Taking Care of Last Minute Details
True to Admiral Lewin’s word on the night of the 6th/7th of May Argentine forces on the Falklands found themselves subjected to what one newspaper reporter described “Britain’s revenge”. That particular report was accompanied by a photograph of an aircraft handler onboard HMS INVINCIBLE writing the words “Glasgow kiss” on the side of a BL755 Cluster Bomb while it was waiting to be loaded onto a Sea Harrier.
During the course of the night eight Buccaneer sorties were launched targeting the three airfields on the Falklands. While the damage to these facilities in terms of the number of aircraft and quantity of equipment destroyed was limited when compared to the previous raids the damage to the runway at Port Stanley caused by the 1000lb bombs further drove home the message to the Argentine defenders that this airfield was not open for business.
Concurrently a second naval bombardment similar to the one the night before was taking place. HMS SHEFFIELD accompanied by HMS GLAMORGAN and returning another appearance HMS BROADSWORD again shelled the unfortunate men of the 6th Infantry Regiment dug in along the coast near Stanley Common. As with the previous night the main objective of the British force was less about inflicting casualties among the Argentine defenders (although some naturally were inflicted) but this time to make a point that despite the destruction of HMS GLASGOW they were still vulnerable to attack.
Unlike the previous night the bombardment was carried out much earlier in order to make maximum use of the cover provided by the darkness and once complete the ships retired east at maximum speed towards relative safety of the carrier group.
The now abandoned but still afloat HMS GLASGOW continued to burn fiercely enough that observers ashore could clearly make out an orange glow on the horizon. The news that it was a burning British ship provided a much needed morale boost to the wet and cold Argentine conscripts.
Just after dawn the Sea Harriers made another appearance with a total of eight aircraft carrying out sorties over the islands. Four of these aircraft flew photo reconnaissance missions while the other four attacked Argentine positions identified on Mount Longdon and Wireless Ridge. Two of these aircraft each dropped a pair of BL755 cluster bombs while the other two equipped with AIM-9L Sidewinders provided top cover. This time it was the turn of the 7th Infantry Regiment to suffer. Like their comrades in the 4th Infantry Regiment on Mount Harriet and Two Sisters the extremely rocky nature of the terrain meant that they had been unable to properly dig themselves into their positions and as with the previous night they suffered the consequences.
Though all of the aircraft that flew sorties that night returned to their respective carriers the two Sea Harriers that had been carrying the cluster munitions had encountered significant small arms fire during their attack run. One of the aircraft had sustained damage when it was hit by fire from a 50 cal heavy machine gun leading to a rather nerve racking return flight and landing.
For the next two weeks the Task Force prepared itself for the upcoming landings. The ships of TG 317.0 the amphibious group commanded by Commodore Clapp aboard HMS FEARLESS began to arrive. By the time all of the additional ships had arrived the Task Force had more than doubled in size.
By the time of the landings British naval forces committed to the campaign consisted of the aircraft carriers HMS EAGLE and HMS INVINCIBLE, the LPH HMS HERMES, the LPD’s HMS FEARLESS and HMS INTREPID, the Destroyers HMS BRISTOL, HMS SHEFFIELD, HMS COVENTRY, HMS CARDIFF, HMS EXETER, HMS GLAMORGAN, HMS ANTRIM, the Frigates HMS BROADSWORD, HMS BRILLIANT, HMS ACTIVE, HMS ANTELOPE, HMS ARDENT, HMS AMBUSCADE, HMS AVENGER, HMS ARROW, HMS MINERVA, HMS ANDROMEDA, HMS ARGONAUT, HMS PENELOP, HMS YARNMOUTH and HMS PLYMOUTH.
Accompanying this force were the various tankers and supply ships of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary and the ships carrying the men and equipment of 3 Commando Brigade including all six of the Round Table class LSL’s and numerous civilian owned merchant ships taken up from trade (STUFT) including the liners SS CANBERRA and SS UGANDA. The latter having been refitted to operate as a hospital ship.
The SSN’s HMS SPARTAN, HMS SPLENDID, HMS VALIANT, HMS CONQUEROR and HMS COURAGEOUS along with the SSK HMS ONYX remained in theatre and were deployed in and around the TEZ and along the coast in order to provide early warning of Argentine aircraft sorties. With the bulk of the Royal Navy deployed in the South Atlantic there was a fear that the Soviets may try to somehow take advantage. It was also clear that the Argentine navy had been eliminated as a threat to the Task Force. Therefore, Flag Officer Submarines and TG 324.3 commander Vice Admiral Herbert was looking at the possibility of withdrawing some of the SSN’s from the South Atlantic and moving them back up north to the area around the GIUK gap to guard against the possibility of the Soviet Navy feeling emboldened.
Also, aboard HMS FEARLESS was the commander of 3 Commando Brigade Brigadier Julian Thompson who with his staff was now working on the small detail of exactly where to land. 3 Commando Brigade was the Royal Marines main fighting formation and was usually made up of 40 Commando, 42 Commando and 45 Commando along with the various integrated supporting units including 29 Commando Regiment Royal Artillery. These supporting units were staffed by a mixture of Royal Marines and Army personnel who had passed the arduous All Arms Commando Course. However, when Operation Corporate had begun the brigade had been reinforced with more army personnel. The 2nd and 3rd battalions of the Parachute Regiment had been reassigned from 5 Infantry Brigade and a reconnaissance troop from the Blues and Royals had been added. Though they would now be fighting alongside each other the rivalry between the Paras and Royal Marines was legendary and it probably wouldn’t have been inaccurate at this point to have described them as having more hatred for each other than any Argentinian.
Though it had initially been stripped of the majority of its infantry component 5 Infantry Brigade wasn’t going to be left out of things. The brigade was now primarily made up of 2nd Battalion of the Scots Guards, 1st Battalion of the Welsh Guards and the 1st Battalion of the 7th Duke of Edinburgh’s Own Gurkha Rifles along with the supporting elements. The brigade had embarked on the requisitioned liner RMS QUEEN ELIZABETH 2 and sailed from Southampton with great fanfare on the 12th of May. Although 5 Infantry Brigade would not be taking part in the initial phase of the land campaign they would still be a vital and much welcomed boost to the strength of the British land force.
The QE2 herself had spent the week prior to her sailing being converted from a luxury liner into a troopship. In this role she would be following in the footsteps of her illustrious forebearer during the second world war. Two helicopter pads had been constructed over the swimming pools, the public lounges had been converted into large dormitories, fuel pipes had been installed throughout the ship to enable her to conduct refuelling’s at sea, and more than 2000 sheets of hard board had been laid down to protect the carpets that were more used to designer shoes than military boots. More than 650 civilian crew members had volunteered on this particularly interesting voyage.
Though he wouldn’t be taking over operational command on the ground until after 3 Commando Brigade had established a beachhead Major General Moore, RM would be the Commander of the land forces aspect of Operation Corporate. Though he had previously commanded 3 Commando Brigade until 5 Infantry Brigade arrived in theatre having a 2 star commander would probably just add an extra layer of complexity and unnecessary distraction to a single brigade operation. Therefore, Moore would be arriving in theatre just ahead of 5 Infantry Brigade. With a force made up of Paras, Marines, Guardsmen and Gurkhas pretty much the creme de la crème of the British fighting man Moore was confident that his men could do the job given to them. If they could make it ashore that is.
Over the next two weeks British forces mostly dedicated themselves to intelligence gathering and operations to soften up the Argentine defences in preparation for the landing campaign. Aircraft from HMS EAGLE and HMS INVINCIBLE flew numerous sorties carrying out photo reconnaissance and strikes against the airfields and Argentine fighting positions. It was during this period however that the Task Force began to suffer its first aircraft losses. During a night attack against Argentine infantry positioned on the mountains around Port Stanley a Buccaneer collided with the terrain killing both the pilot and observer. It was deduced that the pilot error was the most probable cause of the loss with the pilot most likely becoming temporarily disoriented in the dark at the worst possible moment and losing track of exactly where he was in relation to the terrain or making an error of judgment while trying to avoid ground fire.
Days later a Sea Harrier was brought down while it was making a low-level photo reconnaissance run over Port Stanley. The aircraft was struck by a Roland SAM fired by the 601st Air Defence Artillery Group who until this point between the casualties sustained in the Buccaneer attack on Port Stanley airfield on the 2nd and their seeming inability to protect their comrades from British air attacks had been having a pretty bad time. The aircrafts pilot Lt Nick Taylor RN was able eject from his doomed Sea Harrier but found himself the first British POW of the conflict (excluding the unfortunate members of Naval Party 8901 who had been captured during the initial Argentine invasion back in April, at least those men had been repatriated).
While Lt Taylor was well treated by his captor’s footage of both himself and the remains of both his aircraft and the Buccaneer that had crashed previously were broadcast in Argentina and around the world in a major propaganda coup for a junta that was feeling increasingly threatened by its own people.
Despite this loss during this time the Sea Harrier was able to demonstrate its unique value. More than once due to the ferocious weather typical of the South Atlantic the CATOBAR equipped HMS EAGLE was unable to launch or recover aircraft. The VSTOL aircraft of HMS INVINCIBLE were much less affected by such weather and took up the mantle of providing air defence for the Task Force and continuing to carryout sorties over the islands much to the delight of INVINCIBLE’s commander Captain Black.
During this time the Argentine Air Force was conspicuous by its absence. British intelligence teams were not far of the mark when they concluded that the losses suffered on the 6th coupled with a lack of dedicated MPA aircraft were probably causing the Argentines to pause for thought.
The destruction of HMS GLASGOW had clearly shown the threat posed by Argentina’s Exocet anti-ship missiles. Operation Mikado had been launched to look at various options for neutralising this threat and if necessary carry them out. The Super Etendard strike aircraft were known to be based at NAS ALMIRANTE QUIJADA at Rio Grande on the Argentine mainland. The Operation Mikado planning team had concluded that the most effective way of putting these aircraft out of action was either a long range strike from HMS EAGLE or a special forces operation but there were a number of problems with both of these options. There was distinct unwillingness within the war cabinet to authorise a strike on the argentine mainland. Despite everything that had happened Britain and Argentina were not in a formal state of war and the British government had been keen to keep the conflict as contained as possible. In the past week or so Britain had seen the destruction of HMS GLASGOW and the captured Lt Taylor being paraded in front of Argentine cameras which was making the members of the war cabinet become more and more cautious. There were also more pressing problems in the military sense. There was almost no onsite intelligence regarding the air base meaning that it was unknown how the base was defended or even if the Super Etendard’s and Exocets would be present and if so where exactly would they be on the airbase.
With regards to the option of an air strike from HMS EAGLE until that point a great part of the Task Force’s protection from air defence had been simply staying beyond the range of aircraft based on the mainland. Closing with the Argentine mainland would expose the Task Force’s most vital asset to a much increased potential risk of air attack. There were still too many unknowns about Argentina’s ability to provide air defence for both the base and mainland in general. It didn’t help that the war cabinet in Whitehall were nervous about the possibility of any more British airmen being captured. Without knowing exactly where the aircraft and missiles would be on the airbase if they even were present at all there would be no guarantee that an air strike could do anymore than temporarily deny them the use of the runway.
Various special forces options were examined. However, these also suffered from the same problems of political unwillingness in Whitehall and a lack of onsite intelligence. The SF option at least had the advantage that the men on the ground would be able to search the airbase for their targets (The Super Etendard’s, Exocet missiles, crew messes and if this option was taken up potentially the pilots themselves). An SF operation would have the added difficulty of how to infiltrate a large enough force to carry out the operation. Going in via submarine insertion would mean that the submarines would have to be recalled from their current duties to have the SAS and SBS men embarked before carrying out what would be an extremely risky mission for the boats. A helicopter insertion would likely mean that HMS HERMES would have to expose herself to an increased risk of air attack by moving closer to the mainland. It was unlikely that Admiral Woodward and Brigadier Thompson were going to release such an important asset for a mission such as this.
The final option envisioned an Operation Entebbe style raid with a pair of C-130’s landing directly onto the runway and disgorging an entire squadron of SAS men to cause havoc. This last option was dismissed as it was regarded as akin to mass suicide and even earned itself the nickname Operation Certain Death.
In the end permission for an operation against the Argentine mainland was never forthcoming meaning that Operation Mikado was never carried out.
After the conflict it later emerged that the Argentine Marines defending the airfield were indeed expecting some sort of attack and were well prepared. It also emerged that the Exocets and Super Etendard’s had indeed been present. During the strike against the HMS GLASGOW group one of the missiles had not functioned correctly and had simply dropped straight into the sea. With only three missiles left in the inventory the 2nd Naval Air Fighter/Attack Squadron had unknown to the British been stood down for a couple of days while Argentine technicians had tried to figure out what had gone wrong and ensure that it wouldn’t happen again.
The continued threat posed by the Exocets helped to influence the choice of landing beaches.
By the end of the third week of May a considerable amount of intelligence on the Argentinian’s disposition on the Falkland’s had been gleaned from Ariel reconnaissance, signals intelligence, satellite imagery and special forces observation posts. It had been deduced that the enemy forces numbered approximately 13,000 men and the majority were positioned in a defensive perimeter around Port Stanley with other forces located at chokepoints and other geographical features. This led to initial British plans for a direct assault on Port Stanley being quickly ruled out.
One of the most curious figures of the Falklands campaign was Major Southby-Tailyour of the Royal Marines. He had previously undertaken a tour of duty on the Falklands and being a keen yachtsman had spent his time exploring the coast giving him an intimate knowledge of nearly the entire coastline including almost every creek and inlet. He had even written a book on the subject of sailing in the Falklands but given that before the crisis most people had never even heard of the place let alone been able to find it on a map he had been unable to find anyone willing to publish his book. When the crisis had begun he had made his commanding officer aware of his previous experience in the area. When he had presented his manuscript, he had immediately found himself made a member of Brigadier Thompsons staff where his knowledge proved invaluable.
after much deliberation, war gaming and planning it had been decided that 3 Commando Brigade would be landing at San Carlos. An amphibious landing is probably the most risky of all naval operations. The decision on when and where to land nearly always involves a degree of compromise between the land, air and sea commanders and San Carlos was no exception. Brigadier Thompson himself wasn’t exactly wild about the choice of San Carlos given that it was more than 50 miles away from the main objective of Port Stanley and the beaches there were known to be less than ideal for unloading large quantities of men, equipment and stores. Less than 13 miles to the SE there was a strong enemy force at Goose Green and there was also a risk that the sea approaches and beaches themselves may have been mined.
These drawbacks however had been outweighed by the advantages that San Carlos had offered. It was far enough away from the majority of the Argentine forces near Port Stanley that they would be unable to intervene in time to prevent the British establishing a beach head and was also well beyond the range of the Argentine artillery positions identified so far. The high ground surrounding the proposed anchorage in San Carlos water would provide protection from Exocet attack for the stationary ships and would provide considerable protection against air strikes using bombs as the Argentine pilots would only have seconds to identify and attack a target after they crossed the ridgeline. The high ground would also provide the ideal location to set up Rapier SAM systems to provide an extra layer of protection from air attack. Indeed, the computers at the radar research establishment at Malvern back in the UK had already identified the ideal positions to situate the Rapiers.
Air cover over San Carlos would be provided by HMS INVINCIBLE’s Sea Harriers while HMS EAGLE’s Phantoms working with the Gannets would attempt to intercept inbound raids over the sea to the west before they even reached the islands. The Type 64 tactic of pairing a Sea Dart equipped Type 42 Destroyer with a Sea Wolf equipped Type 22 Frigate positioned to the north of the islands would be used again to hopefully draw some Argentine aircraft away from the landing ships and into the engagement envelopes of the British SAM’s.
Final preparations began on the 19th of May with a considerable amount of cross decking taking place. The large bright white painted luxury liner turned troopship SS CANBERRA was carrying a considerable amount of personnel and equipment. Her large size and distinctive paint scheme would make her an obvious target for Argentine pilots meaning that it would be reckless possibly bordering on suicidal to leave the majority of 3 Commando Brigade onboard her. Therefore, as many men and as much equipment as possible was dispersed to other ships leading to considerable overcrowding on the HERMES, FEARLESS and INTREPID. Tragically this operation did not go smoothly. A Sea King HC.4 conducting a cross decking flight suffered a catastrophic engine failure and crashed into the sea leading to the deaths of 9 Royal Marines and one of the pilots.
Despite these tragic setbacks the crossdecking operations were completed on the 20th of May and a signal was sent from Northwood to Admiral Woodward instructing him to inform Brigadier Thompson that he was to land in the Falklands at his discretion.
San Carlos, Night of the 20th/21st
The young Argentine corporal knew that he shouldn’t sleeping. He was supposed to be setting an example to the three conscript privates with him in the foxhole. Their job was to keep a watch out towards the sea for anything untoward but it was so dark that they simply had no hope of being able to see anything during the night. He had been trying to get hold of some night vision goggles but these were like gold dust and his superior had ended the conversation by asking him if he really wanted them to spot the British fleet in the incredibly unlikely event that it sailed right past them or to be able to spot the senior NCO coming to check on him. Those same four men had been in this same foxhole every night for more than a week now looking for something that in all likelihood probably was not going to come. The corporal who had not to long ago been a conscript had a disdain for certain aspects of military life including the in his opinion excessive discipline. It had started out as him allowing two men to have a quick snooze while the other two kept watch. Over time this had become three men asleep while one man kept watch. There had been one incident where all of them had dropped off to sleep but they were far enough away from the main force at Fanning Head that no one ever really came to check on them during the nights. Waking up to do his turn keeping watch out to sea he saw the private who had been doing this job right where he had left him. Noticing that the private wasn’t moving the corporal reckoned that he had probably fallen asleep. Who could blame him? Having to ly prone for hours at a time and bored it was only human instinct that people would start to feel sleepy. The corporal grabbed him by the ankle to shake him out of his slumber but nothing happened.
Pushing himself up he rubbed his eyes as his head came up over the top of his foxhole. As he took his hand down from his face he was stunned to see barely inches away from his own face another pair of eyes staring right back at him. That pair of eyes was the last thing the corporal or any of the privates saw in this world. He never even had the time to tell what colour they were.
During the course of the night eight Buccaneer sorties were launched targeting the three airfields on the Falklands. While the damage to these facilities in terms of the number of aircraft and quantity of equipment destroyed was limited when compared to the previous raids the damage to the runway at Port Stanley caused by the 1000lb bombs further drove home the message to the Argentine defenders that this airfield was not open for business.
Concurrently a second naval bombardment similar to the one the night before was taking place. HMS SHEFFIELD accompanied by HMS GLAMORGAN and returning another appearance HMS BROADSWORD again shelled the unfortunate men of the 6th Infantry Regiment dug in along the coast near Stanley Common. As with the previous night the main objective of the British force was less about inflicting casualties among the Argentine defenders (although some naturally were inflicted) but this time to make a point that despite the destruction of HMS GLASGOW they were still vulnerable to attack.
Unlike the previous night the bombardment was carried out much earlier in order to make maximum use of the cover provided by the darkness and once complete the ships retired east at maximum speed towards relative safety of the carrier group.
The now abandoned but still afloat HMS GLASGOW continued to burn fiercely enough that observers ashore could clearly make out an orange glow on the horizon. The news that it was a burning British ship provided a much needed morale boost to the wet and cold Argentine conscripts.
Just after dawn the Sea Harriers made another appearance with a total of eight aircraft carrying out sorties over the islands. Four of these aircraft flew photo reconnaissance missions while the other four attacked Argentine positions identified on Mount Longdon and Wireless Ridge. Two of these aircraft each dropped a pair of BL755 cluster bombs while the other two equipped with AIM-9L Sidewinders provided top cover. This time it was the turn of the 7th Infantry Regiment to suffer. Like their comrades in the 4th Infantry Regiment on Mount Harriet and Two Sisters the extremely rocky nature of the terrain meant that they had been unable to properly dig themselves into their positions and as with the previous night they suffered the consequences.
Though all of the aircraft that flew sorties that night returned to their respective carriers the two Sea Harriers that had been carrying the cluster munitions had encountered significant small arms fire during their attack run. One of the aircraft had sustained damage when it was hit by fire from a 50 cal heavy machine gun leading to a rather nerve racking return flight and landing.
For the next two weeks the Task Force prepared itself for the upcoming landings. The ships of TG 317.0 the amphibious group commanded by Commodore Clapp aboard HMS FEARLESS began to arrive. By the time all of the additional ships had arrived the Task Force had more than doubled in size.
By the time of the landings British naval forces committed to the campaign consisted of the aircraft carriers HMS EAGLE and HMS INVINCIBLE, the LPH HMS HERMES, the LPD’s HMS FEARLESS and HMS INTREPID, the Destroyers HMS BRISTOL, HMS SHEFFIELD, HMS COVENTRY, HMS CARDIFF, HMS EXETER, HMS GLAMORGAN, HMS ANTRIM, the Frigates HMS BROADSWORD, HMS BRILLIANT, HMS ACTIVE, HMS ANTELOPE, HMS ARDENT, HMS AMBUSCADE, HMS AVENGER, HMS ARROW, HMS MINERVA, HMS ANDROMEDA, HMS ARGONAUT, HMS PENELOP, HMS YARNMOUTH and HMS PLYMOUTH.
Accompanying this force were the various tankers and supply ships of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary and the ships carrying the men and equipment of 3 Commando Brigade including all six of the Round Table class LSL’s and numerous civilian owned merchant ships taken up from trade (STUFT) including the liners SS CANBERRA and SS UGANDA. The latter having been refitted to operate as a hospital ship.
The SSN’s HMS SPARTAN, HMS SPLENDID, HMS VALIANT, HMS CONQUEROR and HMS COURAGEOUS along with the SSK HMS ONYX remained in theatre and were deployed in and around the TEZ and along the coast in order to provide early warning of Argentine aircraft sorties. With the bulk of the Royal Navy deployed in the South Atlantic there was a fear that the Soviets may try to somehow take advantage. It was also clear that the Argentine navy had been eliminated as a threat to the Task Force. Therefore, Flag Officer Submarines and TG 324.3 commander Vice Admiral Herbert was looking at the possibility of withdrawing some of the SSN’s from the South Atlantic and moving them back up north to the area around the GIUK gap to guard against the possibility of the Soviet Navy feeling emboldened.
Also, aboard HMS FEARLESS was the commander of 3 Commando Brigade Brigadier Julian Thompson who with his staff was now working on the small detail of exactly where to land. 3 Commando Brigade was the Royal Marines main fighting formation and was usually made up of 40 Commando, 42 Commando and 45 Commando along with the various integrated supporting units including 29 Commando Regiment Royal Artillery. These supporting units were staffed by a mixture of Royal Marines and Army personnel who had passed the arduous All Arms Commando Course. However, when Operation Corporate had begun the brigade had been reinforced with more army personnel. The 2nd and 3rd battalions of the Parachute Regiment had been reassigned from 5 Infantry Brigade and a reconnaissance troop from the Blues and Royals had been added. Though they would now be fighting alongside each other the rivalry between the Paras and Royal Marines was legendary and it probably wouldn’t have been inaccurate at this point to have described them as having more hatred for each other than any Argentinian.
Though it had initially been stripped of the majority of its infantry component 5 Infantry Brigade wasn’t going to be left out of things. The brigade was now primarily made up of 2nd Battalion of the Scots Guards, 1st Battalion of the Welsh Guards and the 1st Battalion of the 7th Duke of Edinburgh’s Own Gurkha Rifles along with the supporting elements. The brigade had embarked on the requisitioned liner RMS QUEEN ELIZABETH 2 and sailed from Southampton with great fanfare on the 12th of May. Although 5 Infantry Brigade would not be taking part in the initial phase of the land campaign they would still be a vital and much welcomed boost to the strength of the British land force.
The QE2 herself had spent the week prior to her sailing being converted from a luxury liner into a troopship. In this role she would be following in the footsteps of her illustrious forebearer during the second world war. Two helicopter pads had been constructed over the swimming pools, the public lounges had been converted into large dormitories, fuel pipes had been installed throughout the ship to enable her to conduct refuelling’s at sea, and more than 2000 sheets of hard board had been laid down to protect the carpets that were more used to designer shoes than military boots. More than 650 civilian crew members had volunteered on this particularly interesting voyage.
Though he wouldn’t be taking over operational command on the ground until after 3 Commando Brigade had established a beachhead Major General Moore, RM would be the Commander of the land forces aspect of Operation Corporate. Though he had previously commanded 3 Commando Brigade until 5 Infantry Brigade arrived in theatre having a 2 star commander would probably just add an extra layer of complexity and unnecessary distraction to a single brigade operation. Therefore, Moore would be arriving in theatre just ahead of 5 Infantry Brigade. With a force made up of Paras, Marines, Guardsmen and Gurkhas pretty much the creme de la crème of the British fighting man Moore was confident that his men could do the job given to them. If they could make it ashore that is.
Over the next two weeks British forces mostly dedicated themselves to intelligence gathering and operations to soften up the Argentine defences in preparation for the landing campaign. Aircraft from HMS EAGLE and HMS INVINCIBLE flew numerous sorties carrying out photo reconnaissance and strikes against the airfields and Argentine fighting positions. It was during this period however that the Task Force began to suffer its first aircraft losses. During a night attack against Argentine infantry positioned on the mountains around Port Stanley a Buccaneer collided with the terrain killing both the pilot and observer. It was deduced that the pilot error was the most probable cause of the loss with the pilot most likely becoming temporarily disoriented in the dark at the worst possible moment and losing track of exactly where he was in relation to the terrain or making an error of judgment while trying to avoid ground fire.
Days later a Sea Harrier was brought down while it was making a low-level photo reconnaissance run over Port Stanley. The aircraft was struck by a Roland SAM fired by the 601st Air Defence Artillery Group who until this point between the casualties sustained in the Buccaneer attack on Port Stanley airfield on the 2nd and their seeming inability to protect their comrades from British air attacks had been having a pretty bad time. The aircrafts pilot Lt Nick Taylor RN was able eject from his doomed Sea Harrier but found himself the first British POW of the conflict (excluding the unfortunate members of Naval Party 8901 who had been captured during the initial Argentine invasion back in April, at least those men had been repatriated).
While Lt Taylor was well treated by his captor’s footage of both himself and the remains of both his aircraft and the Buccaneer that had crashed previously were broadcast in Argentina and around the world in a major propaganda coup for a junta that was feeling increasingly threatened by its own people.
Despite this loss during this time the Sea Harrier was able to demonstrate its unique value. More than once due to the ferocious weather typical of the South Atlantic the CATOBAR equipped HMS EAGLE was unable to launch or recover aircraft. The VSTOL aircraft of HMS INVINCIBLE were much less affected by such weather and took up the mantle of providing air defence for the Task Force and continuing to carryout sorties over the islands much to the delight of INVINCIBLE’s commander Captain Black.
During this time the Argentine Air Force was conspicuous by its absence. British intelligence teams were not far of the mark when they concluded that the losses suffered on the 6th coupled with a lack of dedicated MPA aircraft were probably causing the Argentines to pause for thought.
The destruction of HMS GLASGOW had clearly shown the threat posed by Argentina’s Exocet anti-ship missiles. Operation Mikado had been launched to look at various options for neutralising this threat and if necessary carry them out. The Super Etendard strike aircraft were known to be based at NAS ALMIRANTE QUIJADA at Rio Grande on the Argentine mainland. The Operation Mikado planning team had concluded that the most effective way of putting these aircraft out of action was either a long range strike from HMS EAGLE or a special forces operation but there were a number of problems with both of these options. There was distinct unwillingness within the war cabinet to authorise a strike on the argentine mainland. Despite everything that had happened Britain and Argentina were not in a formal state of war and the British government had been keen to keep the conflict as contained as possible. In the past week or so Britain had seen the destruction of HMS GLASGOW and the captured Lt Taylor being paraded in front of Argentine cameras which was making the members of the war cabinet become more and more cautious. There were also more pressing problems in the military sense. There was almost no onsite intelligence regarding the air base meaning that it was unknown how the base was defended or even if the Super Etendard’s and Exocets would be present and if so where exactly would they be on the airbase.
With regards to the option of an air strike from HMS EAGLE until that point a great part of the Task Force’s protection from air defence had been simply staying beyond the range of aircraft based on the mainland. Closing with the Argentine mainland would expose the Task Force’s most vital asset to a much increased potential risk of air attack. There were still too many unknowns about Argentina’s ability to provide air defence for both the base and mainland in general. It didn’t help that the war cabinet in Whitehall were nervous about the possibility of any more British airmen being captured. Without knowing exactly where the aircraft and missiles would be on the airbase if they even were present at all there would be no guarantee that an air strike could do anymore than temporarily deny them the use of the runway.
Various special forces options were examined. However, these also suffered from the same problems of political unwillingness in Whitehall and a lack of onsite intelligence. The SF option at least had the advantage that the men on the ground would be able to search the airbase for their targets (The Super Etendard’s, Exocet missiles, crew messes and if this option was taken up potentially the pilots themselves). An SF operation would have the added difficulty of how to infiltrate a large enough force to carry out the operation. Going in via submarine insertion would mean that the submarines would have to be recalled from their current duties to have the SAS and SBS men embarked before carrying out what would be an extremely risky mission for the boats. A helicopter insertion would likely mean that HMS HERMES would have to expose herself to an increased risk of air attack by moving closer to the mainland. It was unlikely that Admiral Woodward and Brigadier Thompson were going to release such an important asset for a mission such as this.
The final option envisioned an Operation Entebbe style raid with a pair of C-130’s landing directly onto the runway and disgorging an entire squadron of SAS men to cause havoc. This last option was dismissed as it was regarded as akin to mass suicide and even earned itself the nickname Operation Certain Death.
In the end permission for an operation against the Argentine mainland was never forthcoming meaning that Operation Mikado was never carried out.
After the conflict it later emerged that the Argentine Marines defending the airfield were indeed expecting some sort of attack and were well prepared. It also emerged that the Exocets and Super Etendard’s had indeed been present. During the strike against the HMS GLASGOW group one of the missiles had not functioned correctly and had simply dropped straight into the sea. With only three missiles left in the inventory the 2nd Naval Air Fighter/Attack Squadron had unknown to the British been stood down for a couple of days while Argentine technicians had tried to figure out what had gone wrong and ensure that it wouldn’t happen again.
The continued threat posed by the Exocets helped to influence the choice of landing beaches.
By the end of the third week of May a considerable amount of intelligence on the Argentinian’s disposition on the Falkland’s had been gleaned from Ariel reconnaissance, signals intelligence, satellite imagery and special forces observation posts. It had been deduced that the enemy forces numbered approximately 13,000 men and the majority were positioned in a defensive perimeter around Port Stanley with other forces located at chokepoints and other geographical features. This led to initial British plans for a direct assault on Port Stanley being quickly ruled out.
One of the most curious figures of the Falklands campaign was Major Southby-Tailyour of the Royal Marines. He had previously undertaken a tour of duty on the Falklands and being a keen yachtsman had spent his time exploring the coast giving him an intimate knowledge of nearly the entire coastline including almost every creek and inlet. He had even written a book on the subject of sailing in the Falklands but given that before the crisis most people had never even heard of the place let alone been able to find it on a map he had been unable to find anyone willing to publish his book. When the crisis had begun he had made his commanding officer aware of his previous experience in the area. When he had presented his manuscript, he had immediately found himself made a member of Brigadier Thompsons staff where his knowledge proved invaluable.
after much deliberation, war gaming and planning it had been decided that 3 Commando Brigade would be landing at San Carlos. An amphibious landing is probably the most risky of all naval operations. The decision on when and where to land nearly always involves a degree of compromise between the land, air and sea commanders and San Carlos was no exception. Brigadier Thompson himself wasn’t exactly wild about the choice of San Carlos given that it was more than 50 miles away from the main objective of Port Stanley and the beaches there were known to be less than ideal for unloading large quantities of men, equipment and stores. Less than 13 miles to the SE there was a strong enemy force at Goose Green and there was also a risk that the sea approaches and beaches themselves may have been mined.
These drawbacks however had been outweighed by the advantages that San Carlos had offered. It was far enough away from the majority of the Argentine forces near Port Stanley that they would be unable to intervene in time to prevent the British establishing a beach head and was also well beyond the range of the Argentine artillery positions identified so far. The high ground surrounding the proposed anchorage in San Carlos water would provide protection from Exocet attack for the stationary ships and would provide considerable protection against air strikes using bombs as the Argentine pilots would only have seconds to identify and attack a target after they crossed the ridgeline. The high ground would also provide the ideal location to set up Rapier SAM systems to provide an extra layer of protection from air attack. Indeed, the computers at the radar research establishment at Malvern back in the UK had already identified the ideal positions to situate the Rapiers.
Air cover over San Carlos would be provided by HMS INVINCIBLE’s Sea Harriers while HMS EAGLE’s Phantoms working with the Gannets would attempt to intercept inbound raids over the sea to the west before they even reached the islands. The Type 64 tactic of pairing a Sea Dart equipped Type 42 Destroyer with a Sea Wolf equipped Type 22 Frigate positioned to the north of the islands would be used again to hopefully draw some Argentine aircraft away from the landing ships and into the engagement envelopes of the British SAM’s.
Final preparations began on the 19th of May with a considerable amount of cross decking taking place. The large bright white painted luxury liner turned troopship SS CANBERRA was carrying a considerable amount of personnel and equipment. Her large size and distinctive paint scheme would make her an obvious target for Argentine pilots meaning that it would be reckless possibly bordering on suicidal to leave the majority of 3 Commando Brigade onboard her. Therefore, as many men and as much equipment as possible was dispersed to other ships leading to considerable overcrowding on the HERMES, FEARLESS and INTREPID. Tragically this operation did not go smoothly. A Sea King HC.4 conducting a cross decking flight suffered a catastrophic engine failure and crashed into the sea leading to the deaths of 9 Royal Marines and one of the pilots.
Despite these tragic setbacks the crossdecking operations were completed on the 20th of May and a signal was sent from Northwood to Admiral Woodward instructing him to inform Brigadier Thompson that he was to land in the Falklands at his discretion.
San Carlos, Night of the 20th/21st
The young Argentine corporal knew that he shouldn’t sleeping. He was supposed to be setting an example to the three conscript privates with him in the foxhole. Their job was to keep a watch out towards the sea for anything untoward but it was so dark that they simply had no hope of being able to see anything during the night. He had been trying to get hold of some night vision goggles but these were like gold dust and his superior had ended the conversation by asking him if he really wanted them to spot the British fleet in the incredibly unlikely event that it sailed right past them or to be able to spot the senior NCO coming to check on him. Those same four men had been in this same foxhole every night for more than a week now looking for something that in all likelihood probably was not going to come. The corporal who had not to long ago been a conscript had a disdain for certain aspects of military life including the in his opinion excessive discipline. It had started out as him allowing two men to have a quick snooze while the other two kept watch. Over time this had become three men asleep while one man kept watch. There had been one incident where all of them had dropped off to sleep but they were far enough away from the main force at Fanning Head that no one ever really came to check on them during the nights. Waking up to do his turn keeping watch out to sea he saw the private who had been doing this job right where he had left him. Noticing that the private wasn’t moving the corporal reckoned that he had probably fallen asleep. Who could blame him? Having to ly prone for hours at a time and bored it was only human instinct that people would start to feel sleepy. The corporal grabbed him by the ankle to shake him out of his slumber but nothing happened.
Pushing himself up he rubbed his eyes as his head came up over the top of his foxhole. As he took his hand down from his face he was stunned to see barely inches away from his own face another pair of eyes staring right back at him. That pair of eyes was the last thing the corporal or any of the privates saw in this world. He never even had the time to tell what colour they were.
