HMS Hermes to Australia?

I don't know if a rebuild could be undertaken to lower manning costs. However the Type 984 3D radar and ADWAS might be too much for the RANs requirements and incompatible with the rest of the RAN so it might be removed in the RAN refit, which should free up some crew requirement.

The Melbourne with her Sea Venom/Gannet/Wessex CAG escorted HMAS Sydney on her 1st, 3rd and 4th trooping voyages to Vietnam but stayed outside the Market Time area. She was also offered by the RAN in March 66 as an ASW asset on Yankee station and the USN requested her in April 67 as an ASW asset.

In my mind the Melbourne could have escorted Sydney on her 3rd trooping trip in April-May 1966, stayed on for a war cruise doing Market Time, ASW and possibly CAS for 1ATF, escorted Sydney in the AO again in June 1966 and left with her on about the 8th of June. There are several instances of this sort of bursts of activity by the Sydney that the Melbourne could have covered, like the combined 5th and 6th voyage where Sydney went to Singapore to change battalions rather than Australia in April-May 1967.

Of course this would be far easier to arrange if the RAN hadn't been hamstrung by the 1959 decision to make Melbourne an ASW Helo carrier and instead bought Skyhawks and Trackers at that stage.

Sounds quite plausible that MELBOURNE would be temporarily assigned to Market Time & be available for CAS duties in support of 1 ATF. The problem lays with gaining sufficient recognition / publicity of the FAA and its fixed wing element to purchase HMS HERMES. Now this may very well occur earlier with a hotter Konfrontasi resulting in one or two air to air engagements against TNI forces.

Perhaps MELBOURNE's air group shoots down another MIG or destroys several torpedo boats attempting to attack USN destroyers...

Is this for your bigger & more independent ADF TL?
 
Sounds quite plausible that MELBOURNE would be temporarily assigned to Market Time & be available for CAS duties in support of 1 ATF. The problem lays with gaining sufficient recognition / publicity of the FAA and its fixed wing element to purchase HMS HERMES. Now this may very well occur earlier with a hotter Konfrontasi resulting in one or two air to air engagements against TNI forces.

Perhaps MELBOURNE's air group shoots down another MIG or destroys several torpedo boats attempting to attack USN destroyers...

Is this for your bigger & more independent ADF TL?

I don't think anything that drastic is required, just simple work in support of both national and alliance ends. If the Melbourne is credited with the stopping of a smuggling boat on her first escort mission then I think it would lead to more work in Vietnamese waters and acceptance of the role of a carrier, which could lead to an enhanced role in later escort missions, acceptance of the 1967 USN request and acceptance of the Hermes offer in 1968 to better fulfil the tasks required of the RAN carrier.

I have been giving my vague idea for an Australian TL some thought lately, but don't expect fleets of ships and aircraft and divisions of troops tearing up South East Asia. The idea is to explore a bureaucratic decision change leading to significant butterflies.
 
Err... Doing a quick Google, it would seem that the PA58 was the code for the Verdun, which was to be 45kt, not 35 kt. Note, too, that the project was cancelled as being prohibitively expensive by the French - who have a much higher tolerance for expensive war machines than most countries.

I don't doubt that the Brits had lots of paper studies, but there is a definite advantage to going with something that actually exists, rather than what might, possibly eventually, exist (with overruns and new design flaws).

Again, while the US might have studied alternate carriers in an interesting range, they never actually built any, and the Aussies would have been stuck without any at all, if they tried buying one. (I also tried Googling SCB.100 and didn't come up with anything interesting.)

Was Verdun's displacement on the website standard or full-load. IIRC it was cancelled in the French equivalent of the 1957 Defence Review in which nearly every aircraft project was cancelled or cut back. Only the Mirage III escaped unscathed. As that was in the late 1950s I presume that the reason for the cuts was the cost of the war in Algeria.

I take your point about buying something that exists against the risk of buying something new. However, the Spanish did buy the SCS.
 
Its interesting how any talk of any country getting a carrier and people lose their shit and start suggesting schemes that are totally out of character for the country in question. Australia got carriers because when they were the new big thing there were some available on the cheap from Britain. I can imagine Australia picking up a slightly larger carrier than Melbourne on the cheap, but a new build PA58 or used Essex or whatever is in no way in keeping with Australia's military behaviour in the Cold War era.
 
Its interesting how any talk of any country getting a carrier and people lose their shit and start suggesting schemes that are totally out of character for the country in question. Australia got carriers because when they were the new big thing there were some available on the cheap from Britain. I can imagine Australia picking up a slightly larger carrier than Melbourne on the cheap, but a new build PA58 or used Essex or whatever is in no way in keeping with Australia's military behaviour in the Cold War era.

That said and in agreement with, but I'm sure I read somewhere that during the '60's the Australians showed an interest in the CVA-01 design indicating that they had possibly had far greater ideas and thus may have considered a different policy.
 
That said and in agreement with, but I'm sure I read somewhere that during the '60's the Australians showed an interest in the CVA-01 design indicating that they had possibly had far greater ideas and thus may have considered a different policy.

It depends on what you mean by 'Australia'. I have no doubt that the RAN explored options other than its then current force structure, including big carriers with more powerful aircraft, these ideas may even have had the support of the Navy Minister and the Department of the Navy. However I doubt the 2 other service Ministers and Departments and the Defence Minister and Department was behind these ideas, nor was the Cabinet.

In the 60s there was a Ministry, a Department and a Board for all 3 services as well as a Department and Minister of Defence. In addition there was a Chiefs of Staff Committee with a separate chairman that was only superior in rank to the 3 service chiefs in 1965 and 1968-70, and none of these were Admirals. So while the RAN may have had big ideas so did all the other services and in the tangled web of Defence its not surprising that ideas such as Vulcan bombers and CVA01 carriers didn't get up.
 

Pangur

Donor
With a tangled web like that I am vaguely surprised that anything got up. As BTW when they cut that structure to what we have today.
 
My impression is that the major constraint on the size of the RAN from the 1950s to at least the 1970s was Australia's small population. That is the RAN could not recruit enough sailors, not just to man the ship, but also the second-line units like the expanded training organisation needed to support it.

For example the plan to upgrade Sydney to the same standard as Melbourne was abandoned in 1956 because the RAN could not recruit enough sailors, not because it could not afford to pay them.

Since 1950 (I think) the plan had been for a fleet of 2 aircraft carriers, 3 cruisers, 9 destroyers, 11 fast frigates, 14 slow frigates, 32 minesweepers and 45 other vessels. Hopefully that adds up to 116 vessels as there was to be a striking force of 36 ships and a reserve of 80.

The 9 destroyers were 4 Darings, 2 Battles and 3 modernised Tribals. The 11 fast frigates were 6 Type 12s and 5 R class destroyers rebuilt as Type 15 frigates. The 14 slow frigates were the 12 Australian built Loch/Bay class and the 2 Australian built Grimsby class sloops. The minesweepers were originally 32 war built Bathurst class, but it was later amended to 28 Bathurst and 4 Ton class.

However, one Daring, two Type 12s and some of the destroyer modernisations were cancelled in 1956. As far as I can tell, that wasn't because of the cost, but because there weren't enough sailors. Though some of the destroyer modernisations were cancelled due to earlier than expected obsolescence and the ships were becoming too old for it to be cost effective.

IIRC the book blamed the personnel shortages on the introduction of National Service to keep the CMF up to strength. It said that the money would have been better spent to recruit more regulars by improving their pay and conditions.
 
With a tangled web like that I am vaguely surprised that anything got up. As BTW when they cut that structure to what we have today.

Morshead recommended it in his 1957 report on the subject but Menzies didn't do it, it was done during Gough's government 73-75.

The PoD of my on again, off again TL will be the acceptance of the Morshead report merging 6 departments into 2 in 1958.
 
My impression is that the major constraint on the size of the RAN from the 1950s to at least the 1970s was Australia's small population. That is the RAN could not recruit enough sailors, not just to man the ship, but also the second-line units like the expanded training organisation needed to support it.

For example the plan to upgrade Sydney to the same standard as Melbourne was abandoned in 1956 because the RAN could not recruit enough sailors, not because it could not afford to pay them.

Since 1950 (I think) the plan had been for a fleet of 2 aircraft carriers, 3 cruisers, 9 destroyers, 11 fast frigates, 14 slow frigates, 32 minesweepers and 45 other vessels. Hopefully that adds up to 116 vessels as there was to be a striking force of 36 ships and a reserve of 80.

The 9 destroyers were 4 Darings, 2 Battles and 3 modernised Tribals. The 11 fast frigates were 6 Type 12s and 5 R class destroyers rebuilt as Type 15 frigates. The 14 slow frigates were the 12 Australian built Loch/Bay class and the 2 Australian built Grimsby class sloops. The minesweepers were originally 32 war built Bathurst class, but it was later amended to 28 Bathurst and 4 Ton class.

However, one Daring, two Type 12s and some of the destroyer modernisations were cancelled in 1956. As far as I can tell, that wasn't because of the cost, but because there weren't enough sailors. Though some of the destroyer modernisations were cancelled due to earlier than expected obsolescence and the ships were becoming too old for it to be cost effective.

IIRC the book blamed the personnel shortages on the introduction of National Service to keep the CMF up to strength. It said that the money would have been better spent to recruit more regulars by improving their pay and conditions.

In the 50s Australia's strategy was to send a 3rd AIF to the Mid East to fight WW3, which is why we had the nasho training huge numbers of recruits for 3 months to provide a base for several divisions. I daresay that the big plans of the RAN were in line with this strategy. This strategy died with the end of the 50s nasho in 1959.
 
In the 50s Australia's strategy was to send a 3rd AIF to the Mid East to fight WW3, which is why we had the nasho training huge numbers of recruits for 3 months to provide a base for several divisions. I daresay that the big plans of the RAN were in line with this strategy. This strategy died with the end of the 50s nasho in 1959.

Is that why 2 RAAF fighter squadrons (and another from the RNZAF) were based at Malta for several years in the 1950s?

Also IIRC the South African Centurion tanks were for an armoured division to be deployed to the Middle East and in the 1950s the RRhAF Vampire squadrons would spend a few months a year at Aden.
 
Is that why 2 RAAF fighter squadrons (and another from the RNZAF) were based at Malta for several years in the 1950s?

Also IIRC the South African Centurion tanks were for an armoured division to be deployed to the Middle East and in the 1950s the RRhAF Vampire squadrons would spend a few months a year at Aden.

Exactly.

We ended up with about 140 Centurions, but the 1st Armoured Regiment often only had 2 sabre squadrons active. The rest were to form up a second armoured regiment for 2nd division upon mobilisation.
 
In the 50s Australia's strategy was to send a 3rd AIF to the Mid East to fight WW3, which is why we had the nasho training huge numbers of recruits for 3 months to provide a base for several divisions. I daresay that the big plans of the RAN were in line with this strategy. This strategy died with the end of the 50s nasho in 1959.

Interesting... I do know that the RAN was at the time responsible for the SLOCs in the Indian Ocean ('an enormous task'), which would tie in with the 3rd AIF fighting in the Middle East.
 
In the 50s Australia's strategy was to send a 3rd AIF to the Mid East to fight WW3, which is why we had the nasho training huge numbers of recruits for 3 months to provide a base for several divisions. I daresay that the big plans of the RAN were in line with this strategy. This strategy died with the end of the 50s nasho in 1959.

Do you have any information on the composition of the CMF in the 1950s and 1960? That is the number of regiments and battalions, especially the RAAC, RAA and RAE.
 
Do you have any information on the composition of the CMF in the 1950s and 1960? That is the number of regiments and battalions, especially the RAAC, RAA and RAE.

Not really, I think there were about 30 CMF battalions in 1959 and the pentropic experiment ruined them.
 
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