Hostile Waters: The Great Lakes Campaign of 1913

A short alternate history that I want to eventually follow my other book (but for cheaper), this covers two naval battles between the USN and RN/RCN on the Great Lakes in 1913. It's a bit tough to classify since the PoD in pre 1900, but the events themselves are post 1900.


Prelude

On the morning of June 30, 1913, the USS Swordfish, a Salmon-class submarine, patrolled along the shores of Manitoulin Island. The day was sunny and half the crew loitered on the submarine’s deck while it cruised along Lake Huron’s surface. A few of the all-Irish crew tried their hands at fishing while others cleaned the 50mm deck gun and other maintained a vigilant watch over the lack. Though war had been declared against Britain a week earlier, the Swordfish had yet to encounter anything fiercer than a Canadian freighter which was quickly sent to the bottom.

It was not until 1113, that morning did Seaman Conrad O’Donnell inform the boat’s skipper, Lt. Commander Edmund Fitzgerald that he spotted smoke almost directly ahead. Fitzgerald, like all submarine commanders in the Great Lakes, knew the Royal Navy planned to sortie from Owin Sound to strike before the American fleet could leave the confines of Lake Michigan. When exactly it sortied was not known, and was the purpose of the Swordfish’s, as well as several other boats’ patrol.

Standing orders were to determine the size of the enemy fleet along with position and course. As the British struck at Mackinac Strait in the Second and Third Anglo-American Wars, their destination was obvious. Fitzgerald gave the order to submerge and his crew manned their battlestations. The Submarine spent more than an hour tracking the Royal Navy once they intercepted the fleet. The Anglo-Canadian fleet consisted of three battleships and battlecruisers, three cruisers, nine destroyers and ten smaller vessels.

Instead of following orders, Fitzgerald made an attempt to reduce his report by one battleship. At 1442, the Swordfish launched two torpedoes towards the HMCS Leopard, scoring two hits on the battlecruiser and reducing its best speed to 10 knots. Immediately after the attack, Royal Navy destroys began to fan out from the battleships and cruisers, searching for the American submarine.

Had Fitzgerald fired only one torpedo, the British and Canadians might have first suspected a mine, giving Swordfish time to escape. As it happened, sharp-eyed watchmen on the HMCS Lancer spotted the wake from the torpedoes and spread word of the enemy submarine’s general vicinity. Fitzgerald had little hope of outrunning determined destroyers and before he was forced to try, he ordered his boat brought close enough to the surface for its antennae to touch the sky. His warning over the wireless telegraph was short and memorable. Taking a page from Paul Revere, Fitzgerald informed Chicago simply that the British were coming.

Whether or not Revere said ‘British’ or ‘regular’ or ‘redcoat’ remains unclear to this day, but what is known is that the Anglo-American struggle for the Great Lakes dates back to the founding of the United States of America. Though action on the lakes was light during the Revolution and occurred mostly after the Treaty of Paris when American forces took control of forts on the southern shore, fighting between the United States and Great Britain spread across all the lakes during the Second Anglo-American War (1812-14).

During 1812 and 1813, the British and their Indian allies attacked and captured numerous forts along the American shores of the lakes, including Fort Mackinac, Fort Dearborne and Detroit. In the case of Mackinac, the American commander of the garrison surrender with next to no resistance offered. The British sweep through the Great Lakes during that war was one of the most humiliating defeats in American history. Only the Battle of Lake Eire fought on September 10, 1813, saved face with a decisive American victory and control over that lake.

Actions on the Great Lakes during the Third Anglo-American War (1882-85) offered far stiffer American resistance yet resulted in almost the same number of British victories. The greatest battle on the Lakes during that war occurred on July 18, 1884, when the British and American Lake Ontario squadrons faced off near Galloo Island. The bloody three hour battle cost the United States dearly as its naval squadron on the lake was all but annihilated in a decisive British victory. With the United States Navy effectively erased from Lake Ontario, Royal Marines raided Rochester, Oswego and Niagara with impunity.

Seven months before the disastrous battle, British forces landed again on Mackinac Island, laying siege to the island. American reinforcements attempted to reach Mackinac from Chicago, but were forced to turn back during a winter’s storm, leaving the soldiers of Fort Mackinac to fend for themselves. Unlike previous wars, the British could no longer call upon Indians to aid them as the natives were either expelled from the region decades before or assimilated into American society.

Nevertheless, with the hope of aid dashed, Colonel Maxwell Eddington was forced to surrender the garrison, making it the second time in the fort’s history that the colors were struck, giving the British as much control over Lake Huron as they would have over Lake Ontario. The Third Anglo-American War ended poorly for the United States, forcing them to make territorial concessions to Britain and Canada in the Pacific Northwest. After falling twice in a century, the United States Navy was determined that Fort Mackinac would never fall again.

During the 1890s, after a slight economic depression, both the Army and Navy’s budgets grew in size. Though the Great Lakes were of great importance, the region saw on a fraction of the naval dollars that both the Atlantic and Pacific received. Between 1895 and 1905, Fort Mackinac underwent renovation, refitting and expansion. The previous garrison of three thousand grew to eight thousands, and new 253 mm short batteries pointed out towards Lake Huron. Two squadrons of torpedo boats were delivered to the fort on June 8, 1907. Two minelayers found new homes in Mackinac’s small port.

Mackinac was not the only location to receive new batteries. All of the important ports of the Great Lakes saw rings of fortifications erected in the decade leading up the Great War. Similar improvements occurred between 1903 and 1913 on the Canadian shores of the Lakes. After handedly defeating American forces in two previous wars, the Royal Navy made the mistake that most chronic victors eventually make. They forgot the axiom ‘always assume you enemy is as least as smart as yourself’. The United States Navy, as well as Army, was still viewed as a largely amateur force by the British and other European powers. By not taking their foe seriously, Britain made a costly blunder before the first shots of the Great War were fired in 1913.
 
Commanders

Both the American and Anglo-Canadian Admirals in overall charge of the 1913 campaign were obscure characters before the Great War. Both sides reserved the men believed to be their most able admirals for the war at sea. This did not mean than Charles Vreeland or Walter Cowan were inexperienced or incompetent. Far from it. Both ranked high in their academy days and both severed on numerous ships over the years. So why were these men stationed at what was to be a sideshow for the Great War? Vreeland with to serve out the remainder of his naval days in a quiet place and Cowan made more than one enemy in London that saw him exiled to Ontario.

Charles E. Vreeland was born March 10, 1852, in New Jersey. At the age of 14, he joined the United States Navy as an apprentice, eventually winning political appointment to the United States Naval Academy. From his graduation in 1873 to 1911, when he was appointed commander of the Great Lakes, Vreeland saw service on numerous warships and watched first hand as they evolved from sail-and-steam to all big-guns. With the exception of a tour of Europe as a naval attaché between 1894 and 1896, Vreeland spent virtually his entire career at sea. He rose through the ranks slowly at first, only becoming an executive office of the USS Delphi in 1897.

Vreeland was given command of the battleship Kansas on April 7, 1906. Vreeland remained in command of the Kansas during its 1905-8 tour with the Atlantic Fleet before his transfer to the USS Oregon, based in Chicago. He gained overall command of the Great Lakes fleet in 1911, with his promotion to Rear Admiral. The posting was not the most glorious of naval commands nor sought after, but as he approached his sixtieth year, Vreeland decided Chicago to be the perfect posting to remain at until his retirement, planned for 1913. As tensions with Britain grew and the situation in Europe intensified, the Navy Department convinced him to delay retirement for one year.

One of the more capable officers serving under Rear Admiral Vreeland was one Captain Robert Doyle, commander of the USS Columbia. Doyle was born in Cleveland, Ohio in 1870. Unlike his commanding officer, Doyle’s rise through the ranks paralleled that of a rocket through the stratosphere. He was accepted into the Naval Academy in 1889, graduated in 1893, and saw his first posting on the armored cruiser USS Boston. By 1900, he earned the rank of Lieutenant Commander and was appointed XO to the USS Hull, a newly commissioned torpedo boat destroyer. Following the Tierra del Fuego War, in which Chile successfully deployed torpedo boats to cripple an Argentine fleet, navies of the world rushed to produce ships capable of counteracting the small and maneuverable boats.

As captain of the USS Des Moines, Doyle was on the fast track towards admiral’s stripes until, in 1906, he ran afoul of a Senator from Massachusetts who was known was harboring grudges. After pulling some strings, Doyle found himself relieved of command on the open sea and transferred to Chicago for a staff assignment at the Great Lakes Fleet headquarters. When Vreeland took overall command of the fleet, he assigned the veteran sailor as commander of the battlecruiser Columbia, ultimately saving Doyle’s career from oblivion.

Commanding the eight thousand Marines garrisoned on Mackinac Island was one Major Thaddeus Monroe. Monroe was born in Wyoming Territory in 1873, an unlikely start for any United States Marine. He tried his hand on the family ranch for several years, until he grew tired of the same daily routine. Monroe left home at the age of 19 to enlist in the army, but opted for the Marine Corps when he learned that most of their postings were tropical paradises. After three years of fighting various wars in banana republics like Nicaragua, he soon learned that paradise and sweltering jungle went hand-in-hand. He earned a battlefield commission during his time in the 1897 Dominican Intervention.

Two tours of duty in Guatemala proved Monroe a brilliant tactical commander, although he continued to struggle with overall strategic pictures. Monroe was more a hand’s on leader, preferring to lead his men from the front line than draw on maps fifty kilometers from the front line. He loved a good fight, and looked forward to action in the Bahamas when a fourth war against Britain appeared inevitable. He would see action on the front lines, but unfortunately for him, the Corps decided his skill would be put to better use defending Fort Mackinac, which was certain to come under attack. Monroe took the assignment, organized defenses and trained his men to repel an invasion. He also spent the better part of the winter of 1912-13 complaining about the weather.

Commanding the join Anglo-Canadian Great Lakes fleet, Vice Admiral Walter Cowan lived a far more exciting career than his American counterpart. Cowan lacked much of the education that his fellow flag officers took for granted, never attending any fancy English school, but nonetheless entered the Royal Navy in 1884. As a midshipman, he saw action in the Medditerrean and Nigeria, at the latter location contracting malaria which invalidated him back home.

He returned to service after a full recover in 1887, against serving on the Nile River, Indian Ocean and fighting pirates in Malaysia. Unlike Vreeland, Cowan had plenty of combat experience as both underling and commanding officer. At a banquet in 1910, Cowan entered a heated argument with a higher ranking admiral, insulting his superior and landing in a world of trouble. Only his many years of distinguished service prevented his career from ending. Instead, like the American Robert Doyle, he found himself exiled to as remote a posting from the open sea as a navy man could ever see.

Cowan’s Army counterpart, Lieutenant General Reginald Wingate, was one of the few high ranking officers of the Great Lakes Campaign to actually volunteer for the backwater posting. Wingate was commissioned into the British Army in 1880 as a Lieutenant in the Royal Artillery. With British influence growing fast over Africa and Southern Asia, Wingate saw action against numerous opponents in locales ranging from the Sudan to East Africa to Malaysia to the conquest of Burma.

By 1905, Wingate’s career in the field was coming to an end as he was appointed Governor-General of British Sudan. After six years of administrative duty, Wingate hungered for a good fight, and lobbied London for a field posting. When he was offered command of a Canadian Army in 1912, he jumped at the chance. As a general, Wingate was privy to some strategic planning in London, and knew that both the United States and Great Britain were preparing for another war. Though the United States armed forces were viewed as amateurs by their British foes, Wingate still looked forward to testing his mettle against a civilized foe as well armed as him. Wingate planned not only to take Fort Mackinac like his predecessors for the two previous wars, but he intended to complete their work. When he took Mackinac, Wingate had no intention of returning it.

 
Interesting start and I look forward to more. Good luck with the posting and hope you can follow through with regular posts. I am a rabid fan of timelines with frequent posts. :D
 
Interesting, but I don't see battlecruisers being stationed upon any of the Great Lakes. I'm not sure if you are aware of Avalanche Press' game US Navy Plan Crimson, but I would consider that a place to start - at least in getting an idea of how warships would transit between most of the lakes by canals.
 
I'm not much of a war buff, so I'm not sure I'll be following closely but I'll subscribe just to make sure I don't miss anything good I can understand.

Maps I realize aren't easy to do nor have I ever done one, but if I'm going to try to follow a war timeline they sure do help a lot.

Especially in the context of the 1913 war being downtime of alt-1887 one! Which apparently the Yanks lose badly on every front.

That raises 2 questions:

1) Why and how did the USA come to blows with the British Empire in '87?

2) Evidently the Yanks lose--if so, why were they stupid enough to risk the war in the first place--this part of the question really punts back to the first one. But, given that they are beat on the Lakes as you make clear enough, did they nevertheless manage some substantial victory on another front--say, taking Quebec and Montreal by land?

Because if the Yankees lose on all fronts, getting shredded on the Lakes and not taking some other important Canadian ground to hold hostage at the negotiating table, I'd think that we'd lose a whole lot more than some border adjustments at Washington State's (or even Oregon's:eek:) expense--in addition to losing ground on the West Coast, which would have seemed peripheral in the 1880s, the British would have sought to better secure Canada against a repeat performance by taking strategic advances in the Midwest and who knows, even in Maine or New York, as well. Regardless of how the '87 war started, as victors the British will take the position that it was the USA's fault and they are entitled to major territorial compensations to secure their innocent protectorate(s) in North America from future Yank aggression.

I can see two reasons they'd be very judicious in doing so--one, considering that trying to hold former US territory could be a poison pill, requiring disproportionate amounts of martial law and constantly risking provoking a new war with the US. But that argument should hold around Puget Sound just the same as in Illinois or Minnesota, so then why any territorial adjustments at all? (And why should what few there were be in the West?)

Or, in the 1887 backstory the Americans did indeed win some victories, and were holding important Canadian territory hostage, which they could no more hold in the long run than the British could hold Chicago or Buffalo--therefore at the peace table the Yanks held some high cards despite being beaten badly on the whole.

Anyway I understand that the '87 war is now a done deal and shouldn't be rehashed here, you want to focus on the 1913 war. Well and good, but you should tell us, as essential background, why it happened, a summary of how the whole war--which would have included the whole British Empire retaliating against the USA around the world, interdicting all US merchant marine shipping, blockading the coasts and possibly landing anywhere on the Atlantic, Gulf, or Pacific coasts they liked--went, and what the settlement was. If there were territorial changes, a map or at least a detailed verbal descriptions of just what went to British custody, and why the British felt they could hold that indefinitely, is in order too.

Otherwise it's too much like a DBWI, with us guessing as to the backstory.
 
Interesting, but I don't see battlecruisers being stationed upon any of the Great Lakes. I'm not sure if you are aware of Avalanche Press' game US Navy Plan Crimson, but I would consider that a place to start - at least in getting an idea of how warships would transit between most of the lakes by canals.

They don't transit. The classes of warships on the Great Lakes were designed for the lakes.
 
They don't transit. The classes of warships on the Great Lakes were designed for the lakes.
Even just moving on the lakes, you do need to transit from lake to lake unless you have, say, a seperate Lake Superior Fleet, Lake Ontario Fleet, Lake Huron Fleet, and Lake Erie Fleet which are permanently built and based in those lakes and cannot move between them.
 
They don't transit. The classes of warships on the Great Lakes were designed for the lakes.

In the same vein, I guess the US is building battleships strictly for use in the Atlantic Ocean and others to be deployed solely in the Pacific - no matter if they own the Panama Canal.

Naval planners are going to make use of the canals to transit warships between the lakes since they can't afford to build individual shipyards, and the attendant infrastructures, for each lake. Why would the Canadians forego bring warships in via the St. Lawrence Seaway?
 
In the same vein, I guess the US is building battleships strictly for use in the Atlantic Ocean and others to be deployed solely in the Pacific - no matter if they own the Panama Canal. ...

I'm thinking there's no way the USA controls any Central American canal, or has any overseas possessions. Maybe after this 1913 war; not before it.

Britain OTL avoided serious conflict with the US after the Civil War; if it came to such a breach Americans and a British colony were fighting it out in 1887, I don't think the fledgling "special relationship" would ever come back from that--not if they are at it again just 26 years later. Not being able to fancy that the other English-speaking power has come under their wing and guidance, the British have to have faced the ugly fact that they have no recourse but containment. There will have been no such easy opportunities for the US to gain overseas footholds as came to us OTL; if Spain were the target of a warmongering press campaign, the British would come to Spain with offers of help; if Spain completely lost its ability to hold on to her colonies despite British support they'd see to it they fell into other hands--their own if necessary, or more likely propping them up as nominally independent republic-protectorates. The Monroe Doctrine, originally proposed by the British as a cover for their own indirect forms of rule in Latin America, is out the window; if there are to be debt-collecting, "order-imposing" gunboats and marine expeditions in Central America it would be British gunboats and British marines. And if there is to be a Central American canal--which a Britain that has keeping the US contained on its agenda would desire more than OTL--it will have been built under British patronage.

It's not clear to me what this effort would do to Britain economically. It means lost opportunities for British capital to profit from investment in the USA. (They might still reap some of that, laundered through Continental middlemen who would take a cut, but the more successful British containment is, the less profitable a venture the USA as a whole is, so they will take a double hit there). OTOH impeding the growth of US power overseas, starting with market power, does mean more opportunities for British capital and influence. And perhaps the stark needs of keeping a cold and watchful eye on the potentially largest economic power in the world will lead to reforms in Britain, of business practices for instance, that might keep her more competitive in the 20th century.

Conversely a USA that deems itself ready to go for another round with the British Empire in 1913 is presumably a quite different country than OTL too. Even if they waited until the entanglements of a great European war bogged down much British strength, it has to be a USA that is heavily militarized and fortified. They have to have plans for wartime autarky, even if they also have plans for breaking the RN on the high seas.

So it seems odd to focus on the lake campaigns; this war has got to have a lot more scope. There's got to be big naval war, big land war both east and west of the Lakes, involvement on a World War scale of other European powers...

I would think that if the USA and Britain came to blows in 1887, that Britain has ever since cultivated Mexico as an ally and built up the potential military threat south of the border well beyond what that country could afford on its own. So in addition to a Canadian front (three or five of them, depending on how one counts--Maritimes, New Brunswick/Quebec, the Lakes, the Great Plains, and the Rockies/Pacific coast all require different forces and methods to contest) there would be fronts with Mexico too. Not to mention whatever conflagrations are going on simultaneously in Europe and on the high seas.

Now perhaps The Kiat has got some kind of explanation of how and why in both wars, both sides restrict themselves to naval warfare on the Great Lakes and refrain from all the obvious maneuvers each side could be expected to make--the Americans, attacking with overwhelming manpower on the east and west sides of the Lakes, into New Brunswick/Quebec and Alberta/Saskatchewan; the British, using overwhelming seapower to threaten the entire US coast and choke our trade overseas to essentially nothing. If one tries one, the other must try the other, so it's hard to see how it could keep from escalating into an all-out knockdown fight both times. If this could somehow be avoided, fine, but someone has to spell out what special circumstances could allow such restricted wars.

Otherwise I'm assuming both sides are in a full-scale all-out war with each other, both times. In 1887 relieving Canada of a US invasion would have been a major expedition already; by 1913, even with the US substantially weakened vs OTL it amounts to a major theatre, perhaps the major one, of a world war--since if the US did not wait for such a war to bog down their foe, Britain's enemies must certainly take advantage of the opportunity trying to quell the Yankees would present them. And presumably the USN has built up a whole lot by 1913, enough to make Kaiser Wilhelm's fleet look like a child's set of bathtub toys. If not--whoever the political leaders are who would propose to launch such a war without a first-class navy should be tried and convicted for treason.
 
Even just moving on the lakes, you do need to transit from lake to lake unless you have, say, a seperate Lake Superior Fleet, Lake Ontario Fleet, Lake Huron Fleet, and Lake Erie Fleet which are permanently built and based in those lakes and cannot move between them.

I meant they were designed as brown-water warships with no intent of ever taking them out of the Great Lakes. Transit between Michigan, Huron and Superior isn't that difficult, and neither Erie or Ontario play a roll in this history.
 
Now perhaps The Kiat has got some kind of explanation of how and why in both wars, both sides restrict themselves to naval warfare on the Great Lakes and refrain from all the obvious maneuvers each side could be expected to make--the Americans, attacking with overwhelming manpower on the east and west sides of the Lakes, into New Brunswick/Quebec and Alberta/Saskatchewan; the British, using overwhelming seapower to threaten the entire US coast and choke our trade overseas to essentially nothing. If one tries one, the other must try the other, so it's hard to see how it could keep from escalating into an all-out knockdown fight both times. If this could somehow be avoided, fine, but someone has to spell out what special circumstances could allow such restricted wars.

Yes, I have the perfect explanation: this history is only about the campaign on the Great Lakes in 1913. Maybe one of these years I'll write about other campaigns/fronts in this Great War. I certainly don't want to get all sidetracked and try to explain every little detail back to 1775, about how this USA is different from ours and so on.

Think of it like this: how many books about Jutland (for example) talk about the events leading up to the Great War back fifty to a hundred years? Aside from talk about the naval arms race, I'd say none.

As for your earlier post, the US learned quite a bit from its losses, and the next section I'm going to write will be about both sides' war plans.
 
Naval planners are going to make use of the canals to transit warships between the lakes since they can't afford to build individual shipyards, and the attendant infrastructures, for each lake. Why would the Canadians forego bring warships in via the St. Lawrence Seaway?

Other than canals would be easy to shut down? There are more than one front to a war. I guess I could have an independent Quebec, but that sounds a bit on the clichéd side.
 
I'm wondering how you got apparent fleet boats on the Lakes.:confused: In the first place, boats that size hadn't even been conceived by BuC&R yet... In the second, the need for them on the Lakes is about zero.:rolleyes:

More likely, you get a G-boat (or something like, maybe an H-boat). So they might be Carp-class.
 
A couple of other things, pending The Kiat giving us a canonical backstory:

(And, adding this in before posting in response to a later response from The Kiat, I am assuming here that the POD is sometime after the OTL Civil War. From his coy response, maybe it isn't, maybe it goes back a heck of a lot earlier. But see my response to that after this one...)

I don't know how or why the US would get into a fight with the British over Canada in 1887 (well, to be fair, any fight with Britain over anything would become a fight over Canada--but again, it's hard to picture the scenario).

The easiest thing to imagine is a replay of the war of 1812--arrogant and greedy Yanks, puffed up by a recent victorious war, launch a half-baked land grab on dubious pretexts. This helps explain why and how the Americans apparently held the Idiot Ball again (as the 1812 precedent shows we are fully capable of doing.:rolleyes:)

Still, while it is true I guess that part of the factional arrogance of the War Hawks of 1812 was puffed up by the still-in-living-memory victory of the Revolutionary War, I still think that the recent experience of the Civil War in the USA would count for a lot more this time around. It might be that the legions of former Union (and perhaps joining them, Confederate) officers would have an exaggerated sense of their military brilliance and therefore underestimate the difficulties of conquering and subjugating Canada. But make no mistake, the Civil War was serious business and the Union Army eventually emerged victorious fair and square from it. The only European nation that would have experienced war on such a serious scale and won it as of 1887 in living memory and with modern technology would be the German Empire, and their war was decided much more quickly.

So even it it were true that the 1887 war was started by half-baked American hotheads with delusions of grandeur, I would think that if their initial filibustering schemes fell through as sadly as the War Hawks of 1812 fumbled their football, if the United States was then facing serious defeat, before simply surrendering to British power, cooler-headed veterans of the Civil War, who might have held back from the initial aggressions, would come forward and brush aside the incompetents, and redirect the American war effort so it is no longer a complete debacle. They might, under the leadership of a President suitably sobered by the ugly prospects of defeat, be fighting merely to regain the status quo ante and to come to the negotiating table with the British in a position of strength from which to be magnanimous and rueful. But the Union, unlike even the Prussian-led German alliance that beat the French Second Empire, also had learned how to fight a long war of attrition. I don't think the Yanks would therefore surrender until they'd recovered any losses earlier half-wittedness may have cost them.

At some point--we'd toss the Idiot Ball aside, however tenaciously it might have been held in the beginning.

And whether I'm right or wrong about that, if post-war we have a hostile Canada, somewhat aggrandized by the war settlement, facing a Union that had suffered defeat in some sense, with both sides relying on arms rather than a mix of trust and deterrence to keep the peace and order, the United States would as I said be much changed (as would Canada to be sure). We could expect such a Union to have, on the French model, universal manhood Army service for a period of years followed by reservist status for essentially the entire adult male population. Very heavy military expenditures, taking the form of paying for this levee en masse plus extensive fortifications and military hardware--heavy artillery and so forth. Again the US Army knew, as no European power in this generation did, what was involved in total warfare of an entire modern nation mobilized to the utmost for the long haul--and the US political system managed to sustain that amidst politics almost as usual.

So come 1913, the total US force ought to be one hell of a bear. For Canada also to host an equivalent wolverine resistance would require that the British Empire is spending a whole lot of her arms budget, and stands ready to ship in a whole lot of men, to hold the crazed Yankee colossus at bay.

I finally want to repeat a question I think I asked--if the British were in a position after the 1887 war to demand territory from the USA, why settle for expanding only on the West Coast, which in the 19th century was still very peripheral to British Empire concerns? Most of the Canadians whom British honor was pledged to defend lived east of the Rockies, and were vulnerable to Yankee strikes from the developing industrial and developed agricultural heartlands of the US Midwest and New England. The most sensible answer I can think of for the British taking some or all of Washington State would be that local forces based in British Columbia (I know, it probably wasn't united as such back then, but I'm using it as a geographic term) had overwhelmed what was locally available for defense in Washington and with naval help had completely dominated the shores of Puget Sound and immediate hinterland. Whereas perhaps back east the gains were ambiguous and offset by Yankee gains held right up to the peace talks.

Still I'd think that while Alaska would be quite forfeit to Britain whether a single Tommy or RN sloop made an appearance there or not (because it was not yet heavily settled by Americans and therefore could be bargained away with minimal pain) that even if the British had taken all of Washington State and a good part of Idaho and Oregon too, they'd bargain most of it or even all of it back in exchange for small but strategic gains in the Great Lakes region to serve as buffers and strongpoints and deterrents against any future Yankee invasion schemes. Well, I daresay on the same principle they'd be sure to buttress their position on the Puget Sound somewhat, especially if they were already in occupation. But protecting the shores of BC and Vancouver Island, while quite important, would not have the same priority as protecting the more populous provinces to the east.

So I'm wondering if they did indeed make some small but important territorial gains east of the Rockies, and their taking a big swathe of land on the West Coast as well just goes to show how strong their victory was.

Again a map, or anyway a detailed description of the war and peace of 1887, seems in order as a starting point for understanding the nature of the 1913 lake war.

And I'd be very wary of the Americans holding the Idiot Ball a third time in this timeline, especially if they are the ones who start the war. They might display a bit of the foolishness of armies typically prepared to fight the last war, but not the sort of ramshackle foolhardiness typical of the filibusters of the 19th century. If the 1913 American forces are going to prove to be military fools, they will be professional military fools.:rolleyes: And given time, they'll learn--weed out the worst idiots and the others will wise up.
 
Yes, I have the perfect explanation: this history is only about the campaign on the Great Lakes in 1913. Maybe one of these years I'll write about other campaigns/fronts in this Great War. I certainly don't want to get all sidetracked and try to explain every little detail back to 1775, about how this USA is different from ours and so on.

Think of it like this: how many books about Jutland (for example) talk about the events leading up to the Great War back fifty to a hundred years? Aside from talk about the naval arms race, I'd say none.

As for your earlier post, the US learned quite a bit from its losses, and the next section I'm going to write will be about both sides' war plans.

You certainly don't need to discuss "every little detail," but something major happened sometime in the 19th century (if you aren't actually working with a POD before that) and it sure would be nice to know what that was. Presumably you do, and could tell us. You don't have to tell the story that way if you don't want to of course, but until you reveal the canon divergence, it is only reasonable to speculate.

When we read a book about Jutland today, the author can assume we already know the context--we know why and how the Kaiser decided to acquire a Kriegsmarine suitable for challenging the RN head-on, and indeed how interwoven that decision was with the fact that the Germans were fighting the British in the first place. We judge the outcome of the battle in the context of its strategic place in the war, and in the war plans of the respective sides, and with a general knowledge of the respective places of the nations comprising the two sides before and after the war--none of which the author of a book on Jutland has to explain.

So here you are writing a book on the 1913 Great Lakes campaign. I am prepared to sit back and see how it goes, bearing in mind my attention span for mere battle accounts is kind of limited. Especially when I am all disoriented as to the stakes and probabilities. If the American ships get swept from the lakes in the first battles--is that all she wrote for the Lakes campaign as the RCN celebrates victory? Or do the Americans have shipyards that will pour out ten times those numbers of hulls, with trained reservist crews to man them? With some backstory I might know this, as I would if I were an American following the story in the newspapers at the time. Here we are helpless, except for double-blind speculation, as you can reveal out of a hat either that this US is an industrial colossus or that it is a disintegrating hulk of a failed state--all at your whim.

Presumably you do know the back story and are committed to a certain view of what the respective powers have come to. It might be fun to see it teased out in glimpses and eventually emerge from the fog. Maybe that's the plan.

But until the thing stands revealed I trust you won't find these kinds of speculations offensive or disruptive. As for me, I've shot my bolts for the moment, I've put out quite a lot of speculation on what sort of history might conform to your revelations thus far on the assumption of a minimal divergence from known OTL history.

And I'm not sorry I did. Such deep themes, and personal stories, are the kind of thing I'm interested in--textbooks about battles on land or sea hold little meaning for me divorced from the contexts high and low.
 
I'm wondering how you got apparent fleet boats on the Lakes.:confused: In the first place, boats that size hadn't even been conceived by BuC&R yet... In the second, the need for them on the Lakes is about zero.:rolleyes:

More likely, you get a G-boat (or something like, maybe an H-boat). So they might be Carp-class.

You need them all right if British Canada and the United States have been sitting glaring at each other across the lakes (and on other borders east and west we've been told to never mind about, that's another book:rolleyes:) each certain that the other will eventually attack in full force and each escalating over a course of 26 years.

At some point someone would propose pouring liquid nitrogen over the lakes to freeze them into ice sheets on which formations of armored aerosani "cavalry" will sweep past the other side's icelocked fleets. Then someone else will propose upgrading the fleet ships to icebreakers.

At this date, 1913, assuming similar rates of technical advance, aircraft might prove relevant by the end of the war if it runs long enough and probably are already appreciated as important if auxiliary scout craft. But given that there are vast expanses of water here, it seems only natural that a navy is called for.

OTL these fleets would be laughable because we've had long peace between the US and Canada (not uninterrupted by the occasional war scare in the 19th century to be sure) since 1814, a peace first enforced by strategic balance of power between the US and Britain (that is, the lakes aren't the only line of defense) followed by treaties reflecting that balance, then gradually by common interest and trust.

Now imagine, in the year 1913, that the German Second Empire and French Third Republic of OTL are somehow ISOTed to face each other across these lakes. Would they not build fleets there? And what pray tell would be the "natural" upper limit of a capital ship for such a fleet?

Seriously, I wonder. :confused: Is there some natural upper limit you can explain to me, admittedly ignorant of narrowly military matters as I am? Since I am aware of none I figure it's just the maximum size competition has escalated to before open war breaks out. So it could be a big boat, or a dreadnought, or (prior to the generation that just freezes the whole damn lake) a freaking Habbukuk unsinkable ice ship two miles long.

As far as I can tell there is just no damn limit, until they settle it by slugging it out.

Or God willing, some other means. But evidently not here.:(
----
I belatedly note you are just rolling your eyes at big submarines, not at the sort of surface fleet vessels I guessed at first you were dismissing. But the point stands--I see no reason why both sides would have not built Dreadnoughts, and cruisers, and destroyers, and the whole panoply of ocean-going ships of the type the RN and USN had developed by this point OTL. Therefore submarines to take them on...

I suppose the eyeroll is at their size, both because as you say, OTL no one had made those sizes of subs yet so they might be technically impossible as of 1913--this is a strong point but it depends on how the detailed backstory of the timeline has progressed.

The other, implicit point, is that subs need size to achieve range, and even in Lake Superior there is only so much range that is needed--if you've lost all your resupply ports on your respective shore, north or south, your side is in big trouble anyway...

I suppose one might trade off range for more firepower in the form of more torpedoes though. Or the subs are damn big because they run on battery power, and are mostly batteries...

Then they wouldn't correspond to any OTL classes. And indeed it would be very strange if they did.
 
In a spirit of positive contribution, a map

That is, an appropriated map; I lack the skill to make a decent one from scratch. I chose this one because it gives information on depths and the levels of each lake surface relative to sea level and hence each other. Given we've got submarines and big surface ships in this timeline already I think we need that info.

GreatLakesMap.jpg


Also, here's a link to a NOAA map of the currents of the lakes.
 
Last edited:
The story opens with a submarine off the coast of Manitoulin island, thinking of diving. There isn't 100 feet of water within 10 km of the island and rocks and shoals abound. Check the charts.
 
Control of Huron and Superior would also hurt Canadian commerce a little bit. Yes, there are railroads overland too that probably even carry more, but that's the Army's problem.


The story opens with a submarine off the coast of Manitoulin island, thinking of diving. There isn't 100 feet of water within 10 km of the island and rocks and shoals abound. Check the charts.

A little ten foot tall boat don't need that much. Like with anything on a lake, it's going to be smaller than the salt water variety. And if one plans on publishing, one writes it first, looks it over, then rewrites it as many times as one needs to get it right.
 
Top