Why risk (for both countries) the possibility of more diplomatic trouble? Chile was used for intel gathering and spec forces preparation. More than that, specially intervention of chilean forces, could escalate things baddly...
HMS EAGLE in the Falklands
- Thread starter flasheart
- Start date
Why risk (for both countries) the possibility of more diplomatic trouble? Chile was used for intel gathering and spec forces preparation. More than that, specially intervention of chilean forces, could escalate things baddly...
Yeah its too dangerous at this point as most of the Argentine army is on the Chilean border, the Falklands was done on a resource shoestring and if Chile strikes all the stuff they aren't using will be turned on Chile. That said you can be sure that they will be sharing intel, providing an escape route for British spec ops forces if needed and enjoying watching their great foe realize just how badly they have fouled up in all of this.
Chile can also be fairly certain its going to be rid of the Argentine Junta after this which will deescalate tensions and the humiliation in the Falklands should let them extort a few concessions while the Argentine's are down.
Last edited:
Burton K Wheeler
Moderator
Whats going to happen to the Argentinians:
Let's post with a bit more decorum.
@MancFrank
I understand the purpose quite well. Actually, you can't understand the actual increase in takeoff weight "without getting into the maths".
The ski jump does not allow a Sea Harrier to operate "at its maximum all - up weight, that is, the design limitation of the airframe itself". In fact, neither the quote nor the article itself makes that claim. Many other undetailed articles claim it allows the Harrier to take off with a "full load of fuel and ammunition" which is false (a claim Farley does not make).
Declassified flight manuals are available. Have a look and run some numbers. You can get the on station times from official reports as well.
Farley probably didn't pull the 30% lift deficit out of thin air, that is a workable number determined by "maths" and testing. Practical limits to ramp angle, etc. What he is saying in a simplified fashion is that the ramp gives you a roughly 30% boost in effective takeoff distance. This was an “average” number established in testing at distances consistent with a carrier deck. RN and USN get the same numbers.
So, keeping the numbers simple a 500' STO run with a ramp is roughly equivalent to a 650' run without the ramp. This is well short of the 1,400' STO run needed to launch the aircraft at a 31,000lb gross weight. Physics is a bitch. The aircraft has a computer that runs the calculations but one can’t escape the math.
Publications are available which cover the helicopter lift requirements for SBL. Numerous studies have been conducted. 4 x CH-53 and 12 x CH-46 creates logistic versus operations lift conflict when attempting SBL for a USMC battalion. Ponder that versus two Brigades. Not enough aircraft were available before Atlantic Conveyor was lost to meet both logistic and operational needs. There are several detailed accounts of the logistical difficulties encountered. Not losing AC will help, but the available was insufficient for SBL before she was lost. I stand by my point of adding every additional helicopter that is possible. Each one makes the situation on the ground better.
I was incorrect about the lack of tanker capability. If I understand your air defense premise it is that 14 Buccaneers will preemptively eliminate the threat by striking Argentine air bases. That’s an approach. I would still go for More Phantoms than Buccaneers.
I understand the purpose quite well. Actually, you can't understand the actual increase in takeoff weight "without getting into the maths".
The ski jump does not allow a Sea Harrier to operate "at its maximum all - up weight, that is, the design limitation of the airframe itself". In fact, neither the quote nor the article itself makes that claim. Many other undetailed articles claim it allows the Harrier to take off with a "full load of fuel and ammunition" which is false (a claim Farley does not make).
Declassified flight manuals are available. Have a look and run some numbers. You can get the on station times from official reports as well.
Farley probably didn't pull the 30% lift deficit out of thin air, that is a workable number determined by "maths" and testing. Practical limits to ramp angle, etc. What he is saying in a simplified fashion is that the ramp gives you a roughly 30% boost in effective takeoff distance. This was an “average” number established in testing at distances consistent with a carrier deck. RN and USN get the same numbers.
So, keeping the numbers simple a 500' STO run with a ramp is roughly equivalent to a 650' run without the ramp. This is well short of the 1,400' STO run needed to launch the aircraft at a 31,000lb gross weight. Physics is a bitch. The aircraft has a computer that runs the calculations but one can’t escape the math.
Publications are available which cover the helicopter lift requirements for SBL. Numerous studies have been conducted. 4 x CH-53 and 12 x CH-46 creates logistic versus operations lift conflict when attempting SBL for a USMC battalion. Ponder that versus two Brigades. Not enough aircraft were available before Atlantic Conveyor was lost to meet both logistic and operational needs. There are several detailed accounts of the logistical difficulties encountered. Not losing AC will help, but the available was insufficient for SBL before she was lost. I stand by my point of adding every additional helicopter that is possible. Each one makes the situation on the ground better.
I was incorrect about the lack of tanker capability. If I understand your air defense premise it is that 14 Buccaneers will preemptively eliminate the threat by striking Argentine air bases. That’s an approach. I would still go for More Phantoms than Buccaneers.
This is the key part, if they had merely expanded on Article 51 a little then it would have headed off any controversy for most people. I say most people as there is a small minority who would criticise the sinking even then more due to their personal dislike of Thatcher or political beliefs than the actual facts.
Can I suggest getting a copy of Adm. Woodward's One Hundred Days. I'm reeling this off from memory, but I recall that he issued an order, from Hermes' satellite uplink to Conqueror, instructing Capt. Wreford-Brown to sink the Belgrano. Adm. Woodward knew full well he did not, as OC Task Force, have authority to issue a change in ROE to the nuclear attack boats such as Conquerer. As he hoped, Adm. Fieldhouse, OC Warrior (Northwood) cut the transmission off the satellite before the downlink on Conqueror could retrieve it. That was the point at which the scrambled egg and those who measured their rank in suit-buttons gathered and the order was made and transmitted to Capt. Wreford-Brown.
"Sink the Belgrano."
"Sink the Belgrano."
Battle of the Falkland Islands Part 1
Port Stanley Airfield, 2nd May, 0400 Local
It was a quieter night than usual. With the expected influx of aircraft tomorrow meaning that it would be a very long day the majority of the base personnel were trying to rest while they still had the chance. In his little trailer the Skyguard radar operator was struggling to keep his eyes open. The other operator had fallen asleep and they had been taking it in turns to sleep and keep watch on the screen. However, after many hours of staring at nothing on the screen boredom and human nature had begun to set in. The fact that despite the bitter cold outside two men in a space that small did make things quite toasty wasn’t helping with his concentration. His eyes beginning to ache he thought he’d indulge himself and shut his eyes just for a few seconds. As often happens with these things a few seconds can often become somewhat longer. Realising this upon opening his eyes a brief moment of panic set in. However, this subsided when he saw that only a few minutes had passes, his comrade was still asleep and no one had discovered them. He then became aware of what he thought was a blip on his screen which lasted mere seconds. His tiredness clouded his judgment and he wasn’t sure if he’d actually seen something or if his mind was playing tricks on him. He wondered if it was worth waking his sleeping comrade or even should he contact the command post. If he was wrong about seeing something would it be worth the dressing down he would surely receive. That moment of indecision marked the end of his life.
The two men received places in the Argentine military cemetery but their graves are empty. There were no bodies found to bury.
The four AS-37 Martel air to surface missiles that opened the attack largely wiped out the airfields air defence systems and paved the way for the next part. The pair of Buccaneer’s callsigns Black 1 and Black 2 had played their part well and began the return trip to HMS EAGLE. Next up was Black 3 and Black 4 who were to a degree guided to their target by the fires from the burning air defence systems. All of the aircraft taking part in the mission had despite the darkness approached the Falklands at as lower altitude as they dared to avoid detection. Once Blacks 1 and 2 had launched their antiradiation missiles the other aircraft had rapidly gained altitude for their approach.
The four Phantoms callsign Reds 1-4 providing fighter cover had climbed almost vertically and then switched on their radars in the hopes of finding any target to engage. More than one of the Phantom crews felt a slight pang of disappointment when the radars showed no contacts other than the Buccaneer’s. The intelligence assessment that the Argentines not having much of a night flying capability had proved accurate.
Blacks 3 and 4 between them carried 32 1000lb bombs and in the course of a bombing run over the runway lasting mere seconds certainly made an impact in the most literal sense of the word. Finally, behind them came Black 5 and Black 6 carrying Matra rocket pods for a total of 144 SNEB 68mm rockets. These were launched against the aircraft, equipment, buildings and other “soft” targets located away from the remains of the runway. The low light and likely dispersed positioning of these targets meant that this attack was carried out from a higher altitude with the rockets covering a wide area. A large fireball meant that at least one rocket had found its mark. A line of tracer rose up from the ground meaning that the Argentines were finally getting their act together and that now was probably a good time to head home.
As the Buccaneer’s departed Red 1 did a fly past the airfield at what he felt to be a sufficiently long distance and was able to observe numerous fires on the ground and some tracer being fired blindly into the air.
0500 Local
Brigadier Menendez hadn’t needed to be told what was happening when he awoke. The numerous loud bangs and the rising fireballs visible from his quarters in Port Stanley’s Government House had both shocked him out of bed and told him everything that he needed to know. Unable to contact anyone on the airfield he had elected to drive over there and see for himself. He had arrived to the sight of the airfields firefighters chasing after a man who was running around literally on fire. To Menendez that meant that and the fireball he had observed meant that at least one of the napalm storage sites had probably been hit.
After managing to get some semblance of order about things the airfields commanding officer had sent out subordinates to assess the damage at various parts of the facility. The news was not good. The radar and missile systems had been almost wiped out, numerous aircraft had been damaged or destroyed outright and worst of all the runway and landing field had been shattered.
This was a catastrophe Menendez thought to himself. Filling in the craters and repairing the runway alone could take days meaning that this airfield wouldn’t be able to support Operation Martillo. As he drove back to his headquarters to deliver the news to Buenos Aries he wondered how such a thing could have happened. Had the damned radar operators been asleep or something?
HMS EAGLE, 0600
With the aircraft from the nights strike now recovered and crews debriefed Admiral Woodward was pleased with the results. The airfield would likely be out of action for at least the rest of the day, possibly longer and had removed one threat to his ships leaving him free to ponder his next moves.
The task force was still faced by four threat axis. To the South although the signal detailing the new ROE had been transmitted to her HMS CONQUEROR had not yet acknowledged meaning that depending on whether she was listening or not Commander Wreford-Brown might not yet be aware of his new orders. They would just have to keep trying until they got some sort of response. If worse came to worst Woodward could redirect his force North and try to get away from the Belgrano group to the south of the islands.
After a marathon 8 hour flight from Ascension island involving multiple air to air refuelling’s an RAF Nimrod MR2 maritime patrol aircraft was now on station 300 miles to the north of the islands and using its Searchwater radar to conduct a surface search of the area. From the data gathered it was clear that to the north of the islands there were actually two distinct groups of ships each three strong and moving eastwards.
Woodward knew that one of these groups was the carrier group and based on intelligence assessments the other was likely some sort of escort group but no one was quite sure which was which. The electronic warfare specialists were beginning to report detecting faint radar emissions from S-2 Tracker aircraft.
HMS SPLENDID was still in the vicinity but had reported that due to her current position relative to the surface contacts unless they reversed course she would not be able to sufficiently close with them to be able to carry out an attack.
That meant that it would fall to HMS EAGLE’s air group to deal with the threat. This again raised the issue of the identities of the two surface groups. If this could not be positively ascertained then it may become necessary to attack both groups. Woodward would have to find out how long it would take to turn around the returning aircraft and if EAGLE could generate enough sorties to launch two strikes and maintain CAP.
There had still been no contact of any kind with the Argentine Submarine believed to be in the area. The subsurface threat warning throughout the fleet was at its highest level and there was little nothing more that they could do to protect themselves than they already were. HMS INVINCIBLE and HMS HERMES had Seaking HAS.5’s sweeping the area and the escorts were listening intently for even the faintest hint of a submarine.
To combat the increased air threat the combat air patrol had been increased to 4 Phantoms and 2 Sea Harriers airborne with another pair of each on alert 5 status. This alone placed a great deal of pressure on the Phantom squadron even before they were asked to potentially provide fighter cover for two strikes.
ARA SAN LUIS
Frigate Captain Azcueta once again replayed the sequence of events that had led to him being in this what could be at best described as less than ideal situation. He got the sense that while clearly this whole Malvinas endeavour had been designed to look good at home someone somewhere should have given some thought to how the British would react.
The state of his countries submarine service at the start of the war had perfectly illustrated just how little preparation there had been and things had gotten much worse since then. Submarine Force Command had started with a total of four boats consisting of two Ex US Navy GUPPY type boats and two modern Type 209 boats. Of the Guppy’s thus far SANTA FE had been lost and the other one SANTIAGO DEL ESTERO was so decrepit that she was not certified to dive as she probably wouldn’t come up again if she did. ARA SALTA sister to his own SAN LUIS was undergoing maintenance and not for lack of trying simply wouldn’t be ready to sail for a long time. That left Azcueta’s boat as the sole operational Argentine submarine. But it didn’t stop there, SAN LUIS herself and her crew weren’t exactly in tip top condition. The boat like her sister had been undergoing maintenance when the conflict had begun and completion had been rushed meaning many corners had been cut and some work simply not done at all. The snorkel was leaking, the bilge pumps were not functioning as they should be, one of the diesel engines was out of action, the list went on. A sign of how long it had been since any serious work was done on the boat was the fact that it had taken divers more than a week to scrape away the various crustaceans that had built by on the hull. Moreover, the pick of the Submarine forces officers were in Germany working on the TR-1700 class project (With Germany being an ally of the UK god only knows what was going to happen with that project) meaning that many departments on the boat were being run by junior petty officers. Azcueta himself was an experienced submarine commander although he lacked experience of Type 209 boats.
Anyway, what had happened had happened and he was here now and still had a job to do. His boat was located just over 200 miles NE of the Malvinas and was searching for targets of opportunity. He had been trying to locate the British carrier group and had had some success with this. The sonar had picked up numerous sounds that had been identified as emanating from warships. The information he transmitted back to Argentina would be of great value to the various commanders. His orders were to locate the British carriers and attack targets of opportunity. If he could penetrate the ASW screen he would try to sink one of the large ships. If not then he would just try and pick off some of the escorts.
That sounded easy enough but the problem was getting away afterwards.
The intelligence briefing, he had been given before sailing had stated that the British had sent down two large ships known to carry large numbers of ASW helicopters. That was a problem as by the time a helicopter was close enough to the boat for the crew to be aware of it the aircraft would probably be close enough to be aware of the submarine.
His thoughts were interrupted when the sonar operator announced that he had a fix on two ships to the east operating gas turbines. Knowing that there were no Argentine ships equipped with such engines in the vicinity these had to be British warships. This far away from the other ships of the British fleet they were likely some form of outer picket.
Azcueta thought for a bit about letting these ships pass and seeing if anything came on behind them. However, he decided that it would be better to try to sink these two ships for a number of reasons. If there were only two of them he not only had a better chance of a successful attack but also of living to tell the tale and fight another day. Also taking out a few escorts would certainly be a great help to the other naval and air assets being deployed against the British.
After closing with the pair of British ships SAN LUIS launched a pair of SST-4 torpedos at a range of 10,000 yards. Unfortunately for SAN LUIS not long after launch all data from the torpedo guidance wires suddenly cut out almost as if they had been severed. Worse the sonar operator reported the British ships changing course. Captain Azcueta ordered a dive right down to the seabed. Taking a page out of the Kriegsmarine’s old playbook if he could rest his boat on the bottom with all the various wrecks mostly of old whaling ships around the British may not be able to find him. With the reports coming in that the British were rapidly gaining speed and that there was still no response from the torpedo guidance wires things were only made worse by the sonar operating shouting that there were now British torpedo’s in the water. For just a few seconds officers and plainsmen were distracted. A few seconds can often be a few seconds to long. The plainsmen began to level out the boat slightly to late meaning that she impacted the seafloor with an audible thud.
The sonar operators onboard HMS BROADSWORD and HMS YARNMOUTH were certain that they had heard the sound of torpedoes in the water. The ships had taken evasive action as a result and called in 3 nearby Seaking’s as well as scrambling BROADSWORD’s own Lynx helicopter. If the Subsurface threat as high as it was a shoot first ask questions later policy regarding possible subsurface contacts had been effectively adopted. Thus far this had resulted in a lot of dead whales but it was felt better to be safe rather than sorry. A Seaking HAS.5 (The Sun newspaper would later erroneously claim that this aircraft had been piloted by Prince Andrew) had dropped a pair of Mk 46 torpedoes in the vicinity of where the SST-4’s had been detected which failed to acquire a target. Sonar operators then reported hearing a dull thud in the same area. The operator’s assessment was that this was a manmade noise. Using the estimated location as reference point the ships and aircraft conducted a torpedo and depth charge attack. For their efforts they were later rewarded with the sight not of yet another dead whale but of a distinct oil slick.
It wasn’t until after the conflict that an examination of records from both sides resulted in the status of ARA SAN LUIS being changed from missing to having been sunk on the 2nd May.
After many years of investigation and debate by both historians and the manufacturers AEG it is still not known for certain why the SST-4 torpedoes failed when they did. Theories range from the weapons being launched at to greater distance without an active sonar contact to poor maintenance of the weapons themselves or the fire control system. There is an often repeated theory that an Argentine weapons technician may have mistakenly inserted a magnetic gyro in the weapons the wrong way around which would have caused them to run astray. The Argentine naval technical school at the time was known more for its detentions and human rights abuses than its high standard of technical training. It is also somewhat suggestive that after the details of this incident came to light AEG made numerous changes to the design of the SST-4.
It was a quieter night than usual. With the expected influx of aircraft tomorrow meaning that it would be a very long day the majority of the base personnel were trying to rest while they still had the chance. In his little trailer the Skyguard radar operator was struggling to keep his eyes open. The other operator had fallen asleep and they had been taking it in turns to sleep and keep watch on the screen. However, after many hours of staring at nothing on the screen boredom and human nature had begun to set in. The fact that despite the bitter cold outside two men in a space that small did make things quite toasty wasn’t helping with his concentration. His eyes beginning to ache he thought he’d indulge himself and shut his eyes just for a few seconds. As often happens with these things a few seconds can often become somewhat longer. Realising this upon opening his eyes a brief moment of panic set in. However, this subsided when he saw that only a few minutes had passes, his comrade was still asleep and no one had discovered them. He then became aware of what he thought was a blip on his screen which lasted mere seconds. His tiredness clouded his judgment and he wasn’t sure if he’d actually seen something or if his mind was playing tricks on him. He wondered if it was worth waking his sleeping comrade or even should he contact the command post. If he was wrong about seeing something would it be worth the dressing down he would surely receive. That moment of indecision marked the end of his life.
The two men received places in the Argentine military cemetery but their graves are empty. There were no bodies found to bury.
The four AS-37 Martel air to surface missiles that opened the attack largely wiped out the airfields air defence systems and paved the way for the next part. The pair of Buccaneer’s callsigns Black 1 and Black 2 had played their part well and began the return trip to HMS EAGLE. Next up was Black 3 and Black 4 who were to a degree guided to their target by the fires from the burning air defence systems. All of the aircraft taking part in the mission had despite the darkness approached the Falklands at as lower altitude as they dared to avoid detection. Once Blacks 1 and 2 had launched their antiradiation missiles the other aircraft had rapidly gained altitude for their approach.
The four Phantoms callsign Reds 1-4 providing fighter cover had climbed almost vertically and then switched on their radars in the hopes of finding any target to engage. More than one of the Phantom crews felt a slight pang of disappointment when the radars showed no contacts other than the Buccaneer’s. The intelligence assessment that the Argentines not having much of a night flying capability had proved accurate.
Blacks 3 and 4 between them carried 32 1000lb bombs and in the course of a bombing run over the runway lasting mere seconds certainly made an impact in the most literal sense of the word. Finally, behind them came Black 5 and Black 6 carrying Matra rocket pods for a total of 144 SNEB 68mm rockets. These were launched against the aircraft, equipment, buildings and other “soft” targets located away from the remains of the runway. The low light and likely dispersed positioning of these targets meant that this attack was carried out from a higher altitude with the rockets covering a wide area. A large fireball meant that at least one rocket had found its mark. A line of tracer rose up from the ground meaning that the Argentines were finally getting their act together and that now was probably a good time to head home.
As the Buccaneer’s departed Red 1 did a fly past the airfield at what he felt to be a sufficiently long distance and was able to observe numerous fires on the ground and some tracer being fired blindly into the air.
0500 Local
Brigadier Menendez hadn’t needed to be told what was happening when he awoke. The numerous loud bangs and the rising fireballs visible from his quarters in Port Stanley’s Government House had both shocked him out of bed and told him everything that he needed to know. Unable to contact anyone on the airfield he had elected to drive over there and see for himself. He had arrived to the sight of the airfields firefighters chasing after a man who was running around literally on fire. To Menendez that meant that and the fireball he had observed meant that at least one of the napalm storage sites had probably been hit.
After managing to get some semblance of order about things the airfields commanding officer had sent out subordinates to assess the damage at various parts of the facility. The news was not good. The radar and missile systems had been almost wiped out, numerous aircraft had been damaged or destroyed outright and worst of all the runway and landing field had been shattered.
This was a catastrophe Menendez thought to himself. Filling in the craters and repairing the runway alone could take days meaning that this airfield wouldn’t be able to support Operation Martillo. As he drove back to his headquarters to deliver the news to Buenos Aries he wondered how such a thing could have happened. Had the damned radar operators been asleep or something?
HMS EAGLE, 0600
With the aircraft from the nights strike now recovered and crews debriefed Admiral Woodward was pleased with the results. The airfield would likely be out of action for at least the rest of the day, possibly longer and had removed one threat to his ships leaving him free to ponder his next moves.
The task force was still faced by four threat axis. To the South although the signal detailing the new ROE had been transmitted to her HMS CONQUEROR had not yet acknowledged meaning that depending on whether she was listening or not Commander Wreford-Brown might not yet be aware of his new orders. They would just have to keep trying until they got some sort of response. If worse came to worst Woodward could redirect his force North and try to get away from the Belgrano group to the south of the islands.
After a marathon 8 hour flight from Ascension island involving multiple air to air refuelling’s an RAF Nimrod MR2 maritime patrol aircraft was now on station 300 miles to the north of the islands and using its Searchwater radar to conduct a surface search of the area. From the data gathered it was clear that to the north of the islands there were actually two distinct groups of ships each three strong and moving eastwards.
Woodward knew that one of these groups was the carrier group and based on intelligence assessments the other was likely some sort of escort group but no one was quite sure which was which. The electronic warfare specialists were beginning to report detecting faint radar emissions from S-2 Tracker aircraft.
HMS SPLENDID was still in the vicinity but had reported that due to her current position relative to the surface contacts unless they reversed course she would not be able to sufficiently close with them to be able to carry out an attack.
That meant that it would fall to HMS EAGLE’s air group to deal with the threat. This again raised the issue of the identities of the two surface groups. If this could not be positively ascertained then it may become necessary to attack both groups. Woodward would have to find out how long it would take to turn around the returning aircraft and if EAGLE could generate enough sorties to launch two strikes and maintain CAP.
There had still been no contact of any kind with the Argentine Submarine believed to be in the area. The subsurface threat warning throughout the fleet was at its highest level and there was little nothing more that they could do to protect themselves than they already were. HMS INVINCIBLE and HMS HERMES had Seaking HAS.5’s sweeping the area and the escorts were listening intently for even the faintest hint of a submarine.
To combat the increased air threat the combat air patrol had been increased to 4 Phantoms and 2 Sea Harriers airborne with another pair of each on alert 5 status. This alone placed a great deal of pressure on the Phantom squadron even before they were asked to potentially provide fighter cover for two strikes.
ARA SAN LUIS
Frigate Captain Azcueta once again replayed the sequence of events that had led to him being in this what could be at best described as less than ideal situation. He got the sense that while clearly this whole Malvinas endeavour had been designed to look good at home someone somewhere should have given some thought to how the British would react.
The state of his countries submarine service at the start of the war had perfectly illustrated just how little preparation there had been and things had gotten much worse since then. Submarine Force Command had started with a total of four boats consisting of two Ex US Navy GUPPY type boats and two modern Type 209 boats. Of the Guppy’s thus far SANTA FE had been lost and the other one SANTIAGO DEL ESTERO was so decrepit that she was not certified to dive as she probably wouldn’t come up again if she did. ARA SALTA sister to his own SAN LUIS was undergoing maintenance and not for lack of trying simply wouldn’t be ready to sail for a long time. That left Azcueta’s boat as the sole operational Argentine submarine. But it didn’t stop there, SAN LUIS herself and her crew weren’t exactly in tip top condition. The boat like her sister had been undergoing maintenance when the conflict had begun and completion had been rushed meaning many corners had been cut and some work simply not done at all. The snorkel was leaking, the bilge pumps were not functioning as they should be, one of the diesel engines was out of action, the list went on. A sign of how long it had been since any serious work was done on the boat was the fact that it had taken divers more than a week to scrape away the various crustaceans that had built by on the hull. Moreover, the pick of the Submarine forces officers were in Germany working on the TR-1700 class project (With Germany being an ally of the UK god only knows what was going to happen with that project) meaning that many departments on the boat were being run by junior petty officers. Azcueta himself was an experienced submarine commander although he lacked experience of Type 209 boats.
Anyway, what had happened had happened and he was here now and still had a job to do. His boat was located just over 200 miles NE of the Malvinas and was searching for targets of opportunity. He had been trying to locate the British carrier group and had had some success with this. The sonar had picked up numerous sounds that had been identified as emanating from warships. The information he transmitted back to Argentina would be of great value to the various commanders. His orders were to locate the British carriers and attack targets of opportunity. If he could penetrate the ASW screen he would try to sink one of the large ships. If not then he would just try and pick off some of the escorts.
That sounded easy enough but the problem was getting away afterwards.
The intelligence briefing, he had been given before sailing had stated that the British had sent down two large ships known to carry large numbers of ASW helicopters. That was a problem as by the time a helicopter was close enough to the boat for the crew to be aware of it the aircraft would probably be close enough to be aware of the submarine.
His thoughts were interrupted when the sonar operator announced that he had a fix on two ships to the east operating gas turbines. Knowing that there were no Argentine ships equipped with such engines in the vicinity these had to be British warships. This far away from the other ships of the British fleet they were likely some form of outer picket.
Azcueta thought for a bit about letting these ships pass and seeing if anything came on behind them. However, he decided that it would be better to try to sink these two ships for a number of reasons. If there were only two of them he not only had a better chance of a successful attack but also of living to tell the tale and fight another day. Also taking out a few escorts would certainly be a great help to the other naval and air assets being deployed against the British.
After closing with the pair of British ships SAN LUIS launched a pair of SST-4 torpedos at a range of 10,000 yards. Unfortunately for SAN LUIS not long after launch all data from the torpedo guidance wires suddenly cut out almost as if they had been severed. Worse the sonar operator reported the British ships changing course. Captain Azcueta ordered a dive right down to the seabed. Taking a page out of the Kriegsmarine’s old playbook if he could rest his boat on the bottom with all the various wrecks mostly of old whaling ships around the British may not be able to find him. With the reports coming in that the British were rapidly gaining speed and that there was still no response from the torpedo guidance wires things were only made worse by the sonar operating shouting that there were now British torpedo’s in the water. For just a few seconds officers and plainsmen were distracted. A few seconds can often be a few seconds to long. The plainsmen began to level out the boat slightly to late meaning that she impacted the seafloor with an audible thud.
The sonar operators onboard HMS BROADSWORD and HMS YARNMOUTH were certain that they had heard the sound of torpedoes in the water. The ships had taken evasive action as a result and called in 3 nearby Seaking’s as well as scrambling BROADSWORD’s own Lynx helicopter. If the Subsurface threat as high as it was a shoot first ask questions later policy regarding possible subsurface contacts had been effectively adopted. Thus far this had resulted in a lot of dead whales but it was felt better to be safe rather than sorry. A Seaking HAS.5 (The Sun newspaper would later erroneously claim that this aircraft had been piloted by Prince Andrew) had dropped a pair of Mk 46 torpedoes in the vicinity of where the SST-4’s had been detected which failed to acquire a target. Sonar operators then reported hearing a dull thud in the same area. The operator’s assessment was that this was a manmade noise. Using the estimated location as reference point the ships and aircraft conducted a torpedo and depth charge attack. For their efforts they were later rewarded with the sight not of yet another dead whale but of a distinct oil slick.
It wasn’t until after the conflict that an examination of records from both sides resulted in the status of ARA SAN LUIS being changed from missing to having been sunk on the 2nd May.
After many years of investigation and debate by both historians and the manufacturers AEG it is still not known for certain why the SST-4 torpedoes failed when they did. Theories range from the weapons being launched at to greater distance without an active sonar contact to poor maintenance of the weapons themselves or the fire control system. There is an often repeated theory that an Argentine weapons technician may have mistakenly inserted a magnetic gyro in the weapons the wrong way around which would have caused them to run astray. The Argentine naval technical school at the time was known more for its detentions and human rights abuses than its high standard of technical training. It is also somewhat suggestive that after the details of this incident came to light AEG made numerous changes to the design of the SST-4.
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Dud torps, that was lucky and a much more effective black Buck this time. Its really not Argentina's day and its barely started.
You almost feel a tad sorry for the idiots, once upon a time three 40 year old tanks caused a curbstomp. Up against the most powerful carrier Britain ever built things are already going south for them.
You almost feel a tad sorry for the idiots, once upon a time three 40 year old tanks caused a curbstomp. Up against the most powerful carrier Britain ever built things are already going south for them.
Although the Flanker (Russia, China) and Fulcrum (Russia, India) have been converted to STOBAR duty so the airframes can handle the stress of landings. What mods you would need to do to the front ends of the aircraft (strengthened nose gear, more robust nose assembly overall, etc.) could I suppose throw of the performance in such a way that it is not worth the trouble.
SsgtC
Banned
Kind of. The MiG-29K is actually a development of the MiG-29M. Which shares only it's external appearance with it's predecessors. Similar to the Super Hornet, in that it was called a "derivative" but is actually a new aircraft. The -29M already had a lightened and strengthened fuselage for use as a multirole fighter. That made it easier to convert to a naval fighter. But even having said that, the Indian Navy is having maintenance issues with it's fighters because they aren't really designed to land on carrier decks. See the below quote:Although the Flanker (Russia, China) and Fulcrum (Russia, India) have been converted to STOBAR duty so the airframes can handle the stress of landings. What mods you would need to do to the front ends of the aircraft (strengthened nose gear, more robust nose assembly overall, etc.) could I suppose throw of the performance in such a way that it is not worth the trouble.
As for the Flanker, the Chinese knockoffs are literally falling apart, with the Navy scrambling to develop a replacement. Though, that's more from the fact that they were trying to reverse engineer an incomplete prototype than anything.Defense News said:
RodentRevolution
Banned
The control wires on Argentine torpedoes snapping is OTL.
Problems with the torpedoes and shipboard torpedo systems contributed to the three misses.
The fire control computer on San Luis was out of service and the fire control solution had to be
calculated manually. Additionally, the wires broke on all the weapons shortly after firing which took
away the ability to steer the weapon after the time of fire. These problems and the opinion that the torpedoes were fired with the submarine too deep, had direct influence on the outcome of each shot.
There is also evidence that the SST-4 torpedoes
From page 11 of:
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a279554.pdf
For a look at submarine operations OTL.
Still a bad day to be part of a Fascist navy, and they clearly didn't read the manual for those fish.
SsgtC
Banned
Actually, it's now believed that the misses were the result of problems with the SST-4 torpedo. The manufacturer of the fish made a ton of changes to the design immediately after the Falklands.
So US torpedoes in early ww2 all over again? Well bad for them, good for us I guess.