How can you plausibly get a WWI 'East first' strategy?

Wilhelm also could be influenced by people its often suggested that reading Mahan's "The Influence of Sea Power upon History" had a huge impact on Wilhelm. What if Wilhelm read Goltz's 'Das Volk in Waffen' / The Nation in Arms and ended up having a similar response? The book called for the total mobilization of a nation in time of war with the attitude that only fittest nation could survive a future general conflict. If Kaiser Bill gets obsessed with such ideas who better to carry them out than Goltz?

Michael

Wars aren't won by defensives, a commander who has no campaign plan to try to win the war would be replaced with someone who would make such a plan.

I think its important to remember though that any pre-war military plan is going to have to be sold to the public and general staff on a political front. Trying to convince the people (without proof of its nessecity brought on by the war actually happening and clearly not going to end within a short period of time) to immediately accept radical changes to their lives and the hardships of total mobalization or the invasion of their territory and major death toll a war of defensive attrition would require isen't going to be easy.
 
19th and 20th centuries were years of mass citizen armies. For Germany increasing annual draft rates to Frances level wouldn’t be a large shock to the population at large. The most radical of Goltz ideas would be for an economic General Staff. That could be either Earth shattering or totally behind the scenes.

Michael
 
I think the great appeal of "West First" strategy is that it's a far more concrete approach than a "East First". The uncertainty aspect of "East First" is often overlooked but, going by the fears and words of the german generals from 1900 up to the war, it's shows quite clearly they were unease at throwing troops against Russia that could simply be bogged down in inconclusive battles on a very wide and deep front. To me, this kind reasoning from their part is perfectly sound.

The "West First" gave the germans strategic depth to act following the circunstances. It offered a rapid conclusion of it's operational status and the opportunity to adjust the forces as necessary, depending on the objectives achieved. To this point, by occupying northeastern France and blooding the french army, it put Germany in a better position to further wage war against her enemies. It was a risky strategy, yeah, but based on the information available at the time, there are great merits on the part of the german generals to believe the East strategy to be even more riskier.

What many people often do is to take british neutrality as granted if Germany goes East but the germans can't do that on their strategic planning. I can clearly see how the risk of being bogged down in the East with a unscathed franco-british combinee closing on Metz makes the Schlieffen plan to look much more attractive.
 
Wilhelm also could be influenced by people its often suggested that reading Mahan's "The Influence of Sea Power upon History" had a huge impact on Wilhelm. What if Wilhelm read Goltz's 'Das Volk in Waffen' / The Nation in Arms and ended up having a similar response? The book called for the total mobilization of a nation in time of war with the attitude that only fittest nation could survive a future general conflict. If Kaiser Bill gets obsessed with such ideas who better to carry them out than Goltz?

Michael
Willy had a hard-on for ships.

I think the Germans were well on their way to 'a nation in arms'. In the West the state is a means of ensuring law and order, an arrangement that allows civil society to re-produce itself, to allow commerce to flourish under the rule of law and where the political rights and obligations of an individual can be negotiated and ultimately guaranteed, and where the armed forces are under the ultimate control of legislature.

In Prussia-Germany the state existed over and above society. The individual's rights and obligations were always subordinate to the powers-that-be who were, in the Lutheran scheme of things, ordained by God and that the state was a spiritual entity, as the philosopher Hegel had taught, namely the hand of God on earth, under a monarch who was ‘God’s anointed one’ and as such it was anything but a mere cooperative association for the facilitating of commerce. Above all it was a warrior state. The government ruled the Empire according to the requirements of the army, and that is the true definition of militarism, namely the prioritisation of the perceived needs of the defence forces over all others. And further, just to underline the difference between imperial Germany and western powers at the time, there existed in the Reich a separate constitution for the army Wehrverfassung. The essential feature of this arrangement was that the Empire was divided into military districts under the command of a general officer who was constitutionally controlled by an independent military cabinet that exercised the so-called Kommandogewalt meaning that the military stood under no other authority than that of the Kaiser, the all highest himself. Only the administrative structure was subsumed under the authority of the regular bureaucracy. But what is crucial was the fact that the Kaiser in times of national emergency could decree that the Kommandogewalt of the army should assume responsibility for all normal government policies and actions. The civilian bureaucracy would have to submit to the ultimate authority of the army, SDP majority or not.

The British army generally did not see itself as the guardian of British institutions beyond the authority of Parliament. It was the servant, not the master. No one in the United Kingdom seems to have understood that in Germany the opposite was true. The German General Staff saw itself as the guardian of the state. The Kaiser himself, who thought he was the state, had been sidelined in 1908 after giving a notorious interview to a British newspaper. In 1914 the General Staff ruled Germany, a situation which became more obvious during the war.
 
The "Germany goes on the offensive in the east, defensive in the west" has started to become a WWI AH trope around here for a while. I admit I submitted to this as well, not really thinking about it (forgive me, I am but a benighted noob). But after doing some more reading, it becomes clear "East first" was never a serious German strategy. But what would the steps required to make this plausibly happen?

Perhaps a suitable POD is that Albert Ballin comes away from his mission in London with a crystal clear perception that GB will support France if Germany moves against her. If Germany is certain that GB will side against her then WW1 heads for a negotiated settlement between A-H and Serbia. Perhaps Germany can go defensive in the West and give A-H support against Russia as it will be clear that Russia is the aggressor. Perhaps GB can hold the French from attacking in this situation.

IOTL: Before news of the ultimatum had reached England Ballin had dined with Grey and Haldane and a pacifist member of the Cabinet, Lord Morley, and had come away with the impression that Great Britain, with her concern for the balance of power in Europe, would only intervene in a Continental war if Germany were to swallow up France. This was probably a measure of Ballin’s natural fear of war with England, for Haldane’s impression of the conversation was rather different; he thought they had made it clear that Britain’s neutrality could not be counted upon if Germany attacked France. When Ballin tackled Churchill on the question Churchill replied that it would be a great mistake to assume that England would necessarily do nothing; she would judge events as they arose. Ballin, not to be put off, continued very earnestly, ‘Suppose we had to go to war with Russia and France, and suppose we defeated France and yet took nothing from her in Europe, not an inch of her territory, only some colonies to indemnify us. Would that make a difference to England’s attitude? Suppose we gave a guarantee beforehand?’
Churchill only repeated his earlier reply; England would judge events as they arose. But it would be a great mistake to assume that she would stay out whatever happened.When Ballin returned to Berlin he was able to report that no British Cabinet Minister had come out with an unequivocal statement that the British government would support France if she were attacked. And misled by the almost aggressive pacifism of some of the Ministers to whom he had spoken, and the general feeling throughout England that a Balkan war was none of their concern and it would be silly to become embroiled over such a remote dispute, he concluded that the British decision would turn on Germany’s intentions towards France; if Germany made it clear that she had no intention of annexing French territory, particularly along the Channel coast where England was particularly sensitive, he was hopeful that the British would remain aloof. His simple faith in the efficacy of German ‘assurances’ was shared by Bethmann, who called the British Ambassador to the Chancellery on July 29 and put this very proposal to him. Germany had no desire to ‘crush’ France in any conflict that might arise, ‘provided that the neutrality of Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British government that the Imperial government aimed at no territorial acquisition at the expense of France When the British Ambassador asked him about French colonies, he said that he was unable to give similar guarantees. However, he was prepared to respect the neutrality of Holland if Germany’s adversaries did the same, and while it depended upon France what operations might be necessary in Belgium, ‘Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany.’

Grey read the Ambassador’s note of the conversation with a feeling of the utmost despair. It was evident that the German Chancellor felt a general war to be near. But what sort of a man could he be, seriously to propose a bargain which would reflect such discredit not only on the British government’s honour but on its common sense and instinct for preservation! He replied that His Majesty’s Government could not for a moment entertain the Chancellor’s proposal ... it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France—a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover.
 

BooNZ

Banned
The "Germany goes on the offensive in the east, defensive in the west" has started to become a WWI AH trope around here for a while. I admit I submitted to this as well, not really thinking about it (forgive me, I am but a benighted noob). But after doing some more reading, it becomes clear "East first" was never a serious German strategy. But what would the steps required to make this plausibly happen?

No one seriously advocated an "east first" strategy aka Barbarossa, but it is reasonable to imagine the Russians could have faced more than 1/8th of the German armed forces in the opening weeks of the war. Mobility, counter attack and decisive battle were cornerstones of German military thinking/ doctrine in the decades leading into WWI, concepts largely abandoned by Moltke J.

Maybe if there was something in Russia to provide a target worthy of 3 rapid mobilising armies Germany would go on the offensive in the East. Perhaps Russia's plan 19 would put 3 or 4 Russian Armies on the East Prussian border in 2 weeks, then the Germans would have something for their Armies to do other than wander around Poland for a month after defeating the Russian 1st and 2nd Armies.

With the absence of the Russian 1st and 2nd field armies, the Polish fortresses would fall quickly and without the Russian military supplies and munitions stored therein, the prospects of the remaining Russian field armies would not be very good.

Wars aren't won by defensives, a commander who has no campaign plan to try to win the war would be replaced with someone who would make such a plan.
The counter attack doctrines advocated by Moltke the Elder and Schlieffen imply an initial defensive posture and both retired with their reputations intact, although Schlieffen did have the indignity of the worse ever plan put into operation by the Germans being named after him.

I think the great appeal of "West First" strategy is that it's a far more concrete approach than a "East First". The uncertainty aspect of "East First" is often overlooked but, going by the fears and words of the german generals from 1900 up to the war, it's shows quite clearly they were unease at throwing troops against Russia that could simply be bogged down in inconclusive battles on a very wide and deep front. To me, this kind reasoning from their part is perfectly sound.
It is my opinion Motlke J recognized he was out of his depth (he did not want the job) and the uncertainty inherent in German counterattack doctrine, coupled with the increasing scale of forces involved, scared him witless. To someone of with fewer military talents than his illustrious predecessors, the comparative simplicity and certainty of a rigid tour through Belgium would have been quite comforting.

The "West First" gave the germans strategic depth to act following the circunstances. It offered a rapid conclusion of it's operational status and the opportunity to adjust the forces as necessary, depending on the objectives achieved. To this point, by occupying northeastern France and blooding the french army, it put Germany in a better position to further wage war against her enemies. It was a risky strategy, yeah, but based on the information available at the time, there are great merits on the part of the german generals to believe the East strategy to be even more riskier.

It is easy to cite 'benefit of hindsight', but the mobilization speed of the Russians, the likelihood the French would retire in good order, the French impotence on the offence, the qualitative shortfalls of the Russians, the offensive intent/ doctrine of the Entente, the expectation of a long war were all detailed in German pre-war intelligence assessments.

It not entirely clear to me what were the assumptions supporting the OTL invasion of Belgium or the extent to which German military expectations were shared with the civilian decision makers.

What many people often do is to take british neutrality as granted if Germany goes East but the germans can't do that on their strategic planning. I can clearly see how the risk of being bogged down in the East with a unscathed franco-british combinee closing on Metz makes the Schlieffen plan to look much more attractive.
I disagree. The Germans (and French) recognized there were no good options available for the French to attack across the German-French border. Therefore the German decision to invade Belgium either totally disregarded the military potential of the British and/or assumed Belgium belligerence. As an aside, if Belgium remains neutral, how is Britain expected to contribute to the Entente war effort, which is clearly directed at preserving the Russian Empire?
 
No one seriously advocated an "east first" strategy aka Barbarossa,
The Kaiser did.

However all the well matured mobilisation plans meant that strike west was the only option. The railways had their schedules and it ran by clockwork. Too bad that Schlieffen's plan called for more men than the German Army actually had and was so super secret that it was locked in a chest held by his elderly daughters in 1914. Mind you, I can point to 1913 articles in the open press that accurately outline the German war plan in the event of General war.
 

BooNZ

Banned
Willy had a hard-on for ships.

Thank you for the imagery...

I think the Germans were well on their way to 'a nation in arms'. In the West the state is a means of ensuring law and order, an arrangement that allows civil society to re-produce itself, to allow commerce to flourish under the rule of law and where the political rights and obligations of an individual can be negotiated and ultimately guaranteed, and where the armed forces are under the ultimate control of legislature.

The German Army enjoyed immense prestige within and without Germany, but the German military exercised significantly less influence over civilian authorities than their equivalents in France or Russia. Following the Franco-Prussian war the Germans endured over 40 years of peace and never seriously threatened war outside a few off colour speechs from Willy. Meanwhile the peaceloving British were inventing concentration camps...

The British army generally did not see itself as the guardian of British institutions beyond the authority of Parliament. It was the servant, not the master. No one in the United Kingdom seems to have understood that in Germany the opposite was true. The German General Staff saw itself as the guardian of the state. The Kaiser himself, who thought he was the state, had been sidelined in 1908 after giving a notorious interview to a British newspaper. In 1914 the General Staff ruled Germany, a situation which became more obvious during the war.
How different were the roles of the German Army and the Royal navy to Germany and Britain respectively? If the German army was all powerful, why did it allow vast sums to be spent on a German Dreadnaught fleet? Why did the German army allow money to be wasted on what was the most comprehensive social welfare system in the world? Why did both the French and Russians spend proportionately more on military matters than the Germans?

The Kaiser did.

Really? What was that strategy? In what ways did it resemble Barbarossa?

However all the well matured mobilisation plans meant that strike west was the only option. The railways had their schedules and it ran by clockwork. Too bad that Schlieffen's plan called for more men than the German Army actually had and was so super secret that it was locked in a chest held by his elderly daughters in 1914. Mind you, I can point to 1913 articles in the open press that accurately outline the German war plan in the event of General war.

Von Staabs (German Railways General) did not agree with your assessment. He asserted the German railways could have moved half the German military between fronts with two weeks notice, possibly an exageration, but the suggestion the German railways only trained/ prepared for one potential mobilisation option is painfully naive.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
The "Germany goes on the offensive in the east, defensive in the west" has started to become a WWI AH trope around here for a while. I admit I submitted to this as well, not really thinking about it (forgive me, I am but a benighted noob). But after doing some more reading, it becomes clear "East first" was never a serious German strategy. But what would the steps required to make this plausibly happen?

In earlier years, there were plans for a Russian first strategy. In the annual planning for 1914, there was no Russia first strategy. It is a fairly minor POD to get what you ask for, and then you just need the Kaiser to selection option Russia.

Edit: If you mean in 1915 or later, you need Falkenhayn to just read the data differently. i.e Russia is weaker. The we see a defensive on the west where German holds to loses ground, and a bit and hold plan in the east. i.e. Advance about 100 miles, pause, let logistics catchup, repeat. Since it was all East in 1915, we are talking about a different 1916 plan.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Maybe if there was something in Russia to provide a target worthy of 3 rapid mobilising armies Germany would go on the offensive in the East. Perhaps Russia's plan 19 would put 3 or 4 Russian Armies on the East Prussian border in 2 weeks, then the Germans would have something for their Armies to do other than wander around Poland for a month after defeating the Russian 1st and 2nd Armies.

The what is to be gained is a client state of Poland post war and a much better food situation. It is really as much as anything a decision about who is weaker. IMO, OTL plan was the one most likely to win the war for Germany. While I talk a lot about changes to Germany plans, in reality, most of the land based ones are minor or the changes are of naval nature. Or both.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Wilhelm also could be influenced by people its often suggested that reading Mahan's "The Influence of Sea Power upon History" had a huge impact on Wilhelm. What if Wilhelm read Goltz's 'Das Volk in Waffen' / The Nation in Arms and ended up having a similar response? The book called for the total mobilization of a nation in time of war with the attitude that only fittest nation could survive a future general conflict. If Kaiser Bill gets obsessed with such ideas who better to carry them out than Goltz?

Michael

Which Mahan ideas in particular do you want the German GHQ to adopt?
 

BlondieBC

Banned
19th and 20th centuries were years of mass citizen armies. For Germany increasing annual draft rates to Frances level wouldn’t be a large shock to the population at large. The most radical of Goltz ideas would be for an economic General Staff. That could be either Earth shattering or totally behind the scenes.

Michael

The did not need to go anywhere near that far. The French draft 3 years at an 87% rate for a factor of 2.6. The Germans did two years at 50% for a factor of 1.0. The Germans need 1-3 more armies in the east. If you have 1 more army, you can not only avoid pulling the three corp east, but you can also do an initial small attack into Poland out of east Prussia. If you have 3 extra armies, you can run the France first plan and the Russia first plan at the same time.

And we have spent a lot of ink on the internal politics that made this difficult. There is plenty of men and a plenty big enough GDP to pay for the needed army. Germany just underspent by a wee bit in the 1910-14 time frame if Germany was to win an make the same number of mistakes.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
I am saying he WAS influenced by Mahan. I am suggesting he be influenced by Goltz from Das Volk in Waffen / THe Nation in Arms.

Michael

Ok, must have misread that. Is there something Mahan suggest that the Kaiser did in OTL that you think he should not have done?
 
Ok, must have misread that. Is there something Mahan suggest that the Kaiser did in OTL that you think he should not have done?

My biggest problem with Mahan is it / followers of it ignore geography; UK is an island nation and bottle necks North Sea. That is my memory / conclusion.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
My biggest problem with Mahan is it / followers of it ignore geography; UK is an island nation and bottle necks North Sea. That is my memory / conclusion.

He actually made one simple mistake. He actually goes through Germany strategic position, and roughly endorse OTL plan. Mahan assume that the British would respect Dutch neutrality and Germany could do unlimited imports. While we know this is not what happened, if we make this easy to understand mistake, then the Kaiser plan works great. Keep the RN off the German coast free up land units. Dominate the Baltic. Unlimited imports, and crush France easily, but it takes a couple of years.

And it is not even that hard an ATL to write, you would just need a great power to think respecting neutrals was important. So change things a bit, and have a series of butterflies cause the USA to have a larger army and reserve. Say 15 active divisions and 30 reserve. Have TR do it. Then when WW1 starts, the USA delivers a note to great powers stating our strong support of our right to trade. We also do a partial defensive mobilization. With 20+ divisions ready to move into Canada with a few weeks notice, the UK backs down.

And even without this change, I don't know it is impossible. A very pro-right of neutral USA President could probably do it with existing forces. One does not know in the future when wars start and who the leader is. If President Pro-Trade had simply mobilized the National Guard and Congress had buffed defense spending, it may well have been enough to get the UK to back down. The serious blockade did not start until 1915, so if the USA is doing its typical panic mobilization and the UK is think about the war in 1915, it may well be worth leaving USA merchant shipping alone. And with more mobilized, we might well see a different German diplomatic strategy.

Now I am believer that the HSF actually helped Germany, it is just the Navy can never win a land war alone. It helps, not wins.
 
Avoid the Rusdo Japanese war and the Russian empire's weaknesses aren't exposed.
Germany either goes for the quick kill or doesn't realize that Russia is on it's last legs.
 
The German Army enjoyed immense prestige within and without Germany, but the German military exercised significantly less influence over civilian authorities than their equivalents in France or Russia.

I wouldn't call Russia 'in the west'. German civilian authorities knew full well their place and how powerless they were against the military. August Bebel had been passing information to the British Admiralty for years as he wanted GB to be prepared to face and beat Germany if necessary. He knew a victorious German military would stomp on civilian authorities if and when it had the chance.


Following the Franco-Prussian war the Germans endured over 40 years of peace and never seriously threatened war outside a few off colour speechs from Willy. Meanwhile the peaceloving British were inventing concentration camps...

Should we discuss the Herero and Namaqua?

How different were the roles of the German Army and the Royal navy to Germany and Britain respectively? If the German army was all powerful, why did it allow vast sums to be spent on a German Dreadnaught fleet? Why did the German army allow money to be wasted on what was the most comprehensive social welfare system in the world? Why did both the French and Russians spend proportionately more on military matters than the Germans?

Navies were nation building. The German Navy was not 'Prussian', 'Saxon', 'Bavarian' etc. The 'German' Army wanted to preserve it's Prussian core. To do this, it couldn't outgrow it's officer corp. The Navy was to be a unifying force within Germany and take up the extra pool of men - the city/industrial classes. It was also to function as a touchstone for the millions of German diaspora across the world. The USA had 9 million people who had German heritage. A port visit was seen as a useful way of reminding people that their homeland was still looking out for them. The Navy was also the Kaiser's 'Lieblingsobjekt', his 'love object' thus ensuring it's status and funding. This built Krupp into Europe's single largest employer - the Army alone was never going to do that.

The French and Russians were spending more because the Germans had jacked up their spending.
In 1913 GB was spending about 3.1% GDP on Defence
Germany 3.57% GDP
France 4.65% GDP
Russia 2.73% (1912) GDP
Italy 2.48% GDP
A-H 3.67% GDP
 

BooNZ

Banned
I wouldn't call Russia 'in the west'. German civilian authorities knew full well their place and how powerless they were against the military. August Bebel had been passing information to the British Admiralty for years as he wanted GB to be prepared to face and beat Germany if necessary. He knew a victorious German military would stomp on civilian authorities if and when it had the chance.
What qualifies August Babel as an expert? Was he a time lord? In any case, over the years Britain has been riddled with socialists/communists willing to betray their country due to their opinions, but that does not necessarily mean their opinions are correct. you might be able to argue the German army was a law unto itself, but that is a very different thing to dominating the civilian leadership of Germany.

Should we discuss the Herero and Namaqua?
Were those independent nation states? If considering domestic matters, the treatment of the Scots and Irish under British law was scarcely sweetness and light, let alone in the furtherest reaches of empire. As a colonial power, Britain was certainly better than most, but that's a rather low bar.

Navies were nation building. The German Navy was not 'Prussian', 'Saxon', 'Bavarian' etc. The 'German' Army wanted to preserve it's Prussian core. To do this, it couldn't outgrow it's officer corp. The Navy was to be a unifying force within Germany and take up the extra pool of men - the city/industrial classes. It was also to function as a touchstone for the millions of German diaspora across the world. The USA had 9 million people who had German heritage. A port visit was seen as a useful way of reminding people that their homeland was still looking out for them. The Navy was also the Kaiser's 'Lieblingsobjekt', his 'love object' thus ensuring it's status and funding. This built Krupp into Europe's single largest employer - the Army alone was never going to do that.
So you're now suggesting the priorities of the German army were ignored in the interests of the German state - that does not support your original supposition of a state dominated by the German army.​

The French and Russians were spending more because the Germans had jacked up their spending.
In 1913 GB was spending about 3.1% GDP on Defence
Germany 3.57% GDP
France 4.65% GDP
Russia 2.73% (1912) GDP
Italy 2.48% GDP
A-H 3.67% GDP

https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/arms_race_prior_to_1914_armament_policy

From 1904 to 1911 the French and Russian army budgets increased 45% and 47% respectively. Over the same period the German army budget had increased about 1%, while the A-H budget had declined about 2%. In 1912 the CP powers belatedly joined the arms race the Entente had been running for a number of years. The above makes a nonsense of your claims the German state was dominated by the German army and your claims the increases in military spending were triggered by the Germans.
 
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