How can the January Offensives be planned better?

As we know, the soviet January Offensive of 1942 was not the tide changing victory Stalin expected it to be. Too many objectives and too little forces to accomplish them with, while the Wehrmacht was still very much kicking. So, how can the objectives (particularly encircling AGC) be accomplished better?

I thought of calling off the Kerch landings in December, and using the army transported there to support the Rzhev-Vyazma offensive. Let's say someone realizes how insane it is, that they're landing an entire army on a narrow peninsula with only 1 way out. So, they're sent to attack Vyazma. That's 3 armies (21 divisions) that can be used in support of the offensive, and that won't just be annihilated trying to break out against superior German tanks and infantry.

Also, the 2nd Shock Army can be used to support the Demyansk offensive instead of the Lyuban offensive, which, sure, was initially successful but was stretched out and encircled after taking too much land to defend well against AGN in the Leningrad region. So, they can instead defend the Ramushevo corridor to Demyansk and collapse the pocket - 100,000 men bagged and wiped from the Wehrmacht Order of Battle, and proceed to act as the northern pincer for encircling AGC later. The shock armies in this area won't have to be tied down trying to destroy the pocket.

Are there any other force concentrations that can be made to increase the chance of success and try to encircle the 9th Army in the Rzhev-Vyazma salient?
 

Deleted member 1487

Encircling AG-Center is beyond the power of the Soviet military at the time. They could not advance that far that fast with their logistics in winter at that time. So focusing on wiping out individual German armies rather than go full deep battle is what they should have done. That is why Operation Uranus worked in 1942, they learned from the mistakes of the Winter offensive of 1941-42 so in the winter of 1942-43 they started small, but then went big again and tried to wipe out AG-South...but again got carried away and suffered Manstein's riposte at Kharkov. Focusing on the 3rd Panzer army would have been wise, while launching a simultaneous offensive against 9th army to push it back and unhinge that front and pushing on to at least Vyzasma, while holding forces attack Guderian on the Southern flank to pin those forces and prevent their redeployment elsewhere. Much of it is just coordinating better so they can actually get their offensives to launch at the same time and go for shallower encirclements to wipe out smaller units like corps and then push over depleted armies later.
 
By encircling AGC, I mostly just refer to the forces in the Rzhev-Vyazma salient. Mostly, just pushing the German army from Rzhev, Vyazma, and perhaps to the area around Yartsevo (if enough damage is done) to somewhat resemble the frontline after 1943's evacuation of the salient. The most I have in mind is encircling parts (or whole if there is an opportunity) of the 9th Army and putting the focus of the spring and summer on retaking Ukraine once there is no threat on Moscow or the surrounding area (wasn't AGC planning operation Wirbelwind to encircle the Soviets around the area of Sukhinichi?). So once the 9th Army is bloodied, forces can be pushed to the 2nd Kharkov offensive and won't slam straight into Wehrmacht troops in preparation for Fall Blau, as they will be diluted to shore up lines near Smolensk.

Regarding the flank operations like the Orel-Bolkhov offensive, is it possible for the Red Army to actually succeed (partially) in this area, like taking Orel? I haven't seen any information on what actually happened in this area but I suppose it was the same, Soviets underestimating the enemy.

For reference, where is the 3rd Panzer Army at during January 1942? Around Vitebsk and Velikiye Luki?
 
Top