How bad Could Fredericksburg be for the Union?

[ggarner57]

The Battle of Fredericksburg is already considered one of the most one sided battles of the Civil War and a disastrous defeat for the Union. What I am wondering is just how much worse this defeat could have been. Is there any way this could've led to the destruction of a significant part of the Army of the Potomac?

 

[TFSmith121]

Not really ... the operational situation was such that

The Battle of Fredericksburg is already considered one of the most one sided battles of the Civil War and a disastrous defeat for the Union. What I am wondering is just how much worse this defeat could have been. Is there any way this could've led to the destruction of a significant part of the Army of the Potomac?

Not really ... the operational and tactical situation was such that once the attack on Marye's Heights was repulsed Dec. 13, other than the possibility of a renewed assault Dec. 14 (which Burnside's subordinates make clear to the CG would also fail), the US forces were able to withdraw, and there was nothing the rebels could do to prevent it - any rebel attack (Dec. 14 or Dec. 15) would have placed them in the position of making an opposed river crossing (without a bridiging train that compared to the Army of the Potomac's, of course) and then a follow-up assault, which is why Burnside's attack Dec. 13 failed.

http://www.civilwar.org/battlefields/fredericksburg.html?tab=facts

Best,

 

[jahenders]

Not really ... the operational and tactical situation was such that once the attack on Marye's Heights was repulsed Dec. 13, other than the possibility of a renewed assault Dec. 14 (which Burnside's subordinates make clear to the CG would also fail), the US forces were able to withdraw, and there was nothing the rebels could do to prevent it - any rebel attack (Dec. 14 or Dec. 15) would have placed them in the position of making an opposed river crossing (without a bridiging train that compared to the Army of the Potomac's, of course) and then a follow-up assault, which is why Burnside's attack Dec. 13 failed.

http://www.civilwar.org/battlefields/fredericksburg.html?tab=facts

Best,

I would tend to agree. A serious confederate assault wasn't too likely.

Some of the earlier Union assaults could have been (even) bloodier, but even that would likely have balanced out in that Burnside might have called off later ones.

I guess you could have Meade's division cutoff and mauled (vs driven back) when it penetrated Jackson's lines, but even that would likely expose Confederate forces to pretty intense Union fire.

 

[avernite]

Not really ... the operational and tactical situation was such that once the attack on Marye's Heights was repulsed Dec. 13, other than the possibility of a renewed assault Dec. 14 (which Burnside's subordinates make clear to the CG would also fail), the US forces were able to withdraw, and there was nothing the rebels could do to prevent it - any rebel attack (Dec. 14 or Dec. 15) would have placed them in the position of making an opposed river crossing (without a bridiging train that compared to the Army of the Potomac's, of course) and then a follow-up assault, which is why Burnside's attack Dec. 13 failed.

http://www.civilwar.org/battlefields/fredericksburg.html?tab=facts

Best,

Any chance of Burnside ordering a renewed assault anyway based on some vague rumour (rebels out of gunpowder?) likely to lead to success?

If so, would it cause very terrible damage, or would it result merely in a probing attack to confirm the rumours? I don't know Burnside very well...

 

[Honorius]

Any chance of Burnside ordering a renewed assault anyway based on some vague rumour (rebels out of gunpowder?) likely to lead to success?

If so, would it cause very terrible damage, or would it result merely in a probing attack to confirm the rumours? I don't know Burnside very well...

The rebels were out of ammo. A renewed assault as Burnside intended, and which he planned to lead in person, would have thrown the Confederates off Maryes Heights and turned the battle fluid.

In Eastern Tennessee and in North Carolina, Burnside had shown that when free to maneuver, he could win.

Hell if Halleck hadn't fucked up in sending the Pontoons when he was supposed to, their wouldn't have been a Fredricksburg as Burnside would have been across the river and moving on Richmond before Lee could have reacted.

 

[TFSmith121]

Yep; as it was, even with the US forces being on the

I would tend to agree. A serious confederate assault wasn't too likely. Some of the earlier Union assaults could have been (even) bloodier, but even that would likely have balanced out in that Burnside might have called off later ones. I guess you could have Meade's division cutoff and mauled (vs driven back) when it penetrated Jackson's lines, but even that would likely expose Confederate forces to pretty intense Union fire.

Yep; as it was, even with the US forces being on the offensive and suffering ~13,000 casualties, the rebels suffered moe than 5,000. That's not a great ratio for the US, but it's not particularly good for the rebels, either.

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

As Honorius points out, Burnside considered attacking

Any chance of Burnside ordering a renewed assault anyway based on some vague rumour (rebels out of gunpowder?) likely to lead to success? If so, would it cause very terrible damage, or would it result merely in a probing attack to confirm the rumours? I don't know Burnside very well...

As Honorius points out, Burnside considered attacking Dec. 14; whether the IX Corps would have done better than the preceding attack is doubtful. Even with the vagaries of the ANV's supply lines, it was a very strong position and doing the same thing two days in a row is unlikely to be a recipe for success.

Best,

 

[avernite]

As Honorius points out, Burnside considered attacking Dec. 14; whether the IX Corps would have done better than the preceding attack is doubtful. Even with the vagaries of the ANV's supply lines, it was a very strong position and doing the same thing two days in a row is unlikely to be a recipe for success.

Best,

Well, that's the point of this thread, aye?

If Burnside attacks on the 14th (which as you say he DID consider, so assume he does for the ATL) and loses, does that significantly harm the Union, or was the ANV in such dire straits that a new attack could only be repelled with relatively acceptable loss-ratios for the Union?

 

[TFSmith121]

The IX Corps suffers losses and Burnside is probably cashiered

Well, that's the point of this thread, aye? If Burnside attacks on the 14th (which as you say he DID consider, so assume he does for the ATL) and loses, does that significantly harm the Union, or was the ANV in such dire straits that a new attack could only be repelled with relatively acceptable loss-ratios for the Union?

The IX Corps suffers losses and Burnside is probably cashiered if he went against the advice of his senior subordinates and loses. The point is his senior subordinates are Sumner, Hooker, and Franklin, who are not going to throw more men away. There's a reason Burnside's rhetoric about one more charge focused on the IX Corps, and not the entire army or even Sumner's two corps "grand division"...

There's also the question, frankly, of how likely the IX Corps would push things if they were attacking Dec. 14? As it was, under Wilcox, they has been committed Dec. 13 and suffered a fair number of casaulties; I don't see Burnside as the type of commander whom men would follow to the death.

As bloody as the Marye's Heights action was, it wasn't like it left the II, III, V, and IX corps as shells; they all were understrength, some divisions severely, but they were all still intact. The left, Reynolds I and Smith's VI corps, were both in good shape.

The ANV had more troops that had not become engaged, but the geography was such about all they could do was stand pat; trying to pursue just puts the shoe on the other foot, and ends up putting the rebels through the equivalent of Malvern Hill, except across a river, rather than up a hill.

Best,

 

[Honorius]

As Honorius points out, Burnside considered attacking Dec. 14; whether the IX Corps would have done better than the preceding attack is doubtful. Even with the vagaries of the ANV's supply lines, it was a very strong position and doing the same thing two days in a row is unlikely to be a recipe for success.

Best,

It worked in the Second Battle of Fredricksburg and in parts of the Battle of Cold Harbor. If Burnsides subordinates had obeyed orders and supported each other rather than sabotaging Burnside and each other, the battle would have been a success.

Meade for example busted a hole in Jackson's line and asked Gibbon for support only for Gibbon to tell him off. If Gibbon had said great, I'm behind you, he could have widened the gap and still been following orders.

Regardless, a renewed offensive on the 14th with the Fresh Forces Burnside had would have crumbled Lee's Army which was spent from the fight and had no reserves. IX, XI, and XII Corps were available to renew the assault and if they cracked a hole, Lee's forces would not have been able to contain it.

 

[Honorius]

There's also the question, frankly, of how likely the IX Corps would push things if they were attacking Dec. 14? As it was, under Wilcox, they has been committed Dec. 13 and suffered a fair number of casaulties; I don't see Burnside as the type of commander whom men would follow to the death.

Burnside had nothing but victories to his name at this point and was well liked by troops who fought beside him. Furthermore his victories were from storming fortified positions. Too often this general is maligned without people understanding the circumstances and ignoring his real successes.

 

[Shinsu]

If Burnside attacks on the 14th (which as you say he DID consider, so assume he does for the ATL) and loses, does that significantly harm the Union, or was the ANV in such dire straits that a new attack could only be repelled with relatively acceptable loss-ratios for the Union?

Then Burnside would likely have been one of the many more corpses to be added to battlefield. He planned to lead the corps into the battle, straight up the center of the wall, it wouldn't have ended well to say the least.

Meade for example busted a hole in Jackson's line and asked Gibbon for support only for Gibbon to tell him off. If Gibbon had said great, I'm behind you, he could have widened the gap and still been following orders.

He found a hundred yard gap between Jackson's lines, could Gibbon have widened the gap? Of course, would that have meant a victory? No.

Regardless, a renewed offensive on the 14th with the Fresh Forces Burnside had would have crumbled Lee's Army which was spent from the fight and had no reserves. IX, XI, and XII Corps were available to renew the assault and if they cracked a hole, Lee's forces would not have been able to contain it.

Considering that Burnside wanted to attack the center of wall, it would be very unlikely that it would have worked due to a number of various things. Firstly, they couldn't outflank it from when they marched towards it, they could come along a small ridge that offered protection and keep going right but then they were met with impassible terrain. To the left you had not only no protection, but you would run directly into the wall if you tried to follow the protection.

Commanders, lost control of their men almost instantly once they were actually able to fire at the wall, the sheer amount of smoke, noise etc. made it nearly impossible, not to mention, you had a number of men that held the ground right behind the end of the protective ridge, these men, more often then not, fired into their own lines because of over-lap.

The best thing that Burnside could have done, would have been to go eight or ten miles upstream and cross at United States Ford ( I'm saying this all off the top of my head but I'm sure TFSmith will correct me if I'm wrong) Burnside decided to do just this during his mud march, but at that point, the rebels had fortified the crossing and the weather made the march grind to a halt.

 

[Honorius]

He found a hundred yard gap between Jackson's lines, could Gibbon have widened the gap? Of course, would that have meant a victory? No.

600 Yards and the initial attack completely flatfooted the Confederates who had arms stacked. Gibbons following behind Meade would have been able to role up the line and enable Meade to check Jackson's counterattack as Franklin sent more men in. When Burnside later heard of Meade's initial success and Gibbons failure to support him and Franklin's inaction in supporting Meade till it was too late flabbergasted him and even Lincoln was shocked in his own investigation to the conduct of the battle.

Considering that Burnside wanted to attack the center of wall, it would be very unlikely that it would have worked due to a number of various things. Firstly, they couldn't outflank it from when they marched towards it, they could come along a small ridge that offered protection and keep going right but then they were met with impassible terrain. To the left you had not only no protection, but you would run directly into the wall if you tried to follow the protection.

This very same plan worked a few months later in the same spot.

 

[Shinsu]

This very same plan worked a few months later in the same spot.

Even though the reason that such an attack worked was because they knew that a Confederate division *Barksdale in the center* had no protection on it's left flank, which was learned via a truce. That and Early only had 45 cannon to use against a force that was nearly twice his size.
The Union forced was ~27,000, while the Confederate forces were ~ 12,000, Compared to the first battle where Union forces were ~102,000 compared to ~72,000 for the Confederates. The same advantages that Sedgwick used, were not open to Burnside, not to mention that Sedgwick was a more flexible and understanding commander then Burnside.

 

[Honorius]

Even though the reason that such an attack worked was because they knew that a Confederate division *Barksdale in the center* had no protection on it's left flank, which was learned via a truce. That and Early only had 45 cannon to use against a force that was nearly twice his size.
The Union forced was ~27,000, while the Confederate forces were ~ 12,000, Compared to the first battle where Union forces were ~102,000 compared to ~72,000 for the Confederates. The same advantages that Sedgwick used, were not open to Burnside, not to mention that Sedgwick was a more flexible and understanding commander then Burnside.

Except Sedgwick did not not exploit the open flank due to terrain, he charged head on, didn't fire till he was 25 yards and seized the heights with the bayonet.

Also Burnside was very flexible as shown in the Knoxville Campaign where he inflicted lopsided defeat after lopsided defeat on Longstreet.

On the 14th the Confederates were out of Ammo and Burnside had three Fresh Corps with two more that were recovered enough to mount further operations. Franklin alone had 20,000 Fresh men to commit which he failed to use to widen Meade's opening.

Lee had no reserves to throw in.