How can Germany keep its 1914 borders?

Here's Germany in 1914.

649px-Deutsches_Reich_%281871-1918%29-de.svg.png


What PODs do we need for Germany to keep these borders until 2017 and beyond?

For starters, I'd say we need to avoid the First World War that beget the Second, as well as any further German land grabs or claims, for example into Austria-Hungary. This move alone should help take these borders intact into the 1940s, since without WW1 we may not see the rise of the USSR and other destabilizing factors that change borders.

But there's also the issue of Polish independence, France demands on Alsace-Lorraine, and Danish demands on Northern Schleswig. The first, that of Poland may become tricky, especially if Russia gives any land to the Poles or Austria-Hungary collapses through domestic ethncity-based separatist movements.
 
But there's also the issue of Polish independence, France demands on Alsace-Lorraine, and Danish demands on Northern Schleswig. The first, that of Poland may become tricky, especially if Russia gives any land to the Poles or Austria-Hungary collapses through domestic ethncity-based separatist movements.

I think that most autonomous/independentist/rattachist drives in 1914 Germany could have been dealt with with a partial federalization of Prussia and acknowledgement of minorities* (in Alsace-Moselle, Posen, Hannover, etc.). I'm not sure how it would have been possible in the early XXth, but with a more liberal Germany you could have room for that IMO.

With a France that was increasingly accepting the loss of Alsace-Moselle by the early XXth, and a Russia that could be see at least as much detrimental to Polish rights than Germany (especially if the latter assumes a bit of autonomism in this regard), I don't think you'd have particularily disloyal minorities to deal with.

*It should be stressed that minorities in Imperial Germany weren't systematically tied to language : for instance you had a good part of non-Romance Alsace that still identified itself with a really distinct indentity from Imperial Germany, including a french-leaning one)
 

Deleted member 1487

Not fight WW1 for starters. Then no wars over the 20th century. No wars and there are no gains or losses of territory and it all becomes Germanized. Prussian Polish areas were pretty germanized and would only get more so as time went on. You'd have to find some way to reform or constructively demoblish the A-H empire so as not to require annexation by Germany, but that is doable in some way, which will probably be a mini-EU type federalization. By the 1940s I think France will start to finally accept that A-L is gone and germanized, while the eastern parts of Germany would get getting Germanized before Poland gets in a position to have real independence and a draw on Polish separatist groups. Plus of course the Germans would crack down hard if there were any.

I wonder if increasing prosperity would also help culturally solidify the nation in terms of ethnic minorities on the borders? The Germans used to be much more chauvanistic about their economic success, but it certainly is still there to a degree, so if in a no-wars TL where Germany is much more prosperous without the wars destroying land and people and through retaining such a large amount of territory with rich agriculture and resource rich lands, the relative prosperity compared to their neighbors might well help with the cultural identification with Germany.

Comedian Marc Maron has mentioned this several times on his podcast (he's got a bit of a thing to try and figure out how different American and European Jews are) when interviewing European Jewish guests and seems to have some consensus that German Jews of a certain generation that's he's had contact with had a major cultural arrogance stemming from their association with being German, so I'm wondering if by the 1940s or so without any wars whether German Poles, French, Danes, and so on would view themselves as better than their non-German cousins outside the Reich due to their relative prosperity and increasing identification with being a member of a successful empire. In my travels I met a few Ruhr Poles, people of Polish heritage that moved to the Ruhr area of Germany to work in industry and the coal mines, who by now are 5th generation Germans and strongly identified as German, despite their ethnic heritage and the history of WW2, so is certainly is possible to assimilate culturally, which would tamp down on any separatist ideas. In the case of the Poles in particular IOTL the Congress Poland based Polish patriots seeking independence wanted to impose their brand of nationalism on Galicia and Posen area Polish territories, so down the road by the time Congress Poland controlled by Russia could get independence without war, non-Russian Empire Poles might not want to join that version of Poland. The upper crust of Galician (A-H Poland) society was reluctant to accept Warsaw's rule during WW1's Kingdom of Poland era, but the necessity of joining overrode their political disagreements when A-H collapsed and Warsaw was the only safe game in town; without the political collapse of the previous regimes that non-Russian Empire Polish areas were part of, they could well decide not joining is more in their interests than subordinating themselves to yet another 'foreign' capital.
 
Last edited by a moderator:
Germany has to accept 2 things:

a) Germany (and Russia and everyone else) can and would guarantee Austria-Hungary's 1914 boundaries but accept that Austria is second tier and any further expansionist ideas in the Balkans or anywhere else is a no go. If Austria does collapse some decades into the future, Germany can pick up the German pieces for sure and maybe even some Polish and Czech and/or Slovak, maybe Slovenian pieces in a greater Germany compensating for the loss of a subservient ally.

b) Accept that investment in Turkey may end up being a be a big waste and avoid getting into a war with great powers if the decide to Sevres her at some point. Germany might be able to pick up a scrap in lesser Armenia or some place if it happens.

If they accept those 2 things no war will happen.

After 10 years Germany actually has some decent colonial paces with air conditioning and anti malaria drugs could be soon attractive for emigration and national pride. If relations with Britain continue to normalize she might be able to strong arm or buy some other place too like Angola. These will keep her busy and give Kaiser Wilhelm a legacy.

USA and USSR will be superpowers, but Germany will be a quasi 3 super power based on her economic status, added territories from Austria-Hungary and a decent colonial empire with some strong German communities abroad in colonies and South America and such places.
 

Deleted member 1487

a) Germany (and Russia and everyone else) can and would guarantee Austria-Hungary's 1914 boundaries but accept that Austria is second tier and any further expansionist ideas in the Balkans or anywhere else is a no go. I
Thats the problem right there, you need RUSSIA to accept that. The issue wasn't Germany accepting that other people would guarantee Austria's borders, it's that Russia and Serbia and Romania, and Italy didn't want to, they wanted their slice of the Austrian pie. That was the crux of the problem, Russia wanted to dominate the Balkans and the Straits, which means Austria couldn't exist and as part of their pan-slavic ideology they wanted to free the 'little slavs' from the germanic dominating powers. So right there the foreign policy problem isn't Germany's fault per se.
 
Thats the problem right there, you need RUSSIA to accept that. The issue wasn't Germany accepting that other people would guarantee Austria's borders, it's that Russia and Serbia and Romania, and Italy didn't want to, they wanted their slice of the Austrian pie. That was the crux of the problem, Russia wanted to dominate the Balkans and the Straits, which means Austria couldn't exist and as part of their pan-slavic ideology they wanted to free the 'little slavs' from the germanic dominating powers. So right there the foreign policy problem isn't Germany's fault per se.
Does A-H collapse have to impact Germany's 1914 borders?
 
Thats the problem right there, you need RUSSIA to accept that. The issue wasn't Germany accepting that other people would guarantee Austria's borders, it's that Russia and Serbia and Romania, and Italy didn't want to, they wanted their slice of the Austrian pie. That was the crux of the problem, Russia wanted to dominate the Balkans and the Straits, which means Austria couldn't exist and as part of their pan-slavic ideology they wanted to free the 'little slavs' from the germanic dominating powers. So right there the foreign policy problem isn't Germany's fault per se.

I am thinking from the OTL 1908 events that Russia would be content with pushing on the Straits, dominance in Bulgaria, less dominance but still dominance in Serbia. They could still reach agreements then, but Austria was overreaching and should have been smacked down by Germany diplomatically at some point here 1908-1914. Were still talking the 3 old reactionary empires and still Congress of Vienna boundaries in Poland, and does Russia really want more Poles to deal with? Italy and Romania and Serbia are still handle-able by Austria all 3 by herself in case of aggression attack by those

Germany would be very happy with letting Russia push in the Pacific as in OTL, but if the Germans let the Russians push on the Ottomans too in this TL, the Russians would be busy and content enough to not push on German and Austria, and would end up clashing with England. And if a Sevres like treaty happened I bet the Germans could get some colonial compensation elsewhere.

(of course OTL Germany didn't want Russia messing with the Ottomans, with their Baghdad railway investments and their intrigue in the Muslim world and all, so likely something these would have triggered war anyway, by 1916 the Russian Black Sea fleet is pretty salty strong and I can see them picking a fight with the Ottomans the next time the usual revolt picks up in Armenia or Kurdistan).
 

NoMommsen

Donor
I am thinking from the OTL 1908 events that Russia would be content with pushing on the Straits, dominance in Bulgaria, less dominance but still dominance in Serbia.
You might forget, that in 1908 Russia was 'content' with the 'deal' between Isvolsky and (can't remember his austrian counterpart right from my head), that gave Russia kind of a free hand to try to dominate in the main direction of the straits
ONLY due
to its military weakness at that point : Russo-japanese war lost (a humilitationg loss), the after that at first thought of miltary reforms stopped and compromised by internal bickering.

This weakness was then used to humilitate Russia even more by the IOTL outcome of the bosnian crisis.

Afterwards, almost paralell to its growing military strenght grew also its ambitions on the Balkan as a whole, and escp. in Serbia at A-Hs 'soft underbelly'.
Without all the quarrels with the Serbd, A-H would have been rather happy with trying tosolve its own internal peoblems (though in regular intervalls Conrad would cry for a war oscillating every 6 months or so between going against Serbia or Italy ... and being ignored as all the years before).
... should have been smacked down by Germany diplomatically at some point here 1908-1914.
Its only (more or less) reliable ally ?


IMO to avoid WW 1 you would (also ?) have to alter or "disturb" the alliance blocks (Triple Entente contra Triple Alliance [though IMO Italy was almost from the beginning an ... not really needed and fitting part of it]), that formed and consolidated at that time.

A possible POD to start that : The Treaty of Björkö in 1905
Let it be "accepted" by the then chancellor von Blow, not threatening with resignment, and the dominating russian politician of that time Sergei Witte.
Though it might not end in a firm german-russian alliance but will loosen the bonds between all of the alliances, making them more "fluent" on single and/or seperate events.
-> german-russian "friendship" compromising its alliance with France morer the next years,
-> possibly butterflying the russo.british treaties of 1907 away or at least delay them.
-> less reaffirmation of A-H, which turns more on its own navel than outside
-> german "acceptance" of russian influence/pressure in/on the ottoman empire
-> (even) lesser german "engagement" in the ottoman empire
-> more "quarrels" between russian and the Entente powers and their schemes for the ottoman empire

If the assasination of FF still happens I think its impact would be much much lesser and a WW 1 could be avoided.
 
I think it's an impossible task when everything east an south of Germany and well within its sphere of influence will inevitably change its borders.
 
Thats the problem right there, you need RUSSIA to accept that. The issue wasn't Germany accepting that other people would guarantee Austria's borders, it's that Russia and Serbia and Romania, and Italy didn't want to, they wanted their slice of the Austrian pie. That was the crux of the problem, Russia wanted to dominate the Balkans and the Straits, which means Austria couldn't exist and as part of their pan-slavic ideology they wanted to free the 'little slavs' from the germanic dominating powers. So right there the foreign policy problem isn't Germany's fault per se.

Yeah, the same Russia that restored Hungary to the Austtrians in 1848, left the Austrians alone in 1859, 1866 and 1870 when Vienna was theirs for the taking. You might not agree with it, but Nicholas expected an Austrian collapse from within when Franz Joseph died. Even if he was wrong about it, that view shaped his foreign policy. Neither Romania, Italy or Serbia was planning an attack on Austria

Austria and Hungary just couldn't accept that their mismanagement and desire to dominate the country politically was at the heart of the Empire's troubles. Instead they sought to project the problem abroad

Even a complete collapse of Austria wouldn't mean that German borders have to change. An intact Germany without Austria would find favor with the Russians as a threat to France but not to Russia
 

Deleted member 1487

Yeah, the same Russia that restored Hungary to the Austtrians in 1848, left the Austrians alone in 1859, 1866 and 1870 when Vienna was theirs for the taking. You might not agree with it, but Nicholas expected an Austrian collapse from within when Franz Joseph died. Even if he was wrong about it, that view shaped his foreign policy. Neither Romania, Italy or Serbia was planning an attack on Austria

Austria and Hungary just couldn't accept that their mismanagement and desire to dominate the country politically was at the heart of the Empire's troubles. Instead they sought to project the problem abroad

Even a complete collapse of Austria wouldn't mean that German borders have to change. An intact Germany without Austria would find favor with the Russians as a threat to France but not to Russia
1914 changed the diplomatic situation vis-a-vis Russia and Austria. Between 1870-1914 policy changed. For one thing the three emperor's league died out. Romania in 1914 wasn't planning on it, but the king was about to die and his son was very pro-entente. Italy was hostile to A-H over the Italian minority issue, but wasn't going to start a war, just pile on if it could get something, while Serbia's intelligence services were actively promoting separatists in Bosnia. Germany wasn't keen on being left alone without Allies, Russia wasn't that favorable to Germany and still allied to France, who hated Germany, and an independent Austria isn't going to do well.
 
A common AH cliche:

Frederick III doesn't die of throat cancer in 1888, and goes on to reign for a long time. Without Wilhelm II's inept foreign policy, WWI is avoided and Germany maintains good relations with most of the great powers.

Central Europe falls into Germany's sphere of influence as Germany's economy grows and prospers. This benefits Central Europe too.

Eventually, all of Europe forms a prosperous EU-style bloc with Germany as the economic engine similar to in OTL in the late 20th/21st century, except this Germany is bigger and more powerful with its 1914 borders and a stronger military.
 
The best scenario is avoiding the Great War and you have plenty of places to set in motion its butterfly but then it is rather daunting imagining a world without the World Wars. The next best scenario is a Central powers victory or even stalemated Great War, messier but still likely to leave German borders intact.

In this world one might never see Communism or Fascism emerge, although I think both the left and right might still breed some dangerous actors and one might still see revolution and reactionary governments come to power, especially as decolonialization takes on momentum.

For one I see the British Empire holding its place as the only global power here and acting as world policeman far longer, it will likely be torn asunder in the brush fire wars. The RN remains premier and the FAA likely develop into a more potent strike force, the Army devolves to fight on the fringes and if the RAF emerges it is focused on air defense and bombers until the SLBM fades its role to self-defense. London remains the prime global finance center but it is dogged closely by New York and slightly more distantly by the banking rivals in Germany. The UK evolves a niche focused and boutique manufacturing sector that might do better in the post-industrial era but it likely still loses big in mass market sectors to American and German and later Japanese and Chinese competitors.

France will eventually face its twilight as a great power and likely go bankrupt fighting to hold its colonial empire. Biggest danger will be either Japan or more likely China supporting independence in Indochina with both Germany and the USA earning more sway in its other holdings as they both buy materials and export products. It will eventually see itself integrated into the continental trade links. It likely forms good bonds with Italy and Greece, makes inroads in Romania and becomes a strong exporter to Russia, benefitting from being its biggest creditor, but as debts climb and Russia stagnates that relationship may upend France yet again. It looks rather akin to how Canada is to the USA.

Russia likely sees itself fall into a trap of exporting raw materials, later especially oil and gas, as well as food and cheap manufacturers rather than actually transition to stronger economic underpinnings. Maybe revolution but I think it gets just wealthy enough to limp along. It is the biggest threat to start a regional war with the Ottomans, the Chinese or the Japanese, but it may see high tension with Germany for quite some time. In some ways it looks like Mexico does with respect to the USA, a place to outsource the dirty industry. It might face some real pressure from the Poles to grant independence, Germany has a dog in that hunt and German Poles might urge Germany to get reckless, it may be quite the flashpoint.

A-H will face its share of challenges but I do not feel it shatters, likely it simply crumbles and goes through an ugly divorce. As always it is this region that fuels the greatest risk of war, the Germans cannot have any genuine enemies on its underbelly so it must intervene, the other powers have plenty of notions about getting involved, but it might simply look rather like modern Europe, a bunch of new states enjoying independence but swimming up river in a global economy truly dominated by a few. At best I think it splits, Hungary goes its own way, Austria might hold some non-Germans but I think it loses enough.

Italy stays on the long vacation, although it as many ambitions, it will slowly lose its relevance and fade into being the biggest player in the Med until someone else arrives. Eventually it might capitalize on Libyan oil and gas to develop a rather breezy and sunny economy, a great place to visit or retire to.

The USA still emerges as a global economic power but not as hegemonic. It likely zeniths as a great naval power by the end of the 1940s as events in Asia diffuse its fears. As a country it might look far more regionalized, have more ethnic diversity among the "white" population and see racism linger longer and have more potential to shatter its inner workings than we suspect. Americans run around the world chasing business opportunity and challenging the British hegemony as perceived to be counter to its interests and values, but it may never see itself as a military power.

The Ottomans likely fade to almost extinction, the biggest threats being the British and Russians, but once the oil begins to flow and any authority remains in the Empire then it will have a new day in the sun. We will still see some violence on the Arabian peninsula, the Empire will certainly reassert itself and the British will not be happy, but German interest might be enough to dissuade the British from going to war. On a positive note there should be no Armenian genocide and less pressure to cleanse the Greeks, this Empire might have some better diversity and all the wealth might actually uplift the entire region, its peoples should pass into modernity with ties to Europe that hopefully solidify long term peace. The biggest danger might be a war sparked off by the Greeks or Bulgarians as the Ottomans fall the weakest, assuming the Russians do not pounce first.

Japan likely still goes on to grab the power in Asia but its hands are far more tied with the European powers firmly entrenched. If it can avoid an open war, likely enough, it may become a major trade partner with the British and quietly undermine the Empire's grasp to open markets. It likely develops into a significant regional power but forever in the shadow of China. Worst case scenario it goes militaristic and stagnates into a rather poor facsimile of the USSR.

China likely struggles even longer to shake off the influence of the West and reassert its independence, it likely remains poor and like modern China leverages its huge pool of cheap labor to industrialize and accrue wealth. It may indeed become one of the biggest players in Asia but built on the backs of its people with even more pressure from below as the wealth divide will not be masked by the Communist façade. We might see something like communism emerge here to redress the grinding poverty that was China's history.

And of course the Reich, it might be one of those places that actually breaks under the Kaiser and goes into revolt, but more likely I see it transitioning towards a limited monarch and more socialist leaning democracy with oddly strong doses of Liberal strains, this should be the number two power, third economically, compared to the British Empire or the USA but decidedly the continental juggernaut. It should remain equal to Russia in real power despite less population, maybe a bit behind in GDP but per capita GDP will tell us the Germans have real wealth in depth. Likely a world leader in many industries and a stronger competitor in many more, if it is made from metal or manufactured for precision or efficiency then it comes from Germany. If the Empire fails then it goes to the Germans versus the USA for dominance globally. Germany likely lives with a strong fear of Russian ambitions and faces a lot of potential unrest all around it so it may remain a strong military power long after others let their militaries fade. I can see German peacekeepers, advisors and operatives perennially deployed as Germany wades into the sort of messes the USA did in OTL. The might prop up the Dutch in DEI, or the South Africans or even the French in Indochina, or they might champion China versus Japan or woo Japan by supporting gambits into China and showdowns with the other Europeans by proxy. Germany will be a quixotic figure, too much like how the USA got sucked into vacuums left as other powers faded or were pushed from the board, yet never quite so dominant.

This multilateral world will be both more dangerous and less fragmentary than our own, Europe will hold sway longer, its culture, language and influence will set more deeply in places like Africa, one might see more but less fearsome wars, more violence in the shadows, but also more peace and a different distribution of wealth, it could be very different or almost the same.
 
Top