36. Satraps and strife
The reason for the antagonism between Karanos and Antigonos can thus be surmised: both were ambitious, vain and power-hungry, both were fully confident in their own abilities and when the opportunity arose to claim the regency both could not resist it. Perhaps the reason for the conflict was that both men, nephew and uncle, were more alike than they would care to admit.
- Excerpt from Antikles of Massalia’s
History of the Hellenes vol. 3: from Philippos Nikator to the Polemarcheia
Despite being disliked by many of his contemporaries it was undeniable that Karanos was the best choice for regent: already he had served as chiliarch and satrap of Babylon for almost a decade and had shown himself to be a capable ruler. He was begrudgingly respected for his able administration: particularly in Babylonia itself he had overseen many infrastructural projects, canals were dug and irrigation expanded, leading to the opening of additional farmland and increased harvests and prosperity. It was probably also Karanos who was responsible for a large-scale renovation of the temple of Esagila in Babylon, and if the Great King was absent from Babylon he took his place during the Akitu festival. This seems to have made him somewhat popular among the Babylonians, and in Mesopotamia it seems Karanos enjoyed a certain popularity due to his capable administration, in contrast to the rest of the empire where many saw him as a scheming bureaucrat.
Within the royal family he was also not without support, indeed things were quite to the contrary. Karanos was supported by practically all of them, aside from Antigonos and his close relatives. His most influential supporter was Queen Arsinoe, widow of Philip III and grandmother of the Great King Alexander IV. A formidable figure in her own right, she was bright and intelligent and known for her quick wit, she held sway over the court during her husband’s absences and personally oversaw the education of her sons. She supported Karanos because she wanted her grandson to rule one day; in Antigonos she saw a jealous nephew and a threat to her descendants’ kingship.
Nonetheless the shock must have been great when the news reached Babylon that Antigonos had rallied the forces in Syria and had himself acclaimed as rightful regent by them. Antigonos saw himself as a natural choice for regent: he was a relative of the Great King, a successful commander and a popular figure among the Macedonians. At first there were some attempts at negotiation by Karanos, but these were quickly rebuffed by Antigonos, who derided his uncle as an effete treasurer [1]. The cities of northern Mesopotamia quickly opened their gates to Antigonos’ forces, and for some time it must have appeared as if the regency would naturally belong to him, that the troops in Babylon would overthrow Karanos and acclaim Antigonos. It was thus that Antigonos made no attempts at marching on Babylon and instead consolidated his position in the north, basing himself in Nikopolis, awaiting the inevitable news from Babylon that Karanos was overthrown. When this did not happen he personally led a cavalry column south, not expecting any resistance he thought he could ride straight to Babylon. Near the ancient town of Sippar his advance was impeded by the local militia, who attempted to resist him. They were cut to pieces by Antigonos’ professional force, but it did cause Antigonos to reconsider his course of action. Perhaps he was not as welcome in Babylon as he thought he was, he thus returned north to Nikopolis to gather his army to force the issue.
In Babylon itself Karanos, despite the shock of Antigonos’ initiation of hostilities, asserted himself quickly. While not popular among the soldiers he did oversee the treasury and thus was able to secure their loyalty by granting generous payments and bonuses. Mercenaries were also recruited and the Babylonians themselves levied. Word of the situation was send to the satraps with requests for aid, asking for troops and supplies. Karanos’ greatest asset was that he controlled the king himself: it was his presence which legitimized Karanos’ claim to the regency and Alexander IV was always present at parades and exercises, a reminder of the continuity of the Argead dynasty, to which the army was still fanatically loyal. Karanos thus had a reasonably strong position, and with possible aid from the satraps his strength would only increase, enabling him to overpower Antigonos. Instead of abandoning Babylon, which Antigonos expected him to do, he remained in place, daring Antigonos to strike.
As seat of the Argead Empire Babylon was unsurpassed and critical to Antigonos’ claim to power, but he could not risk encirclement by his enemies. His brother Demetrios he left behind in Syria to see off any attempts at invasion from either Anatolia or Egypt while at the same time he send east his close companion Peukestas with a force 25000 strong, which was meant to either intimidate or stop the eastern satraps from reinforcing Karanos. Peukestas, a grandson of Alexander the Great’s companion of the same name, was half-Persian half-Macedonian and fluent in both languages. Much like his grandfather he had adopted Persian dress and customs, but unlike his grandfather not many among the Argead nobility detested him for this and many followed him in this trend of cultural cross-pollination. In January 267 he occupied Ekbatana, forcing the Median satrap Darius to flee, and thus preventing forces from northern Iran or beyond to join up with Karanos.
It is unknown if Antigonos himself was aware of the state of affairs further east, but it is not unlikely, just like Karanos he had a network of informants and spies. The battle of Taxila had dramatically changed the balance of power in the east, where at first the Argeads were more or less unopposed (although also somewhat overstretched) now they had to contend with Suracaksas’ Gandharan kingdom, which was evidently a potent force. The territories beyond the Hindu Kush were irrevocably lost, and the various garrisons and cities alongside the Indus surrendered later that year without much resistance: for the Macedonians there was little hope of an easy reconquest. Suracaksas however was not interested into expansion further west, it was in the Gangetic Plain that he saw the future of his nascent empire. After Philip IV’s death the remnants of his army retreated back to Bactra, where the satrap Ptolemaios had freed Amyntor from prison after hearing of his brother’s death. While there was some talk of another offensive into India the idea was quickly shelved after news of the crisis over the regency reached Bactra. As a close ally of Karanos there was no doubt about who Amyntor supported, but in order to march west he first needed to settle affairs in the east.
Having secured his hold over the Indus Valley Suracaksas was more than willing to sign a treaty with the ‘mleccha’. For the Macedonians it was a humiliation, despite the death of their king there would be no vengeance against Suracaksas, and for the Gandharans it was a triumph: they went from a vassal state to arguably the dominant state of India only in the span of a few years. Terms however were not harsh for the Argeads: beyond Gandhara, the Indus and some parts of the Kabul Valley not much was lost. In return for some talents of silver Suracaksas also released many captives: the elite regiments of the Argyraspidai and Athanatoi were present at Taxila but had suffered relatively few losses, they surrendered wholesale after Suracaksas captured their baggage train. These highly trained troops could be crucial in the coming struggle so Amyntor was eager to recruit them. Another provision of the peace treaty gave Suracaksas the right to buy horses and hire mercenaries from the Saka, eager as he was to complement his own army with a capable force of cavalry. In return Suracaksas agreed to give 150 elephants to Amyntor. With peace signed Suracaksas could now dedicate himself to his great ambition: the subjugation of the Gangetic states and the creation of an Indian empire [2]. Amyntor could now dedicate himself to defeating Antigonos, in February 267 he finally departed Bactra with an army 30000 strong.
He force-marched his armies west, stopping at Merv for supplies and a short rest, and it was also there that he met the Median satrap Darius, who informed him of the presence of Peukestas’ force in Ekbatana. Undeterred Amyntor pressed onward, and Peukestas marched out to confront him. It was near Hekatompylos, in the satrapy of Parthia, that the armies faced off. At first there were attempts at negotiation, in both armies there was unrest among the Macedonian contingents about fighting against their own countrymen, but despite that all fighting still broke out. In the end it was Amyntor’s deployment of the Argyraspidai that proved to be the winning move, professional and without remorse they easily bested the opposing phalanx, which consisted of less experienced men. Having broken through the enemy’s left wing the Argyraspidai reformed and struck the rest of Peukestas’ formation in their flank. Peukestas’ cavalry retreated from the field, and later offered their service to Amyntor, leaving his infantry stranded. The first large scale battle of the war ended in a victory for Amyntor and thus Karanos.
For Karanos the victory at Hekatompylos could not have come at a better time. Antigonos had marched on Babylon in January, but his offensive had not gone as planned. Babylonia was a land of canals, and this only increased with the ascent of the Argead dynasty and their investments in the expansion of agriculture and trade. Antigonos was thus bogged down crossing canal after canal, constantly harassed by Karanos’ forces. Just north of Babylon there was a large canal, known as the Canal of Asklepiades after its architect, which connected the Euphrates with the Tigris. Karanos positioned his troops behind this canal, which Antigonos had to cross in order to reach Babylon. The Euphrates was blocked by a dozen triremes linked together with a iron chain, making it impossible for Antigonos’ river fleet to reach the city. Karanos had ordered the arsenals and weapon workshops of Babylon emptied and lined the banks of the Canal of Asklepiades with ballistae and catapults. Antigonos made several attempts at crossing the canal, but those were bloodily repulsed by Karanos’ troops. Perhaps Antigonos would have found a way to dislodge Karanos, but when the news of the defeat at Hekatompylos reached him he decided to retreat back to Syria, to escape being trapped between the armies of Karanos and Amyntor.
In Syria however the situation was also dire. Demetrios, Antigonos younger brother and his deputy in Syria, had to deal with invasions from north and south. From Anatolia the satrap of Cappadocia, a native nobleman named Arsames, had invaded Cilicia and now launched raids towards Nikatoris (OTL Antioch) and from Egypt the satrap Lagos launched his assault, he quickly occupied the southern Levant and was now poised to strike north. For a moment it must have seemed as if Antigonos’ cause was doomed. Antigonos returned to Nikatoris in April 267, leaving behind his lieutenant Diomedes at Zeugma to prevent Karanos’ forces from crossing the Euphrates, and immediately launched his counterattack. In a whirlwind campaign he drove back Arsames, first his Median cavalry bested Arsames’ Cappadocians at the Syrian Gates and two weeks later at Tarsus Antigonos’ veterans (many of whom served under him in Italy) broke through Arsames’ lines, after which the Cappadocian satrap fled into the city. Not long afterwards Tarsus’ garrison send Arsames head to Antigonos and switched sides. Antigonos however was in no position to pursue a campaign further into Anatolia, because Lagos was now threatening the Phoenician cities, which were all supportive of Antigonos’ cause. Granting his troops no respite Antigonos quickly marched south, surprising Lagos who was encamped near Byblos. Perhaps he had hoped that Arsames would deal with the problem, but with Antigonos and his army now bearing down on his position Lagos chose to retreat.
Antigonos fighting Lagos at Akko
Near Akko however Lagos was overtaken by Antigonos’ army, which was driven forward relentlessly by its ambitious commander. Despite outnumbering his opponent Lagos was not confident of his position, his forces consisted of on one hand inexperienced levies and on the other hand veterans whom he distrusted because many had served under Antigonos. It was augmented by mercenaries from as far afield as Thrace and Arabia. Once again however Antigonos carried the day, Lagos gambled everything on a mass charge of his cavalry on the right flank which was countered by Antigonos himself who commanded a squadron of the hetairoi. Antigonos deliberately sought out Lagos and slew him, after which the battle ended rather quickly. Sensing an opportunity Antigonos quickly marshalled a part of his fleet and sailed for Egypt, at Pelusium he accepted the surrender of its garrison and not long afterwards Antigonos reached Memphis in July 267. Egypt quickly changed sides, it was home to many veterans who served under either Antigonos or his father and for the country’s administration little changed except the recipient of Egypt’s taxes.
However while gaining Egypt Antigonos was at risk of losing Syria. Two inconclusive battles, one near Edessa and another near Zeugma, were fought between Diomedes and Amyntor. Antigonos once again rushed north, but in September 267 Diomedes was swept of the field by Amyntor not far from Nikatoris. Amyntor entered Antigonos’ erstwhile capital in triumph and celebrated his victory in Antigonos’ lavishly decorated palace. Three weeks later the two faced off against each other at the plains near Emesa. Both sides deployed around 50000 troops, Antigonos led his hetairoi forward and managed to best Amyntor’s Persian cavalry but when he reformed his cavalry to strike Amyntor’s rear positions he was confronted by war elephants who kept his cavalry at bay. In the meantime the Argyraspidai bested Antigonos’ veterans and drove them back. Antigonos did manage to return to his lines in the end and managed a retreat, but his army was badly mauled. He fell back on the cities of Phoenicia , from where he ferried most of his army to Egypt, which was to function as his new base of operations. Antigonos had suffered a grievous blow, but he was certainly not about to give up.
Amyntor quickly regained most of the Levant, entering Damascus in October 267 and Jerusalem a month later. He negotiated with the Nabataeans for their support for a campaign in Egypt, and with their support he crossed the Sinai in December 267 but he was bogged down at Pelusium, which once again performed its role as bulwark of Egypt against Asian invaders. An outbreak of disease forced his retreat in March 266, after which Amyntor returned to Asia to oversee the siege of Tyre. Using his large fleet, constructed for Philip III’s envisioned campaign against Carthage, Antigonos supplied and supported various coastal strongholds in Phoenicia and Syria, making sure to keep pressure on Amyntor. A campaign was also launched against Cyprus, where the vassal king of Cypriot Salamis chose the side of Antigonos and was duly rewarded with 5000 troops to subjugate the rest of the island. Antigonos thus changed his strategy, now he would use his naval forces to strike at his enemies.
In Egypt he regrouped his forces, hiring mercenaries and recalling veterans. His warchest was depleted, but his men’s loyalty to him was still high. Of course he also employed many mercenaries, to whom personal loyalty often meant nothing, and in order to pay them Antigonos heightened taxes and confiscated gold and silver from temples. He also send Diomedes upstream, to gather gold, silver and other valuables in Upper Egypt and perhaps launch a campaign against Kush to gain that land’s famed goldmines. In the meantime Antigonos embarked upon his most ambitious venture in April 266, taking 200 ships he sailed first to Rhodes, which quickly chose his side, and afterwards he sailed into the Aegean. Halikarnassos fell to a quick naval assault, Ephesos evicted its pro-Karanos garrison after a short blockade and near Naxos a fleet send by the Macedonian regent Patroklos was defeated decisively. In August 266 Antigonos landed at Piraios with his army, and there he declared that the Greek cities would be autonomous and ungarrisoned, hoping to win them over to his side.
Footnotes
- That might not sound much like an insult, but treasurers in this era were often eunuchs.
- More on that in the next update.
