How can Russia win the Russo-Japanese War?

Very much so. A few small changes, a few slight changes in fortune, and Japan gets hurt very badly.

Remove or thwart Stoessel at Port Arthur on January 1st 1905 and Nogi cannot take what is left of his army north to join with Oyama in time for Mukden in February. That could have huge ramifications, especially considering how close an uncoordinated Russian attack came to unhinging the entire Japanese line at Sandepu in late January.

losing Markarov to a bad piece of fortune (and the battleship he was on) didn't help any either. He was a very aggressive commander and could have bought considerably more time if he had not been killed by a mine
 
Surely nthe best way for Russia to win the Russo-Japanese War would have been for them not to embark on it until the Trans_Siberia railway was finished, thus making troop movements to the Far East much easier. I don think Alexander III, had he lived, who have embarked on such a war without completing the railway first. So perhaps a timeline where he live to 1910 or 1912. Not inconceivable, he wasnt very old when he died after all.
 
Surely nthe best way for Russia to win the Russo-Japanese War would have been for them not to embark on it until the Trans_Siberia railway was finished, thus making troop movements to the Far East much easier.


You do know that Japan began the war with a sneak attack by torpedo boats on Port Arthur, don't you?

Russia was pursuing an aggressive diplomatic policy in northeast Asia, particularly with regards to Japan, but it was Japan and not Russia who chose when the war began and not Russia.

Also, have you ever thought that the soon-to-be-completed nature of railway might have figured into Japan's thinking about when the begin the war?
 
You do know that Japan began the war with a sneak attack by torpedo boats on Port Arthur, don't you?

Russia was pursuing an aggressive diplomatic policy in northeast Asia, particularly with regards to Japan, but it was Japan and not Russia who chose when the war began and not Russia.

Also, have you ever thought that the soon-to-be-completed nature of railway might have figured into Japan's thinking about when the begin the war?

Agreed. And the Russians just so happened to be caught with their pants down, navy spread over four stations (and more on the way when by comparison Japan's latest acquisitions already arrived), army in two bits, railway unfinished, etc. - mind, the Tsar stalled with the oficial treaty of sphere of influence partitions till the Japanese decided they had enough.

Of course even that wasn't really decisive until the Stavka decided to fight the war with mostly reservists.
 
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losing Markarov to a bad piece of fortune (and the battleship he was on) didn't help any either


There are huge numbers of naval PODs and we discuss them rather often. Land-based PODs are examined less frequently, which is why I chose a Port Arthur POD in my example. I chose a land-based POD for another reason too. I wanted to make the point that Russia could lose every naval battle and still win the war.

For Japan, controlling the sea was a necessity. For Russia, controlling the sea was of little consequence. This is 1904, not 1944. There are no LCTs, LCIs, Mulberry constructions, or any of the rest of the of amphibious warfare equipment, practice, or doctrine to many us blithely and wrongly assume are always available.

Japan can and did use rowboats to put troops ashore from freighters, but their numbers and capabilities were small. Japan chose a well located beach on which to land and then supply a field army. She needs ports and the railways fanning out from them.

In 1904 there were all of four ports in the region which could meet the logistical demands Japan would have to place on them: Chemulpo (Inchon), Dalny, Port Arthur, and Vladivostok. Chemulpo allowed Japan's armies to cross the Yalu and cut off the Liodong peninsular, the quick loss of Dalny allowed Japan to invest Port Arthur and sustain their campaigns northward against Liaoyang and Mukden, capturing Port Arthur required a siege of four months that could have lasted much longer and cost the Japanese army conducting the siege over a third of it's number in casualties, and the Vladivostok was was even better fortified than Port Arthur.

Japan absolutely required control of the seas and ports, either of which Russia can disrupt. Russia only required the Trans-Siberian railway, an asset which Japan could not disrupt.

Japan can win out at sea, as she did in the OTL, and still lose the war on land, as she came very close to doing in the OTL.
 
Japan can win out at sea, as she did in the OTL, and still lose the war on land, as she came very close to doing in the OTL.

A larger naval presense in Vladivostok and a smaller one in Port Arthur could have made a lot of difference too - cruiser squadrons raided Japanese transports despite Japan locking in the bulk of the Russian navy.

Of course - Port Arthur was lost because Dalny was lost (huge numerical disparity for the Japanese), and then the approaches to the heights from where the Japanese could siege Port Arthur was lost again (60K vs. 16K). There were lots of bad land decisions as well as bad naval decisions.
 
A larger naval presense in Vladivostok and a smaller one in Port Arthur could have made a lot of difference too - cruiser squadrons raided Japanese transports despite Japan locking in the bulk of the Russian navy.


That would have made for a very nerve wracking war on the Japanese side. Russia even had a few submarines in the Far East too.

While torpedoing freighters is asking a little too much for the period, I've always wondered what a submarine mine laying effort could have accomplished. Japan lost two battleships, something they managed to keep hidden while the war was still being fought, to mines around Port Arthur.

Of course - Port Arthur was lost because Dalny was lost (huge numerical disparity for the Japanese)...

Agreed. Holding Dalny allowed Japan to ship in the 11-inch mortars which performed most of the heavy lifting during the siege. Much more importantly, Holding Dalny allowed Japan to land and supply Nogi's army besieging Port Arthur and Oyama's army group operating in Manchuria against the Russians. Neither force could have been supplied solely through Chemulpo (Inchon). Dalny was a necessity and delaying or preventing the capture of Dalny would have had huge consequences.

... and then the approaches to the heights from where the Japanese could siege Port Arthur was lost again (60K vs. 16K).

Even after Port Arthur was lost to Russia as a fleet anchorage, it still could have tied down Nogi's 3rd Army. With her main supply port of Dalny so close to Port Arthur, Japan could not leave that Russian garrison in her rear. There were also psychological issues in play. Nogi had taken Port Arthur with little effort in the 1st Sino-Japanese War and was now fixated on taking the port in this war. Like a degenerate gambler throwing good money after bad, the increasingly suicidal Nogi kept squandering his troops in frontal assaults in an eerie prequel to WW1's Western Front.

Nogi was able to begin bombarding the harbor during the first week of December, finally took the last large prewar fort on the 31st, Stoessel surrendered the next day. After taking control of the port, the Japanese were shocked at the number of troops, sailors, and supplies still available to the Russians.

After losing perhaps as many as 100k men killed and wounded, Nogi was able to shift his roughly 120K man army north to join Oyama just in time for Mukden in mid-February. When you remember just how much a close run thing Mukden was, you can't help but imagine what might have occurred during that battle if Port Arthur held out for less than one month more.

There were lots of bad land decisions as well as bad naval decisions.

Again, agreed. As with the loss of Makarov, single deaths like that of Kondratenko had huge consequences.
 

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While torpedoing freighters is asking a little too much for the period, I've always wondered what a submarine mine laying effort could have accomplished.


Is that even feasible?

The mines would have had to be stacked on the back deck of the submarine and there wouldn’t have been room for enough to make a decent mine field.
 
Is that even feasible?


Honestly, I don't know. :eek:

I do know that prior to WW1 laying mines around enemy ports and in enemy waters was believed to be the chief strategic offensive use of submarines. As odd as it seems to us in 2011, torpedo attacks were felt to be too difficult to occur too often. It was a case of mines for offense in your enemy's waters and torpedoes for defense in your own waters.

The mines would have had to be stacked on the back deck of the submarine and there wouldn’t have been room for enough to make a decent mine field.

There were mine laying submarines being built by ~1910 which used several methods like deck launching, tube launching, etc. Whether those ideas and/or techniques could be plausibly brought forward to 1904 I simply don't know.

As for the size of the fields, Japan lost two battleships to rather "thin" fields laid by the Russians outside Port Arthur, fields which consisted of a dozen or fewer mines by rather small vessels.

One such field was positioned where it was because the officer commanding the mine layer noticed that Togo's battle line always steamed away along the same course when leaving after their bombardment missions. He laid his next field with this repetition in mind and potted a Japanese battleship the following day, although Japan was able to conceal that loss until after the war.

I've always wondered what sort of fits the Japanese might have had with a relatively small number of mines laid and replenished outside of Shimonoseki by Russian subs operating out of Vladivostok...

It's most likely implausible or even impossible, but it's something I've mulled over a time or two.
 
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