HMS EAGLE in the Falklands

[NOMISYRRUC]

It's too late to change the OP, but I think it should have happened like this...

IOTL Hermes paid off as a strike carrier in 1970 and her conversion to a commando carrier actually took place form 1st March 1971 to 17th August 1973 at a cost of £25 million. OTL she replaced Albion which was sold and scrapped.

However, ITTL...

It should have been Eagle that paid off in 1970 and her Phantomisation refit would take palace from 1st March 1971 to 17th August 1973.

IOTL major refits of large British warships had a habit of going way over time and cost from the 1950s rebuild of Victorious to the conversion of Tiger to a command cruiser. Therefore I am very sceptical that Eagle's Phantomisation refit would have been quick and cost the oft quoted estimate of £5 million. This is why if I was writing TTL I would have said that her Phantomisation refit would have actually cost £25 million, i.e. the same as the commando carrier conversion of Hermes.

However, if I was writing this TL some of that increase would be because it was actually a Service Life Extension Programme (SLEP) refit so that the ship would be able to serve for another 10 years. This would include replacing the ship's DC electrical system with an AC system, refurbishing her machinery and modernising some of her electronics. The latter would include replacing the Type 984 radar with a Type 988 (which ITTL would also be fitted to Bristol) and replacing her Action Data Automation (ADA) system with the Action Data Automation Weapons System (ADAWS) Mk 3 system which IOTL was to have been fitted to the CVA.01 class.

Having Eagle out of service from 1970 to 1973 has the bonus that it avoids the grounding which increased the estimated cost of the refit from £5 million to the £40 million quoted in Post 23.

Hermes would remain in commission as a strike carrier from 1970 until relieved by the Phantomised Eagle in 1973. She would then be paid off and then either scrapped or sold.

Albion isn't paid off in 1973 and scrapped after the proposed conversion to a support ship for the North Sea oil rigs falls through. Instead she takes the place of Hermes IOTL. So in 1976 she begins a conversion to an ASW carrier which is completed in January 1977. Then delays in the Invincible class result in her being fitted with a ski jump and the modernisation of her flagship facilities in a refit which began at Portsmouth in early 1980. The TTL edition of Jane's Fighting Ships 1981-82 would say that Albion is likely to be run onto 1984-85 depending upon how long it would take to finish the Invincible class. (The OTL JFS 1981-82 said that Illustrious was to start her sea trials in late 1981 and she would be commissioned early in 1982, while Ark Royal was expected to be completed in 1985). If Albion survives the TTL Falklands War she would have been paid off in 1984 like Hermes was IOTL and sail to India in 1987.

 

[KokkenKunten]

This is a timeline of the OTL Phantom FG Mk 1 and F Mk 3 squadrons from March 1965 to March 1984.

767 NAS was the FAA's Phantom training squadron. After its disbandment in August 1972 the aircrew for 892 NAS did their Phantom conversion training at No. 228 Operational Conversion Unit the RAF's Phantom training formation.

Although 899 NAS never operated the Phantom IOTL it was Eagle's Sea Vixen squadron and would probably have been her Phantom squadron if plans for her "Phantomisation" had not been abandoned.

No. 43 Squadron, RAF was formed with the Phantom FG Mk 1 aircraft that would have been used to form Eagle's Phantom squadron.

IOTL the Buccaneers from the disbanded 809 NAS were used to form the short lived No. 216 Squadron in RAF Strike Command. IOTL the original plan was to form a second Phantom FG Mk 1 squadron in the RAF. However, in the end the aircraft were rotated among the existing RAF Phantom units.

No. 74 Squadron, RAF was reformed in October 1984 with ex-US Navy F-4J Phantoms, which were designated Phantom F Mk 3 in RAF service. I have put it in this table for reasons which will become apparent when I post the TTL version of the spreadsheet.

Rather off, is that. Some corrections:

892's Pilots did not arrive on squadron straight from the Phantom OCU, they were first streamed through the Phantom Training Flight / Phantom Post Operational Conversion Unit (PTF/PPOCU) to bring them to the standard required by the RN. This was a three ship unit based at Leuchars, with aircraft provided from 111 Sqn (see below) & commanded by an RAF Squadron Leader. The aircraft carried a variant of the 892 'Omega' scheme without the red background. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:McDonnell_Douglas_F-4K_Phantom_FG1,_UK_-_Navy_AN1325454.jpg

The RAF's second FG.1 unit was 111 Sqn ('Tremblers'), which began the transition from the FGR.2 to FG.1 in Early 1978. The aircraft were not 'rotated among the existing RAF units' - the FG.1 is sufficiently different from the FGR.2 in so many areas as to make this impossible - from both maintenance and flight currency standpoints.

The additional Phantoms purchased from the US in 1984 were NEVER designated F.3, F. MK. 3 nor any variant thereof, they were F-4J(UK) and were always referred to as such by the Mod, RAF & the crews that flew them. F.3 is a bedwetting spotter's invention only - sometimes wiki is not your friend...

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The additional Phantoms purchased from the US in 1984 were NEVER designated F.3, F. MK. 3 nor any variant thereof, they were F-4J(UK) and were always referred to as such by the Mod, RAF & the crews that flew them. F.3 is a bedwetting spotter's invention only - sometimes wiki is not your friend...

Aircraft of the Royal Air Force Since 1918 by Owen Thetford, Eighth Edition, 1988.

Page 430 - Title McDonnell Douglas Phantom F.3

Third paragraph

No. 74 Squadron's Phantoms differed from all others in R.A.F. service by being second-hand U.S. Navy aircraft rather than specially-built and they originally carried the designation F-4J (U.K.) before becoming Phantom F.3. The first examples reached Britain in August 1984 and the full batch was allotted the serials ZE 350 to 364.

Thetford (who AFAIK was not a bedwetting spotter) uses the designation F.3 another two times in the entry on this variant of the Phantom. Once in the third paragraph on Page 430 and the final time in the second paragraph on Page 431.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The RAF's second FG.1 unit was 111 Sqn ('Tremblers'), which began the transition from the FGR.2 to FG.1 in Early 1978. The aircraft were not 'rotated among the existing RAF units' - the FG.1 is sufficiently different from the FGR.2 in so many areas as to make this impossible - from both maintenance and flight currency standpoints.

I'll give you that one.

I misremembered the following note that I made some years ago from Francis K. Mason's book on the Phantom.

Once the RN phased out 892 NAS it was thought that a second RAF F-4K squadron would be formed. In the event No. 111 converted to the F-4K, but the redundant F-4Ms were pooled to support the other existing squadrons.

 

[KokkenKunten]

Aircraft of the Royal Air Force Since 1918 by Owen Thetford, Eighth Edition, 1988.

Page 430 - Title McDonnell Douglas Phantom F.3

Third paragraphThetford (who AFAIK was not a bedwetting spotter) uses the designation F.3 another two times in the entry on this variant of the Phantom. Once in the third paragraph on Page 430 and the final time in the second paragraph on Page 431.

And he's dead wrong in doing so.

Didn't we establish previously that unofficial sources often contain erroneous data & claims?

Feel free to pester some actual RAF Phantom Phlyers on a well known pilot's web board for confirmation, or alternatively, get hold of a copy of the original op. order (you'll need to trawl whoever's currently responsible for the Swanton Morley archives for this).

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

892's Pilots did not arrive on squadron straight from the Phantom OCU, they were first streamed through the Phantom Training Flight / Phantom Post Operational Conversion Unit (PTF/PPOCU) to bring them to the standard required by the RN. This was a three ship unit based at Leuchars, with aircraft provided from 111 Sqn (see below) & commanded by an RAF Squadron Leader. The aircraft carried a variant of the 892 'Omega' scheme without the red background. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:McDonnell_Douglas_F-4K_Phantom_FG1,_UK_-_Navy_AN1325454.jpg

That's interesting.

From Flying Units of the RAF ― The ancestry, formation and disbandment of all flying units from 1912, by Alan Lake, Copyright © 1999 Alan Lake

Page 155
PHANTOM POST OPERATIONAL CONVERSION UNIT ― see Royal Air Force Post Operational Conversion Unit

PHANTOM TRAINING FLIGHT (1) ― see Royal Air Force Post Operational Conversion Unit

PHANTOM TRAINING FLIGHT (2) ― see 74 Squadron

Page 176
ROYAL AIR FORCE POST OPERATIONAL CONVERSION UNIT
Formed 1st September 1972 at Leuchars by re-designating an element of 767 Squadron.

Disbanded 31st May 1978 at Leuchars.

Page 215
74 SQUADRON, RFC, later 74 SQUADRON, RAF, later 74 (RESERVE) SQUADRON, RAF

A Phantom Training Flight existed within the Squadron between 1st February 1991 and 31st December 1991.

[I'm not shouting, the words in capitals have been transcribed as they appear in the book.]

 

[KokkenKunten]

892's Pilots did not arrive on squadron straight from the Phantom OCU, they were first streamed through the Phantom Training Flight / Phantom Post Operational Conversion Unit (PTF/PPOCU) to bring them to the standard required by the RN. This was a three ship unit based at Leuchars, with aircraft provided from 111 Sqn (see below) & commanded by an RAF Squadron Leader. The aircraft carried a variant of the 892 'Omega' scheme without the red background. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:McDonnell_Douglas_F-4K_Phantom_FG1,_UK_-_Navy_AN1325454.jpg

One minor correction to my earlier post. I should say, of course, that the PPOCU FG.1's were 'on the books' of 43 Sqn, NOT 111. Clearly, I'm getting too hung up on 'Tremblers' not getting their due as an FG.1 unit!

That's interesting.

From Flying Units of the RAF ― The ancestry, formation and disbandment of all flying units from 1912, by Alan Lake, Copyright © 1999 Alan Lake

Page 155
PHANTOM POST OPERATIONAL CONVERSIN UNIT ― see Royal Air Force Post Operational Conversion Unit

PHANTOM TRAINING FLIGHT (1) ― see Royal Air Force Post Operational Conversion Unit

PHANTOM TRAINING FLIGHT (2) ― see 74 Squadron

Page 176

ROYAL AIR FORCE POST OPERATIONAL CONVERSION UNIT
Formed 1st September 1972 at Leuchars by re-designating an element of 767 Squadron.

Disbanded 31st May 1978 at Leuchars.

Page 215
74 SQUADRON, RFC, later 74 SQUADRON, RAF, later 74 (RESERVE) SQUADRON, RAF

A Phantom Training Flight existed within the Squadron between 1st February 1991 and 31st December 1991.

[I'm not shouting, the words in capitals have been transcribed as they appear in the book.]

The training flight element for 74 Sqn existed only in the period when they transitioned from the F-4J(UK) to the FGR.2. This should not be confused with the earlier PTF/PPOCU. That aside, 228 OCU still retained responsibility for the (rapidly dwindling) FGR.2 fleet as a whole until July 1992 when it disbanded. By then, no further FGR.2 pilots were required and the Wattisham wing (56 & 74 Sqns) stood down on the Phantom in December of that year.

 

[KokkenKunten]

Perhaps this will put the F-4J(UK) / F.3 issue to bed:

F-4J(UK) by Frank Judge, on Flickr

img204 by Frank Judge, on Flickr

 

[General Ripper]

Any update?

About aircrafts and carriers, IMHO, sensible would be something like this:

HMS Eagle: 12 Phantoms, 14 Buccaneers, 6 Gannets AEW, 4 ASW helicopters, 2 SAR helicopters

HMS Invincible: 10 Harriers ( ground attack ), 2 SAR helicopters, 8 Sea Kings ( ASW )

HMS Hermes: 12 transport helicopters, 2 SAR helicopters, 12 ASW helicopters

But that's just my 2 pennies.

 

[jsb]

HMS Invincible: 10 Harriers ( ground attack ).....
HMS Hermes: 12 transport helicopters, ......

Why would you not deploy all the harries you can on the CV(L)s?

GB has plenty of available Harriers sitting in GB and Germany and they cant be used effectively if loaded onto lightly converted merchants unlike army helicopters?

 

[Virginia Liberal]

Why would you not deploy all the harries you can on the CV(L)s?

GB has plenty of available Harriers sitting in GB and Germany and they cant be used effectively if loaded onto lightly converted merchants unlike army helicopters?

USMC uses them from its Wasp Class Assault ships with no ski jump just fine. ( I think I got the Class name right )

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Any update?

About aircrafts and carriers, IMHO, sensible would be something like this:

HMS Eagle: 12 Phantoms, 14 Buccaneers, 6 Gannets AEW, 4 ASW helicopters, 2 SAR helicopters

HMS Invincible: 10 Harriers ( ground attack ), 2 SAR helicopters, 8 Sea Kings ( ASW )

HMS Hermes: 12 transport helicopters, 2 SAR helicopters, 12 ASW helicopters

But that's just my 2 pennies.

This is from earlier in the thread. Post 346 on Page 18.

If the British had waited until December 1982 they would have been able to deploy a maximum of 33 Sea Harriers, which is only 2 more than the number available on Monday 5th April 1982.

Sea Harrier Production for the Royal Navy

According to notes that I made several years ago from the Harrier Story by Davies and Thornborough a total of 57 Sea Harrier FRS Mk 1 were ordered as follows:

24 in 1975 (including 3 pre-production aircraft). The first fight date was 30th December 1978, but I did not record the delivery dates
10 in 1978 which were delivered 16th November 1981 to 22nd April 1982
14 in 1982 which were delivered 27th March 1985 to 20th June 1986
9 in 1984 which were delivered 13th November 1987 to 31st September 1988 (which I presume was a transcription error for 30th September 1988). These aircraft were ordered to increase the squadrons from 5 to 8 aircraft

For completeness the contract for the 32 Sea Harrier F/A Mk 2 rebuilds was not placed until December 1988, 5 years later than expected. 10 new build aircraft were ordered in March 1990, which was increased to 15 in 1992 and 18 in 1994.

The 1982 order was placed after the war was over so unless production could be speeded up the Royal Navy is not going to get any more Sea Harriers between 22nd April 1982 and the end of the year.

Sea Harrier Production for the Indian Navy

23 Sea Harrier FRS Mk 51 ordered according to the book against a requirement for 48. Orders and deliveries were as follows:

6 in 1978 which were delivered from 13th December 1983 to 5th October 1984
10 in 1985 - but 5 delivered 14th December 1989 to 24th June 1990
7 in 1986 - but 12 delivered 10th April 1990 to 7th March 1992.

So even if the British Government had requisitioned the aircraft building for India in April 1982 and was able to complete all of them by the end of they year they would only have acquired 6 extra aircraft.

Sea Harrier Availability in April 1982

According to the same source 30 Sea Harriers were built by Monday 5th April 1982 (the day the task force sailed). One was lost in 1980 and 28 went to the Falklands. However, when I went through the detailed notes I counted 32 as follows:

5 with 800NAS on Invincible
5 with 801NAS on Hermes
3 with 899NAS
4 with the Ministry of Defence (Procurement Executive)
7 in the attrition reserve at RAF St Athan
2 in maintenance at the Sea Harrier Support Unit at Yeovilton
4 not known, but I think they were with 899NAS
1 being rushed to completion on the British Aerospace line
1 lost in 1980

Total 32

The 28 aircraft that went to the Falklands were distributed as follows:

• 12 in 801NAS aboard Hermes. That is 5 from 801NAS; 3 from 899NAS; 3 more were flown in at the weekend of 3rd-4th April 1982 and the 12th arrived on 5th April 1982 when she was in the Bay of Biscay. I did not make a note of where the last 4 aircraft came from, but its likely that they came from 899NAS;
• 8 in 800NAS aboard Invincible. That is 5 from 800NAS, plus 2 from the attrition reserve and one from the Ministry of Defence (Procurement Executive). This aircraft was being used for Sea Eagle trials and 2 of the other 3 development aircraft went to 899NAS;
• 8 in 809 NAS which flew to Widewake on 30th April 1982. It embarked on the Atlantic Conveyor and the notes I made said that on 18th and 19th May 4 Sea Harriers transferred to Invincible and the rest to Invincible. However, that must be a transcription error so I presume half went to Invincible and the rest to Hermes. These aircraft were absorbed by 800 and 801NAS.
• The source also says that the 3 squadrons exchanged their AIM-9G Sidewinders with AIM-9L at Ascension Island.

809 NAS

My notes say that 809NAS was authorised the day after the task force sailed and was to be formed by the end of the month. At that time 11 Sea Harriers were available as follows:

• 3 were with the MoD (PE) but one of them was written off on the Yeovilton ski-jump
• 5 were at RAF St Athan
• 2 were in maintenance at the Sea Harrier Support Unit (SHSU) at Yeovilton and
• 1 was being rushed to completion on the BAe line.

809NAS had acquired 8 of the above aircraft, which left 2 with 899NAS for training. 8 Sea Harriers were lost from all causes in the Falklands and the serviceability rate for the Sea Harrier and Harrier GR Mk 3 in the Falklands War was 90%.

The Cancelled Sea Harrier Order

My notes also say that 802 NAS was to have been formed in 1981 according to a 1978 announcement. The squadron would have been equipped with the 10 aircraft of the projected third order, but this was cancelled in the 1981 Defence Review.

However, as the aircraft ordered in 1982 weren't delivered until 1985 I think that if the third order had been placed in 1981 the aircraft would not have been delivered until 1984 AND to have been of use in the Falklands War they would have had to have been ordered in 1980 at the latest.

RAF Harriers in the Falklands War

The RAF Harriers were cleared for aircraft carrier operations in 1971. 3 went to Ascension Island for air defence and 6 embarked on the Atlantic Conveyor. The latter aircraft transferred to Hermes which operated 15 Sea Harriers and 6 Harriers. The RAF joined in part because of the Sea Harrier shortage. 3 replacement Harrier GR Mk 3 flew from Ascension to Hermes on 1st and 8th June 1982 (total 6?) and 3 replacement Harrier GR Mk 3 arrived from the 14th June 1982 from the Contender Bezant. On 4th July 1983 the Harrier Detachment at RAF Port Stanley had a Unit Equipment of 10 Harrier GR Mk 3. The last 4 Harrier GR Mk 3 were ordered in 1983 as Falkland attrition replacements.

The Atlantic Conveyor went down with 3 out of 4 Chinooks and all the Harrier support equipment. E.g. the FOB at Port San Carlos had an 850ft runway, a VTOL pad and parking for 4 Harriers, there would have been parking for 10 but the material required went down with the Atlantic Conveyor.

 

[Nick P]

I can now see why people start two separate threads, one for their story and one for others to pick apart their ideas....

Please do carry on with this Flasheart.

 

[SsgtC]

I can now see why people start two separate threads, one for their story and one for others to pick apart their ideas....

Please do carry on with this Flasheart.

Amen!!! I've been really enjoying this!! Please carry on and ignore the background chatter!!

 

[Virginia Liberal]

Amen!!! I've been really enjoying this!! Please carry on and ignore the background chatter!!

agreed please continue and don't think my post a detraction merely a shared thought

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

This replaces Posts 439 and 440. It is the F-4K Phantom squadrons IOTL from March 1965 to March 1984 IOTL and what I think they would be ITTL.

I have excluded 700P because I decided not to put it in. I have excluded the Royal Air Force Post Operation Conversion Unit which existed from 1st September 1972 to 31st May 1978 because it wasn't officially a squadron - there's a clue its name.

@MancFrank if you spot any errors feel free to (politely) point them out. However, right or wrong this is the last version.

 

[KokkenKunten]

@MancFrank if you spot any errors feel free to (politely) point them out. However, right or wrong this is the last version.

In the RAF order of precedence (which, in the days of many fast jet squadrons, was well established and codified), 43 Sqn would re-establish before 74 Sqn.

 

[kaymay]

Guys infos good but please let the author tell his tale.

 

[flasheart]

HMS EAGLE, 1st May

They say that the worst part of any battle is the waiting. That was certainly a sentiment that the men of HMS EAGLE and the other ships of the carrier group would have agreed with. It was late afternoon and the group was now located to the north east of the Falklands heading towards a position at approximately 50.00S 054.00W whereupon they would begin operations against Argentine forces within the TEZ. The ships company had transitioned into defence watches a few days previously to allow them to blow a few cobwebs out of the system. The men were now split into two watches which would be swap over every 6 hours and the ship itself had been cleared for action. Anything that wasn’t going to be immediately needed was a potential fire/shrapnel hazard and had either been locked away somewhere out of the way or in many cases simply thrown overboard.

Captain Slater had originally intended for this meeting in his cabin to be a small affair to discuss the ships state of readiness. Also present were ships XO, MEO and air group commander. However, at the last minute completely unannounced the Task Force commander Rear Admiral Woodward had decided to attend having received the latest Argentine intentions assessment from Northwood was especially keen to be kept up to date with potential issues concerning his fleets most critical asset.
The XO was up first. He talked about the state of the ships company and the various preparations for action that had gone on. The only real issue he brought up was the level of tension onboard. The last emergency drills had been conducted a few days previously and it had been made clear to everybody that the next time the general alarm sounded it would be for real. This was a completely new experience for most of the ships company and some weren’t dealing with it as well as others. The XO was concerned that if tension continued to rise then there could be a potential adverse effect on morale or worse people may start to relax into the heightened readiness state a bit too much and start to take their eye off the ball.
The MEO was up next and went through the various defects and what his department was doing to correct them. No ship is completely without problems and for a such a large and elderly ship that had just undertaken such a long voyage EAGLE had no more mechanical issues than were to be expected. This was largely down to the Marine Engineering department keeping on top of things and dealing with any small problems before they could grow into something bigger. As things stood at this moment there weren’t any problems that would immediately affect EAGLE’s performance or ability to conduct flying operations. Yet.

The air group commander spoke last and reported on the state of his aircraft and men. The Admiral took a particular interest in this report. Of the men right now, those aircrews and flight deck hands not committed to sustaining the Combat Air Patrol were in their cabins and messdecks trying to get as much sleep as possible while they still had the opportunity. Like the XO the squadron commanders were worried about the effect that the general tension on the ship was having on their crews who were now very aware that the next time they climbed into a cockpit would be for the real thing. CDR Ward (CO of the Phantom Squadron) had been practically screaming for the severed head of one particular as yet unidentified individual. The story was that during a conversation in the wardroom (where in his opinion in an act of great charity the XO was now allowing aircrew to wear flight suits) a Sub lieutenant had rather unhelpfully pointed out to a group of Ward’s pilots that they would now likely be having to land their aircraft in the dark and without the benefit of somewhere to divert to and that not only that but the average life expectancy of someone finding themselves actually in the South Atlantic. Whether malicious or merely just ill considered idle conversation a few of the pilots had been more than a little unnerved by this and the Air Group commander had found Ward trying to organise some sort of lynch mob to locate the offending individual. Naturally he had put a stop to such nonsense but he had made a note to find out who this officer was and have a quiet word with him.

With regards to the aircraft themselves they were as ready as they were ever going to be and as of right now almost all were serviceable. As far as he was concerned there would be nothing to prevent tonight’s mission from being able to go ahead.
At this point Rear Admiral Woodward spoke and stated that as well as the already planned mission it was highly probable that within the next 48 hours the air group would also be required to conduct maritime strikes and air defence missions and asked of the assembled officers if the ship was up to the task. Naturally they all replied yes but had slightly concerned looks on their faces. Woodward proceeded to bring them up to speed on the very latest intelligence situation and how the carrier group would react.



ARA VEINTICINCO DE MAYO

Rear Admiral Allara commander of TG 79.1 read aloud the signal from Purto Belgrano to the assembled officers. The naval aspect of Operation Martillo was to proceed.
His carrier in company with the two Type 42 destroyers would proceed south towards the area where the British were believed to be located. Approximately 100 miles to his east TG 79.4 consisting of three modern Exocet equipped Drummond class corvettes were acting as a screening force.
Though direct contact had not been made the Argentinians were slowly pinning down the British fleets location via the information provided by their aircraft and submarine. Though for its own safety it had been obliged to keep its distance the air force ELINT equipped Boeing 707 had confirmed (through the detection of radar emissions) the presence of Gannet AEW aircraft known to only be carried by the British HMS EAGLE. The submarine ARA SAN LUIS was located to the NE of the Malvinas and had reported hearing explosions consistent with depth charges. Admiral Allara mused on this particular piece of information. Evidently the British felt themselves unable to positively determine the location of the SAN LUIS and so were getting nervous and attacking everything that could potentially be her. This nervousness could very well be their undoing as it was allowing the real SAN LUIS and by extension the rest of the Argentine fleet to get a more positive bearing on at least some of their escort ships.

His group would steam south through the night to a point just outside the British exclusion zone and as soon as it was light enough start launching S-2 Tracker aircraft to get a firmer idea of where the British fleet was. In concert with TG 79.3 to the south headed by ARA GENERAL BELGRANO, TG 79.4 and ARA SAN LUIS they would conduct a pincer movement meeting each other to the NE of the islands. This would have the effect of gradually reducing the area that the British could be in until they were eventually located. Once that happened the locating unit would initiate the attack with the other units moving to join in. The air force had aircraft waiting to launch against the British ships as soon as they were located (Despite the planned use of Port Stanley airfield most of the aircraft still didn’t have the fuel to search for the targets themselves).
For the Veinticinco De Mayo her contribution to the actual attack would be her eight A4Q Skyhawks of the 3rd Naval Fighter/Attack Squadron. It was regrettable that the Exocet equipped Super Etendard’s were not yet carrier qualified by they wouldn’t be left out and would be operating from ashore.

As far as was possible all ships were to remain beyond 200 miles of the Malvinas. The British had declared what they called a “Total Exclusion Zone” within which any Argentine forces would be liable to attack. This combined with their previous behaviour indicated to Allara that the British were still acting with a degree of restraint and attempting to limit the spread of this conflict. While he had no doubt that once the shooting started that this exclusion zone and all other restraints placed upon his enemy would quickly evaporate for now it would at least perhaps give him a degree of protection and enable him to get closer to his objective.
There was one thing that was really worrying him though. His carrier wouldn’t be getting close enough to the British fleet to have to worry about surface attack and following the recent exercises with the air force he was confident that his pair of Type 42’s could fend off any British air attack. Their nuclear powered submarines were a different matter.



Chequers

The war cabinet had assembled in order to discuss an urgent issue. Admiral Fieldhouse brought them up to speed on the developing situation. HMS CONQUEROR had located and begun tracking a group of Argentine warships to the South of the Falklands that included the cruiser ARA GENERAL BELGRANO. HMS SPLENDID had reported intermittent detections of the Argentine aircraft carrier 25th of may to the north. Though she no longer had sonar contact with the carrier the previous detections all had the ship heading south towards the TEZ. It was the assessment of both himself, Admiral Lewin and Rear Admiral Woodward aboard HMS EAGLE that the Argentinians were conducting a pincer movement and that a full scale attack was developing. This was further supported by the American satellite images they had received that showed the runway at Port Stanley airfield having been lengthened.

In light of this situation Admiral Woodward had sent a signal outlining what he wished to do about it but as the Argentinians were outside of the TEZ he required the authority of the war cabinet to carry out his plan. As per usual the various ministers started debating the issue without any clear direction towards a decision. Lewin thought to himself that it would probably have been a damned sight easier to go straight to the PM direct and tell the rest of the cabinet only after the event. A quick look in Fieldhouses direction indicated that he was thinking along roughly the same line.
Some were worried about the diplomatic repercussions of the potential large loss of life and that Britain might be seen to have launched an unprovoked attack. An increasing number of members though pointed out that after South Georgia Britain was in all but name effectively at war with Argentina anyway so why were they trying to impede her forces ability to fight that war.

In the end knowing that she would be held responsible for whatever happened anyway the PM was the one who decided the issue. Turning to Admiral Fieldhouse she simply said
sink them.



Wideawake Airfield, Ascension Island

Clutching a piece of paper, the RAF officer didn’t even need to say anything to gain the attention of the various flight suited figures in the crowded crew tent. The men had been waiting in nervous anticipation and trying to pass the time as best they could.
To their relief and excitement the officer told them “Tonight’s performance is to begin as advertised and the supporting cast have confirmed their attendance”.

 

[Starfox5]

Yes! Sink them!