How can the Allies win WWII without the Soviets or US?

In a World War II in which the Soviets and Americans never get involved in, how can the Allies (Britain, France, and lesser-known countries) win WWII against the Axis?
 
The French agree to the Franco British union.

Said union slowly overwhelms Germany by sheer weight (2 million Indian volunteers went unused OTL). Alternatively, they hold the line until tube alloys comes online.

Or the French make a substantive move during the Phony War.

Quite a few ways really. France's war was one of the most epic clusterf**ks in human history. Tone that done to even a massive clusterf**k and you're away laughing.
 
See pdf27's A Blunted Sickle.

Fantastic timeline that deals with this. If the initial German lunge into France doesn't knock France out, the Entente has a significant advantage over them in the long-term.
 
If the French did the Saar offensive more aggressively when Germany was invading Poland then the war would have been much shorter.
 
IF not involved includes no lend lease then it gets difficult for Britain (I assume no change for 1940 of course (Blunted Sickle is a good example for different outcomes).

2 Million "unused" Indian troops are roughly the equivalent of the French troops in the North in 1940. And if Germany does not fight Russia 2 (or more) Million Indians don't really matter.

Without LEnd lease each man that fights is one less who produces the weaponry.
 
The French agree to the Franco British union.

Said union slowly overwhelms Germany by sheer weight (2 million Indian volunteers went unused OTL). Alternatively, they hold the line until tube alloys comes online.

This, basically. If things don't change until 1941 so that Britain has no allies left on the European mainland then it's a matter of holding on until Tube Alloys delivers a nuke, probably in the 1946/47 time frame.

The two million Indians didn't go unused BTW - a lot of them were required for internal security. Probably the only easily redeployable troops would be the half a million or so men of 14th Army if Japan stays out of the war which consisted of two British, nine Indian and three African (81st and 82nd West African, and 11th East African - all famously tough units with exemplary combat records) divisions. These should be enough to secure the Middle East and clear North Africa even without the US in the war, but after that you're in a classic whale vs. elephant scenario until a game changer happens, and for a British/Allied victory that is most likely going to be nukes.
 
This, basically. If things don't change until 1941 so that Britain has no allies left on the European mainland then it's a matter of holding on until Tube Alloys delivers a nuke, probably in the 1946/47 time frame.

The two million Indians didn't go unused BTW - a lot of them were required for internal security. Probably the only easily redeployable troops would be the half a million or so men of 14th Army if Japan stays out of the war which consisted of two British, nine Indian and three African (81st and 82nd West African, and 11th East African - all famously tough units with exemplary combat records) divisions. These should be enough to secure the Middle East and clear North Africa even without the US in the war, but after that you're in a classic whale vs. elephant scenario until a game changer happens, and for a British/Allied victory that is most likely going to be nukes.

Yes in theory but practically no.

In fact, to have Britain be in such a situation by may 1940, you would need an earlier POD that would butterfly away the outbreak of the war itself.

The fact is that Hitler went to war the way he did because he thought Britain and France did not want to go to war (on which he was right) and that they would not go to war (on which he happened to be wrong in 1939 on the Poland case).

His analyses was based on the fact that the british government was held by appeasers. Chamberlain threatened war and finally declared war reluctantly because he felt he was forced to, not because he really wanted to fight it. Britain was not prepared nor in a hurry to bring a big enough expeditionary force on the continent, be it constitued with british or with indian soldiers.

And France by itself felt felt paralyzed because it knew it did not have Britain's support and thought it could not act without Britain's approval or against Britain's will (from 1919 to 1938, Britain's policy was to contain a fantasized french hegemony on the continent and to reinforce Germany in order to secure peace).
France's military doctrine being obsolete, too slow, too centralized and without air support (which most of the french general staff and political leaders ignored), it was in fact almost certain that France would be defeated by Germany if it faced Germany without a strong numerical advantage a or big strategic depth.

Germany's operative revolution that was quickly summarized as blitzkrieg was a massive advantage that could have been contained only with an enormous amount of luck or with a much bigger numerical advantage.

And if the situation had been different, Hitler would probably not have gone to war.
 
Yes in theory but practically no.

Germany's operative revolution that was quickly summarized as blitzkrieg was a massive advantage that could have been contained only with an enormous amount of luck or with a much bigger numerical advantage.

Well not really, if the Allies had acted on any of the mountain of intelligence they had about the attack on the Ardennes or if the French had been able to moun their part of the counterattack at Arras thing scould have been quite different. And of course if Hitler had gotten his way Germany would have attacked in the Autumn of 39' before Sickle Cut was on the table.
 
Without the US, it's the USSR and Britain vs Germany (Germany loses). Without the USSR, it's the US and Britain vs Germany (Germany still loses). Without both of them, it's Britain alone vs Germany (and, Germany still loses). In order to keep the Soviets out of the war, Germany would have had to stay in the West while simultaneously devoting large forces to occupy territory in the East, and without pillaging the USSR their economic shortcomings would be even more pronounced under a total war situation. Even if the Germans manage to keep Britain out of Western Europe, their economy would still have collapsed: it's a no-win for Hitler.
 
Ultimately Germany loses because they are a land power with no significant overseas support and with no natural barriers.

Plus, once Churchill is in power in London, the British simply never give up. Ultimately Churchill's hold on the English is greater than Hitler's hold on the Germans.

Japan if they avoid fighting the U.S. probably rolls in the Pacific but their army eventually bogs down in fighting an impossible to win war against the Chinese. Several million more Chinese are killed but ultimately the Japanese pull back and consolidate.

People forget that "world conquerors" who have any degree of long time success have an important feature:

They know when to stop. Julius Caesar basically quit conquering when he won enough to give him unmatched military cred in Rome and plenty of loot to pay off his troops and provide for the citizenry.
 
In a World War II in which the Soviets and Americans never get involved in, how can the Allies (Britain, France, and lesser-known countries) win WWII against the Axis?

Yes

But it requires Britain and France rearming at least 2 years earlier

1942 levels of Military re-armament and force levels by 1940 (difficult but not impossible without the spur of an actual war)
 
Well not really, if the Allies had acted on any of the mountain of intelligence they had about the attack on the Ardennes or if the French had been able to moun their part of the counterattack at Arras thing scould have been quite different. And of course if Hitler had gotten his way Germany would have attacked in the Autumn of 39' before Sickle Cut was on the table.

Theoretically, you are right again. But you are forgetting practical factors, among which the fact that political or military leaders never act with full information nor with 100% proof information.

The french had had several times (through dutch and belgian intelligence) the information that the germans were going to attack through the Ardennes.
Why did they finally choose not to trust this information ?
Because Hitler and the german command delayed many times the date of the german offensive. So the french got to the conclusion that this information was not trustable. But they could not know that it was only due to the fact that Hitler and his general staff delayed the outbreak of their offensive again and again.

And besides, there were too many incompetent people at the head of the french general staff, people either too old in their bodies or too old in their mind, that validated the absurd decision that the Ardennes and Sedan were unbreakable ... while many officers warned that there was a real danger there and remembered that the fate of the war of 1870 had been scealed at Sedan.

And even if the french had been prepared to stop the german offensive where it happened, be it in the Ardennes or on the Somme river, the strategy and tactics of the fightings were very different in 1940 from those of 1914-1918. The germans created a new doctrine that was much more mobile and that was flexible and adaptable. The motorized groups had a large autonomy and the commanders were able to take initiatives. The armed groups communicated between themselves and adapted their roadmap in order to support the one than succeeded to break through.

And they could do it because of their few but big motorized united concentrated on a point of breakthrough.

So if they had found strong opposition at one point, they could have changed their course. But the most probable is that they would have broken resistance because they were the only ones to enjoy air support.

The french and their allies had as many troops as the germans on the western front in may 1940. They had more tanks, more motorized vehicles, more cannons.

But they had spread their troops too much.
Their tanks motorized units could not communicate by radio between one another and had to call the army's head for info. And they were scattered on all the frontline.
They suffered a huge inferiority in air support.

In 1940 far more than in 1914, France and Britain needed a second front to force Germany to divide its forces given Germany's tactical superiority. Hitler gave this advantage to western powers only on 1941 June the 22nd, which was too late for continental France that did not enjoy the strategic depth nor the huge demographic reserves of the USSR.


... Ultimately Churchill's hold on the English is greater than Hitler's hold on the Germans.
...

I disagree with this. Germany was a totalitarian regime and Hitler exerted on the german people that, fortunately, neither Churchill nor any other british or western head of government or head of State ever exerted on its population.

Hitler exerted so much power on the german people (and it was not only constraint but also approval from his people that he had some kind of bewitched) that the german people brought itself on the verge of self-destruction.
Stalin was able to do almost the same, but only because he led a defensive war for the survival of his people (the slavs were destined to be partly exterminated and partly reduced to slavery) and of his regime.
 
I'm inclined to agree France was likely to lose over the immediate run - but the battle of France was quite spectacular as a failure.

If the French don't do the exact worst thing (deploy the best, most mobile forces such that they can be cut off through the Ardennes, without defending the Ardennes properly), they'll instead have a series of running battles that grind down the French but also German forces. At that point the question is if the disparity in effectiveness (in Germany's favour) is enough to offset the disparity in economy (in the Allies' favour). It's likely to extend the battle of France into autumn if not winter, IMO. And without such a clear 'we are absolutely beaten' feeling as developed after the second French line was overrun, there might never be a Vichy, so you could have the North African theater as a quick mopping up of Libya from two sides, followed by a massive buildup in both Britain and Tunisia, so that the Allies can snipe away at the edges (Sicily, Sardinia?)

One thing a slow grind might also ensure is Italy sitting tight much longer, or engaging in Greek adventures instead (massively helping the British economy as ships can keep going through the Med).
 
2 massive PODs for WW2 would be....France holding on in 1940 and therefore Italy very likely not opportunistically jumping in at the last minute!

The Effects on WW2 would be massive

No Italy in the War means that Merchant Ships can use the Suez (effectively increasing transport capacity of the existing merchant fleet per year), plus no U boats / LRMP aircraft operating out of France or for that matter bombers (or at least escorted bombers) striking the UK by using airbases in Northern France might help as well.

No "Verdun of the Med" for the RN fighting the Axis and no French IndoChina being occupied by the Japanese (triggering one of the final conditions for war between USA and Japan) + a Great many assets available to oppose adventurism in the east might even butterfly away the war with Japan altogether or greatly delay it.

If the Blitzkrieg attack through the Ardennes is Stopped, cancelled or destroyed then the battle of France becomes an attritional one.

If France is not defeated in 1940 then its unlikely to be defeated at all.

But the only way for this to happen is for France and certainly Britain to start the rearmament process earlier and certainly for the case of the British Army to have many more fully trained and equipped Mechinised Divisions committed to France in 1940 and for both nations to have built more Tanks and Aircraft.

Effectively the only way for this to happen is having 1942 levels of production in 1940 (numbers not equipment) and this requires and earlier 'proper' start to rearmament.

The amount of money that Britain for example was spending on the military in 1939 is laughable for us sitting safely at our desks in 2015 when we consider how much they would be spending post the Battle of France - IIRC it was planned to be 4% of GDP and that only grudgingly at the time.
 
I'm inclined to agree France was likely to lose over the immediate run - but the battle of France was quite spectacular as a failure.

If the French don't do the exact worst thing (deploy the best, most mobile forces such that they can be cut off through the Ardennes, without defending the Ardennes properly), they'll instead have a series of running battles that grind down the French but also German forces. At that point the question is if the disparity in effectiveness (in Germany's favour) is enough to offset the disparity in economy (in the Allies' favour). It's likely to extend the battle of France into autumn if not winter, IMO. And without such a clear 'we are absolutely beaten' feeling as developed after the second French line was overrun, there might never be a Vichy, so you could have the North African theater as a quick mopping up of Libya from two sides, followed by a massive buildup in both Britain and Tunisia, so that the Allies can snipe away at the edges (Sicily, Sardinia?)

One thing a slow grind might also ensure is Italy sitting tight much longer, or engaging in Greek adventures instead (massively helping the British economy as ships can keep going through the Med).

Well, in may-june 1940, the french and the belgians fought like lions. They suffered very heavy casualties in just a few weeks.

And as I previously mentioned, the problem was not only a couple of french fatal mistakes. The problem was also that the germans were developing a tactical revolution that made them faster, more flexible and adaptable and gave them more shock power.
On the other hand, France had no demographic reserves. Never had Germany enjoyed such a demographic advantage over France as in 1940. So basically, when Germany trapped the best french forces in Belgium, It was game over for the french.

And Italy was not important at this stage of the war. Just a few french units were enough to roll back the italian offensive in the Alps in june 1940. The italian army was close to a joke. It could not even defeat the greek army.
 
Easily if they act soon enough, if you are talking about after the fall of France then Operation Vegetarian, but the British lose as well as Germany unleashes waves upon waves of nerve gas on their cities and probably a few nasty bugs they will cook up in places like Norway and send on missions over Britain.
 
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