-6 (if running ... not-so-good) weeks campaign.
The politicians ... they had even less on "strategic" thoughts about a war and what it might/could/would/should bring.

All that could be somehow "traced" was :
  • remove/diminuish the threat of the "russian bear" and steamroller (though we today with the bessing of hindsight know, that this was a myth)
  • keep/gain a "place on the sun" and be an accepted Great Power (not regarded anymore as a "disturbing newcomer")
The "strategic" aims aka war aims at the outbreak were much better defined on the french (defeat/beat/diminuish the germans plus Alsac-Lorrain back) and russian (political leadership/mastery over the Balkan, preferably including the "straits") side, though also stuill rather "cloudly" at the beginning.
 
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