25. Alexander’s second Indian campaign
The Great King Alexander, King of the Macedonians, the Persians, the Babylonians and all the peoples of Asia, Hegemon of the Hellenic League, Strategos Autokrator of the Italiote League, Son of Philippos Nikator, in the eighteenth year of his reign he marched the armies of the Macedonians and the Persians to India, to remind its inhabitants of their servitude to him and his dynasty.
- Excerpt from the Alexander inscription at Behistun, as commissioned by Philip III
Alexander’s several years of rest after the Sicilian campaign had effects both positive and negative. For the empire as a whole it was positive, the lack of extensive levies of men and goods to support campaigns of conquest allowed things to settle down. Prices of common goods such as barley, wheat and dates had risen sharply following the conquests of Philip II, probably because he and his son were more concerned with establishing their empire and supplying the army than with making sure the price of commodities remained low for the common people. At this point in Alexander’s reign however the prices had fallen considerably, even below those under the Achaemenids, testament to the new empire’s vibrant economy and in particular the flourishing agriculture of Mesopotamia, which was now unhindered by war and royal requisitioning. The new cities of Syria and Mesopotamia, such as Nikatoris, Herakleia-on-the-Tigris and Nikopolis, were growing steadily, every year immigrants from the Aegean arrived to settle in the east. The native Syrians and Babylonians too settled in those cities, as they were centres of economic activity, but they were prohibited from partaking in Hellenic civil culture, they could not sit on the city’s council or take part in its festivals. Despite these discriminatory practices it seems many of the new settled cities were evenly divided between Hellenic and Asian population. Trade, eased up by the enormous amounts of coins that Alexander had minted, seems to have doubled in comparison to Philip’s reign.
The negative effects were more personal in nature. The Great King lived in opulent luxury at either the Palace of Nebuchadnezzar in Babylon during winter or at Ekbatana or Pella during summer. Alexander thus oversaw various ceremonies and other somewhat dull matters of state, which were nevertheless just as important as triumphing on the battlefield. When not having to attend to long meetings with various advisors or overseeing the solving of disputes or the correct making of offerings to the gods Alexander spend his time in the way that any Macedonian monarch would do, by hunting and excessive drinking. The royal pairidaeza, walled parks with an abundance of flowers, trees and animals, spread throughout Mesopotamia and Western Iran were frequently visited by the Great King and his retinue.
The finest vintage of both Hellas and Persia was available in abundance for the king and his companions. Many among the Greeks looked down upon the Macedonians for their habit of drinking undiluted wine, but the Macedonians themselves saw nothing wrong with it and even seemed to have spread the practice to Persia. Like practically all Macedonian men Alexander drank heavily, but it seems that during this period his intake of alcohol increased even more. Drunken quarrels with his closest companions are not unheard of, and in one infamous example Alexander grabbed a spear of one of his guards and hurled it at Hephaistion, with whom he was arguing about who killed the most boars during a recent hunt. Luckily for both the Great King and his lover he missed. We do not know the aftermath of this incident, but perhaps the realization that he almost killed his dearest friend helped Alexander to break out of the self-destructive spiral he was in.
Another factor was probably an illness that Alexander suffered in 311 BCE, which is mentioned in the royal chronicles. While not certain what exactly afflicted him it seems that for several weeks the king’s life hung in the balance. Neither his Greek or his Babylonian doctors were able to effectively deduce what exactly Alexander suffered from, and in the end it were Egyptian doctors send by Bakenanhur who supposedly managed to cure the king. In the aftermath of his illness Alexander was more moderate in his consumption of wine, and sometimes even refused wine altogether for several weeks. Conspicuous consumption however remained a hallmark of the Argead court, even if its king did not always partake. By 310 Alexander had recovered and was relatively fit, even if we do take in account that by now he was nearing 50 and no longer possessed the eternal youth present in many of his images. Ptolemaios, in one of his more unflattering statements, remarks that by the time of his second Indian campaign Alexander’s hair was becoming thin.
Opulent gardens at the Palace of Nebuchadnezzar
This period of relative peace, there were some smaller military engagements on the frontier [1], came to an end in 310 BCE, when simultaneously several military crises confronted the nascent empire. The most immediate but also the least dangerous was an uprising in Persia under command of a certain Baryaxes. Harkening back to the glories of the Achaemenids he claimed descent from Darius the Great and openly declared Alexander an usurper. His biggest success was that he managed to occupy Pasargadai, the location of the tomb of Cyrus, for several weeks. From there he published several ‘royal’ edicts, which ranged from lowering the tax on possessing camels to granting the satrapy of Babylon to his father-in-law. His followers seemed to be mostly common bandits, dispossessed farmers and some disgruntled minor nobility. By and large it seems the Persians supported the Argead regime, and the rather sad revolt of Baryaxes is often seen as the last attempt at fomenting some kind of Persian resistance against the Macedonians. Ariobarzanes, the long-serving satrap of Persia quickly crushed Baryaxes, who died together with his troops, trampled underneath the hooves of the Argead cavalry.
The crisis that was most dire, and which would require direct royal intervention, took place on the banks of the Indus. The Indian satrapies had turned out to be both very valuable and rather volatile. Access to exotic goods, high-quality Indian steel, spices and gemstones all ensured that trade flourished, but at the same time there appeared to be a deep distrust between the new Macedonian rulers of the region and the local population. Already several uprisings had been brutally crushed by Lysimachos, satrap over most of the Indus Valley. The Macedonians suspected that the brahmans were behind the resistance, and often targeted them in retaliation for the intransigence of the Indians. The reason for Alexander to march east once again with a large force, and the difference between these and other revolts, was that the Nanda dynasty of Magadha had broken its treaty with Alexander and, possibly in conjunction with an uprising, invaded the Indus Valley.
In the aftermath of the battle of Ahicchatra peace had been signed between Alexander and the Nanda, but despite the successful blunting of the Argead assault it is hard to argue that the conflict had been a Nanda victory. Large parts of the Yamuna and Ganges valley had been devastated by the Macedonian advance and the human cost of the war had also not been insignificant. The prestige of the dynasty too had been afflicted, for Dhana Nanda now had to acquiesce to the Macedonians establishing a satrapy in India itself. Before the war Dhana Nanda had not been a popular ruler, and the war itself did not change that. Still, he managed to cling on for several years, dying in mysterious circumstances in 319 BCE. He was succeeded by his son Pabbata, but power was practically held by the minister and general Shriyaka. It seems that for several years the new administration decided to honour its treaty with the Macedonians, but this ended around 313 BCE. The reason for this change in attitude is much more rooted in the Nanda domestic situation than in any perceived Macedonian weakness. The Nanda were increasingly seen as incapable and corrupt, and it must have seemed as Magadha was headed for a regime change. It was thus that Shriyaka, in order to bolster both his own position as the dynasty’s, started preparations for his campaign to the west, to reclaim all of India and to drive away the mleccha [2].
In this endeavour he was egged on and supported by Chanakya, a teacher and philosopher who had worked at the university at Taxila and who wished for nothing more than for the barbarians to be driven out. A brilliant mind, Chanakya attempted to reform the Nanda state, despite having personally hated Dhana Nanda. He probably was instrumental in coordinating the uprisings along the Indus with the invasion of Shriyaka, because it is quite likely that he still had his contacts among the wise and learned of Taxila and the surrounding lands. Shriyaka thus marched west early in 310 and encountered minimal resistance, for the Macedonians were quite busy with the uprising among the population. Already the garrisons at Alexandria-on-the-Indus, commanded by Lysimachos himself, and at Artakameia were isolated and put under siege by the insurgents. Shriyaka himself, commanding an army supposedly 100000 strong, captured the city of Philippopolis Indike in June 310, destroying the city that Alexander had founded only several years before.
The military governor of Gandhara [3], Attalos son of Andromenes, and Poros, king of the Puru had in the meantime gathered their forces to confront and possibly delay Shriyaka, giving Alexander time to reach and relief his beleaguered forces. Near Bucephala they confronted Shriyaka, and after several days of skirmishing the two armies confronted each other on the battlefield. For the Macedonians and for Poros it was a crushing defeat. Shriyaka, who evidently had learned from his earlier encounter with Alexander, deployed his elephants on the flanks in order to deter the Macedonian cavalry while using his superior numbers and his longbows to grind down the phalanx. Inevitably gaps opened up after several hours of intense combat, which were exploited by Shriyaka’s elite infantry from the sreni guilds. Attalos’ phalangites were relatively inexperienced, most of them had not taken part in any of Alexander’s campaign, and thus broke their ranks relatively quickly. A last ditch attempt to salvage the situation by leading a cavalry charge ended with Attalos’ death and the complete disintegration of the Macedonian army. Poros, who held down one of the flanks with a force of his own, was quickly surrounded and he too died fighting. For Shriyaka the victory had been a vindication and the crowning achievement of all his work as minister and general. Perhaps his would be the honour of driving the barbarians beyond the Hindu Kush.
Now the road to Taxila was open, and it must have appeared as if victory was in his grasp. The king of Taxila, Omphis, had sent envoys to Shriyaka in order to strike a deal and possibly spare his city. Secret negotiations must still have been ongoing when in August 310 Perdikkas arrived with a 20000 strong force, mostly veterans that had been settled in Bactria. He had been ordered to act as vanguard for Alexander’s army, which by now was also on its way. Still, Shriyaka probably could have captured Taxila were it not for the monsoon rains, which started earlier than normal. These delayed supplies and reinforcements and prevented an easy crossing of the Hydaspes, which lay between Shriyaka’s army and Taxila. In the meantime the situation in the south had also changed, reinforcements under joint command of Peukestas and Antigonos’ son Demetrios had arrived via Arachosia and the Bolan Pass and had managed to break the sieges of Alexandria-on-the-Indus and Artakameia. Afterwards they marched north to Taxila, brutally supressing the revolts near the Indus, where they were to join up with Alexander.
Alexander arrived in India in October 310 with a 60000 strong army. Consisting off, among others, the elite regiments of the Argyraspidai (‘Silver shields’), the hetairoi and levied troops from the diverse array of peoples that his empire ruled, it was a fearsome force. One of the more notable regiments present were known in Greek as the Athanatoi, or the Immortals, recruited from the Iranian nobility who fought as heavily armoured cavalry. They also had a foot regiment, which fought not unlike the Macedonian hypaspistai, but with a more Iranian-style equipment, they used an tabar axe instead of a kopis sword. In order to prevent Shriyaka from crossing the Hydaspes Alexander quickly marched his army to the river, but in doing so he must have significantly exhausted it. It was thus in October 310 that Alexander and Shriyaka faced off once again.
Several weeks of manoeuvring followed, with Shriyaka or Alexander attempting to outflank their foe by crossing the river, only to be prevented from doing so by timely arrival of enemy forces. For Shriyaka, who was supported by a crumbling dynasty and for whom victory was of the utmost importance, it was important that he could strike fast. Some of his officers became disgruntled, accusing their commander of cowardice in face of the enemy. Alexander had no such criticism, and despite the great size of his empire he did manage to receive some reinforcements, testament to the logistical system that was put in place by the Achaemenids and which the Macedonians had used and improved upon. In the end it was thus Shriyaka who took the initiative in early November 310. He split his forces and crossed the river at two points, one to the north of the Macedonian camp and another to the south of it. He however deliberately botched the assault, he ordered his troops to cross over and skirmish with the Macedonians, but afterwards they had to retreat in order to convince the Macedonians to give chase.
Shriyaka’s elephants advance
The following battle was one of the most desperate and bloody of Alexander’s campaigns. He almost fell for Shriyaka’s trap, and while deploying his phalanx on the river’s eastern bank he was suddenly confronted by a overwhelming assault by the Nanda army. Over 200 elephants bore down on Alexander’s position while most of the Macedonian forces still were on the other side of the river. Fighting was fierce, but with his back to the river Alexander had no other option. His were elite forces, some even veterans of Philip’s campaigns in Greece, others had fought at Hyrkanis and Mepsila, and this was not the first time they had faced off against a numerically superior foe. Alexander and his bodyguard fought dismounted, and time and time again the phalanx repelled the Nanda assault. Improvised rafts made sure that reinforcements arrived. The tide of battle definitely turned when Poros the Younger, who had joined Alexander on his campaigns in Italy and Sicily and had remained at his court for several years, led his forces across the river further downstream and outflanked Shriyaka and stormed his camp, torching it. While confusion reigned in Shriyaka’s camp Alexander could finally start his own advance, driving back the Indian infantry and elephants, many of whom ran amok their own troops.
Shriyaka attempted to salvage the situation, he had kept his more elite forces and his chariots in reserve to deliver the finishing blow. Sadly for him however the situation was by now unsalvageable. His elite infantry was harassed by Saka horse-archers and their formation smashed apart by Median and Persian cavalry. The chariots, although an impressive sight, were an antiquated weapon at best and they too were swept aside. Despairing at the sight Shriyaka decided to surrender, and he send an envoy to Alexander to parlay peace. Shriyaka had to release all his prisoners and return the valuables plundered on his campaign, but in return he was allowed to return to Magadha unharassed. As the sun set that day over the blood-swollen Hydaspes Alexander had won a great battle, but at a high cost. The Argead army had lost 5000 men, many of them veterans with invaluable experience. For later generations of Argead rulers the battle would become a legendary one, with Alexander and a few companions holding back a million Indians with contemptuous ease, but for them too it was a reminder of a time when the Great King of Asia could triumph in India.
Shriyaka returned east after the battle, a broken man who could have won it all, had he been more daring early on in his campaign. He did not live long afterwards, supposedly killed by some officers over a petty dispute. The titular Nanda ruler Pabbata also disappears from the record soon after the battle, and with him the Nanda dynasty. Infighting in Magadha ensured that no new conquering dynasty would arise from there for some time, instead the various states of the Ganges would reassert their independence. When, in the end, a ruler united both the Indus and the Ganges in a single empire it was not from Pataliputra that he marched forth but from Taxila. Omphis too was one of the losers of the conflict, his treachery had been found out and he lost his head in return. His territory was granted to Poros the Younger, who now ruled an extensive client kingdom. In hindsight perhaps a bit too extensive, although Alexander himself did not have to deal with that. Alexander remained in India for some time, making sure that order was restored, but he would not for now march east again, despite the dissolution of the Nanda Empire. Limits had been reached, that much Alexander had learned over the preceding years, and trying to exceed that would only invite disaster. It was early in 309 that Alexander went west again, and not long after he must have heard about the situation in Italy.
Footnotes
- See update 23
- Sanskrit word roughly meaning ‘barbarian’
- The region around Taxila