Ah well, not participating anymore on this one...What qualifies August Babel as an expert? Was he a time lord?
Ah well, not participating anymore on this one...What qualifies August Babel as an expert? Was he a time lord?
Haven't you failed in half-a-dozen other threads to bring *any* argument for why going east equals automatic loss in the west? Beyond wild assertions that you are right and the others are wrong? And especially with the britons not getting in immediately?
I am still waiting for you to cough up the evidence for this one. After all, if it so trivial, why don't you provide a bit beyond wild assertions?
You're right about the content of the instructions for Baron v.Schoen (german ambassador to Paris).Well the Germans thought the idea was ASB batshit crazy:
Instruction to the german Ambssador in Paris, 1914
If the French Government declares that it will remain neutral your Excel- lency will kindly state that we must, as a guarantee of that neutrality, demand the handing over of the fortresses of Toul and Verdun, which we shall occupy and hand back on the conclusion of the war with Russia. The reply to this last ques- tion must ... {made in eighteen hours}
Erhmm, ... and what do you want to prove with citing this telegram ?Or how about this:
the Kaiser had sent a telegram directly to his cousin George V accepting what he believed was the British offer guaranteeing French neutrality. Mobilisation could not be reversed, he said, but ‘If France offers me neutrality, which must be guaranteed by the British fleet and army, I shall of course refrain from attacking France and employ my troops elsewhere’
That's rather BMMR*, big time....
In other words: The Germans are so afraid of France, that they would rather go to war with Britain, Belgium and France than leave a neutral France in the rear.
See above and belowOnly if France turns over Verdun and Toul or Britain offers to fight France if she joins the war, will the Kaiser's army go East.
Completly agree with you, as well as Baron v.Schoen, as he didn't talk with the french about itNow the idea that France is just going to turn over Toul and Verdun or the British agree to attack France in 1914 is ASB batshit crazy as far as I'm concerned. I will hear your arguments otherwise
You can't imagine, with how much anticip......pation I await this.I will give you the full explanation as to why the "East First, Germany WIns" threads around here are hogwash when I get back from vacation
This might cover only the number of threads I had some ... engagement with @Aphrodite on this theme ... yet.Haven't you failed in half-a-dozen other threads to bring *any* argument for why going east equals automatic loss in the west? Beyond wild assertions that you are right and the others are wrong? And especially with the britons not getting in immediately?
I am still waiting for you to cough up the evidence for this one. After all, if it so trivial, why don't you provide a bit beyond wild assertions?
One of the big myths of WW 1....
Or the Germans realize that the Russians may be faster in mobilisation and do something about it.
...
It was less "admiration", more than kind of an "understanding" that most other "westeners" lacked. He was able to "judge" the ottomans (may they be turkish, bulgarian, arab, egyptian, macedonian, bosnian, etc., etc.) not simply after west-european standards, but by their own history.Reading the wiki article, it seems he would be a good choice. He understood that trying to quickly beat France was unlikely. He admired the Ottomans and Asian peoples (which might help the Ottoman army want to join the Central Powers?), but would it make him think a Russian offensive is a good idea?
First of all: Stop that. Calling other viewpoints "asb batshit crazy" makes you come off as lacking both respect for the others and self-restraint. You are not automatically right if you keep pounding your points of view, and the others not wrong.Well the Germans thought the idea was ASB batshit crazy:
And that tells me what exactly? That the germans were quite certain that the frenchies will stab them in the back, given opportunity? And that it is therefore better to either procure a security or see to it that others back any promises made by them? Neither of them tells me that the germans were afraid, merely that they would not trust a promise given by the french without further security.Instruction to the german Ambssador in Paris, 1914
If the French Government declares that it will remain neutral your Excel- lency will kindly state that we must, as a guarantee of that neutrality, demand the handing over of the fortresses of Toul and Verdun, which we shall occupy and hand back on the conclusion of the war with Russia. The reply to this last ques- tion must ... {made in eighteen hours}
https://www.google.com/search?q=tou...rome..69i57.6138j0j1&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8
Or how about this:
the Kaiser had sent a telegram directly to his cousin George V accepting what he believed was the British offer guaranteeing French neutrality. Mobilisation could not be reversed, he said, but ‘If France offers me neutrality, which must be guaranteed by the British fleet and army, I shall of course refrain from attacking France and employ my troops elsewhere’
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/history...ary-how-events-unfolded-on-August-1-1914.html
Moltke Jr. said many things. Blowing up a single sentence from a single letter into the CONFIRMED OPINION OF THE GREAT GERMAN GENERAL STAFF is disengnious at best.You need more? How about this letter from Moltke to Conrand in 1909:
"the defense against Frane would absorb such great strength that the remaining troops for an offensive against Russia would not suffice to force a decision onto it"
And this is against the Russian army of 1909 which was far inferior to the one of 1914.
See War Planning 1914 Richard Hamiliton p. 57
That is a quite peculiar interpretation of the points you have stated. Maybe it was not so much "fear" as it was "mistrust". After all, redeploying armies takes time, and it is quite a difference whether or not a fortress is fully staffed or only a skeleton crew remains. It seems to me that you tend to see things under the lens of a severe germanophobia (that is, the germans can never win and they are always a threat). As for the why your points are factually wrong, the the post by @NoMommsen for details, it serves no purpose to reurgitate them again.In other words: The Germans are so afraid of France, that they would rather go to war with Britain, Belgium and France than leave a neutral France in the rear. Only if France turns over Verdun and Toul or Britain offers to fight France if she joins the war, will the Kaiser's army go East.
Now the idea that France is just going to turn over Toul and Verdun or the British agree to attack France in 1914 is ASB batshit crazy as far as I'm concerned. I will hear your arguments otherwise
I would not call a position on an issue under contention by several very knowledgeable posters with access to original documents "hogwash". And I expect a very, very thourough examination as to why and where the french would succeed in an endavour they failed so miserably OTL. That is to say, why should the battle of A-L play out any differently if Schlieffen is not carried out?I will give you the full explanation as to why the "East First, Germany WIns" threads around here are hogwash when I get back from vacation
You probably are right and I wrote it bad... what I tried to say was the Germans "realize", as in overanalyze and compensate, the Russians. They had a scarry reputation as a "Steamroller" afterall. So how much would it need to make them even more scary, at least in the German eyes.One of the big myths of WW 1.
The germans knew VERY well about the russian mobilization improvements since 1905.
For the russian North-West Front, aka russian 1st and 2nd Army, doubed by the germans "Njemen-Army" and respective "Narew-Army" they estimated in 1914 a time of about 4-7 day until readiness to march and a possible readiness to actual attack in East-Prussia in about 15 days, if things get worse (for the germnas, aka the russian logistics would make everything "right".
(Memoirs of v.Stein, General Quartermaster of Moltke, Memoirs of Hermann v.Kuhl, Chief of Staff of 1st german army and prior to this Superior Quartermaster IV to the Great General Staff with the responsibility : "Russia")
Maybe they give up the false assertion that they only can win quick and conclude correctly that they are well capable of fighting a year long two front war, especially when Britain stays neutral.Real trouble is you can't get a quick victory that way.
Maybe they give up the false assertion that they only can win quick and conclude correctly that they are well capable of fighting a year long two front war, especially when Britain stays neutral.
If Germany did not declare war, and France and Russia are the first to issue DOWs, then that has the potential for creating a propaganda success for Germany, no?In that case, why would she need to declare war at all?
Maybe they give up the false assertion that they only can win quick and conclude correctly that they are well capable of fighting a year long two front war, especially when Britain stays neutral.
I have no idea how to convince them without hindsight that year long two front is going to work, but I think it takes no hindsight to see that Schliefen isn't.Any thoughts on what would cause them to do so?
Strange ideas seem t have been in the air at that time. Just look at the French and their Plan XVII. That makes their German opposite numbers look almost reasonable.
Of corse the success of an east first strategy is doubtful, but even more so is the Schlieffen Plan. The Germans should have anticipated that France succeeds in holding long enough for the BEF, the British sea blockade and the Russian offensive to take effect. They should have expected that saltpeter shortage forces them to surrender by mid 1915.
And that dampens my skepticism that they might have tried something else instead.
It was pondered and very acceptable for the germans that the Schlieffen Plan wouldn't immediately knockout France from the war. The plan, however, at last offered concrete numbers about what it could achieve, how much french land it could occupy, how much french forces it would draw, etc. The fact is, it was much better for Germany to wage war on eastern Belgium and northern France than to wage war in the outskirts of Metz.
It looks like some people are giving tactical priority (exploitation of the poor state of russian armies in comparison to Germany's) over strategic objectives. The war in the East, politically and strategically, isn't as important as the war in the West, and OTL proved it. It offered the risk of turning out in a inconclusive theater (regardless of Germany's tactical successes) while giving up any strategic advantages that could have been obtained in the West. Many people think the reason Germany tried to take out France is first is because they considered Russia the bigger threat but that is a misleading path on the german strategic thinking: they acted against France first because they, IMO correctly concluded the decisive battle would be fought there - they planned to fulfill their strategic objectives in the west and then reach an accomodation with Russia, either by further waging the war or seeking a political solution, according to the circunstances presented by the uncertainty of the Eastern Front.
A very cogent rebuttal to the notion that the "Schlieffen Plan" was simply stupid, despite our now hindsight clarity, at the time it does offer a means to an end. I still believe it was an almost unbelievable gamble given the perceptions of their enemies and presumptions of Russian strength.
It is my opinion that Moltke simply closed his eyes to the problem of what happens after the dice have been cast or what next if not complete success? Perhaps why he imploded.
That said I am very willing to discuss the so-called "East First", or as I see a more balanced two front war that by necessity limits the war in the West to a strategic defense, because it offers such an intriguing path out from under the war as we know it.
It was a big gamble, yeah, but there are some aspects of this gamble that must be taken in consideration:
German strategic thinking considered that russian mobilization (together with the french one, in the context of the franco-russian alliance) represented an existential threat to Germany because they considered themselves unable to fight both countries in a conventional two front war. To correct this grim possibility, in the absence of a political understanding between the parts, the german plan offered a "solution": should Russia not stop it's mobilization, Germany should act before it's complete. Taking advantage of it's infrastructure and organization, Germany would mobilize and first, seize the initiative and catch the enemy armies flat footed. If Germany waited forever and no political solution came, the general staff considered they'd be doomed because they'd be unable to match the numbers and fight a fully organized and mobilized franco-russian combinee. The german successes during the Battle of Frontiers happened because they were better prepared to preempt the initiative from the french.
As outlined above, the decision Moltke had to make was a difficult one: unleash the Schlieffen Plan and expect that Germany makes good strategic gains...or do nothing and hope for a political understanding, knowing that a few days later the military solution (should Germany's enemies choose that) would be unwinnable. To be honest, Moltke, indeed, waited, to the detriment of the timetables, more than necessary. The moment Russia started to mobilize and then refused to stop, Moltke had just two choices, do nothing and for the best (and since the military situation would be unnatenable, Germany and Austria would need to make every political concession asked from them), or unleash "Schlieffen".
In my opinion, Moltke's mistakes wasn't necessarily at choosing to enact the plan but the transfer of two corps to East Prussia. According to their strategic thinking, the war in the East wasn't as relevant as the West, so, even if Germany lost few more miles in the East, in the grand scheme of things that wouldn't affect the conduct of the war. By stripping the Western Front from two army corps, however, Moltke contradicted his own philosophy - he put concrete strategic objectives on jeopardy in the West to further seek tactical adventures in the East (which is, by the way, the antithesis of "Schlieffen Plan"). Such a faulty application of logic and gross contradiction of his own plans can only be explained by his emotional breakdown.
I perfectly agree with you. He should had have the calm to access the situation and proceed accordingly but we know, as outlined above, that after he moved two corps to the East, he wasn't emotionally sound as required.
I think an often overlooked content of the german plan is that the germans can't rule out british involvement and soon or later, even if Germany defeats Russia, she'll need to turn West to fight the decisive battle against France. Let's assume it's mid 1916, you managed to defeat Russia but now you are at war with both France and Britain (and a bunch of countries Britain will bring to war as well...) and you don't hold a single inch of french soil...ah..you are still blockaded as well. So, what Germany can do to win the war in this scenario? It actually looks far worse than OTL.
You probably are right and I wrote it bad... what I tried to say was the Germans "realize", as in overanalyze and compensate, the Russians. They had a scarry reputation as a "Steamroller" afterall. So how much would it need to make them even more scary, at least in the German eyes.
It was pondered and very acceptable for the germans that the Schlieffen Plan wouldn't immediately knockout France from the war. The plan, however, at last offered concrete numbers about what it could achieve, how much french land it could occupy, how much french forces it would draw, etc. The fact is, it was much better for Germany to wage war on eastern Belgium and northern France than to wage war in the outskirts of Metz.
It looks like some people are giving tactical priority (exploitation of the poor state of russian armies in comparison to Germany's) over strategic objectives. The war in the East, politically and strategically, isn't as important as the war in the West, and OTL proved it. It offered the risk of turning out in a inconclusive theater (regardless of Germany's tactical successes) while giving up any strategic advantages that could have been obtained in the West. Many people think the reason Germany tried to take out France is first is because they considered Russia the bigger threat but that is a misleading path on the german strategic thinking: they acted against France first because they, IMO correctly concluded the decisive battle would be fought there - they planned to fulfill their strategic objectives in the west and then reach an accomodation with Russia, either by further waging the war or seeking a political solution, according to the circunstances presented by the uncertainty of the Eastern Front.
I found this article https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/pre-war_military_planning_great_britain in my travels through the intermanet and thought that the introduction, while it isn't AH, has relevance to our regular threads on WW1 war plans.
For many years scholars studied the war plans prepared by the armed forces of Europe as evidence of long-term belligerent intent. If states planned to go to war to fulfil policy objectives, then armies and navies ought to have prepared operational plans to carry out those intentions. By the same token, when the crisis of July 1914 broke, those plans had the capacity to determine the pace and direction of the crisis in its latter stages: “war by railway timetable”, as A.J.P. Taylor (1906-1990) put it.[1]
This approach suffered from three major defects. First, it assumed that states had the governmental machinery to integrate general staffs within their policy-making structures. Most did not as it required the experience of war itself for states to learn how to manage the making of strategy at the civil-military interface. Secondly, it assumed that general staffs focused upwards on the links between operations and their policy effects. In reality, they tended to look downwards to tactics and how their forces would fight. Thirdly, and consequently, the schemes that resulted from these staff exercises were not “war plans”, but campaign plans. As a result, they failed to address the real demands of a fully-fledged war plan: the need for economic mobilisation, alliance coordination, and integration across theatres and fronts and between land and sea.
Collectively, these sorts of criticism have downplayed the role of the general staffs in the coming of the war. The more recent works on the war’s origins have little to say about what sort of war states thought they might be risking in July 1914.[2] This is equally misleading. Europe did not go to war “by railway timetable”, but it had experienced arms races on land and sea, and a wave of popular and professional literature described future war. Moreover, the lack of governmental structures to manage general staffs gave those bodies leeway, which meant that what they did and said had political effect.