How can the Roman Empire Survive?

[Arctofire]

Lots of people have pondered this scenario, and it is a very interesting one. Rome was one of the greatest civilisations in history, and the true founders of western culture. Their contributions to architecture, military strategy, science, engineering, poetry, law, and politics are so numerous that it would be easier to count the aspects of western culture than don't trace their heritage back to Ancient Rome than those that do.

When the Roman Empire fell, it begun the Dark Ages, and western Europe went into decline for a millennium. This has led to multiple people to speculate what history would have been like if the Roman Empire had not fell.

But throughout all this, they are not taking into account what made Rome fall in the first place. The fact was is that the Roman Empire was unsustainable. It's economy relied heavily on slave labor, and this became more and more dominant towards the end of its life.

Karl Kautsky is one of the greatest historians of this time period, and provides a comprehensive analysis as to why Rome collapsed. Because slaves are generally much more unproductive than free farmers, agriculture was very inefficient, and relied on constant expansion for more labor power and fertile land. Whilst in the early days of the Roman Republic, an embryonic form of capitalism existed, with joint stock companies and a sophisticated banking system, it gradually degenerated into a slave society, because wealthy merchants, instead of investing in technology like what happened in the Industrial Revolution, invested their money in slaves, which gradually created huge inequalities. Once the empire became too big to control and stopped expanding, it fell into a long period of stagnation, a long, slow, and painful death.

In 19th century America, the fact that slave owners were trying to expand slavery into the north shows how the United States potentially could have gone the way of Rome, and how the civil war was a war between capitalism and slave society.

The Gracchus brothers attempted to curb the power of the big landowners, but both of them were assassinated by those who's interests they threatened. I think if the Roman Empire is to survive, then changes need to happen at the start of its life, Gius Gracchus is not assassinated, and he succeeds in creating a revolution of the plebeians against the patricians.

Whilst the redistribution of land and extension of citizenship to all Latin people might slow down the expansion of the empire, it would make it more sustainable. A moral code, similar to Confucianism in China, might have been set up, encouraging the strong to take care of the weak. If these reforms were implemented, we might have seen eventually technology evolve and the Roman Republic eventually becoming an industrialised state.

 

[Historyman 14]

Best way is to go back to the Crisis of the Third Century and adverted, or greatly downsize it. And by that, have Gordianus III survive and thus have him establish a new and stable dynasty.

 

[catalfalque]

The executive got rid of the legislature. I've done a ton of reading and watching documentaries, and it increasingly seems that this is the key. Sure, have an Emperor to prevent the Marius, Sulla, Pompey, Crassus, Caesar problems, but by removing checks on that Emperor you also remove the balance. Augustus clearly hoped that dynasty could provide the stability, and to a degree you can argue that Tiberius did, but what Tiberius also did was to sideline the Senate, a process that resumed under Caligula after a brief attempt to revive it upset his ego.

What this leads to is the idea that all power is at the top, and that murder, rebellion,

 

[oca2073]

In rank of importance (IMHO)

1. Standardize the imperial succession. No more civil wars.
2. Establish a theme system for the Auxilia so that the bulk of the Army is conscripted land free-holders rather than expensive paid professionals. This should be done as soon as the incentives for Roman citizenship is on the wane, and bonuses have to be paid to unwilling soldiers. By Hadrian latest.
2. Secure better borders with more bulk. This involves having more capable and expansionist emperors in the early Principate when Roman identity and thus military strength was still relatively strong. The emperors were too conservative and curbed the expansionist activities of the governors for fear of competition, appointing not so bright men to lead armies and making it clear that expansion would mean the end of your political/military career.
3. Establish a central army stronger and more numerous than just the Praetorians. Do not pamper the Praetorians, pay them the exact same as your legions by rule, only with a much shorter term of service.
4. Political family hostages in Rome for governors.
5. Heavier taxes on slaves (to reduce reliance) and eastern imports to stop outflow of gold. Land value tax and higher inheritance tax will help.
6. Get rid of the imperial cult to avoid antagonizing the Jews, thus hopefully avoiding three massive rebellions that drained resources.
7. Don't invade Britain.

 

[LSCatilina]

When the Roman Empire fell, it begun the Dark Ages, and western Europe went into decline for a millennium.

Essentially, Early Middle-Ages are a direct continuation of Antiquity both in western and eastern Romania. The conception of this period as Dark Ages (which should be restricted to post-imperial Britain, which was "dark" as in with poor historical sources) is really unwarranted : there's no question that the collapse of the western Roman state and decline of late imperial structures (happening earlier in most Gaul and Spain, but essentially a consequence of Justinian conquests in Italy and Africa) didn't had social-economical consequences (especially the disappearance of an urban middle-class), but Roman civilisation, culture and institutions essentially survived in a relatively new political form.

But throughout all this, they are not taking into account what made Rome fall in the first place.

Not to be contrarian, but they did. In fact there's a whole historical genre focused on why Rome fell, some unpalatable at best, many actually serious : one good recent exemple would be the Fall of Rome by Peter Heart.

The fact was is that the Roman Empire was unsustainable. It's economy relied heavily on slave labor, and this became more and more dominant towards the end of its life.

Servile economy wasn't that homogeneous in the Empire : it was relatively limited in Egypt, prevalent in Spain and a lot of situations between these two. That being said you're entierely right to point slavery remained a distinct productive and social feature of Romania, and such even after the fall of the Roman state well into the Xth century,

Karl Kautsky is one of the greatest historians of this time period

While he's leagues better than Gibbons, he didn't beneficied from the lot of social-economical analysis and accounts we do have now, especially on the social structure of Late Romania.

Because slaves are generally much more unproductive than free farmers, agriculture was very inefficient, and relied on constant expansion for more labor power and fertile land.

It's not what's observable, tough : let's rememeber that a really important part of slave labour was to be found in the domestic sphere (in what had been called a Domestic or Familial production mode) that tended to be forgotten because its result wasn't monetarized and because it was essentially made by female slaves : cooking, milling, textile work, etc. that was redistributed into the familial sphere.
On the other end of the scope, you have slavery of skilled workers, not only in workmanship but also administration.

Eventually, while agricultural slavery played a major role into Roman servile economy, it wasn't the only productive sphere it depended from. Not only free and/or clientelized farmers were still playing an important role, as well as a lasting rural middle-class; but their use in large latinfudae was less about their greater productivity (large servile estates wouldn't have survived the IIIrd century if it was the case) but because it was easier to trust them furthest farmland as tenants from a logistical point of view : note that it seems slaves were particularly used in "cashable" products such as wine or livestock guarding in addition to more basic products.

Allow me to quote Kyle Harper on this.

Property ownership of this magnitude is often claimed to have undermined the viability and profitability of slavery, as units of ownership became too large to manage closely. There is a kernel of truth here, since tenancy, reduced supervision costs, and arable cultivation were compatible. But as a framing narrative of fourth-century labor, this story has more to do with Marxist orthodoxy than the evidence of the period. As Finley long ago noted, what is relevant is the unit of exploitation, not ownership. It is eminently plausible that wealthy senators collected rents from distant estates but maintained pockets of intensely managed land near markets or on their more valuable land. There is a clear logic of supervision and commercialization behind the prominence of “our slaves in the suburbs.”
In short, with enormous properties that mimicked the dynamics of the rural economy as a whole, Illustrious households held diversified portfolios, mixing their products and their exposure to risk, combining slavery and tenancy without necessarily turning their slaves into tenants​

Whilst in the early days of the Roman Republic, an embryonic form of capitalism existed, with joint stock companies and a sophisticated banking system, it gradually degenerated into a slave society

It's debatable to consider monetarization of republican Rome as capitalism, embryonic or not : long story short, market economy isn't necessarily capitalism due to the lack of a relatively open hired-labour exchange even (and critically) in the early Roman days and to the systematical reliance on land-value and rent : there was not a pre-industrial production in Romania that wasn't tied to agricultural production center or, at best, political centers.

because wealthy merchants

You don't really have a mercantile class or sub-class to be spotted in Antiquity : it's generally associated with closeness to political or productive centers.

Once the empire became too big to control and stopped expanding, it fell into a long period of stagnation, a long, slow, and painful death.

A collapse that lasts for literally centuries (and even more in the East) is no collapse at all : if anything, the problem of Late Roman Empire was its constant need of productive manpower which even a strong slave trade couldn't fill entirely, something which led to a partial mechanization such as with the widespread use of watermills (something that is largely attested since the 80's) and even experience with semi-mechanical reapers.

In 19th century America, the fact that slave owners were trying to expand slavery into the north shows how the United States potentially could have gone the way of Rome, and how the civil war was a war between capitalism and slave society.

The problem of American Civil War was less the expansion of slavery north or west, than a constant fear from southern landowners to loose their political edge in USA, and irrationally that it would mean they would be on par with Black slaves politically. In fact, there's nothing AFAIK that indicate they wanted to expand slavery, "only" preserve it eternally.

Anyway

The preservation of Roman Empire in the West is to be searched along political-military lines, which were what declined first from an imperial point-of-view. Let's focus on "latest PoDs" perspective.
You need to resolve the problem of politic and dynastic instability that allowed a vaacum of institutional power to blossom in provinces and Italy alike : having the Theodosian dynasty survive would be a good step on this regard, allowing the dynastic principle to strengthen (if a bit only) roman institutions such as state and the army, instead of having an imperial position puppetized by Barbarian, senatorial elites or Constantinople.

Militarily, a good PoD would be preventing Huns to form a large hegemony on Barbaricum would certainly be helpful : not because they were an existential threat, but because it forced Romans as Aetius to play Barbarians against other Barbarians as they didn't have the resources to do otherwise. Don't get me wrong : Romans would need Huns would it be only because they were useful federates or mercenaries to deal against other threats. But at least it wouldn't force Roman to abandon a too great autonomy to their foederati.

Of course, this is for maintaining a separated WRE : you have more late and easy ways to deal with ERE swallowing up WRE (at least Italia and Africa) in the Vth century and forming an unified Romania.

 

[LSCatilina]

In rank of importance (IMHO)
1. Standardize the imperial succession. No more civil wars.

It was attempted : not only it didn't work as planned, but it increased the number of "official" claimants.

2. Establish a theme system for the Auxilia so that the bulk of the Army is conscripted land free-holders rather than expensive paid professionals.

Attempted as well : it gave birth to provincial armies, essentially gathered in limitanei, that weren't willing to be moved from their province to another. Rome still ended to use mobile military elements, Barbarians or Romans.

2. Secure better borders with more bulk.

Not without making the army even more costly and even more powerful : the system of political/economical projection into the Barbaricum with subsides, alliances and gifts was more efficient and less of a fiscal black hole; and less prone turning legions into political behemoths as Danubian armies wanted to be.

The emperors were too conservative and curbed the expansionist activities of the governors for fear of competition, appointing not so bright men to lead armies and making it clear that expansion would mean the end of your political/military career.

Giving that the bulk of usurpers, claimants and successful emperors were issued partially from the military, I'd say this is caricatural at best to be honest. I'd add that giving ambitious generals weapons and resources to war in the Barbaricum would certainly end as them turning these to take the empire : it's what happened at each significant crisis, and what literally caused the birth of the Empire with a population fed up with their armies fighting each other at their expense.

3. Establish a central army stronger and more numerous than just the Praetorians. Do not pamper the Praetorians, pay them the exact same as your legions by rule, only with a much shorter term of service.

Praetorians certainly weren't the only central army : they represented an elite force directly tied to the emperor, true, but they weren't the only one and not that dominant on the battlefield.

4. Political family hostages in Rome for governors.

You just turned Rome even more as a Cluecracy that it was. I'd give the emperor trying this idea approximately two days of survival, as it would be spectacularily against Roman political customs and seen as a direct threat from a lunatic unfit to rule Romania. Emperors have been murdered for much less problematic behaviour.

5. Heavier taxes on slaves (to reduce reliance) and eastern imports to stop outflow of gold. Land value tax and higher inheritance tax will help

All the fiscal system depended from land production, to the point taxation was often paied trough it and not money.
The idea that land value tax could be enabled while it would cripple at best the whole social-economical system is... well, in all honesty it doesn't hold up very well.

6. Get rid of the imperial cult to avoid antagonizing the Jews, thus hopefully avoiding three massive rebellions that drained resources.

I'm not sure taking in consideration Jewish opinion is going to do anything good to the Empire? They rebelled as any people structured enough (Jewish revolts are only a part of the popular revolts that popped every generation somewhere in the empire) would do in face of a political super-power : if Roman Empire begins to nurse every mi-identitarian mi-fiscal revolt, it would really quickly collapse.
The focus on Jewish revolts is essentially due to the fact our civilization is partly built on their spiritual legacy, but objectively, it wasn't this crippling.

7. Don't invade Britain.

Why?
I mean, invasion of Britain made sense overall (while maybe not entirely as how it happened), as it allowed Roman control over a large grain and metallic production, which was particularly needed in its inner and outer trade.
Not that not conquering Britain would be crippling to the Empire either, of course (while in the Late Antiquity, it could have led to greater raids into Gaul and Spain than IOTL, as Britain would serve as a warband jumppoint), but it wasn't this much of a problem historically, as far as I can tell.

If anything, constant attempts at taking over Mesopotamia and Armenia were more important resource drains without real long-lasting advantages.

 

[oca2073]

It was attempted : not only it didn't work as planned, but it increased the number of "official" claimants.

No it was not attempted, the succession of Princeps was always about who gained the legitimacy of the legions (and the Senate in early period) at the present moment of their coming to power/succession. Heirs were not officially elevated in an official position of succession until the emperor's deathbed. Later attempts to standardize the succession idiotically resulted in the appointment of multiple co-emperors and heirs.

Attempted as well : it gave birth to provincial armies, essentially gathered in limitanei, that weren't willing to be moved from their province to another. Rome still ended to use mobile military elements, Barbarians or Romans.

The Theme system I have in mind would require Auxilia units to move to another province, there is no good evidence Limitanei were organized in a land theme system. Instead of a poorly paid, equipped class, I'm thinking the Auxilia will be continue to be a long-serving professional military class of disciplined troops, loyal due to the land they received as well as tax exemption. But they won't need to be paid expensive retirement cash bonuses.

Not without making the army even more costly and even more powerful : the system of political/economical projection into the Barbaricum with subsides, alliances and gifts was more efficient and less of a fiscal black hole; and less prone turning legions into political behemoths as Danubian armies wanted to be.

That's true in the short run. In the long run, when the migrations begin all these client states will be swept away and divided won't be able to resist well.

Giving that the bulk of usurpers, claimants and successful emperors were issued partially from the military, I'd say this is caricatural at best to be honest. I'd add that giving ambitious generals weapons and resources to war in the Barbaricum would certainly end as them turning these to take the empire : it's what happened at each significant crisis, and what literally caused the birth of the Empire with a population fed up with their armies fighting each other at their expense.

That's why I said we need the Julio-Claudians, hopefully with better family relations than OTL. Successful Julio-Claudians would be less likely to start a civil war against one of their own, for fear of damaging the family's preeminent position, as well as being close to each other ideally. Other families will find it more difficult to secure support given the preeminence of the Julio-Claudians.

Praetorians certainly weren't the only central army : they represented an elite force directly tied to the emperor, true, but they weren't the only one and not that dominant on the battlefield.

If you look at where troops were garrisoned, a Praetorian force of 10,000 was the only force acting as central army. All other soldiers were at the frontiers, and if an emperor wanted to use them he needed to recall them from their posts. In a military emergency an emperor was completely dependent on support from the governors, he had next to no forces of his own.

You just turned Rome even more was a Cluecracy that it was. Ivan IV isn't that a good model for ancient states. Or any state.

Ivan was crazy which is why his nobles objected. Have Trajan and Marcus Aurelius do it and there won't be a problem.

All the fiscal system depended from land production, to the point taxation was often paied trough it and not money. The idea that land value tax could be enabled while it would cripple at best the whole social-economical system is...

You clearly don't understand what a land value tax is. A land value tax does not discourage production. Quite the opposite according to Georgist thinking. Paying taxes through crops instead of a monetized system is terrible for encouraging agricultural development.

How on earth taking in consideration Jewish opinion is going to do anything good to the Empire? They rebelled as any people structurated enough (Jewish revolts are only a part of the popular revolts that popped every generation somewhere in the empire) would do in face of a political super-power : if Roman Empire begins to nurse every mi-identitarian mi-fiscal revolt, it would really quickly collapse.

You're not pandering to anyone. It just so happened that you had an enlightened emperor coming after Augustus, say Drusus who is Republican and disdains the imperial cult and abolishes it. The Jewish rebellions single handedly compromised Trajan's conquests in the East, they were a massive problem.

Okay, I'll bait : why?

Cause Britain was a massive drain in resources. If it becomes a problem invade it later. But only after Rome has secured all its others borders in Europe and the East. It must be invaded last if it is invaded.

 

[RightHoJeeves]

That's why I said we need the Julio-Claudians, hopefully with better family relations than OTL. Successful Julio-Claudians would be less likely to start a civil war against one of their own, for fear of damaging the family's preeminent position, as well as being close to each other ideally. Other families will find it more difficult to secure support given the preeminence of the Julio-Claudians.

That's all fine and well until you end up with a Julio-Claudian in charge that's batshit crazy a la Caligula or Nero. I don't think it's wise to bank your empire's stability on the mental wellness of a bunch of inbred aristocrats.

 

[FellowNerd]

Why?
I mean, invasion of Britain made sense overall (while maybe not entirely as how it happened), as it allowed Roman control over a large grain and metallic production, which was particularly needed in its inner and outer trade.

If anything, constant attempts at taking over Mesopotamia and Armenia were more important resource drains without real long-lasting advantages.

Cause Britain was a massive drain in resources. If it becomes a problem invade it later. But only after Rome has secured all its others borders in Europe and the East. It must be invaded last if it is invaded.

I vote instead of which one to invade, we instead have a latter PoD to spin off Britain into a client state and consolidate the hold on Mesopotamia. By holding onto the Mesopotamia Rome has immediate access to the trade routes of the east without going through the middle man that is the Sassanids. Also, It would allow the integration of any Arminian Client state to be more likely integrated.

 

[Marc]

Earlier adoption of Christianity, or a similar faith based moral philosophy.
Then, I am more in the hearts and mind school...

 

[oca2073]

That's all fine and well until you end up with a Julio-Claudian in charge that's batshit crazy a la Caligula or Nero. I don't think it's wise to bank your empire's stability on the mental wellness of a bunch of inbred aristocrats.

Rather I'd say all the capable ones were killed off and the inbred ones kept alive cause they weren't considered much of a threat. But ideally good Judio Claudian emperors can be found until the end of the first century AD (which is when the bulk of the expansion will happen) before moving towards an adoption system.

 

[oca2073]

I'd give the emperor trying this idea approximately two days of survival, as it would be spectacularily against Roman political customs and seen as a direct threat from a lunatic unfit to rule Romania. Emperors have been murdered for much less problematic behaviour.

Only if you attempt this as a new, unknown emperor day 1. If Augustus had done it, no one would have blinked. A militarily successful emperor with plenty of political support would have no trouble. His allies would have accepted it as a condition to limit the threat of his political enemies.

The focus on Jewish revolts is essentially due to the fact our civilization is partly built on their spiritual legacy, but objectively, it wasn't this crippling.

No historian would ever doubt that the gravest revolts the Roman ever faced were the Jewish rebellions. 3 in the course of sixty seventy years, 300,000-1 million dead. Whole legions annihilated. If it could be prevented why not prevent it? Plus without the rebellions early Christianity is unable to distinguish itself from Judaism thus limiting their growth, another good thing for the empire.

Why? I mean, invasion of Britain made sense overall (while maybe not entirely as how it happened), as it allowed Roman control over a large grain and metallic production, which was particularly needed in its inner and outer trade.

50,000+ troops stationed on the island including 3 Legions. Constant rebellions. Constant usurpations. The Gallic Empire. ect ect.

If anything, constant attempts at taking over Mesopotamia and Armenia were more important resource drains without real long-lasting advantages.

Only if you're unsuccessful. Successfully done, you've just crippled the Parthian Empire, removed them from the sphere of competition with Rome and added a new province richer than Egypt.

 

[LSCatilina]

No it was not attempted

Adoptive system within broad dynasty was attempted by Antonines, Diocletian tetrarchy was a sounding failure.

Heirs were not officially elevated in an official position of succession until the emperor's deathbed.

They tended to be associated to these positions since the IInd century, altough on diversely institutional basis. The most clear attempt at institutionalising succession failed due to the importance of the growingly militarized role of the emperor.

Later attempts to standardize the succession idiotically resulted in the appointment of multiple co-emperors and heirs.

And yet it was the most stable system of succession in Romania : the big problem wasn't the system of co-rulership (it survived, if not without issues, in both Barbarian kingdoms and ERE) but being tied up with a military role that allowed eventually strong claimants to base themselves off their armies (and to give away their claims to usurpers rising from these armies. You could argue that a double rulership didn't need to be territorial, as Ricimer/Majorian collaboration does point, but it didn't really decreazed the risks while you still needed a swift political-military answers to the border crisis.

there is no good evidence Limitanei were organized in a land theme system.

I used their exemple to point how regional recruitment and organisation was attempted without stellar results : they were of less avaible and trained than mobile professional armies (Romans as Barbarians). That said, there's some comparisons to be made with the early thematic system : division and recruitment based on regional commands, fiscal and landed advantages, notably. One of the main difference is their "military border" aspect that isn't really the same than in the classical thematic system which mixed civilian and military matters.

I'm thinking the Auxilia will be continue to be a long-serving professional military class of disciplined troops, loyal due to the land they received as well as tax exemption.

Auxiliaries were mostly used for secondary tasks (policy, logistics, assistance, garrisonship) which limitanei eventually inherited, as well practices of large tax exemptions (except landed tax) and while they were of relatively lesser quality and avaibility, it's relative to prestige units in comitatenses and scholae.

That's true in the short run. In the long run, when the migrations begin all these client states will be swept away and divided won't be able to resist well.

I'm not talking of client states, but a projection of power : Rome managed to alleviate the pressure on Rhine specifically by being a necessary partner of Barbaricum : politically or commercially. The crisis of the IIIrd century more or less represented a vaacum on this regard, notably because the chiefdoms that depended from Roman exchanges (not only for mobilisation resources, but as well demographical such as the grain trade) both had the need and the opportunity taking these directly in Romania.
It forced the empire to resort to a renewed conception of federates, but then again a mix of mishandling foedi and pressure from places they couldn't reach deepened the problem.
Reinforcing the army, especially as autonomous forces, would be short-sighted in comparison : that the various imperial armies were able to pull their candidates in an imperial hotseat in the Year of the Four Emperors was but a friendly warning that nobody should do that without having a firm grasp on legions.

From one hand, we have a system that was relatively efficient and economic while being vulnerable to crsis (but which system is not?), from the other we have something that would cause crisis.

Successful Julio-Claudians would be less likely to start a civil war against one of their own, for fear of damaging the family's preeminent position, as well as being close to each other ideally.

It never prevented other dynasties to be at each other's throat; not only in Rome but virtually anywhere in ancient to modern Europe.

If you look at where troops were garrisoned, a Praetorian force of 10,000 was the only force acting as central army.

But they were rarely used as such, and almost always in combination with other forces taken from the borders.

All other soldiers were at the frontiers, and if an emperor wanted to use them he needed to recall them from their posts.

Or, more usually, to take in account that emperor's power wasn't dependent on him staying in Rome. Until the Vth century, very roughly, the military role of the emperor only got more and more important part. Note that mobile armies not stuck to the border became more and more important with time too.
While the Praetorian Guard, and other imperial units such as German Guard or their successors in Equites Augusti, had an important role in its mobility; one shouldn't focus on the geographical placement.

In a military emergency an emperor was completely dependent on support from the governors, he had next to no forces of his own.

Military command was relatively independent from civil command, tough.

Ivan was crazy which is why his nobles objected. Have Trajan and Marcus Aurelius do it and there won't be a problem.

If Trajan and Marcus Aurelius would do that THEY would be considered as crazies.

You clearly don't understand what a land value tax is.

I do : I just don't consider it as either fitting the situation, or even this much efficient, as most of quasi-physiocratic thiking.

A land value tax does not discourage production.

It would, in the sense that attributing a value to the land would be done essentially trough its productive value (the notion of social value there would be anachronical, and let's face it, unreachable). I could see, at best, landowners renting de facto part of their estates in exchange of a rent to their domesticity and clientelized tenants alike; basically turning the obsolete idea of slavery and semi-free tenancy turning into serfdom true ITTL. Unless the Roman state would go in an economic Georgist crusade against its own elites, that is.

Paying taxes through crops instead of a monetized system is terrible for encouraging agricultural development.

It's how it was, tough : monetarzation of Roman economy didn't systematically involved next-to-next exchanges, especially in servicable exchanges.

You're not pandering to anyone. It just so happened that you had an enlightened emperor coming after Augustus, say Drusus who is Republican and disdains the imperial cult and abolishes it.

The Jewish rebellions single handedly compromised Trajan's conquests in the East, they were a massive problem.

What compromised Trajan's conquest was that his objectives in Persia were blurry at best : while his take on Armenia was sound enough, Mesopotamia was highly vulnerable to Parthian pressure. Even without Kitos War, the region was unholdable without utterly crushing Parthians or Sassanian armies in a deep movement which Roman army was never able to pull.

Cause Britain was a massive drain in resources.

It's not really obvious, while it represented an important cost on what was basically a military border. Its conquest was certainly less so than Parthian Wars : would Rome have a more sensible policy on their borders with Persians unless trying to to a redux of Alexander's campaign everytime they wanted to score prestige and legitimacy, it would have been different.
Back to Britain : the overall cost of the province is hard to impossible to determine, while part of Roman elites certainly felt it was too much (on the other hand, they did considered anything not benefiting them too much). On the other hand it provided Romans with direct access to grain and metal production, which were really important in inner and outer (mostly Germanic) trade. The development of Roman Britain made it certainly more and more important to regional resources (while there were a lot of backwater regions, it was essentially true of northern Spain too)

I agree that the specifics of the conquests doesn't really lean toward a profitable campaign, and Nero toyed with the idea of abandoning it all together : I think that a system of clientelized tribes could have worked as much well. But it seems to have eventually worked out (altough from a strategical perspective, clientelizing or taking over Caledonia would have been a bonus, while certainly costly) : the local economy significantly managed to recover from the loss of military subsides in the IIIrd century and to emerge as a regional but more romanized ensemble from it.

It must be invaded last if it is invaded.

There's no such thing as secure borders at this point trough : note that a late conquest of Britain would lead by the IIIrd century to see it being a raiding base as Rhine and Danube were, increasing damages in western Romania : of course, we have the benefit of insight on this regard, that Romans wouldn't do. But by the Roman presence alone on this region, it was worth it on this period[

 

[FellowNerd]

I think what oca is refering to with land tax is a flat tax on the amount of land, and not how the land is used. The difference being it doesn't matter if the land is a small farms or a tenement block the tax would remain the same

 

[LSCatilina]

Only if you attempt this as a new, unknown emperor day 1. If Augustus had done it, no one would have blinked

Augustus was much too careful not to go too far with the institutional and symbolical changes : while monarchical idea was relatively popular, in the sense of one virtuous man above the potentially corrupt or amoral institution, the formal acknowledgement of a successor might have been too much.
I don't expect a revolt, of course, but rather a pressure on whoever would be designated princeps trough a formal succession feature. I'm not sure that Augustus would have formalized much more than he did his succession, namely association to power thanks to consular position : would Gaius have survived, it's probable that he woud have kept it while rising to principate. I do suspect that the planned regency would have been a systemic obstacle to anything more formal in the forseeable future, essentially creating a co-emperor position precedent.

No historian would ever doubt that the gravest revolts the Roman ever faced were the Jewish rebellions.

I could think of most of military revolts as being much more of existential threats.

3 in the course of sixty seventy years, 300,000-1 million dead.

300 000 is a fair guesstimate, but 1 million isn't, unless counting casualties due to Roman heavyhanded counter-attacks.

Plus without the rebellions early Christianity is unable to distinguish itself from Judaism thus limiting their growth, another good thing for the empire.

There's no indication that Christianity was a problem for imperial survival.

50,000+ troops stationed on the island including 3 Legions.

There's nothing really supporting it was a ressource drain, or the contrary : while the conquest was certainly costlier than it should have, economical benefit for Romans was significant as well, military expanses being redistributed in the province eventually. Note that their disappearance left Britain, while in crisis, managing it and recovering.

Constant rebellions. Constant usurpations. The Gallic Empire. ect ect.

Which is essentially true of every roman regions with a relatively strong military presence, and that since the late Republic and aggravating with the Late Empire with regular crises. Considering Britain as a resource drain because of this sounds a bit like arguing one would be better of cutting toes when hurting it.
Note this is a big reason why autonomizing and reinforcing the army in the same time is a bad idea.

Only if you're unsuccessful

Problem is that Romans lacked strategical depth there : they tried multiple times and never went close to break their cores. Reasons are debatable, but IMO ranges from overranging their own logistical cores while Parthians didn't, and the central role of the emperor in the campaign increasing the risks of loosing it all in case of problem. Rome couldn't go further and further without efficiently splitting its resources and overextending. Settling for control of northern Mesopotamia as Severus did was probably the more sound idea, possibly perfectible by the maintain of clientelized kingdoms (the tendency of the early empire to just swallow up clients was more based on imperial ideology and Roman political conceptions than something really rational). A chinese-like tributary system could be adapted on this regard, admittedly.

When the same problems arise from Crassus to Julian, passing by Trajan, then there's maybe something to be retained.[/QUOTE]

 

[LSCatilina]

I think what oca is refering to with land tax is a flat tax on the amount of land, and not how the land is used. The difference being it doesn't matter if the land is a small farms or a tenement block the tax would remain the same

By tenement I was referring to a legal fiction on which technically free but clientelized; and in reality semi-servile and servile farmers, would be taxable. Eventually, trough patronage, you'd have a redistribution of production to the de facto landowner in exchange of paying the taxe for the de facto tenents. Increasing the risk that the middle to little property being with time included in this ensemble.

Roman state would be essentially unable, and unwilling, to really go against it; unless arguing of a physiocratic Roman Empire.

 

[oca2073]

Adoptive system within broad dynasty was attempted by Antonines, Diocletian tetrarchy was a sounding failure.[

And the Antonine system was a success, that's why it needs to be formalized and made the norm for every new emperor. Tetrarchy was a failure because there were multiple emperors and heirs.

They tended to be associated to these positions since the IInd century, altough on diversely institutional basis. The most clear attempt at institutionalising succession failed due to the importance of the growingly militarized role of the emperor.[

Let's see. Hadrian succeeding Trajan, no. Commodus succeeding Aurelius, not until the last few years. Septimius Severus had two heirs. Hadrian was not announced until deathbed. Commodus, Caracella, Geta had next to no qualifications and prior political, military career. The succession was a disaster because it was ad hoc. The reason succession failed is because emperors were willing to name inexperienced, young sons as heirs who were not capable and had little political support. Militarized emperors has nothing to do with it, all that needs to be had is a culture and formalized system of appointing military capable and respected men as heirs, usually the most promising one of the generation with the greatest accomplishments, who had a decent moral character.

And yet it was the most stable system of succession in Romania : the big problem wasn't the system of co-rulership (it survived, if not without issues, in both Barbarian kingdoms and ERE) but being tied up with a military role that allowed eventually strong claimants to base themselves off their armies (and to give away their claims to usurpers rising from these armies. You could argue that a double rulership didn't need to be territorial, as Ricimer/Majorian collaboration does point, but it didn't really decreazed the risks while you still needed a swift political-military answers to the border crisis.[

Since the power of emperorship was based on command of armies and legions there is no alternative but for emperors to take a military role and base their power off of that. If there are going to be two emperors, both needs to have command over armies or else one will just be a puppet and emperor in name. So why not just have one emperor and commander in chief? If one emperor just sits in Rome and does nothing, while the other is the general, the former is going to be irrelevant; risks may be decreased, but there's no point. For swift answers at the border, you rely on the emperor's appointed heir, and their relatives secured through marriage alliances, ect.

I used their exemple to point how regional recruitment and organisation was attempted without stellar results : they were of less avaible and trained than mobile professional armies (Romans as Barbarians). That said, there's some comparisons to be made with the early thematic system : division and recruitment based on regional commands, fiscal and landed advantages, notably. One of the main difference is their "military border" aspect that isn't really the same than in the classical thematic system which mixed civilian and military matters.[

The difference is the Theme system, which is tied to land grants. The Limitanei were not organized as such, their regional recruitment was not structured around such. The theme system literally obliges themes to provide a certain number of military age men for recruitment each year or the land will be confiscate. The units provided are disciplined and well trained and comprised effective armies in the Byzantine period. The difference here is that everyone will be serving the standard 25 year Auxilia term allowing even higher military professionalism. The land grants will be high quality and centred around urban settlements for accessibility, not the border necessarily.

Auxiliaries were mostly used for secondary tasks (policy, logistics, assistance, garrisonship) which limitanei eventually inherited, as well practices of large tax exemptions (except landed tax) and while they were of relatively lesser quality and avaibility, it's relative to prestige units in comitatenses and scholae.[

Totally wrong. Auxilia were battle units the same as the Legions. There were qualitatively identical with Legions by the time of Hadrian.

I'm not talking of client states, but a projection of power : Rome managed to alleviate the pressure on Rhine specifically by being a necessary partner of Barbaricum : politically or commercially. The crisis of the IIIrd century more or less represented a vaacum on this regard, notably because the chiefdoms that depended from Roman exchanges (not only for mobilisation resources, but as well demographical such as the grain trade) both had the need and the opportunity taking these directly in Romania.
It forced the empire to resort to a renewed conception of federates, but then again a mix of mishandling foedi and pressure from places they couldn't reach deepened the problem.
Reinforcing the army, especially as autonomous forces, would be short-sighted in comparison : that the various imperial armies were able to pull their candidates in an imperial hotseat in the Year of the Four Emperors was but a friendly warning that nobody should do that without having a firm grasp on legions.

From one hand, we have a system that was relatively efficient and economic while being vulnerable to crsis (but which system is not?), from the other we have something that would cause crisis.[

In the short term, it works and is cost effective. In the long term imperial authority is undermined, the barbarians turn against you, your army tradition suffers and professionalism goes down the drain. Basic institutions fundamentally underpinning the empire are weakened. Better to just conquer those areas before the barbarian migrations in the first century and a half when Rome was still in the ascendency, achieve the best borders possible with the most bulk, rather than risk implementing a system that can blow up during a crisis. It's definitely doable with a string of military capable and focused rulers who have close relationships with other capable and honourable generals who respect the Julio-Claudians.

I also question the assumption that more territories will require more troops. I take the Severan baseline, 33 Legions, 250,000 Auxilia would be more than enough to secure the borders of an empire that ran from Elbe, to Sudetes, to Carpathians, to Danube Delta. And in the east, all or Mesopotamia plus Armenia as client state, maybe eventually annexed later. You'd have a more stable security situation (with fewer enemies) with the same # of troops and downside of military usurpations.

The approach you propose is also not sustainable long term. As soon as the heavy plough is developed all these northern barbarian territories can become agricultural breadbaskets rather than economic deficits. As soon as the populations of Northern Europe increase dramatically, the Roman empire will fall even if crisis is averted.

It never prevented other dynasties to be at each other's throat; not only in Rome but virtually anywhere in ancient to modern Europe.[

Long run true but we're talking about less than a century. As far as ruling dynasties go, Julio-Claudians were remarkably dysfunctional, extremely quickly. Even before Augustus was gone they were assassinating each other. All that is required is that things don't turn south until close to 100 years has passed, a lot of new territories have been conquered, yet the bonds are still strong enough to last under a string of capable emperors this whole time. Not impossible to envisage.

But they were rarely used as such, and almost always in combination with other forces taken from the borders. Or, more usually, to take in account that emperor's power wasn't dependent on him staying in Rome. Until the Vth century, very roughly, the military role of the emperor only got more and more important part. Note that mobile armies not stuck to the border became more and more important with time too.
While the Praetorian Guard, and other imperial units such as German Guard or their successors in Equites Augusti, had an important role in its mobility; one shouldn't focus on the geographical placement.[

So how can an emperor better reinforce his authority and connect with the periphery? Have a central army and have units from the front and the central army recycle back and forth. Do not have isolated walled off units that either serve with the front, or with the emperor (who can assassinate him at will).

Military command was relatively independent from civil command, tough.[

No idea how you got this, military and civil command was taken together until Diocletian's reforms. In any case having civil command separate wouldn't stop military command from usurping them if they chose to.

It would, in the sense that attributing a value to the land would be done essentially trough its productive value (the notion of social value there would be anachronical, and let's face it, unreachable). I could see, at best, landowners renting de facto part of their estates in exchange of a rent to their domesticity and clientelized tenants alike; basically turning the obsolete idea of slavery and semi-free tenancy turning into serfdom true ITTL. Unless the Roman state would go in an economic Georgist crusade against its own elites, that is.[

You really don't understand land value tax. You pay it regardless of whether or not you grow anything or how much you grow. So that incentivizes you to grow less?

It's how it was, tough : monetarzation of Roman economy didn't systematically involved next-to-next exchanges, especially in servicable exchanges.[

So if I propose a tax that leads to more monetization that is bad... how?

What compromised Trajan's conquest was that his objectives in Persia were blurry at best : while his take on Armenia was sound enough, Mesopotamia was highly vulnerable to Parthian pressure. Even without Kitos War, the region was unholdable without utterly crushing Parthians or Sassanian armies in a deep movement which Roman army was never able to pull.[

Besides him dying early, the reason Trajan had to retreat was because he had to make a choice to commit forces to crush the uprisings across the eastern provinces or risk them spiralling out of control. This also meant that he had no forces to hold Mesopotamia. Plus the large Jewish population of Mesopotamia equally hated the Romans. If he'd lived longer, his rear was secure from rebellion, he could have held off the Parthians when they attacked. They would have to do so pretty soon as Mesopotamia was their breadbasket and moneymaker. When they counterattacked, he could crush them then. There would never be a need to pursue them into Persia itself, the Parthians can't survive without Mesopotamia.

Its conquest was certainly less so than Parthian Wars : would Rome have a more sensible policy on their borders with Persians unless trying to to a redux of Alexander's campaign everytime they wanted to score prestige and legitimacy, it would have been different.[

Ignoring of course, that the Parthians attacked the Romans on many, many occasion and were a constant menace?

Back to Britain : the overall cost of the province is hard to impossible to determine, while part of Roman elites certainly felt it was too much (on the other hand, they did considered anything not benefiting them too much). On the other hand it provided Romans with direct access to grain and metal production, which were really important in inner and outer (mostly Germanic) trade. The development of Roman Britain made it certainly more and more important to regional resources (while there were a lot of backwater regions, it was essentially true of northern Spain too)[

If you claim the Persian Wars were an expensive exercise despite Parthia being an actual threat while Britannia was not, while you simultaneously ignore the prospect of actually acquiring Mesopotamia, you are being contrarian for its own sake. Britain was a drain because it was a military dumping ground for 50,000+ troops. Rome kept a single legion in Northern Spain that had gold mines. The math does NOT add up and never did. That is all. Mesopotamia would be a boon to the treasury in spite the cost of garrisoning it, plus Syria now doesn't need protection. Britain was even more the propaganda exercise because it demonstrated the emperor's reach to the farthest corners of the earth. Mesopotamia actually had tactical and strategic prerogatives. All your criticism of the eastern campaigns should be directed to Britain.

But it seems to have eventually worked out (altough from a strategical perspective, clientelizing or taking over Caledonia would have been a bonus, while certainly costly) : the local economy significantly managed to recover from the loss of military subsides in the IIIrd century and to emerge as a regional but more romanized ensemble from it.[

There was never a point under Roman rule when the imperial treasury stopped massively subsidizing Britain. It remained a massive drain and a perpetual military takeover threat. If you are concerned about autonomous armies, this is the place to make cuts.

There's no such thing as secure borders at this point trough : note that a late conquest of Britain would lead by the IIIrd century to see it being a raiding base as Rhine and Danube were, increasing damages in western Romania : of course, we have the benefit of insight on this regard, that Romans wouldn't do. But by the Roman presence alone on this region, it was worth it on this period[

No it's far harder to raid across the Channel than across the Rhine or Danube. Absolutely no comparison. Gaul needs Germania as a shield far more than it ever needed Britain as one.

 

[oca2073]

Augustus was much too careful not to go too far with the institutional and symbolical changes : while monarchical idea was relatively popular, in the sense of one virtuous man above the potentially corrupt or amoral institution, the formal acknowledgement of a successor might have been too much.
I don't expect a revolt, of course, but rather a pressure on whoever would be designated princeps trough a formal succession feature. I'm not sure that Augustus would have formalized much more than he did his succession, namely association to power thanks to consular position : would Gaius have survived, it's probable that he woud have kept it while rising to principate. I do suspect that the planned regency would have been a systemic obstacle to anything more formal in the forseeable future, essentially creating a co-emperor position precedent.

If I were Augustus I would push forward the governors must have some family members residing in Rome and more importantly the one I choose to be my successor shall be recognized by the Senate ahead of time, so long as I appoint someone competent like Tiberius or Drusus. You can call it co-emperor if you want, but the heir is still the heir and will have only as many responsibilities as the emperor chooses to delegate.

I could think of most of military revolts as being much more of existential threats.

Name them. Beside the Illyricum revolt there was none, and that was just ONE revolt. Existential is not the right measure of how severe a revolt is, Judaea was far away compared to Illyria. Better measure is how many died, and the economic cost of the revolt as well as military cost in crushing it. Also did it undermine Rome's perception of invincibility?

There's no indication that Christianity was a problem for imperial survival.

Ignoring all the religious tensions between monotheism vs polytheism? The emperors swinging back and forth? Christianity challenged the imperial ideology to the core, countless scholars have argued this. Yes it was resolved with the later emperors but it did its damage by then and changed the nature of imperial power forever, not in a way beneficial for its longevity.

There's nothing really supporting it was a ressource drain, or the contrary : while the conquest was certainly costlier than it should have, economical benefit for Romans was significant as well, military expanses being redistributed in the province eventually. Note that their disappearance left Britain, while in crisis, managing it and recovering.

The idea that it was not a drain is laughable. Do the math. Calculate the military expenses for the island and the tax revenue. It's not even close. Plus you can do a lot with 40,000 extra troops.

After 350 years of investment, a Roman withdrawal leaves an island still unable to defend itself in any significant way, despite the fact that it is an island. Such that all traces of Roman influence eventually expired in a way that it never did for Gaul or even Dacia. Simply put, Rome would have never abandoned Britain if it was turning out steady profits. It was abandoned precisely because this vanity ego project of the emperor could no longer be sustained. Otherwise they'd have left behind a decent garrison.

Which is essentially true of every roman regions with a relatively strong military presence, and that since the late Republic and aggravating with the Late Empire with regular crises. Considering Britain as a resource drain because of this sounds a bit like arguing one would be better of cutting toes when hurting it.

You are conflating my arguments. A: Britain is a resource drain. B (and separate from A): Britain is an additional threat to an empire susceptible to usurpation which you cannot deny.

Note this is a big reason why autonomizing and reinforcing the army in the same time is a bad idea.

And so you would prefer to keep Britain and its 50,000+ troops?

Problem is that Romans lacked strategical depth there : they tried multiple times and never went close to break their cores. Reasons are debatable, but IMO ranges from overranging their own logistical cores while Parthians didn't, and the central role of the emperor in the campaign increasing the risks of loosing it all in case of problem. Rome couldn't go further and further without efficiently splitting its resources and overextending. Settling for control of northern Mesopotamia as Severus did was probably the more sound idea, possibly perfectible by the maintain of clientelized kingdoms (the tendency of the early empire to just swallow up clients was more based on imperial ideology and Roman political conceptions than something really rational). A chinese-like tributary system could be adapted on this regard, admittedly.

When the same problems arise from Crassus to Julian, passing by Trajan, then there's maybe something to be retained.

No the conquest of Mesopotamia was viable. The Romans captured Ctesiphon too many times to count. It was holding it that posed a challenge. Trajan died early and he had the Jewish revolts problem. Later empires (plus Hadrian) feared usurpation if they conquered Mesopotamia and had to station armies there, it would be a threat to political stability. A solution would be to turn Mesopotamia like Egypt, ruled by someone politically unimportant (an equestrian prefect), the personal property of the emperor, ect.

Leaving Parthia and Mesopotamia intact is just letting the Persian Wars continuing ad infinitum. Client states were almost always a means for an end for Romans, it was a way to gradually spread Roman law, administration, and language. When the territory was ready it was annexed. The Severan attempt to secure the peace by proxy states failed spectacularly by the way. Parthia and Sassanids never stopped being a threat. By holding Mesopotamia and denying it from them, they can be fatally weakened. Client States will be useful for former proxy kingdoms of Parthia; Elymais, Characene, Media Atropatene. These can be turned into client states to guard against Parthia. Rich Mesopotamia is best annexed as a province.