Had Turing been 'queer bashed' to death in the 30s and a genius of his level worked for the evil side in WW2 how much longer would the war have been?
Had Turing been 'queer bashed' to death in the 30s and a genius of his level worked for the evil side in WW2 how much longer would the war have been?
... but hard to say about changing the results as there were a number of allied codebreakers who could possibly have stepped into Turings shoes.
What would have happend, if the Germans had used a simple encryption and than Enigma or the other way round?
And how would the Allies react if the Germans used double Enigma encoding? Eg. use the first encryption set and then a different second?
How would the operators on the other end know what decryption to use?In my mind at least, if encrypted double with different encryptions the Allies would have to decrypt the first and then decrypt the second. And how would they know what first decryption to use?
How would the operators on the other end know what decryption to use?
Also, all of these techniques require one thing, that the Germans actually have an inkling that the British have actually broken their codes in the first place.
The Germans didn’t need a genius working for them to break the British codes, Britain at the start of the war was using ludicrously simple encryption techniques; the Germans had broken the Royal Navy’s codes before the war began and were able to decrypt intercepted RN messages as fast as the British themselves did so. It was not until the summer of 1943 that new codes were introduced and the Germans locked out.
For its part, the breaking of the German enigma codes needed far more than brilliant mathematicians, it needed a backdoor in: the German code books and Enigma wheel settings.
Prior to then, less than half the German messages were being decoded (mostly Luftwaffe messages, which were the lowest quality codes)...
, and taking up to six months to do so: they were not providing the same ‘real time’ information to the British that the Germans were obtaining from reading British codes.
Regular decryption of German messages in a timely manner didn’t start to take place until the Colossus computer was introduced in 1943.
weren't there a lot of discussions at least on the KM side that suspected SOMETHING was happening? after the supply ships were quickly sunk after the Bismarck?
changes would just require a level of caution NOT certainty that the coding had been broken?
As it was the Kriegsmarine added a third rotor wheel on top of the standard machine and later in the war had plans to introduce a fourth rotor; machines were found with a vacant slot for the fourth rotor.
Not only did they break the Royal Navy codes, but they were so proficient at it that during Operation Rheinübung, the B-Dienst teams aboard Bismarck and Prinz Eugen were intercepting and decrypting the Sheffield’s messages as they were being sent.The Germans broke the BAMS (British and Allied Merchant Ship) code. used in convoy operations. They did not break Royal Navy codes generally. Nor did they ever break the TYPEX cipher used by other British services.
The other captures were the German weather ships in the mid-Atlantic; the codes used by them were not useful in cracking either the U-boat codes or the code used by the surface raiders; U-110’s codes were necessary for that.The capture from U-110 was extremely valuable; besides providing current key settings for U-boats, it provided the "code books". (Kriegsmarine messages were "coded", using bigrams for common words, then enciphered.) But other captures also took place around that time.
Which was the direct result of the capture of U-110.From mid-1941 to early 1942, the British read the Kriegsmarine HYDRA key almost continually.
Yes the Kriegsmarine were cautious of the system, but the Luftwaffe and army were convinced it was secure.weren't there a lot of discussions at least on the KM side that suspected SOMETHING was happening? after the supply ships were quickly sunk after the Bismarck?
The Germans broke the BAMS (British and Allied Merchant Ship) code. used in convoy operations. They did not break Royal Navy codes generally. Nor did they ever break the TYPEX cipher used by other British services.
...
.... They did not break Royal Navy codes generally. Nor did they ever break the TYPEX cipher used by other British services.
...
Keep in mind that breaking a code is one thing, actually acting upon the information obtained is another. Hitler displayed an incredible ability to ignore perfectly good intelligence in favour of his own assessments throughout the war, the Soviet build up to the spring offensive in 44 being one examle and the Allied build up to invade Normandy being another. In both cases German high command had a good chance of formulating counter plans based on assessments of enemy movements, intelligence etc. but were prevented in doing so because of the bizzare relationship between political power and control over the army that was a large part of the nazi state.
... one examle and the Allied build up to invade Normandy being another. ...
The Italians broke into the US Army Black code, providing important operational information for the African front to mid 1942.