What are some decisions/events that can lead to a Russian victory in the Russo-Japanese War? Sorry if this has been brought up before but I don't think it has.
How can Russia win the Russo-Japanese War?
- Thread starter Thucydides
- Start date
Its fairly simple. Stay in the war long enough to send its various Western armies East. By the time they get there, Japan would be running out of money and supplies for its armies, so after 2 or 3 big battles Russia could pull out a win.
In the Russo-Japanese War Japan successfully achieved what it tried to do to the US in WW2, it hit Russia so hard in the first moments that Russia caved to the pressure almost immediately. Russia was capable of continued fighting, but due to rising protests in the West, and having lost most of its moral it didn't want to continue. If Russia had stayed in the war just a little longer they would have won by exhausting Japan.
In the Russo-Japanese War Japan successfully achieved what it tried to do to the US in WW2, it hit Russia so hard in the first moments that Russia caved to the pressure almost immediately. Russia was capable of continued fighting, but due to rising protests in the West, and having lost most of its moral it didn't want to continue. If Russia had stayed in the war just a little longer they would have won by exhausting Japan.
I agree with what Domoviye said, but I also want to add a bit about the naval battles. Japan needed total control of the seas to be able to land reinforcements in Manchuria. I think the single biggest advantage Japan had during this conflict was the relative ease of transporting troops (by sea) to Manchuria, while all Russian soldiers and supplies had to travel along the long and slow Trans-Siberia Railway. Any remaining Russian naval presence in the area will make the Japanese much more wary of sending troops. As it happened in OTL, the Japanese naval victories were so great that Japan needed not fear Russian invasion of the home islands, so they were able to send some troops that had been marked for home defense off to fight. Also, the crushing defeat at Tsushima was a terrible blow for Russian morale . Russian warships were a fair match, overall, for their Japanese counterparts. You simply need them to have better tactics and better leadership--not regarding the Japanese as racially inferior opponents might help... Even if Russia still loses the naval engagements, any Russian fleet-in-being in the Far East will make things much harder for Japan. Then, as Domoviye said, Russia can simply outlast Japan.
I was thinking that maybe if the Japanese minelayer was destroyed during one of the Russian's bombardments of the blockading fleet (I think they only had one with them). Then Makarov, the only really intelligent admiral during the whole affair does not die because of a mine and continues to achieve victories over the Japanese fleet and then eventually break out.
Checkmate - Not by a Mine has a longrunning presense here dealing with that exact POD - Petropavlovsk doesn't hit the mine.
As for Russia on the Seas: Russian gunnery, despite the sailors being badly in need of training, was actually OK. The Japanese ships recieved so many hits that in any normal engagement it shouldn't have been lopsided like it was in Tsushima.
One of the issues was Russian shells - they were armour-piercing (good), and they did pierce armour (good), but that proved insufficient to really fatally wound the Japanese ships, and they often wouldn't explode after penetrations.
The Japanese used shrapnel shells that quickly took out the Russian command posts and gunnery crews, and that was a brilliant piece of luck considering the tactics the Russians were using:
The ships were stretched out along a long line playing follow-the-leader, INCLUDING when the leader was disabled and behaved erratically. This let the Japanese envelop the Russian lead ships and fight them four-on-one, time and time again. The fact that the Russian ships were overgrown and worn out after a long trip is kind of important, but not as important as the fact that they were deliberately keeping pace with each other, including the slower vessels.
The Russians never got to use their numerous TBs either - they were mostly used to transport the wounded. Why? Ask Rozhdestvenskiy. I don't even know. The various detachments - the cruiser squadrons etc - cooperated badly and more importantly the cruiser squadrons were too slow to keep up with the battleships and screen them properly.
I've discussed this with a couple of people on the forums before, and we've come to the opinion that any contemprary navy, including the British one (not really all that hot on the gunnery either in the period, and also using AP shells) would potentially be in for a nasty surprise facing Japan. However, they would most likely be acting from friendly nearby ports and would give battle when they were ready, so even if they lost the engagement, they could redeploy and try again, this time against Japan's damaged ships.
The Russian navy was hampered by a commander who had a vague mission (get to X) with great potential of suicide, and made no coherent plans as to how to deal with the possibility of Togo getting the jump on him. Even then, Japan really benefitted from a whole number of lucky chances - like Orel's lights being spotted. Refitted and deployed properly from Vladivostok, and posessing a coherent plan, I think the Baltic fleet would put on a better show, or at the very least won't all get destroyed in one battle.
As for Russia on the Seas: Russian gunnery, despite the sailors being badly in need of training, was actually OK. The Japanese ships recieved so many hits that in any normal engagement it shouldn't have been lopsided like it was in Tsushima.
One of the issues was Russian shells - they were armour-piercing (good), and they did pierce armour (good), but that proved insufficient to really fatally wound the Japanese ships, and they often wouldn't explode after penetrations.
The Japanese used shrapnel shells that quickly took out the Russian command posts and gunnery crews, and that was a brilliant piece of luck considering the tactics the Russians were using:
The ships were stretched out along a long line playing follow-the-leader, INCLUDING when the leader was disabled and behaved erratically. This let the Japanese envelop the Russian lead ships and fight them four-on-one, time and time again. The fact that the Russian ships were overgrown and worn out after a long trip is kind of important, but not as important as the fact that they were deliberately keeping pace with each other, including the slower vessels.
The Russians never got to use their numerous TBs either - they were mostly used to transport the wounded. Why? Ask Rozhdestvenskiy. I don't even know. The various detachments - the cruiser squadrons etc - cooperated badly and more importantly the cruiser squadrons were too slow to keep up with the battleships and screen them properly.
I've discussed this with a couple of people on the forums before, and we've come to the opinion that any contemprary navy, including the British one (not really all that hot on the gunnery either in the period, and also using AP shells) would potentially be in for a nasty surprise facing Japan. However, they would most likely be acting from friendly nearby ports and would give battle when they were ready, so even if they lost the engagement, they could redeploy and try again, this time against Japan's damaged ships.
The Russian navy was hampered by a commander who had a vague mission (get to X) with great potential of suicide, and made no coherent plans as to how to deal with the possibility of Togo getting the jump on him. Even then, Japan really benefitted from a whole number of lucky chances - like Orel's lights being spotted. Refitted and deployed properly from Vladivostok, and posessing a coherent plan, I think the Baltic fleet would put on a better show, or at the very least won't all get destroyed in one battle.
Lately I'm wondering how well the Russians would do with a much reduced fleet from the beginning. After all, in the end the war was decided on land. If the Russians pushed the IJA out of Korea, no matter how victiorius the Japanese Navy was, the Japan would've still lost the war. So no relief fleet sailing half the world and reduced Far East squadron - to 2-4 BB and a number of cruisers, with main base in Vladivostok, instead of Port Artur.
I don't understand - Russia needs at least naval parity to be able to deny Japan the mastery of the seas that made them their supply line. Russia would gain nothing from having LESS ships...
Best Regards
Grey Wolf
The Russians mostly were to blame themselves in loosing this Russian - Japanese War, as they completely missjudged the capabilities of Japan as a military power in the region, and did not react logically to its aggression.
The Russian military were much stronger in the region than those of Japan to start with, even without the relocation of Western troops and ships, but they were not deployed intelligent and remained static for most of the time, allowing the Japanese to take the innitiative, both on land and at sea. The Russian Army in the East was quite larger and better equipped than the Japanese Army in that time, but it remained mostly in the cities, where it could not be deployed on the field, where it was much more usefull. The fleet too remained in port most of the time, only to sporadically raid targets of opportunity, allowing the innitiative agains to the Japanese, who could mine their ports in return. A more aggreesive Far Eastern Fleet was more likely to bring the much smaller IJN into trouble, even before reenforcements of the European stationed fleets arrived.
All in all, the Russian tactics in this war were passive and not realistic, given the agressive use of forces by the smaller Japanese opponent.
The Russian military were much stronger in the region than those of Japan to start with, even without the relocation of Western troops and ships, but they were not deployed intelligent and remained static for most of the time, allowing the Japanese to take the innitiative, both on land and at sea. The Russian Army in the East was quite larger and better equipped than the Japanese Army in that time, but it remained mostly in the cities, where it could not be deployed on the field, where it was much more usefull. The fleet too remained in port most of the time, only to sporadically raid targets of opportunity, allowing the innitiative agains to the Japanese, who could mine their ports in return. A more aggreesive Far Eastern Fleet was more likely to bring the much smaller IJN into trouble, even before reenforcements of the European stationed fleets arrived.
All in all, the Russian tactics in this war were passive and not realistic, given the agressive use of forces by the smaller Japanese opponent.
I'm guessing Tizoc didn't quite complete his thought; if the Russians have a smaller navy overall (and thus fewer ships in the Far East) they could then have a larger army overall (and thus more troops in the Far East).
Arguably, Russia had no need for a blue-water navy at all; no overseas interests to protect (unlike the US, France, etc.), no critical dependence on ocean-borne trade (unlike the UK, Japan, etc.), and so on. They largely had a fleet for prestige, and as the saying goes "there is nothing more expensive then the world's second-best military."
Why did Russia lose the war - because of their naval defeats. On land they pretty much stalemated the Japanese but the sinking of the Far East fleet in the harbour at Port Arthur was one of the reasons the garrison commander gave for surrendering Port Arthur. The sinking of the Baltic Fleet was the trrigger for the peace conference.
Russia only needed the fleets to maintain their position on Sakhalin. Without the fleets, Japan gets stuck in a land war it can't win and Russia does not have the loss of prestige which forced the Tzar to start negotiations.
That ignores the whole logic of naval conflict.
Without a war fleet the Russians are completely open to the Japanese who can land where they want and surround them.
The Japanese do not NEED to go to Muckden; if they land forces and concentrate them to defeat the Russians piece-meal the effect is going to be at least as bad as OTL
Tsu Shima did not so much drive the Russians towards peace as end their final hope. Without the fleet coming, what is their hope?
Best Regards
Grey Wolf
No. Russia "lost" because of Bloody Sunday and the looming 1905 Revolution.
Despite the many battlefield defeats, the all-to-early surrender of Port Arthur, and nothing but disasters at sea, Russia's decision to enter into peace negotiations was made solely on the basis of pressing domestic political issues. In fact, at the time the negotiations began, Japan was more desperate for an end to the war than Russia was, a fact that Witte used to greatly minimize Russia's losses in the resulting treaty.
If Russia could have avoided or put on hold her pressing internal problems, the coming Manchurian summer campaign season would have seen a much larger and still growing Russian Far Eastern army under a new commander facing a Japanese army whose nation could no longer raise international loans and whose reinforcement pool was all but expended. After the Battle of Mukden, the final land battle of the war and one which Oyama only "won" thanks to Kuropatkin's strategic withdrawal, Japan was broke and had been bled white.
Japan's control of the seas around northeast Asia doesn't amount to a thing when Japan cannot support and field an army large enough to decisively defeat Russian armies whose strength is continually growing. Battleships can't effect the Trans-Siberian Railway.
Pretty much agree with all that analysis - I'd just add the lost of prestige caused by the naval disasters made it more difficult for the Tzar to appeal to nationalistic patriotism. Without Tshushima and Port Arthur, one more capaign maight have been posible after Mukden which may have seen the Japanese crumble - nothing defuses revolution like a good victory and nothing fires it up more than an incompetent or unsuccessful war.
Yes, the lack of any victories made it difficult for the government to keep the lid on Russia's many domestic issues. However, that lack of victories didn't create those domestic issues. They existed before the war. The war merely gave them more rein to effect Russian domestic politics.
Defuse or diminish those issues somehow and Russia will outlast Japan because, in the OTL, Russia came within weeks of outlasting Japan in the war and did outlast Japan at the peace talks.
If Witte's advice had been heeded or if "Father" Gapon had been unmasked as a police informant, Bloody Sunday may not have happened and Russia could have won the war.
Not to sound mean or anything, but what exactly do you picture the Far East in 1905 to be? There's no OTHER port facilities. Heck, there's hardly any beaches. Any talk of "landing anywhere and surrounding" is ignoring the nature of the area, unless for some reason the Russians are pushing back into Liaodong or getting themselves really badly exposed in Korea. Since they were on the defensive, neither makes sense.
What is really stupid about this war is that the navy was deployed precisely in the manner that the theoretical war games several years earlier predicted was the worst option - spread between Vladivostok, Dalny, Port Arthur and Chemulpo. Even then, the Russian command behaved in a totally passive, unimaginative manner and the Japanese still benefitted from a very large amount of lucky events before they won.
It's a strange war, but then many wars are.
I have to agree with you. That said, unless the Russians can hold together at home they can't fight a war and a revolution at the same time. Argueably the Russians would have been better off not sending the Baltic Fleet to the Far East to begin with in order to avoid defeat that set in motion the revolution. By simply accepting the loss of their Pacific Fleet, they could have cut their losses and would not have given Japan an important victory and bought themselves some time. Granted hindsight is 20/20, but careful thinking should have told them that by the time the Baltic Fleet reached the Pacific, Port Arthur was likely to have fallen and uniting with the Pacific Fleet was impossible.
Your timing is slightly off. The "revolution" had already kicked off months before Mukden or Tsushima.
Most of the 2nd Pacific Squadron/Baltic Fleet left the Baltic in October of '04 and Port Arthur surrendered during the first week of January in '05 while the squadron was already anchored off Madagascar coaling.
Bloody Sunday, the "official" start of the revolution although major strikes had began in December of '04, occurred in the third week of January '05. Mukden in contrast took place towards the end of February '05 with Tsushima in May of the same year. (That's right. It took the Russians over four months to steam between Madagascar and Tsushima.)
The revolution kicked off before Russia's last two major defeats in the war and Russia had more troops stationed in Poland alone in order to keep a lid on things than it did facing the Japanese in Manchuria.
They were after a victory to help quash a revolution which was already taking place.
No one expected Stoessel to unilaterally decide to surrender on January 1st 1905, especially given the ammo and food still available to his forces, and he was rightly court-martialed after the war. However, Port Arthur was no longer the fleet's destination in January.
Port Arthur had been the destination of the 2nd Pacific Squadron/Baltic Fleet when it left European waters, but that changed when the Japanese captured hills from which they could bombard the harbor in early December of '04. Vladivostok was the destination when the fleet left Madagascar, in January of '05 and that's why the Baltic Fleet tried to pass through the straits at Tsushima.
While Russia's defeats in the war did play a role in starting the revolution, the big defeats occurred after the revolution had begun.
Abdul Hadi Pasha
Banned
I disagree. The catastrophic naval defeats gave impetus to the Revolution, as they destroyed national morale and faith in the Tsar.
Japan's control of the seas mattered quite a bit, since it allowed her to transport troops and supplies at will. Without this control, she wouldn't have lasted long against Russia.
I think people underestimate Russia in this war. They were extremely unlucky. One mine, one bridge hit... it could have all been different. Even Tsushima could have been a victory if one single BB hadn't screwed up it's turn, and forced R to fight at a disadvantage.
Togo wasn't a bad commander, but he wasn't all that special, either.
The revolution began five months before the battle and in December '04/January '05 Russia had more troops in Poland alone than it had fighting Japan.
Even with that control, Japan in the OTL could no longer stand against Russia much longer by mid-1905. She was broke and running out of men, which is why Witte was able to negotiate the very lenient treaty he did.
If Russia could have stayed in the field for the 1905 summer campaign season, Japan could have been forced to sue for peace.
Very much so. A few small changes, a few slight changes in fortune, and Japan gets hurt very badly.
Remove or thwart Stoessel at Port Arthur on January 1st 1905 and Nogi cannot take what is left of his army north to join with Oyama in time for Mukden in February. That could have huge ramifications, especially considering how close an uncoordinated Russian attack came to unhinging the entire Japanese line at Sandepu in late January.
And of course Tsushima would have gone better if they hadn't already lost some of their battleships. All it would take was one victory over the Japanese and they would have to leave. IOTL Togo was really scared of blockading Port Arthur because he was using the only BB squadron he had available.
I also think that especially the early land battles could have gone the other way with just a little more coordination. Like if whoever the General at the Yalu was had followed Kuropatkin's orders to stage an organized retreat and stall the Japanese there. If that happened he could have stalled them enough to wait for reinforcements and make a counteroffensive. And the Japanese were assaulting fortified positions, if the Russians had been more coordinated in their defense they probably could have exhausted the Japanese Army pretty quickly combined with a naval blockade.