As we have discussed here a few times, President Wilson in November 1916 contemplated--in the event of what seemed a likely Hughes victory--appointing Hughes as Secretary of State, then resigning and persuading Vice President Marshall also to resign, thereby making Hughes President immediately instead of having to wait until March. Wilson conceded that this would not be necessary in ordinary times; but the emergency created by the World War had made it essential to avoid any prolonged "lame duck" rule.
Question: What if Herbert Hoover (with the agreement of Vice President Charles Curtis--and of course FDR) attempted the same thing in November 1932, avoiding the awful OTL interregnum of the winter of 1932-3? (The idea was mentioned in some newspapers the day after the election, but Hoover seems never to have seriously considered it.) One could argue that the US was in a much worse state of emergency in 1932-3 than it was in 1916-17: the already depressed economy was spiraling further downward, and by the end of the Hoover administration, bank after bank was closing. (Things were not all that quiet on the world scene during these months, either: Japan walked out of the League of Nations Assembly, and was invading Jehol; and in Germany, Adolf Hitler was appointed Chancellor...)
Hoover argued that the Depression had hit bottom and was stabilizing until the election of FDR created new uncertainties. On February 17, he wrote FDR that there was now a "state of alarm which is rapidly approaching the dimensions of a crisis." To restore confidence, the public needed certain assurances that only FDR could give: "It would steady the country greatly if there could be prompt assurance that there will be no tampering or inflation of the currency; that the budget will be unquestionably balanced, even if further taxation is necessary; that the government credit will be maintained by refusal to exhaust it in the issue of securities." Not surprisingly, FDR was willing neither to accept the idea that he was to blame for worsening the Depression nor to allow Hoover to limit FDR's policy options so drastically. Indeed, a few days later, Hoover acknowledged in a letter to Pennsylvania's Republican Senator David A. Reed:
"I realize that if these declarations be made by the President-elect, he will have ratified the whole major program of the Republican Administration; that is, it means the abandonment of 90% of the so-called new deal. But unless this is done, they run a grave danger of precipitating a complete financial debacle. If it is precipitated, the responsibility lies squarely with them for they have had ample warning--unless, of course, such a debacle is part of the 'new deal.'"
The problem was not so much that FDR rejected Hoover's proposal--if issuing statements designed to "restore confidence" could cure depressions, Hoover would have conquered the Great Depression years earlier--as that he seemed to have no concrete proposals of his own for dealing with the banking crisis at that time; and even if he did, he would not yet be in a position to implement them. Meanwhile, Hoover, obsessed with his own political weakness, was unwilling to do anything about the crisis unless he was sure that Congress and the new administration would not repudiate it. (Hoover considered a national bank holiday proclamation unnecessary and possibly illegal, but was willing to issue a proclamation limiting bank withdrawals, foreign exchange, and gold transactions if FDR would agree to support it. Accounts differ as to whether FDR told Hoover he was sympathetic to Hoover's doing this, but it does seem clear that he was unwilling to back it formally.) Maybe in November, Hoover could not foresee how bad the situation would be by March, but he should at least have been able to see that it was already bad enough to make prolonged lame-duck rule a very bad thing indeed, and something which should be avoided even by unorthodox means, as Wilson was ready to do in 1916.
A difficulty here: "Roosevelt was in no position to accept the Presidency immediately even if Hoover had offered it. His position as governor of New York ran through December 31, and he had made no arrangements for early resignation." Laurin L. Henry, *Presidential Transitions* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution 1960), p. 275. https://archive.org/stream/presidentialtran030967mbp#page/n295/mode/2up/ (Incidentally, all of my quotes in this post are from that book.) But I don't see why Lieutenant Governor Herbert Lehman (who had just won a landslide victory in the Governor's race) couldn't assume the Governorship a few weeks early. Of course it is true that FDR couldn't make all his appointments immediately, but he could have made them sooner than he did. And anyway, even for FDR to become President on January 1, 1933 would cut the interregnum substantially.
One thought: Does an earlier FDR presidency save Anton Cermak's life?...
Question: What if Herbert Hoover (with the agreement of Vice President Charles Curtis--and of course FDR) attempted the same thing in November 1932, avoiding the awful OTL interregnum of the winter of 1932-3? (The idea was mentioned in some newspapers the day after the election, but Hoover seems never to have seriously considered it.) One could argue that the US was in a much worse state of emergency in 1932-3 than it was in 1916-17: the already depressed economy was spiraling further downward, and by the end of the Hoover administration, bank after bank was closing. (Things were not all that quiet on the world scene during these months, either: Japan walked out of the League of Nations Assembly, and was invading Jehol; and in Germany, Adolf Hitler was appointed Chancellor...)
Hoover argued that the Depression had hit bottom and was stabilizing until the election of FDR created new uncertainties. On February 17, he wrote FDR that there was now a "state of alarm which is rapidly approaching the dimensions of a crisis." To restore confidence, the public needed certain assurances that only FDR could give: "It would steady the country greatly if there could be prompt assurance that there will be no tampering or inflation of the currency; that the budget will be unquestionably balanced, even if further taxation is necessary; that the government credit will be maintained by refusal to exhaust it in the issue of securities." Not surprisingly, FDR was willing neither to accept the idea that he was to blame for worsening the Depression nor to allow Hoover to limit FDR's policy options so drastically. Indeed, a few days later, Hoover acknowledged in a letter to Pennsylvania's Republican Senator David A. Reed:
"I realize that if these declarations be made by the President-elect, he will have ratified the whole major program of the Republican Administration; that is, it means the abandonment of 90% of the so-called new deal. But unless this is done, they run a grave danger of precipitating a complete financial debacle. If it is precipitated, the responsibility lies squarely with them for they have had ample warning--unless, of course, such a debacle is part of the 'new deal.'"
The problem was not so much that FDR rejected Hoover's proposal--if issuing statements designed to "restore confidence" could cure depressions, Hoover would have conquered the Great Depression years earlier--as that he seemed to have no concrete proposals of his own for dealing with the banking crisis at that time; and even if he did, he would not yet be in a position to implement them. Meanwhile, Hoover, obsessed with his own political weakness, was unwilling to do anything about the crisis unless he was sure that Congress and the new administration would not repudiate it. (Hoover considered a national bank holiday proclamation unnecessary and possibly illegal, but was willing to issue a proclamation limiting bank withdrawals, foreign exchange, and gold transactions if FDR would agree to support it. Accounts differ as to whether FDR told Hoover he was sympathetic to Hoover's doing this, but it does seem clear that he was unwilling to back it formally.) Maybe in November, Hoover could not foresee how bad the situation would be by March, but he should at least have been able to see that it was already bad enough to make prolonged lame-duck rule a very bad thing indeed, and something which should be avoided even by unorthodox means, as Wilson was ready to do in 1916.
A difficulty here: "Roosevelt was in no position to accept the Presidency immediately even if Hoover had offered it. His position as governor of New York ran through December 31, and he had made no arrangements for early resignation." Laurin L. Henry, *Presidential Transitions* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution 1960), p. 275. https://archive.org/stream/presidentialtran030967mbp#page/n295/mode/2up/ (Incidentally, all of my quotes in this post are from that book.) But I don't see why Lieutenant Governor Herbert Lehman (who had just won a landslide victory in the Governor's race) couldn't assume the Governorship a few weeks early. Of course it is true that FDR couldn't make all his appointments immediately, but he could have made them sooner than he did. And anyway, even for FDR to become President on January 1, 1933 would cut the interregnum substantially.
One thought: Does an earlier FDR presidency save Anton Cermak's life?...
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