Hochseeflotte actually used - German victory?

No, this is not an über-Scagerrack -scenario... :)

By early 1915 it was clear that the war would be a drawn out effort and Hochseeflotte would remain significantly less powerful than combined Allied navies. As a result, the German Navy started the unrestricted U-boat campaign in the West.

But let's turn our attention towards East. In the Baltic, where Hochseeflotte could be deployed at ease, the German Navy was clearly superior to Imperial Russian Navy which had sensibly deployed itself to a kind of naval trench warfare behind coastal fortifications and extensive minefields.

Nevertheless, neither coastal fortifications or extensive minefields were impregnable. An amphibious campaign to wrestle control of Gulf of Riga and Åland isles in order to continue with additional operations towards Estonia and Finland, respectively, does not seem to be that inconceivable (and was naturally done against demoralized opposition in 1917-1918). An ASB dream case would naturally be the rush of Grand Fleet for rescue...

Thoughts?
 
IOTL - because the HSF was always kept on high readiness in the German Bight, the German Navy was vastly inferior to the Russian Navy - but nevertheless managed to keep the (not very aggressive) Russians at bay.
However, conditions in the Baltic did not favour the use of the big HSF ships, especially in the Gulf of Riga. (In 1917, they had to remain west and north of the islands.) And the waters all were heavily mined by both sides (losses from mines were rather frequent).

So, if the HSF deploys in force, they might lose one ship running ashore (like SMS Rheinland in 1918) and get two or three others heavily damaged by mines. One more might fall victim to British or Russian submarines. - For what gain? The Russians would stay in hiding, behind mines and coastal guns. No big sea battle to be had.
 
Mines can be cleared but it takes time and effort and the layer of the minefield can readily defend it against clearence if the clearing force isnt strong enough. The HSF was strong enough to clear mines in order to access seas that it needed to operate in. The HSF could have worked it's way into the Baltic along side the Army and been a valuable assistant in the campaigns in the area. but of course that would require inter-service cooperation and that wasn't about to happen.
 
There were some occassions when the army requested artillery support by the navy. But in most cases this either proved unnecessary when the ships arrived or led to the shelling of own troops, because the enemy had already retreated.
The navy also sent ashore landing parties, which also accomplished very little.

It's hard to see what a full presence of the HSF could/should have accomplished.

Mine fields were cleared constantly, and in the next night laid again by the enemy. There also was a constant danger of stray mines.
 
Minefields don't get re-laid nightly when the enemy has command of the sea. The HSF was strong enough to be able to stop the systematic mining of areas under it's control, this of the situation in reverse in the English Channel where the RN sustained pressure constantly so the in the end it dominated the sea and shore batteries in German held Belgium. The difference of course is that German armies were capturing the coastline as well, so once the sea and land had been secured the enemy could only undertake sea denail efforts.
 
Partially agree, it could have been enforced - in the deep central waters of the Baltic. - But mines were also laid by submarines. And night fighting abilities were rather reduced on both sides.
 
The Hochsee Flotte was not able to defeat the Britsh Royal Navy outright in reality, but even if it had done so, the result would still have been the same, namely the German Fleet was still locked up in its German ports, as there was nowhere to go, after leaving the Northsea. Germany lacked other bases to supply its fleet and a victory would therefore only be good for morale than anything else. Technically it could not be exploited.
 
The Hochsee Flotte was not able to defeat the Britsh Royal Navy outright in reality, but even if it had done so, the result would still have been the same, namely the German Fleet was still locked up in its German ports, as there was nowhere to go, after leaving the Northsea. Germany lacked other bases to supply its fleet and a victory would therefore only be good for morale than anything else. Technically it could not be exploited.

The OP has nothing to do with engaging the Grand Fleet. Did you even read it???
 
Partially agree, it could have been enforced - in the deep central waters of the Baltic. - But mines were also laid by submarines. And night fighting abilities were rather reduced on both sides.

Subs don't lay many mines, they are more offensive harrasment/nuisance value. Thick, hard-to-penetrate defensive minefields need to be laid by surface ships with large mine-loads as an 'operation'. If a fleet can cover the large scale removal of defensive mines the enemy will have to contest control of the sea-area to re-lay the field.
 
There were some occassions when the army requested artillery support by the navy. But in most cases this either proved unnecessary when the ships arrived or led to the shelling of own troops, because the enemy had already retreated.
The navy also sent ashore landing parties, which also accomplished very little.

It's hard to see what a full presence of the HSF could/should have accomplished.

Mine fields were cleared constantly, and in the next night laid again by the enemy. There also was a constant danger of stray mines.

In 1917 Germans captured Saaremaa and Hiiumaa which command the approach to Gulf of Finland and Gulf of Riga, thus making use of Riga for logistics use possible. In 1918 German command of the sea enabled Finnish Whites to capture Finland.

The latter victories were accomplished against demoralized enemy, but were very significant. I don't see any reason why they could not have been achieved in 1915 season, perhaps with no different losses as Russian Navy was significantly strengthened in 1915-1917, which largely negates the effect for the loss of morale.

As for mining issues, yes, mines were very effective in narrowing the areas of movement and causing losses in the Baltic both in WW I and WW II. But minesweeping was no mystery and a minefield not guarded by naval units causes delays but not inordinate difficulties, as happened in 1917 Operation Albion etc.

As for leaving German North Sea coast and Baltic approaches unguarded, I think a British naval assault on Germany and/or to Baltic would have been a dream scenario for Hochseeflotte playing on all it's strengths against British weaknesses.
 
Partially agree, it could have been enforced - in the deep central waters of the Baltic. - But mines were also laid by submarines. And night fighting abilities were rather reduced on both sides.

Yes, but submarine minefields were laid in smaller quantities. As for night fighting abilities, I'd imagine German navy to be significantly superior to Russian Navy in this area too. Furthermore, as for night fighting qualities the nights are extremely short during summer season in these latitudes (for example, in Stockholm in the beginning of June sunset is at 21.49 and sunrise at 3.42).

And I must press that historically large scale landings were made by Germans in 1917 and 1918.
 
In 1915, the Germans lost seven torpedo boats/destroyers in one night due to sea mines, when they tried to penetrate into the Golf of Finland.
Usually, both sides chancelled their operations, when one of their larger ships was hit by a mine.
Because the Russians never were really active and a threat to shipments from Sweden, there was no point in trying to neutralise them by destroying them. Basically, the Russians, although always superior in number and fire power, neutralised themselves.
 
Because the Russians never were really active and a threat to shipments from Sweden, there was no point in trying to neutralise them by destroying them. Basically, the Russians, although always superior in number and fire power, neutralised themselves.

Yes, German (and Russian) casualties to mines were considerable but were in circumstances in which units were sent to the minefields without proper mine reconnaissance and minesweeping. This was not the case in truly major operations such as Operation Albion and later on with series of landings on Finnish coast.

As for benefits, they're not primarily naval in themselves but in larger scale. An earlier elimination of Russia would bring very great benefits not only to Germany but to Austro-Hungary as well. This would be achievable or at least easened by proper use of seapower, in essence by opening an another front in Finland and approaching the Russian capital directly. An invading army could well be transported and supplied via harbors in Southern and Western Finland. As I've written, this was done in OTL in 1917-1918. As the HSF did not historically accomplish that much in 1915 summer season, what would be better use for it?

As for Russia, Imperial Russian Navy definitely was not up to German Navy neither in quantity or in quality as German Navy could easily reinforce itself via Kiel canal.
 
That I have to concede. - Better than doing nothing at Wilhelmshaven (and it was inactivity that brought about the collapse of morale in the HSF), the ships could have been used in the Baltic.
Nevertheless, an invasion of Finland before the Russian Revolution is hardly imaginable. IOTL, the Germans failed already to neutralise the Russian bases on the Aland Isles.
 
Nevertheless, an invasion of Finland before the Russian Revolution is hardly imaginable. IOTL, the Germans failed already to neutralise the Russian bases on the Aland Isles.

Yes, Germans failed in that as they did not try it at all, bar one or two Zeppelin raids. An assault on Finland would demand deployment of a significant fraction of Hochseeflotte and above all, major part of it's support elements. Naturally an assault on Finland could well be aided by Finnish insurgency.
 
There were also two early ship sorties to the Alands, where the Germans found that their maps were faulty, and after losing two vessels in the process they didn't go for it again until 1917.
 
There were also two early ship sorties to the Alands, where the Germans found that their maps were faulty, and after losing two vessels in the process they didn't go for it again until 1917.

Reconnaissance sorties by reconnaissance force is different from an invasion. As for nautical charts, even the RN in 1854 was able to compile sufficients charts on the go (and actually enjoyed hydrographic superiority over Russian Navy), additionally pilots would be available for a charge.
 
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