How Big Could the Ottoman Empire Get?

[Nevermore]

As the topic of the Ottoman Empire has recently been on mind as of late, I figure I would ask the idea: how big exactly (though within reason to keep things from getting ASBish) could the Ottoman Empire feasibly get? This need not necessarily mean direct annexation into the empire (though suggestions as to how would be preferred), perhaps even more along the line of vassal or puppet states. In other words, the goal is to give the Ottomans the biggest sphere of influence that could technically occur.

I'm not thinking of any actual specific time period either, so the sky's the limit.

 

[mowque]

Not much bigger then OTL. They were at chronic overstretch as it was...

 

[Falastur]

Well, if Vienna fell in 1567, I can see a potential domino of catastrophes. Of course, Europe could still pull it together, but there's the potential there for it to go horribly wrong.

 

[Wednesday]

Not much bigger then OTL. They were at chronic overstretch as it was...

What he said. I could see the Ottoman Empire retaining some of their Iranian conquests longer, for example Luristan, but to all intents and purposes they basically reached the culminating point of conquest as is. I cannot see the Turks holding Austria in any real sense even if they had succeeded during the 1529 siege, especially so soon after they had absorbed Hungary. And of course a success in 1683 would benefit France far more than it would benefit the sultan; Louis would be allowed to continue his reunions with minimal interference. (I've always thought that the Dutch, actually, might have been able to get Willem elected to the Imperium in that event, to block off French expansionism and to help shore up defenses against the Turks. It'd be extremely awesome if he did, in any event.)

 

[The Sandman]

I'd actually think that the most interesting areas would be in the Indian Ocean and in southern Russia/Ukraine. Especially the former; what would it take to have the Ottomans push to the Volga and up the Don and Dneiper, thereby integrating an immensely rich agricultural (and later industrial) region into the Empire? Especially since IIRC most of that area wasn't all that heavily settled until the mid to late 1600s.

 

[Philip]

Well, if Vienna fell in 1567, I can see a potential domino of catastrophes.

Not likely at all. It is possible, but unlikely, that Vienna could fall. However, it would most likely involve the Ottomans sacking the city and withdrawing. Perhaps even some tributary stipulations. Austria is simply too far away from the Ottoman power base in the 16th Century.

Hungary serves as a good object lesson. AHP has pointed out several times that directly annexing Hungary was a mistake. Austria would be an even bigger mistake. In Hungary, the Ottomans had the advantages wiping out the Hungarian nobility at Mohacs and the ability to play the Hungarians against the Habsburgs. Neither of these are likely in Austria. Combined with Austria's location further from Constantinople and closer to the European powers, I can't see annexing Austria as benefitting the Ottomans in any way. Projecting from Vienna would be nearly impossible.

The Ottomans' best chance for further expansion are along the Mediterrainian and Black Sea coasts. Sicily, Southern Italy, and the Steppe are particularly possible, at least temperarily. Saving/rescuing Astrakhan (and maybe Kazan?) is possible would help bolster the Ottomans position as the preeminent power in Islam, though I don't know if it would be integrated into the Empire.

 

[Nevermore]

Thanks for all the replies, everyone. Seems that this is a bit hard to do, unfortunately. I'm particularly interested in the notion of the Ottomans expanding along the Indian Ocean (Ottoman-held or Ottoman-aligned pieces of India would make for a very interesting sociopolitical landscape...). However, as was pointed out, somewhere along Russia's border is probably most likely, but I'm not just so sure on the projected areas of it. That seems a bit too close into the nation for any ruler of Russia to allow into it, I'd imagine; certainly they'd react quite violently to Muslim 'intrusion' in the area.

I also doubted being able to take Austria as well. If the Ottomans still sacked Vienna and tried to annex it, I'd imagine they'd have quite the uphill struggle on their hands to get it to work. An annexation of parts of the Ukraine/Steppe might be beneficial in the long run, as an industrial center would probably do nothing but good for the empire. I'm skeptical of Italy and Sicily as well though: that seems to tread far too closely to Papal State lands that the Pope would let that threat get, wouldn't you think? If Austria could send the European powers into a frenzy, Muslims getting anywhere near the Pope could get many Catholic European nations up in arms.

 

[The Sandman]

I suspect that part of the Ottoman expansion into Ukraine and the bits of Russia south of the Volga would involve some messy wars with the Russians. I'm not sure precisely how well they'll do, though; it also might be interesting to see a tacit alliance between the Swedes and the Ottomans in so far as smacking around the Russians and Poland-Lithuania is concerned. Given that European nations were perfectly willing to ally with the Ottomans against other Christians in OTL, this doesn't seem that far-fetched.

As far as Ottoman influence on the Indian, I'd see them as going for a series of trading ports (at least initially), and trying to work through locals wherever possible. Ottoman contacts with Aceh might be particularly fruitful here.

 

[Philip]

I think some people are overestimating the Russian-ness of the Ukraine during the 16th Century.

 

[Pearlshire19]

The Americas

If somehow they won at Venice, then took over Italy, then Spain, they could get to the Americas. Especially if the Spanish already had colonies there.

 

[mowque]

If somehow they won at Venice, then took over Italy, then Spain, they could get to the Americas. Especially if the Spanish already had colonies there.

Wait, what!?

 

[Philip]

If somehow they won at Venice, then took over Italy, then Spain, they could get to the Americas. Especially if the Spanish already had colonies there.

And France, Germany, England, and Russia too. Then all of Africa, Asia, and the world! Except for Switzerland, of course.

 

[Thande]

It's interesting to speculate on how improved communications (like Pickard's mediaeval optical telegraph) might change the rules of the game for this and other examples of imperial overstretch.

 

[Abdul Hadi Pasha]

Here are what I view the possibilities as:

1. Central Europe - virtually nothing at all. I think Vienna could have been taken - it was saved by extraordinarily bad weather - but the Ottomans would have sacked it and withdrawn. It is just way too far and has way too Christian a population to serve as any kind of a springboard for further action. This would have left Central Europe in disarray for a while and would have given the Ottomans some valuable breathing room, and would have been a huge boost for Protestants.

2. Italy - overstretch is less of a problem where there's sea supply. I don't think the Ottomans could hold it in the long run, but for the 16th c it's doable.

3. Morocco - pushing it. Morocco was pretty strong when the Ottomans were at their peak, and it has a large population. Maybe it could be vassalized, but I doubt it.

4. Persia - this is interesting. Selim I planned to conquer it, and he probably had the ability to do it. I doubt it could be held directly, but Shiism could be prevented from dominating it, although the Ottomans as Orthodox Sunni champions vs. the Safavids as guardians of Shiism are largely political choices due to the struggle between the two - before that the lines were very blurry, with the Ottomans often downright Shia-ish and the Safavids were originally Sunni. If Persia had been smashed, though, it would have removed a powerful competitor on the Eastern front which had a huge impact on Ottoman efforts in the West and North. Which leads to:

5. The Caucasus and regions North and East. A Don-Volga canal was planned to create access to the Caspian and allow communication with Central Asia. That doesn't sound very realistic, but it could have been (remotely) possible without a strong Persia.

6. Indian Ocean - the possibilities here are limited before a Suez Canal and rail. Conquest or vassalization of Oman would have crippled the Portuguese and allowed for a fairly wide reach in the Indian Ocean. It's hard to imagine more than coastal enclaves, but it would dramatically increase Ottoman control over trade routes and power-projection capabilities. If Italy is conquered, this becomes somewhat easier and more likely.

7. Spain - I think it's pretty unlikely, but some sort of vassalization and aid to Granada could see it surviving. The problem was that this was too early - the Ottomans were just beginning to develop massive naval capability. This would probably depend on Mehmed living longer and conquering Italy.

In short, I think the Ottomans were largely at their maximum potential in OTL. Probably Italy under a surviving Mehmed is the most likely, as well as greater success in Persia if Selim had lived longer.

As Philip pointed out, I think annexing Hungary was a big mistake. Maintaining a (preferably Calvinist) Hungarian vassal buffer kingdom would have been a much better solution. Hungary is just too far from Istanbul and too close to Hapsburg power.

 

[RGB]

They actually did try to prop up Astrakhan.

It was a notable and costly failure for them.

And while in the 16th Century Russia wasn't what it became in the 18th, they certainly had no difficulty projecting power down the Volga.

In short, the Steppes are right out.

Ditto Sweden - 16th century Sweden couldn't deal with Russia even with Ottoman support (without additional European Allies - remember the Livonian War took Sweden, Denmark, Poland, the Knights, and an ASB-ishly successful Crimean attack to get Ivan to back down). It hit its peak only shortly before Russia modernised and as such its window it limited to the latter half of the 17th to the mid-18th c. at best.

What was the internal state of the Ottomans at that point?

 

[Abdul Hadi Pasha]

They actually did try to prop up Astrakhan.

It was a notable and costly failure for them.

And while in the 16th Century Russia wasn't what it became in the 18th, they certainly had no difficulty projecting power down the Volga.

In short, the Steppes are right out.

Ditto Sweden - 16th century Sweden couldn't deal with Russia even with Ottoman support (without additional European Allies - remember the Livonian War took Sweden, Denmark, Poland, the Knights, and an ASB-ishly successful Crimean attack to get Ivan to back down). It hit its peak only shortly before Russia modernised and as such its window it limited to the latter half of the 17th to the mid-18th c. at best.

What was the internal state of the Ottomans at that point?

Not fantastic, but still more than a match for Russia. Remember that the Ottomans defeated Peter and could have destroyed him, but his wife managed to bribe them out of their situation. If Charles XII had half the diplomatic ability that he did military, and formed an offensive alliance with the Ottomans, the world would probably look different today.

Regarding the Volga, Russia could project a lot of power compared to Astrakhan, but not compared to the Ottomans. Remember that in this period the Crimean Tatars were raiding the outskirts of Moscow - if the Ottomans had made a strong effort toward Kazan, there's not much Russia could have done about it - not in the 16th c.

 

[Wednesday]

Not fantastic, but still more than a match for Russia. Remember that the Ottomans defeated Peter and could have destroyed him, but his wife managed to bribe them out of their situation. If Charles XII had half the diplomatic ability that he did military, and formed an offensive alliance with the Ottomans, the world would probably look different today.

He tried. The sultan - well, rather, Baltaci Mehmet Pasha - elected to go for more short-term gains, which were more certain, than to continue the war.

 

[RGB]

Regarding the Volga, Russia could project a lot of power compared to Astrakhan, but not compared to the Ottomans. Remember that in this period the Crimean Tatars were raiding the outskirts of Moscow - if the Ottomans had made a strong effort toward Kazan, there's not much Russia could have done about it - not in the 16th c.

But the point is, they tried for Astrakhan - and they failed at least once in the 16th century. The Crimeans could raid but couldn't occupy, and they sure could be beaten by Russian armies, as per OTL. As for the Ottomans and their level of interest in the region - they couldn't even hold on to Azov without random Cossakry seizing it from them in the 17th c.

How would you hold it? Overland via the Caucasus is crazy difficult if not impossible. By sea to Crimea and overland to Volga is almost as difficult. Azov and Taganrog were probably depots for just such an expansion, but they changed hands far too much for comfort IOTL. Further, the Russians can easily make occupation of Astrakhan untenable in the long run by raiding along the rivers, which they were really rather good at. By boat in summer, by horse in winter, if they need to.

The Ottomans would have to rely on the Krym Tatars to do the counter-raiding, which was becoming less and less effective throughout the 16th and 17th c. In fact the Tatars had a tough time facing Russian armies without Ottoman troops backing them.

There are a few openings:

1. Livonian War proper - can't see what there is to gain, really, but maybe you could hurt Moscow's environs some more? And to be honest, they already drew all the strength from the allied Khans that they could for that one. So maybe inconsequential, as an opening.

2. Time of Troubles! - Russia is weak on the Volga, a decent chance to make up for the setbacks in the last century. Already a few settlements along the Volga and Dniepr that could actually be siezed. Not a bad attempt.

2b. Razin's revolt. Alexei is in no position to fight a war, he'll have to acqiesca to reasonable demands. But Astrakhan may already be unreasonable at that point.

3. Prut Campaign - while it'd be interesting to see what would happen to Russia without Peter, it's doubtful that the long-term pattern of Ottomans repeatedly losing to the Russians in Kuban or being unable to project much further than the coast when they do win would change much. Still, not a bad opening. I could see the southern border return to status quo, maybe greater Cossack-Ottoman cooperation, and some compensation for Sweden. Russia shrinks back to what it was under Alexei Mihailovich and takes another fifty years to regroup, maybe never quite does if there's no new leadership arising.

4. Have them do better in the war of 1735 against Russia and Austria. The Austrians were not performing well at all, and the Russians performed well in the field but overstretched their supply, as was usual for their southern campaigns.

That could see them sieze more of Ukraine, I imagine. I don't know whether Astrakhan is even an option at this point, though, even if Crimea does well in the Caucasus in the interim. This is the latest opening.

After that, Russians will consistently beat the Ottomans as they move their centres of operations south ever more solidly.

It's true that the Empire was a lot stronger, but there's good reasons why they couldn't and didn't do much better than they did in the Steppes. The trouble with investing a lot into invading Russia for Astrakhan is that:

1. Difficult to defend - besides the Russians, there's Cossacks, Nogais, Bashkirs, Kalmycks, Chechens, Georgians, Circassians. None of them will magically cooperate with any central authority. It will be constant warfare far away from centers of Ottoman strength.
2. Astrakhan, Kuban's coast and the Crimea are the only things of worth, really, at the time. Everything else is largely empty and ungovernable.
3. There's hardly any population to tax on the steppes, and I doubt that the Ottomans were any better at settling the Steppes than the Russians at this point in time. Do they have excess population to export?

4. Concentrating on Russia (and that would take considerable resources, more than is compensated by taking in a part of the Caspian Trade) would weaken them against the rest of Europe - which, to a point, happened IOTL.

 

[Abdul Hadi Pasha]

But the point is, they tried for Astrakhan - and they failed at least once in the 16th century. The Crimeans could raid but couldn't occupy, and they sure could be beaten by Russian armies, as per OTL. As for the Ottomans and their level of interest in the region - they couldn't even hold on to Azov without random Cossakry seizing it from them in the 17th c.

How would you hold it? Overland via the Caucasus is crazy difficult if not impossible. By sea to Crimea and overland to Volga is almost as difficult. Azov and Taganrog were probably depots for just such an expansion, but they changed hands far too much for comfort IOTL. Further, the Russians can easily make occupation of Astrakhan untenable in the long run by raiding along the rivers, which they were really rather good at. By boat in summer, by horse in winter, if they need to.

The Ottomans would have to rely on the Krym Tatars to do the counter-raiding, which was becoming less and less effective throughout the 16th and 17th c. In fact the Tatars had a tough time facing Russian armies without Ottoman troops backing them.

There are a few openings:

1. Livonian War proper - can't see what there is to gain, really, but maybe you could hurt Moscow's environs some more? And to be honest, they already drew all the strength from the allied Khans that they could for that one. So maybe inconsequential, as an opening.

2. Time of Troubles! - Russia is weak on the Volga, a decent chance to make up for the setbacks in the last century. Already a few settlements along the Volga and Dniepr that could actually be siezed. Not a bad attempt.

2b. Razin's revolt. Alexei is in no position to fight a war, he'll have to acqiesca to reasonable demands. But Astrakhan may already be unreasonable at that point.

3. Prut Campaign - while it'd be interesting to see what would happen to Russia without Peter, it's doubtful that the long-term pattern of Ottomans repeatedly losing to the Russians in Kuban or being unable to project much further than the coast when they do win would change much. Still, not a bad opening. I could see the southern border return to status quo, maybe greater Cossack-Ottoman cooperation, and some compensation for Sweden. Russia shrinks back to what it was under Alexei Mihailovich and takes another fifty years to regroup, maybe never quite does if there's no new leadership arising.

4. Have them do better in the war of 1735 against Russia and Austria. The Austrians were not performing well at all, and the Russians performed well in the field but overstretched their supply, as was usual for their southern campaigns.

That could see them sieze more of Ukraine, I imagine. I don't know whether Astrakhan is even an option at this point, though, even if Crimea does well in the Caucasus in the interim. This is the latest opening.

After that, Russians will consistently beat the Ottomans as they move their centres of operations south ever more solidly.

It's true that the Empire was a lot stronger, but there's good reasons why they couldn't and didn't do much better than they did in the Steppes. The trouble with investing a lot into invading Russia for Astrakhan is that:

1. Difficult to defend - besides the Russians, there's Cossacks, Nogais, Bashkirs, Kalmycks, Chechens, Georgians, Circassians. None of them will magically cooperate with any central authority. It will be constant warfare far away from centers of Ottoman strength.
2. Astrakhan, Kuban's coast and the Crimea are the only things of worth, really, at the time. Everything else is largely empty and ungovernable.
3. There's hardly any population to tax on the steppes, and I doubt that the Ottomans were any better at settling the Steppes than the Russians at this point in time. Do they have excess population to export?

4. Concentrating on Russia (and that would take considerable resources, more than is compensated by taking in a part of the Caspian Trade) would weaken them against the rest of Europe - which, to a point, happened IOTL.

The point is that the Crimean Tatars DID have the Ottomans to support them, which is what made them dangerous.

The Russians in the 16th c are really insignificant compared to the massive power of the Hapsburgs. We're talking Astrakhan "instead of" not "in addition to". The Russians had no problem at all holding Kazan, even with the religious difference.

I think the point was to build a Don-Volga canal, otherwise it's kind of pointless. It took Russia until the late 19th c to conquer Turkestan.

As for "the Steppe", I'm not sure what you mean. There is a whole lot more in Turkestan than Steppe. Bukhara, Khiva, etc., not to mention the Silk Route. There are plenty of reasons for heading in this direction. A Kazan Khanate with some Ottoman help would be a lot for Russia to take on, especially with the Crimeans and Ottomans themselves.

This is the 16th c I'm talking about, not the later period. Azov was totally inconsequential to the Ottomans in OTL - they had no interests in lands East of this. If they had, they would have put more attention into defending it.

 

[Valdemar II]

In Europe I could see them set up a Lutheran Vassal (Archduchy or Republic?) in Austria (minus Tyrol) after a succesful siege. Beside that I could see gain in Italy beside that I think they had reach the ultimate potential border in Europe.