The first successes of General Weichs, although they complicated the situation on the left wing of the Bryansk Front, but still did not pose a particular threat. To eliminate the grouping of the 4th Panzer Army, General Golikov, on the night of June 29, the 4th and 24th Panzer Corps of the Southwestern Front and the 17th Panzer Corps from the Stavka Reserve were transferred. The reserves of the Bryansk Front-1st and 16th Panzer Corps, 115th and 116th Tank Brigades were also sent to the site of the breakthrough. These forces consisted of more than 1000 combat vehicles and, of course, if properly used, could radically change the situation. The implementation of countermeasures was complicated by the concentration of the corps, their insecurity with fuel and the inability to fight. General Kazakov writes: "The true reasons for the failure, in my opinion, were in another: in inability."
The Supreme High Command recommended that Golikov concentrate the efforts of the tank corps to defeat the enemy grouping that had broken through to the Gorshechnoe area. The 4th and 24th Panzer Corps were to strike from the area of Stary Oskol to the north, and the 17th Panzer Corps from the Kastornoy area in the South. All three corps were combined into an operational group under the command of Lieutenant-General Ya.N. Fedorenko, the chief of the Main Auto Armored Directorate, who had specially arrived at the front to assist in the organization of combat operations of tank formations. To strike on the left flank and rear of the advancing German grouping, the 1st and 16th Panzer Corps were aimed. Thus, the Bryansk Front had sufficient forces to not only stop the Weichs group, but also to crush its main forces.
Knowing the talents of his commanders, Stalin personally instructed Golikov on June 30:
"Remember well. You now have more than 1,000 tanks at the front, and the enemy has not even 500 tanks. [260]
This is the first and second: on the front of the action of three enemy tank divisions, you have gathered more than 500 tanks, and the enemy has 300-350 tanks the largest.
Everything now depends on your ability to use your powers and manage them humanly. Do you understand? "
No, they did not understand! The front command was unable to organize a timely and massive strike on the flanks of the German grouping. Everything was done in the best traditions of the summer of 1941: the corps entered the battle at various times and in parts, without interaction with artillery and aviation, without reconnaissance and communication, and they were used not so much to solve active tasks to destroy the enemy, but to plug gaps in defense combined armies.
On June 29, the 16th Panzer Corps of Major-General M.I. Pavelkin set off stubborn battles with the goal of eliminating the enemy's bridgehead on the left bank of the Ksheni River in the Volovo region. On the next day, June 30, the 1st Panzer Corps, Major-Major M.Ye., advanced to the offensive south of Livny along the left bank of the Kshen River. Katukova. In the interfluve between Xenia and Olim, fierce battles unfolded. Katukov managed to advance south only 5 km, then he was stopped by German artillery and air strikes and took up a job at the junction of the 13th and 40th armies. Pavelkov's brigades went around the enemy from the south and cut off from the rear communications; for 3 days of fighting the 16th Panzer Corps lost more than a hundred combat vehicles, and the 109th Tank Brigade was surrounded by an enemy.
The former commander of this brigade, Colonel General V.S. Arkhipov recalled that the battles on the river Kshen were remembered
"Especially strong because of the many unused opportunities (our italics .- Author). .. Instead of knocking the enemy off the bridgehead with a blow from the tank fist, we tried to push him with his finger. On the first day, they threw against twenty German tanks and two battalions of submachine gunners who had captured the New Settlement, about the same number of riflemen, but half as many tanks. [261] On the second day - 20 of our tanks against 40-50 fascist and so on. The enemy, increasing his strength, was ahead of us, and if on the first day of the battle for the bridgehead we had a common superiority in the tanks, but did not use it in the attacks, then by the fourth day this superiority had already passed to the enemy. That's what the use of tanks means, with the crushing of tank brigades and battalions for "closing gaps."
Marshal of the armored forces M.E. Katukov leads another way of using tanks - "without looking back":
"I gave the commander the task, and he went to carry it out. An hour or two later the chief of the operational department Nikitin handed the report from the left flank:
- The tank brigade, after suffering heavy losses, withdrew from the battle. The commander was sent to the rear. He has a heavy nervous shock.
What happened?
... After all, how did the typing-type tankers act in the performance of such a task? Preparing for the attack, they first sent forward the combat reconnaissance, so that it caused fire on themselves. The commanders of tank crews and subunits at that time were located in shelters, observation posts and detected the enemy's fire weapons that had been discovered. And then the "By the Machines" command was sent, and tank crews rushed forward, knowing exactly what targets they were to suppress by fire, destroy, crumple with caterpillars. It is clear that the preliminary reconnaissance did not ensure the detection of all targets, but nevertheless greatly facilitated the fight against enemy firepower.
And that day in Pridonye the brigade commander without any reconnaissance led the tank battalions to a large naked hillock and opened fire on the supposed (!) Positions of the Hitlerites. Undoubtedly, he hoped to crush the enemy's defenses (?), Open the way to tanks and infantry. [262] But everything turned out differently. German artillery, well disguised in rye bread and other shelters, remained invulnerable, and tanks on the naked hill became a good target ... "
The commander of a tank brigade is a general's post, and received her officer in the rank of no less than a lieutenant-colonel. I understand that it is possible to give general's epaulettes to a military man who has no idea about reconnaissance, combat formations, use of terrain, disguise. But to entrust such a man with a brigade of tanks? You involuntarily remember the American: "We fool can not be a boss, it is economically impractical." How much did the Red Army cost only one brigade commander who killed fifty tanks in a couple of hours? We will add here the means spent for its maintenance during twenty years of service and on treatment of "nervous shock". Although the mention of "sighted tankmen" suggests that other brigade commanders learned to fight in exactly the same way, only their nerves were stronger.
In the second half of June 30, a large tank battle began on the left flank of the 40th Army, between the divisions of the German 48th Panzer Corps and the tank corps of the operational group Fedorenko. The 4th Panzer Corps of Major-General V.A. Mishulina, having launched an offensive from the region of Stary Oskol, reached the Poter Island by the end of the day, defeating the advanced enemy units here. The 17th Corps of Major-General N.V. Feklenko struck a blow by one brigade from the Orekhov district also on Gorshechnoe. The remaining connections and parts of the hull were still pushed into the initial area for the offensive. 24th Panzer Corps of General VM. Badanov instead of going over to the offensive in conjunction with the brigades Mishulina was tasked with defending the area of Stary Oskol and preventing the enemy from breaking through to the south. [263]
The counterattack of the 4th and 17th Panzer Corps fell not on the flanks and rear of the 48th Panzer Corps of the enemy, but on its reconnaissance and forward units. This put the Soviet corps, which left the area Gorshechnoe, in a difficult situation, as they themselves were threatened by encirclement. On July 1, the enemy, bypassing the main forces Gorshechnoye from the north and south, by the end of the day went to the line Orekhovo, Yasenki, Bogoroditskoe. In the area of Gorshechnoe were surrounded by the 102nd Brigade of the 4th Panzer Corps and the main forces of the Mishulin Corps. Tankmen fought in the ring for another two days, cut off from the rear by the enemy and in the full domination of his aircraft. On the night of July 3, the remnants of the brigades broke through to the east.
As you can see, General Golikov and his staff failed to organize a massive massive strike on the flanks of the Weichs strike group. Moreover, the commander of the front decided to withdraw part of the 40th Army to a new frontier. The Stavka banned this and simultaneously pointed to the inadmissibility of lack of communication with the 40th Army and the tank corps. That is, in fact, nobody controlled these corps, and their commanders, too, are not yet "Hindenburgs", but only learn.
Marshal Vasilevsky writes:
"The commanders of the tank corps (Major-General of the tank troops ME Katukov, NV Feklenko, MI Pavelkin, VA Mishulin, VM Badanov) did not yet have sufficient experience (?), And we did little to help them with their advice and instructions. The tank corps behaved indecisively: they were afraid to break away from the defending infantry of the combined arms armies, and in this connection, in most cases, they acted according to the methods of the rifle forces, not taking into account their specifics and their capabilities ... Examples: Katukov (1st tk) instead of rapid destruction Infantry of the enemy during the day engaged in the encirclement of two regiments ... "
And Katukov agrees with the senior comrade:
"... like any experience, combat is not given immediately. All these thoughts already come to us, the participants of those events, as a consequence of the experience accumulated in subsequent battles. " [264]
Meanwhile, the troops of the 6th German Army and the 40th Panzer Corps, which switched to the offensive on June 30 from the area of Volchansk, broke through the defenses at the junction of the 21st and 28th Armies of the South-Western Front by fourteen hours and, after three days, 80 km, went to the regions of Stary Oskol and Volokonovka. [265]
Commander of the 21st Army, Major-General A.I. Danilov, in order to avoid encirclement, decided to withdraw troops to the eastern shore of Oskol. The task of protecting the retreating formations was assigned to the 343rd Infantry Division of Colonel P.P. Chuvashev and the 13th Panzer Corps, attached to the army. By that time, the latter had been replenished to full strength, it included 158,167.85 tank, 20th motorized rifle brigades, and 2 divisions of rocket artillery. There were 180 tanks in the brigades. It's a powerful enough fist. However, the structure of the association did not have antiaircraft artillery, reconnaissance units and evacuation and repair units. In the conditions of retreat, every damaged or broken tank fell into the category of irretrievable losses. The withdrawal was accompanied by continuous enemy attacks, bomber air raids and lack of support from its artillery and infantry. Tankmen suffered significant losses in technology and personnel, a deadly wound was received by General P.E. Shumov, the commander of the 20th Rifle Brigade, Major P.I. Turbin and the commander of the 85th Tank Major-General A.A. Aseichev.
The units of the 28th Army were also thrown back to the left bank of the Oskol River. At the same time, according to the memoirs of the army commander:
"Our aviation was not in the air. We had no information about the situation of our right neighbor - the 21st Army and her left-flank formations. Nothing could be reported about it and the headquarters of the front, referring to the lack of connection with the union. We did not receive a response to our inquiries on the radio, but we had no aircraft for communication. "
Further, Ryabyshev complains that the command of the front "doubted absolutely accurate information," issued orders that "did not correspond to the current situation," in particular ordered the forces of the 23rd Panzer Corps to strike north and get in touch with the 13th Panzer Corps the corps of the 21st Army, "not knowing its exact location." [266]
Ordinary story: if the victory has many fathers, then defeat is an orphan. On the other hand, in the archives of the FSB of Russia, a memorandum of the special department of the NKVD dated July 18, 1942, addressed to the commissioner of state security of the third rank Abakumov, which is entitled: "On the shortcomings in the fighting of the 23 rd tank corps for the period from 1 to 10 July 1942 ". In it, among other things, the following was stated:
"The continuous transfer of the parts of the 23 rd tank corps from one frontier to another, misuse of them in combat - exhausted the material part, not reaching the goal.
Within 10 days, the hulls made a march with a total difficulty of up to 300 kilometers (on July 1, there were 85 tanks left in the hull ).
By order of the command of the 28th Army, parts of the 23rd Tank Corps on 1.7.1942 were concentrated in the Kozinka, Kaznacheevka and Konoplyanovka areas with the task of destroying the enemy advancing eastward towards Volokonovka and allowing units of the 28th Army to retreat beyond the Oskol River and take up defensive positions.
The first and main task was not fulfilled.
07/01/42, 6 th and 114 th Tank Brigade launched an attack, not having data on the forces of the enemy, without the organization of interaction with the infantry, artillery and aircraft.
As a result of this lack of organization, the tanks were met by ambushes active artillery fire, with air that immediately violated the order of battle the advancing our tanks (here podish you NKVD and tactics understands better than many of our generals - this is because even in the heads not raised himself or classical: "Everyone fancies himself a strategist seeing the battle from outside"? - Ed)..
As a result of ill-conceived attack, part of the body have lost only two days before the battle 30 tanks and the battle moved to the east bank of the river Oskol. " [267]
