Excerpt from
General Thomas Posey: Son of the American Revolution, written by John Thornton Posey (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1992).[1]
Lieutenant General Sir Henry Clinton was frustrated by shortages in manpower in his northern campaign against the Continental Army. He had devised a new strategy to quell American rebellion, following General John Burgoyne’s surrender after the Battle of Saratoga in October 1777 and France’s subsequent entry into the war on the side of the Americans. Clinton hoped to launch a campaign against the Continental Army’s camp in Middlebrook, New Jersey. In this way, Clinton sought to force General George Washington to defend the camp and thus draw him out of New York, enabling British forces to secure the city.
In late May 1779, Clinton launched his strategy, leading 8,000 men to Stony Point, New York. The British understood that this location represented an area of vital importance, since it controlled access to the Hudson Highlands and the portion of the Hudson River beyond. Clinton’s opening move was to assault this location. Only 40 American soldiers defended Stony Point. Seeing the overwhelming might of the British, they retreated without a fight.
Washington immediately began planning a counterattack. Under the cover of darkness, Washington ordered an assault on British fortifications at Stony Point. The Corps of Light Infantry, under the command of General Anthony Wayne, would approach Stony Point along the coast of the Hudson River, scale the point’s steep rocky sides, and attack the British with unloaded but bayonetted muskets. Washington went over the daunting task with Wayne, giving him the power to alter the plan as necessary. When asked if he was prepared to accept the challenge, “Mad Anthony” replied, characteristically: “General, if you give me permission, I’ll storm Hell itself for you.” A few nights later, it is not hard to imagine that the men of the Light Infantry must have felt that Washington had indeed ordered them to mount that ultimate infernal charge as they sloshed with unloaded muskets through the marshes toward the British army bearing down on them from the pinnacle of Stony Point, looming high above them in the midnight darkness of July 17, 1779.…
The 1st Regiment of the Corps of Light Infantry, under command of Colonel Christian Febiger would be the first in the battle order, and so Wayne called upon it for volunteers to act as a vanguard of shock troops to lead the assault. Major Thomas Posey stepped forward with 150 of his men. Most of the Corps felt that they would not survive this assault, Wayne included. However, it is unknown what Posey’s thoughts leading into this desperate skirmish were. Possibly, as a recent and still-grieving widower, with his two sons much too young to grasp the significance of gravity of the moment, he kept his deepest thoughts to himself. But he must have felt fear, the fear known by every man who has ever faced mortal combat.
At the agreed signal, the two assault columns moved out, slogging through the marsh as planned, enjoying the element of surprise until it neared the British Army’s outer picket line. There, the startled British sentries hastily fired a few warning shots before retreating up the hill into the fort. The lower abatis of the British defenses had only been partially dismantled when Posey arrived with his volunteer vanguard. As the British raised the sounds of alarm throughout their encampment, Posey seized an axe from an exhausted solder and hacked away furiously at the remaining logs impeding passage. The abatis destroyed, Posey and his men began the treacherous midnight climb up Stony Point.
The British forces quickly mobilized, standing shoulder-to-shoulder with loaded guns along the parapets and launching grapeshot volleys down on the ascending American troops. Posey and other advance troop leaders, despite the desperate situation, shouted encouragement at their men, urging them forward. At around this time, a diversionary segment of the Corps, led by Major Hardy Murfree, began firing on the British forces at the causeway entrance to Stony Point. This was the only portion of the Corps carrying loaded weapons to the assault. The British fully expected that, if the Americans were to attempt to recapture Stony Point, an attack at the causeway entrance was the best bet. British Lieutenant Colonel Henry Johnson, despite the presence of troops desperately climbing the point, still believed that Murfree’s attack on the causeway represented the main American assault on Stony Point. In response, he pulled six companies of his infantry away from the parapet and down to attack Murfree’s men.
Thanks partially to this ill-conceived strategy on Johnson’s part, the Americans soon breached the parapet. Posey was the sixth man over the wall. As he did so, he shouted, “The fort’s our own!” This was a signal to the main body of the assaulting force that the volunteer vanguard had breached the British encampment. In response, the remaining Corps of Light Infantry quickly brought up their regiments to the summit, where they poured into the fort at a dozen points.
Posey, sword in one hand and a spontoon in the other, drove the closest British defenders away from their gun ports. He then formed a group of his Virginians into a phalanx and led them in a relentless bayonet charge that carried across the entire width of the fort to its north wall. At some point during the vicious hand-to-hand combat, Posey had captured an unnamed British officer, possibly another major. This officer gave Posey a handsome pair of silver-mounted, ivory-handled pistols, prize spoils of war that he cherished throughout his life and which he named “the Stony Point pistols.”
The British were soon outnumbered. Lieutenant Colonel Johnson realized too late that his forces were overrun. He rushed up the summit to launch a last-ditch effort to prevent the British encampment from falling into enemy hands. However, when he reached the summit, he found the encampment firmly in American hands. He promptly surrendered to Colonel Febiger, and the remaining British threw down their arms.
All told, the casualties were rather small on both sides. Only 15 Americans were killed, and 82 were wounded. Posey, for his part, came away from the battle unscathed.[2] On the other side, 20 British soldiers perished, and 74 were wounded. However, the British lost a majority of their forces to imprisonment. Fully 546 men (including the 74 wounded) were captured; an additional 58 soldiers went missing. As such, only 146 British soldiers were able to fight in subsequent battles. Clinton’s plan was defeated before it started.
Excerpt from
Pioneer History of Indiana, written by William Monroe Cockrum (Oakland City, Indiana: Press of Oakland City Journal, 1907)[3]
In February, 1813, President James Madison appointed Thomas Posey Governor of the Indiana Territory. Posey had just finished four months as a Senator from Louisiana. Governor William CC Claiborne had appointed Posey, who had moved to the state from Kentucky in 1810, to take over the office left vacant by the resignation of Jean Noel Destréhan. Posey ran for a term in his own right a month after his appointment, but was soundly defeated in his reelection campaign by James Brown. President Madison, a fellow Virginian, took pity on Posey and appointed him governor of the Indiana Territory.
Posey took over from his predecessor, William Henry Harrison, at a perilous time for the territory. Harrison had left office to fight hostile Indians in the territory’s unsettled north. Indiana’s territorial legislature never took much of a liking to Harrison. Most of the representatives were anti-slavery and thus constantly clashed with Harrison, who wanted to formally expand slavery into the territory. The legislature hoped to receive a governor from the northern United States, one who was fully opposed to slavery and whose values aligned more with those of the territory. Posey was not the man the territorial legislature had desired. However, Posey was far more committed to working in the best interests of the territory than Harrison. Instead of rejecting the relocation of the capital to Corydon, Posey more-or-less tolerated it. While he was incredibly disappointed at the size of the capital city and capitol buildings, Posey worked closely with the legislature to improve it for future political discourse.[4]
Despite this relative amicability, Posey was still opposed to one of the General Assembly’s main goals: statehood. As a result of the War of 1812, the Assembly felt that the federal government had done little for the protection of the territory. General Harrison’s battles against the Indians had convinced the Assembly that they could be responsible for the state’s defense. Ignoring the Assembly’s desires, Posey consistently fought against statehood, claiming that the territory’s population was far too sparse to bear the taxation which the loss of territorial status would bring. He instead recommended the territory continue for a few years and continue to grow through the receipt of federal financial assistance.
Nevertheless, the Indiana General Assembly pressed for statehood. Territorial delegate Jonathan Jennings, elected on November 27, 1809, had introduced such a petition to the US House of Representatives on January 1, 1812. However, this was quickly rejected since the Indiana Territory had only a third of the population required for statehood. He resubmitted the petition on February 1, 1815, but, despite the fact that the state exceeded the population requirement of 60,000 people, Jennings’ petition was ignored. Finally, on January 5, 1816, Congress agreed to form a select committee to address the question of Indiana statehood. After months of work, the Enabling Act of Indiana was signed by President Madison on April 19, 1816.[5]
The election of delegates to a constitutional convention, held in Corydon took place on May 13. In total, 43 delegates were elected.[6] Below is a map of the counties in the Indiana Territory at this time, highlighting how many delegates each county sent to the convention. The star represents the location of Corydon.
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[1] This is an actual book IOTL, which I used to research this section. I have paraphrased most of this section, but there are the occasional passages with direct quotes from the author.
[2] This is the timeline's POD. Yes, the timeline's purpose is to explore what would happen if Corydon remained the capital of Indiana. However, Posey emerging from the Battle of Stony Point unscathed is the POD we need to achieve that.
[3] Another OTL book, which I used extensively for research here. It is incredibly detailed, so I have paraphrased the necessary information.
[4] This is the first butterfly we see from the POD of Posey remaining uninjured during the Battle of Stony Point. IOTL, Posey suffered a minor leg wound. While it did not impair his ability to fight, it did cause him chronic illness later in life. When Posey was appointed governor of the Indiana Territory (under the same circumstances as described in this excerpt), he hated Corydon due to its small size and since it was too far away from medical doctors in Louisville, Kentucky. As such, Posey made his residence in Jeffersonville, communing with the Indiana Territory's General Assembly via courier. The Assembly felt that Posey was snubbing them and not at all invested in the future of the territory. Removing Posey's wound butterflies away his illness, and eliminates the need for him to reside in Jeffersonville. This brings Posey into closer communion with the Assembly and helps to firmly establish Corydon as the seat of territorial government.
[5] TTL's Enabling Act is mostly identical to OTL's. You can read OTL's Enabling Act here, courtesy of the Indiana State Library:
https://www.in.gov/history/2458.htm . However, there is one significant area where both TL's Enabling Acts differ, and that is with the Fifth Proposition, mandated by Section Six of the Act. IOTL, the Fifth Proposition grants the new state of Indiana four sections of the state's choosing of federal land, then under control of Native American tribes, on which to locate a state capital. ITTL, however, there is no Fifth Proposition. Despite grumblings from northern Indiana settlements, the General Assembly did not feel there was an immediate need to relocate the capital from Corydon. As such, Jonathan Jennings made no push for such a proposition. TTL's version of the Enabling Act thus includes no Fifth Proposition. While there will certainly be debates ITTL about whether or not the capital should remain at Corydon, those debates were not solved with the Enabling Act.
[6] Despite being formed prior to the election of delegates to the Corydon Constitutional Convention, neither Jackson nor Orange Counties were able to organize fast enough to send delegates.
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It seems as if nothing of much consequence happens in this update. Or, at least, nothing of consequence occurs differently than IOTL. However, this update lays an important foundation for TTL's future. The next update, we will finally see TTL diverge in a significant way (at least on a local level).