How bad of code breaking achievements are reversed

Had Turing been 'queer bashed' to death in the 30s and a genius of his level worked for the evil side in WW2 how much longer would the war have been?
 
Had Turing been 'queer bashed' to death in the 30s and a genius of his level worked for the evil side in WW2 how much longer would the war have been?

If the 'evil side' is the one I think it is, then from what I recall they were not overly fond of homosexuals themselves.

Edit I read that as "to death" as in endlessly harassed. I think you meant literally to death now. So in that case if the nazi's have a code breaking genius then it doesn't seem like it will help the allies. No doubt it would prolong the war, but hard to say about changing the results as there were a number of allied codebreakers who could possibly have stepped into Turings shoes.
 
Last edited:
... but hard to say about changing the results as there were a number of allied codebreakers who could possibly have stepped into Turings shoes.

I agree there. Turing was brilliant & did important work, but there were dozens - hundreds of other who contributed important aspects to the code breaking effort. Turnigs fans frequently disrespect him by attributing everything important in the Allied 'code war' to him and little to the others.

I do note that Turings most important contributions took effect from 1943, long after the war had turned decisively against the Axis nations.
 

Cook

Banned
The Germans didn’t need a genius working for them to break the British codes, Britain at the start of the war was using ludicrously simple encryption techniques; the Germans had broken the Royal Navy’s codes before the war began and were able to decrypt intercepted RN messages as fast as the British themselves did so. It was not until the summer of 1943 that new codes were introduced and the Germans locked out.

For its part, the breaking of the German enigma codes needed far more than brilliant mathematicians, it needed a backdoor in: the German code books and Enigma wheel settings. The first full set of codes and wheel key settings was obtained from German submarine U-110; forced to the surface by HMS Bulldog in May 1941, the U-boat’s captain failed to throw the code books overboard prior to abandoning ship, and the explosive charges meant to scuttle the U-boat failed to detonate. The code books were written in water soluble ink; had they been thrown overboard they would have been rendered useless. Prior to then, less than half the German messages were being decoded (mostly Luftwaffe messages, which were the lowest quality codes), and taking up to six months to do so: they were not providing the same ‘real time’ information to the British that the Germans were obtaining from reading British codes. Regular decryption of German messages in a timely manner didn’t start to take place until the Colossus computer was introduced in 1943.
 
Last edited:

Cook

Banned
The Germans would gain more, not by further studying of Allied codes (as said in the earlier post, British codes had been broken prior to the outbreak of the war and remained open to German deciphering ‘in real time’ through until mid-1943), far greater value would have been gained for the Germans by analysing further means of improving the Enigma machine and their use of it; a single simple design change, and a few minor procedural changes would have made the German codes fundamentally harder to break; more correctly, fundamentally harder to break successive codes after acquiring the initial codes and wheel settings; no-one was able to actually break Enigma codes without a backdoor.

The Enigma machine used sets of wheels with 26 electrical points (in on one side and out on the other in a different position) around the rim; one for each letter of the alphabet. Because the points were only for letters, numbers in messages had to be spelled out completely, greatly lengthening any message. The wheels could have been built with 36 electrical points, conforming to each letter and each number; this would have not only greatly shortened the length of messages, it would have increased the potential code variables. A three wheel Enigma machine as used had 26x26x26 = 17,576 potential starting settings; which was bad enough as it was, but a three wheel Enigma with 36 point wheels would have had 36x36x36 = 46,656 potential starting settings, and much shorter messages to find a break into!

The principal procedural changes would have been not sending the same message via two different encryption methods, and never sending a message via en plain and encoded. The German habit of sending regular procedural messages to all units, resulting in it going via multiple code systems was a godsend to the Allies and much of it was twaddle that didn't need to be heavily encrypted - the weather forecast for instance.
 
Last edited:
I have some questions.

While I agree that Enigma was a good system, it was only one layer. What would have happend, if the Germans had used a simple encryption and than Enigma or the other way round?

I know that that would still not be safe, as the second layer could be broken too but the Allies would have to know it (both that it is there and what it is).

And how would the Allies react if the Germans used double Enigma encoding? Eg. use the first encryption set and then a different second?
 

Cook

Banned
What would have happend, if the Germans had used a simple encryption and than Enigma or the other way round?

Any additional code system would have, by necessity, been in the German’s code books – consequently acquired at the same time as the Enigma codes and rotor wheel key settings were historically – so no change. Procedurally, for the Germans it would have meant a more time consuming means of sending messages; Enigma’s appeal was that it was not only believed by them to be unbreakable, it was also quite fast; a message could be encrypted, sent and decrypted in a matter of a few hours. And that was very important.

And how would the Allies react if the Germans used double Enigma encoding? Eg. use the first encryption set and then a different second?

If you are proposing they'd encrypt using the Enigma, and then put the encrypted message through again, that would have been the equivalent of doubling the number of rotors on the machine. So going from 26x26x26= 17,576 potential settings, to 26x26x26x26x26x26= 308,915,776 settings. And taking twice as long. As it was the Kriegsmarine added a third rotor wheel on top of the standard machine and later in the war had plans to introduce a fourth rotor; machines were found with a vacant slot for the fourth rotor.
 
Last edited:
Wouldn't doubling the rotors be ineffective if their doctrine retained enough faults for the Allies to figure out both keys?
 
In my mind at least, if encrypted double with different encryptions the Allies would have to decrypt the first and then decrypt the second. And how would they know what first decryption to use?

At least when they do not have the actuel cifers.
 
In my mind at least, if encrypted double with different encryptions the Allies would have to decrypt the first and then decrypt the second. And how would they know what first decryption to use?
How would the operators on the other end know what decryption to use?

Also, all of these techniques require one thing, that the Germans actually have an inkling that the British have actually broken their codes in the first place.
 
How would the operators on the other end know what decryption to use?

Also, all of these techniques require one thing, that the Germans actually have an inkling that the British have actually broken their codes in the first place.

weren't there a lot of discussions at least on the KM side that suspected SOMETHING was happening? after the supply ships were quickly sunk after the Bismarck?

changes would just require a level of caution NOT certainty that the coding had been broken?
 
The Germans didn’t need a genius working for them to break the British codes, Britain at the start of the war was using ludicrously simple encryption techniques; the Germans had broken the Royal Navy’s codes before the war began and were able to decrypt intercepted RN messages as fast as the British themselves did so. It was not until the summer of 1943 that new codes were introduced and the Germans locked out.

The Germans broke the BAMS (British and Allied Merchant Ship) code. used in convoy operations. They did not break Royal Navy codes generally. Nor did they ever break the TYPEX cipher used by other British services.

For its part, the breaking of the German enigma codes needed far more than brilliant mathematicians, it needed a backdoor in: the German code books and Enigma wheel settings.

The Allies did not need
Enigma wheel settings to break Enigma. They broke Enigma by deducing Enigma wheel configurations: the wheel selection and order, and the "ring setting" which disguised the actual wheel setting. Each Enigma message included the wheel settings. The "indicator setting" was sent in clear, and used to encipher the following "text setting", which was used to encipher the message.

The capture from U-110 was extremely valuable; besides providing current key settings for U-boats, it provided the "code books". (Kriegsmarine messages were "coded", using bigrams for common words, then enciphered.) But other captures also took place around that time.

Prior to then, less than half the German messages were being decoded (mostly Luftwaffe messages, which were the lowest quality codes)...

The Luftwaffe used the same Enigma machines and procedures as the other German armed force branches. Its operators were consistently sloppier than other services, but the ciphers were the same "quality".

(Partial exception: in 1942, the Kriegsmarine introduced a new Enigma model for U-boat traffic which had four cipher wheels in the scrambler.)

, and taking up to six months to do so: they were not providing the same ‘real time’ information to the British that the Germans were obtaining from reading British codes.

The RED key (used mainly by the Luftwaffe, but also by the Heer) was broken every day from mid-1940 onward, usually by 6 AM. During the Battle of Britain, ULTRA intelligence was supplied on a daily basis to Dowding at Fighter Command and Park at 11 Group. One reason they were later pushed out was that they were unable to disclose the reasons for many of their tactical decisions.

Other keys were broken as well. In general, Enigma traffic was of immediate, not long term value. The only reason anyone would try to break a six month old message would be the possibility of a "crib" into a currently active key.

It should be noted that in 1940-1941, much of the Allied codebreaking success was based on gross German errors, such as Cillies, the Herivel Tip, and Parkerismus.

Regular decryption of German messages in a timely manner didn’t start to take place until the Colossus computer was introduced in 1943.

COLOSSUS was built to attack the Lorenz cipher used in the Geheimschreiber teletypewriter. It was never used against Enigma. The mechanical attack on Enigma was with the bombes, which were specialized electromechanical devices, not programmable computers.

From mid-1941 to early 1942, the British read the Kriegsmarine HYDRA key almost continually. Because of this, they knew where U-boat patrol lines were stationed, and could route convoys around them. When the Germans failed to sight a convoy, they couldn't make a "wolfpack" attack on it. As one historian put it, the Admiralty could play "Blind Man's Bluff" with their eyes open.

(One convoy was spotted and savaged because a U-boat commander misread his orders and was a hundred miles out of position - and that's where the convoy had been sent.)
 
weren't there a lot of discussions at least on the KM side that suspected SOMETHING was happening? after the supply ships were quickly sunk after the Bismarck?

changes would just require a level of caution NOT certainty that the coding had been broken?

The Germam cipher experts were adamant that no mathematical attack could break Enigma.

There was a flurry of suspicion after the sinking of all the supply ships.

The British became very cautious about using ULTRA after that. They always tried to provide a "cover story" - not only for the Axis, but for Allied pilots, sailors, and even mid-level commanders.
 
As it was the Kriegsmarine added a third rotor wheel on top of the standard machine and later in the war had plans to introduce a fourth rotor; machines were found with a vacant slot for the fourth rotor.

The standard Enigma machine had three rotors. This went back to the original commercial Scherbius machine.

The Kriegsmarine added a fourth rotor position in machines for U-boat traffic; this TRITON key came into use in February 1942. The Allies could not break TRITON, which is a major reason for the horrific shipping losses of the next 10 months.

The capture of a U-boat Enigma suite in October and the work of Alan Turing broke TRITON in November - and the losses were finally checked. The Germans tweaked TRITON in March 1942, and it was black for about two weeks - during which losses again spiked.
 

Cook

Banned
The Germans broke the BAMS (British and Allied Merchant Ship) code. used in convoy operations. They did not break Royal Navy codes generally. Nor did they ever break the TYPEX cipher used by other British services.
Not only did they break the Royal Navy codes, but they were so proficient at it that during Operation Rheinübung, the B-Dienst teams aboard Bismarck and Prinz Eugen were intercepting and decrypting the Sheffield’s messages as they were being sent.

The capture from U-110 was extremely valuable; besides providing current key settings for U-boats, it provided the "code books". (Kriegsmarine messages were "coded", using bigrams for common words, then enciphered.) But other captures also took place around that time.
The other captures were the German weather ships in the mid-Atlantic; the codes used by them were not useful in cracking either the U-boat codes or the code used by the surface raiders; U-110’s codes were necessary for that.

From mid-1941 to early 1942, the British read the Kriegsmarine HYDRA key almost continually.
Which was the direct result of the capture of U-110.
 
Keep in mind that breaking a code is one thing, actually acting upon the information obtained is another. Hitler displayed an incredible ability to ignore perfectly good intelligence in favour of his own assessments throughout the war, the Soviet build up to the spring offensive in 44 being one examle and the Allied build up to invade Normandy being another. In both cases German high command had a good chance of formulating counter plans based on assessments of enemy movements, intelligence etc. but were prevented in doing so because of the bizzare relationship between political power and control over the army that was a large part of the nazi state.
 
weren't there a lot of discussions at least on the KM side that suspected SOMETHING was happening? after the supply ships were quickly sunk after the Bismarck?
Yes the Kriegsmarine were cautious of the system, but the Luftwaffe and army were convinced it was secure.
 

The Germans broke the BAMS (British and Allied Merchant Ship) code. used in convoy operations. They did not break Royal Navy codes generally. Nor did they ever break the TYPEX cipher used by other British services.
...


The Germans did break the AT3 scrambler system on the RT link between London and Washington DC, from 1941 into 1943. The Italians broke into the US Army Black code, providing important operational information for the African front to mid 1942. The Axis also had efficient signals analyst units & gained a lot of tactical intelligence even when unable to penetrate the Allied codes/encryption. Equally bad was the frequent cracking of the SOE codes used in operations in Western Europe 1941-43. Numerous operations were trashed by the Germans due in part to poor code useage by SOE, leaving their communications highly vulnerable.


.... They did not break Royal Navy codes generally. Nor did they ever break the TYPEX cipher used by other British services.
...


Nor did they go anywhere with the US SIGABA, despite capturing a machine and related documents.
 
Keep in mind that breaking a code is one thing, actually acting upon the information obtained is another. Hitler displayed an incredible ability to ignore perfectly good intelligence in favour of his own assessments throughout the war, the Soviet build up to the spring offensive in 44 being one examle and the Allied build up to invade Normandy being another. In both cases German high command had a good chance of formulating counter plans based on assessments of enemy movements, intelligence etc. but were prevented in doing so because of the bizzare relationship between political power and control over the army that was a large part of the nazi state.

Part of this was the fragmented nature of German intellegence. The Allies were far better off due to the Brits creating a proper balance in unified global intel operations. When the US became integrated into the British system in 1942 the Allies had a far better weapon than the German.

... one examle and the Allied build up to invade Normandy being another. ...

In the case of Op Torch Hitler & Co reacted to every major deception op covering it & were suprised when the news of landings in Algeria and Morroco came. The Italian intel service was less influenced by politics and correctly identified the target of the Torch fleets when they headed into the Mediterranean.
 

Deleted member 1487

The Italians broke into the US Army Black code, providing important operational information for the African front to mid 1942.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but they didn't actually break the code, rather hired a cat burglar to rob the US embassy in Rome to get the codes. The British then made the mistake of telling the US military attache in Cairo military information that the Axis then was able to read.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_(code)
 
Top