Should be fixed, will have to go back and reply to your last post later on, can't reply for a while.
Thanks. At least that means you should be able to reply to it together with this one.
They didn't really, the Germans overextended themselves; the Stalingrad Operation was a flank guard mission and the offensive in the Caucasus was advancing into November.
Yes they did. Had they not, the Germans would have walked into Baku and Stalingrad, happily whistling all the way, regardless of any other difficulties. The Caucasus Operation stalled out by the end of August. All gains from there on out were local and not something meaningful in a operational-strategic context. Even the one your alluding too, the Odoznikhie drive, saw the Germans routed back to their start position by the first serious Soviet counter-attack thrown against it. This failure was even acknowledged (albiet, in a extremely indirect fashion) by the Germans, as it caused Hitler to seek the taking of Stalingrad at all costs as a ersatz means of making up for the failure to take Grozny.
Stalin committed a major part of those forces against the Germans in Rzhev and on the flank of Case Blue;
But not remotely all. Many were thrown into separate offensives against AGC. Offensives that won't materialize IATL.
Units in defensive positions were destroyed, they largely did not fall back from position to position, new units manned those positions.
Incorrect. Many of the same units that were manning defensive positions that were ultimately overrun after several days of brutal combat on the 4th were still there on the 12th, manning new positions further back. For example, the 67th Guards Rifle Division on July 4th occupied a stretch of front at the junction of the 47th Panzer and II SS Panzer Corps. 8 days later, it was still fighting from defenses on the junction of the 11th Panzer Division and the
Grossdeutschland Panzergrenadier Division.
Whatever word you want to use multiple defensive belts were breached and the forces manning them were largely killed or captured.
Which is why those same forces were able to go over to the offensive when the German offensive ended with only a minor delay.
Zitadel was about destroying Soviet forces in the bulge, which they were not yet remotely done with when the operation was cancelled to pull out forces.
Citadel was about destroying Soviet forces via encircling them in a massive pocket. It was not about destroying Soviet forces by grinding through them in a frontal assault. The Germans had not aimed for positional warfare, they just got it because their attempt at maneuver warfare failed basically instantly. Positional warfare is what happens when an attempt at maneuver warfare fails, after all. And even by that criteria, they had clearly already failed in the north (the Soviet counter-offensive there was already underway when the cancellation order came down and was already achieving enough success to basically doom the Orel salient) and the one in the south was quite transparently not getting it done and was on the verge of collapsing from physical exhaustion.
The pincer move was stopped in the north first when the Soviets attacked them both frontally and around Orel.
An offensive which predates the cancellation of Citadel and not only stopped the Germans on the northern face of the Kursk bulge, but also had already broken through their defenses on the northern face of the Orel bulge by the time the cancellation orders came down.
As planned the operation was ill conceived, but despite that they were inflicting disproportionate losses on Soviet forces, which matters more to the discussion of what would happen in Moscow in 1942.
Using Kursk to show what happens at Moscow in 1942 suggests that the Germans don't ever even see Tula, much less Moscow, regardless of what the loss rate is.
It took the Soviets actually leaving their defensive positions and counterattacking in the open, at brutal loss rates, to stall the offensive;
Soviet loss rates in '43, and '42 for that matter, may have been brutal... but they were never anything the Soviets proved unable to sustain. The same could not be said for the Germans.
if they try that in 1942...just look what happened; their reserves were as deep, as well equipped, as well led, as well organized, as well supplied, or as well trained or experienced, nor had Kursk level defensive positions, which did not hold up to attack well at all.
Their reserves were as deep in '42 as they were in '43, perhaps deeper actually, just less well deployed (and all that other stuff). But the salient point is the Germans greatly enhanced this by striking where and in a direction those reserves were not and could not be put in a timely enough matter. The places the Germans struck also did not even have defensive positions even comparable, whereas the Moscow defenses certainly are comparable.
The result of attacking German forces with 1942 Soviet forces in the same way would be a massacre...as it was in 1942; that was considerably worse than in 1943, yet in 1943 it wasn't echelons of Soviet passive defense that stalled out the Germans or really appreciably held them up, it was the constant horribly wasteful counterattacks that put them on the tactical defensive and is anything helped spare the Germans the losses of chewing through layers of defenses to kill Soviet reserves.
Except the passive defenses
did hold the Germans up long enough for those counterattacks to go off, unlike in 1942 where the Germans were already through the Soviets tactical-operational defenses by the time the reserves engaged.
Pardon? They defended against the mass of Soviet offensives in front of Moscow in August-September, then tackled head on their major concentrations of troops in front of Moscow, killing or capturing around 1 million of them. 1941 is replete with German offensive bashing through prepared Soviet defenses and fighting major concentrations of Soviet forces.
And in none of these cases were they fighting the Soviets on equal terms. They always had numerical superiority in these instances, particularly at the key points of contact, in 1941. Overwhelming force is just how the Germans, like literally everyone, fought.
Even in 1942 when the Soviets tried to strike back against Case Blue on the flanks they were slaughtered by air and artillery repeatedly despite going after the German flanks.
While air and artillery provided important assistance to German mechanized forces, they could not have halted the Soviet counter-attacks alone.
Given Soviet defensive doctrine in practice at Kursk, seems like rather than sitting still they'd just burn themselves out counterattack (as per 1941 too) while artillery and air strikes, either in the open or in their prepared positions.
Given that it was such counterattacks which ultimately stopped the Germans, then that's probably a good thing.
Again going by history it was airpower that really smashed Soviet armor, artillery, and defensive positions throughout the defensive/offensive period, at 2nd Kharkov and beyond.
In reality, it was the Germans assembling overwhelming force at key points of contact, then outmaneuvering Soviet forces so as to leave them cut off and helpless. Many of the defensive positions fell without a shot being fired as the Soviets were forced to abandon them to avoid being cut-off (or, even more frequently, to break out of already existing pockets). Airpower was there, but it was merely one component and would not have mattered if German ground forces had not been up to the task.
Again based on what? Stalin committed his reserves from Moscow, specially all his tank forces, against the flank of Case Blue and still got them smashed without appreciable effect.
On actual history. Stalin did not commit all of his tank forces, much less all his reserves, nor did it not have appreciable effect: it was actually decisive in delaying the Germans at Voronezh, forcing Bock to retain the 4th Panzer Army for two weeks, and upset their timetable. It was why Hitler got impatient and changed the plan.
In which of his books? I have a few I can check when I get home. Certainly organization was considerably better than in 1941, but wasn't what it was later in 1942 or in 1943.
To the Gates of Stalingrad mainly. I'm about to go home myself, so I should be able to start citing it then.
What makes you think that given Stalin's penchant for counterattacks?
Timing and the initial German ROA outpacing any such counterattack orders. 5th Tank's initial disposition on the start of Blau has it covering a defense line running along the Mecha, a tributary of the Don, about 75 kilometers behind the front. Assuming the Germans manage the same historical ROA as Blau in your proposed axis of advance (although they might not, as Bryansk front's frontline defenses north and east of Orel were akin to the Western and Kalinin Fronts frontline defenses, whereas the defenses the Germans historically broke through to the south were much weaker), they'd reach it on the second day. IOTL, Stalin ordered the 5th Armies counter-attacks on the 3rd... 2 days later.
And in fact, the 5th Tank Army was the only reserve formation released with orders to attack. All of the other armies were deployed with orders to
defend on a arch running from Tula to Voronezh with the expectation that the Germans would swing north towards Moscow. Only when that failed to materialize and, 7 days later, Stalin accepted that the Germans were going for a southern offensive did he begin to release more reserve armies.
Look at 3rd Tank Army: during the Wirbelwind operations he ordered them to counterattack and they were slaughtered, losing over 500 tanks, that is more than 80% of their starting strength. Why would 5th Tank army be used any differently? Especially as it was stationed on the flank of where I'm suggesting an offensive would be launched from, so they'd be attacking a breakthrough much the same as they did IOTL, just aimed in a different direction.
Their not anywhere on the flank. Their actually in the dead middle of your proposed axis of advance.
They failed in their objective and delaying the Germans didn't really have any substantial operational or strategic effect.
The delay actually had a substantial operational effect, as it horribly upset the German timetable, causing Hitler to get impatient and make try to change around Operation Blau.
Lack of strength.
Why would 3rd Tank army sit on the defensive? Stalin ordered them to counterattack and seize the initiative just as IOTL 1941-43 in all defensive operations.
Not at first he didn't. He was expecting the Germans to swing north for Moscow in a similar matter to what you are proposing so he ordered those forces to defend. When the Germans instead moved on Voronezh, only then did he order to the counter-attacks.
In terms of reserve infantry armies, they might well sit on the defensive, the question is again do they actually hold up better to air and artillery attacks in fixed positions?
Yes. With one unique exception, those forces held up better to attempted AGC attacks in this period then did their counterparts much further south.
Soviet forces tried to hold the line repeatedly and failed miserably.
Ignoring that they did hold the line at Voronezh.
That 1000 number was not including 3rd and 5th Tank armies, which at least doubled that 1000 number. They faced them IOTL and destroyed most of them.
It actually very much
does includes 5th Tank Army, which was already under Bryansk Front's command when Blau began. Remove 5th Tank, and Bryansk Front's AFV numbers drop by half. And of course it excludes 3rd Tank Army, that one was never committed to Voronezh during the summer. 1st and 4th Armies were committed to the bulge in the Don, although IATL their likely to be committed to Moscow.
Gets cancelled.
Leaving AG-Center than unengaged means they can help with the offensive, which means Soviet reserves get called in to help and remain uncommitted to the Oka.
The Germans don't have the strength to launch major offensives with more then one Army Group, which was why Blau was so limited compared to Barbarossa to begin with... and indeed, a major reason why it failed. If you want to get Army Group Center strong enough to join in Blau, the only way to do that is to strip out Army Group South which weakens the attack there as well. It also weakens the attempted German counter-offensive . And given the tougher fortifications, forces, and terrain in that direction, the assault is liable to be much slower and costlier for the Germans then it was down south... as indeed was the precisely the case with the historical Wirbelwind. Put bluntly, citing Wirbelwind is effectively citing what would happen with an attack towards Moscow: the Germans spend so much time trying to get through the Soviet prepared defenses that their still bogged down there by the time Soviet reserves counter-attack, which stops the attack altogether.
How are the fortified regions compared to say the Kursk fortifications that didn't hold up to German forces?
Except the fortifications did hold up? I mean, they held up because they were backed up by mobile forces counter-attacking the German flanks. But then that's the point.
Well, I was tracking them where they were on the day Blau started (June 29th). I'll have to look into where they were when they were converted, but that still shows their there.
If the Soviets pull out troops from Kalinin Front you're once against strengthening AG-Center and helping reopen their supply lines from the Toropets bulge.
Clearly you did not read what I wrote, here is what I wrote with emphasis added:
"If the Soviets feel it necessary, they can also bring as many as 6 divisions and 4 brigades down from the Kalinin Front in a timely enough manner
without affecting it's frontline strength at all."
