66. The Second War of the Argead Succession, part 1
Perdiccas thus assembled his troops and prepared for war against Ptolemaios; thus setting off another great contest of arms, a fate from which the descendants of Philip and Alexander were seemingly unable to escape.
- Excerpt from Antikles of Massalia’s
History of the Hellenes vol. 3: from Philippos Nikator to the Polemarcheia
To someone not very interested in history the series of wars that dominated the later parts of the third century BCE might seem complex and obtuse; for seemingly little gain the great Hellenistic powers fought each other in several conflicts. The primary reason for those wars was mostly just control over land, trade and resources, but it was often underpinned by ideology: both sides claimed to be the rightful heir to Philip and Alexander, to the entire Argead Empire and the throne of Asia. During the periods of peace between the conflicts diplomacy was often awkward: Demetrian sources refer to the Great King in Eupatoria as ‘the king of Babylonia’, and the Argead sources refer to the Demetrian ruler as ‘the tyrant of Ionia’, but they nevertheless were capable of living in relative peace, and during the following century the families even intermarried. Of course in the end neither side gained much, and arguably both sides were only weakened by the fighting.
The catalyst of the Second War of the Argead Succession was the treachery of Thrason; the satrap of Cilicia who decided to switch sides when he heard that Ptolemaios had sentenced him to death for his incompetence and brutality. Seeking refuge at the Demetrian court in Ephesos Perdiccas could easily have rebuked him and sent him packing back to Eupatoria; that this didn’t happen, that he immediately seized this opportunity to wage war indicates that the Demetrian king had confidence in his ability to defeat Ptolemaios. He was probably also encouraged by his recent victories over Hephaistion of Macedonia and Herakleides of Thrace [1], and thus, after some initial correspondence urging Ptolemaios to reinstate Thrason, Perdiccas declared war: he claimed that Ptolemaios was an usurper and that he was the rightful Great King of Asia.
The war started late in 236, and one of its first actions was not a military assault but a diplomatic coup: the Kingdom of Cappadocia had been an Argead vassal since the early 240’s, when its king Ariobarzanes was in name a vassal of Eupatoria but in practice independent [2]. Ariobarzanes died in 238, his eponymous son, an ambitious warlord eager to assert his own independence, succeeded him; if Perdiccas had not started a war then perhaps Ptolemaios would have needed to deal with Ariobarzanes II. As Cappadocia covered much of eastern Anatolia and, crucially, controlled a stretch of the routes that connected Cilicia with the Aegean coast, its support was crucial for Perdiccas. At the same time that messengers went back and forth between Ephesos and Eupatoria others visited Mazaka, the Cappadocian capital, and quickly a deal was struck. When the war did break out Ariobarzanes II declared that he no longer recognised Ptolemaios as the rightful Great King; an alliance was signed with Perdiccas and the Argead garrison at Mazaka was slaughtered. A detachment of Cappadocian cavalry joined up with Perdiccas on his march east, Ariobarzanes II however remained in his kingdom: his rule was still somewhat precarious, one of his brothers had attempted a coup the previous year, and he feared what might happen if he left his kingdom unattended.
And thus Perdiccas marched into Cilicia in the Spring of 235, forcing his way through the Cilician Gates after some minor skirmishes with the local defenders, and at first his advance was like a triumphal march: Nikon of Zeugma, a Syrian chronicler who personally witnessed the war, claimed that Perdiccas spent more time dining and making offerings than actually fighting; for a while it must have seemed as if the wealth and splendour of Perdiccas would carry him to victory. Tarsus, after some initial hesitation, opened its gates to the conqueror, as did Adana. His fleet proceeded from its bases on Cyprus and Phoenicia to blockade the ports of Syria, the most important being Alexandria-in-Syria and Ptolemaïs-by-the-Sea [3]. It was at Philippi-on-the-Pyramus [4] that the Demetrian army first met staunch resistance: it was there that Magas,
strategos of Syria and Cilicia, had decided to make his stand against the invaders. Loyal to Ptolemaios and his dynasty Magas was unwilling to yield Cilicia without a fight, but while he was a capable military administrator he turned out to be a somewhat hapless commander: his army, consisting mostly of local levies and hastily hired mercenaries, was outmanoeuvred and, after some skirmishes, forced to retreat by the more experienced Demetrian force. Magas relented and returned to Syria, where he set up his defences around the Syrian Gate, while at the same time awaiting Ptolemaios, who was raising his forces in the east.
Around the same time Thrasyboulos, Perdiccas’ second-in-command, had landed in Phoenicia with a force 10000 strong, and after raising additional forces among the local cities and communities he also marched into Syria, besieging Ptolemaïs-by-the-Sea and launching raids into the Syrian countryside, forcing Magas to divide his army. Perdiccas, in the meantime, had decided not to march south and confront Magas, after which he could have pushed onwards towards the Orontes and cities like Nikatoris, instead from Cilicia he proceeded eastwards. At the Amanian Gate he forced his way through; the garrison which guarded the pass was routed by a daring midnight assault in which Perdiccas’ Saunitai mercenaries played a key role. After securing the Amanian Gate he marched towards the Euphrates, where he hoped to secure Zeugma and the crossing of that river. Somewhere along the way he must have heard that Ptolemaios and his army were already on the west bank of the river; a decisive clash seemed imminent. Some sources mention that Perdiccas hesitated, but that his generals urged to push onwards; they made a comparison with the situation almost a century before, when Philip Nikator after chasing the Achaemenids out of Cilicia defeated them decisively in Syria [5]. Offerings were made, portents observed, and they were judged to be positive: Perdiccas thus decided to march forth and confront Ptolemaios.
The Argead cavalry charges at Cyrrhus
Ptolemaios too was confident of victory: he commanded a sizeable army, 40000 strong, centred around a core of veterans who had served underneath him and his father for several decades now. The phalanx was raised among the Greek and Macedonian population of Babylonia, as were the battalions of the
hetairoi, the Medes and Persians supplied cavalry and light infantry, from Bactria came heavy cavalry and Saka horse-archers. Also present in his army were 200 Indian elephants, a special squadron of the
hetairoi known as the
Agema, i.e. the royal guard. The
Athanatoi (Immortals) were also there; recruited among the Iranian nobility they consisted of both cavalry and infantry. When the threat of Perdiccas became clear Ptolemaios ordered his army to be assembled; it is testament to the excellent logistics of the Argead Empire that it managed to do so before the Demetrians even reached the Euphrates. After the news reached him that Perdiccas had crossed the Amanus Mountains Ptolemaios decided to march out; the two armies near the town of Cyrrhus [6], named after a Macedonian city by its settlers and namesake of Cyrrhestica, the region between Nikatoris and the Euphrates.
Fought in May 235 the battle of Cyrrhus was the largest since the battle of the Halys, 20 years before [7]. Perdiccas’, whose army also depended upon a core of veterans complimented by regional levies and mercenaries, had the slightly larger army and seized the initiative early on in the battle: his light cavalry chased away Ptolemaios’ screen of skirmishers and afterwards harassed the flanks of the Argead army. Ptolemaios decided to oblige him; the phalanx, under command of the chiliarch Attalos, formed up and marched forth, protected on its flanks by the elephants. Perdiccas too ordered his phalanx forwards: the battle however would not be decided by them. On Ptolemaios’ right flank a mass charge of his cavalry, both hetairoi and Bactrian cataphracts, managed to rout the Demetrian forces opposing them; a mix of Thracian and Greek cavalry, greatly aided by the presence of Ptolemaios’ elephants. Vabarzes, commander of the hetairoi and general of the cavalry, was however unable to rein in his troops; instead of reforming and striking the Demetrian rear they instead started plundering the enemy camp, believing that they had already won the battle.
Trouble soon started for Ptolemaios on his left flank: several of his elephants stationed there, under constant harassment by Perdiccas’ light troops, ran amok; sensing an opportunity Perdiccas committed his own elite cavalry to force a breakthrough. As panic spread throughout the Argead ranks Ptolemaios saw himself forced to act; together with the
Agema he rode in; he threw away his helmet so that his men could see him and he himself held aloft the royal banner, encouraging his men to stand fast. This brave action thus secured his flank, and perhaps prevented the complete rout of his forces, but his phalanx was slowly but surely pushed back: the Demetrian left flank had reformed itself and once again advanced while Vabarzes was still attempting to rally his cavalry, to no avail. Several assaults by Perdiccas’ Celtic and Saunitai mercenaries on the flanks of the phalanx were repelled by Ptolemaios’ troops, most notably the infantry of the Athanatoi, but it became increasingly clear that Perdiccas had the upper hand. Slowly but surely the Argead troops started falling back to their camp: Ptolemaios ordered his Saka and Parthian light cavalry forward to cover their retreat, which was aided by the sudden onset of a thunderstorm late in the afternoon.
The battle of Cyrrhus was a victory for Perdiccas, but not the decisive one that he sought: Ptolemaios retreated beyond the Euphrates but could still raise large armies in the east. For Ptolemaios it was a bitter defeat, but certainly not fatal: while some might have questioned the Great King’s military decisions none questioned his right to rule, at least for now. Despite Cyrrhus fortuitous news did soon thereafter reach Ptolemaios: Magas had forced Thrasyboulos into battle just south of Nikatoris and had crushed him decisively, the general himself did not survive the battle and his forces retreated back to Phoenicia. The eventual outcome of the war thus remained in the balance.
Footnotes
- See update 65
- See update 55
- OTL Seleucia Pieria and Laodicea respectively
- OTL Seleucia on the Pyramus, also known as Mopsuestia
- See update 7
- Same location as OTL
- See update 51