Hitler's Alternate WWII Strategy

The road network would be repaired - the German army did not keep tens of thousands of engineers on staff for decoration.

Like they did in Eastern Libya? :rolleyes:

The distance by road (about 480 miles), and that simply defines the amount of supply landed in Tunisia that is consumed in the move to Tripoli. A rough and ready figure might be 25%.
That sounds rather low. At 300 miles, a truck-based logistic net generally consume more then half of what they are transporting. So at 480 miles we are looking at something like 60% given the terrible infrastructure net. So 240,000 tons make it as far as Tripoli. Then they have to make it out to Benghazi, which is 600 miles. And then they have to travel 300 miles to the front line assuming the front is equidistant between Benghazi and Alexandria.

It is an additional 300 miles to Alexandria.

http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/JanFeb01/MS610.htm

Once disembarked, supplies had to be moved vast distances over an extremely limited road and rail network to reach the forward depots. Van Creveld notes that "the enormous distances . . . were all out of proportion to anything the Wehrmacht [the German Army] had been asked to deal with in Europe. From Brest-Litovsk, on the German-Soviet demarcation line in Poland, to Moscow it was only some 600 miles. This was approximately equal to the distance from Tripoli to Benghazi, but only half that from Tripoli to Alexandria [Egypt]."

Compounding the problem was the lack of adequate roads. There was only one "main supply route," the Via Balbia, which stretched endlessly along the coast, often was interrupted by floods, and was laughably susceptible to both air and ground interdiction. Apart from this, there were only desert tracks, the use of which greatly increased wear and tear on vehicles.

If anything, the rail network was even sparser than the road network. German Major General Alfred Toppe laconically concluded, "There was no continuous railroad in Libya. The two railroads, each about thirty kilometers in length, in Tripolitania [northwest Libya] and in the Cyrenaica, were of no military importance." These local factors had a critical impact on German logistics efforts.
 
Exactly. Even if Nazi Germany were to seize Gibraltar and Portugal with Spanish help and secure (tenuous) control of the Mediterranean, they would still end up losing once they went to war with the United States and the Soviet Union. The simple fact is that Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union won because they outproduced Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Militarist Japan. There is nothing Hitler, Mussolini, Tojo or any other Axis leader can really do to change that.

Yes, this is the salient point, but with one reservation. An Axis Med strategy might not influence Germany's main threat axis (which was across the Atlantic, in the form of American airpower), but it could influence the disposition of the USSR. You write,

The simple fact is that Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union won because they outproduced Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Militarist Japan. There is nothing Hitler, Mussolini, Tojo or any other Axis leader can really do to change that.

But there was something the Axis could do about the disparity - the "and the Soviet Union" part. A Med strategy is related to the wartime coalition of the US, USSR and Britain. If the strategy creates or reinforces that alliance, then game over for the Axis. If the strategy were to break up that coalition, then it might be a different story.
 
Seizing Marseilles and Tunisia would give the Germans 600,000 additional tons of shipping and Tunisia, which presumably would allow the necessary LOC in Libya without undue Italian interference.
Except it will need even more trucks and fuel, and you'd still need to cross Libya. Also, you now hand De Gaulle all remaining territories and equipment.
 
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Like they did in Eastern Libya?

No, not like they did in Libya - there is no invasion of Russia in this scenario, so the German army's corps of engineers can lavish all its attention on NA. So, unless we have some evidence that the German army's corps of engineers was not capable of doing its job, the road logistics should be adequate.

That sounds rather low. At 300 miles, a truck-based logistic net generally consume more then half of what they are transporting. So at 480 miles we are looking at something like 60% given the terrible infrastructure net.
Even given this level of incompetency, 40% of landed supply would reach Tripoli, so if 8,000 tons landed in Tunisia each day, Tripoli gets 3,200 tons per day, or about 100,000 tons per month, or doubling the supply capacity for Libya.

So 240,000 tons make it as far as Tripoli.
If 240,000 tons accumulates, then that's 800 division days at 300 tons per day, (mech divisions might require 600 tons per day in high intensity combat, but most days were not high intensity combat), which would allow 15 divisions to campaign for 50 days.

Then they have to make it out to Benghazi, which is 600 miles. And then they have to travel 300 miles to the front line assuming the front is equidistant between Benghazi and Alexandria.
A ton of supply arriving at Tripoli from Tunisia is no different than a ton of supply landed directly in Tripoli.
 
A ton of supply sent from Tunisia to Tripoli is no different than a ton of supply landed directly in Tripoli.

Precisely. So the front line still gets no more then a trickle. Because the greater mass of those supplies would be consumed in transport getting from Tripoli to the front.
 
How many divisions would the Axis need to secure such a long supply line from SAS/LRDG/Commando patrols? It sounds like a target made for the proto-special forces.
 
3,000-5,000 extra daily tons of supply in Tripoli is a serious threat to Alexandria.

No it's not. Because those supplies have to get from Tripoli to the front. And by the time they get there, between consmption en-route and British interdiction efforts, you're looking at something like a few hundred extra tons over IOTL. And that number goes down the closer the Germans advance towards Alexandria.

That isn't going to get the IOTL Afrika Corps to Alexandria, much less a larger force.
 
Is there any chance of crash-expansions of Benghazi and the other eastern ports?

That requires more time (a few years) then the Germans have, is subject to interference from the British, and the materials would have to be brought in from outside which reduces the flow of supplies while construction is on-going. Maybe with a pre-war POD...
 

Deleted member 1487

Is there any chance of crash-expansions of Benghazi and the other eastern ports?

Its a lot easier to build a coastal rail road from Benghazi; work already started pre-war and its much easier to link up to Tobruk. Below is the map showing lines radiating out of Benghazi
UK-Med-I-17.jpg
 
Seizing Marseilles and Tunisia would give the Germans 600,000 additional tons of shipping and Tunisia, which presumably would allow the necessary LOC in Libya without undue Italian interference.

Yeah, you fail to observe that Libya still was an Italian colony. Mussolini in 1940 was still fancying a "separate war", a parallel war with Germany, and wasn't ready to accept the notion that Italy needed help.
That is the fact, and you'd better start facing facts, because they have this annoying habit of existing even if you face away from them.
 
Its a lot easier to build a coastal rail road from Benghazi; work already started pre-war and its much easier to link up to Tobruk.

So the idea now is that Italy spends money like there's no tomorrow to build an infrastructure when they don't need it, so that when, much later, and entirely unexpectedly, France falls, Hitler can suddenly decide to do whatever he wants on Italian territory, regardless of the complete opposition of the Italian government, and have a chance of succeeding? Is that the plan? Clever.
 
That requires more time (a few years) then the Germans have, is subject to interference from the British, and the materials would have to be brought in from outside which reduces the flow of supplies while construction is on-going. Maybe with a pre-war POD...
Maybe, although I was thinking more of an 'Axis Mulberries' concept, ie, it being obvious the existing ports aren't sufficient, the Germans try to come up with a solution that's quick enough to deploy within a year.

Its a lot easier to build a coastal rail road from Benghazi; work already started pre-war and its much easier to link up to Tobruk.
Problem is, Benghazi itself still isn't a great port. In fact this would be more helpful for moving stuff to the front that was brought to the city by road.
 

Deleted member 1487

So the idea now is that Italy spends money like there's no tomorrow to build an infrastructure when they don't need it, so that when, much later, and entirely unexpectedly, France falls, Hitler can suddenly decide to do whatever he wants on Italian territory, regardless of the complete opposition of the Italian government, and have a chance of succeeding? Is that the plan? Clever.

What are you talking about? Italy was building up a rail road out from Benghazi pre-war and the war interrupted construction.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benghazi#World_War_II
Additionally Cyrenaica was populated by more than 20,000 Italian colonists in the late 1930s, mainly around the coast of Benghazi. Benghazi population was made up of more than 35 per cent of Italians in 1939.[22]

As a consequence, there was in Cyrenaica and mostly in Benghazi a huge economic development in the second half of the 1930s. Benghazi was going to be connected in 1940 by a new railway to Tripoli, but in summer of that year war started between Italians and British and infrastructure development came to a standstill.

When the Germans get involved in February 1941 start prioritizing rail infrastructure construction to ease supply burdens out to Tobruk; its not rocket science. Your strawmanning and being rude for no reason considering you jumped to conclusions and I made no reference to time period or even who would do the expansion; its not like the Italians couldn't do it and later get German help. Its infrastructure that was needed anyway and was delayed by the Great Depression and both World Wars.
 
The issue is that expanding the railway reduces the viable army size. Why? Because without a rail-manufacturing facility in Libya, all the rails have to be brought in from Italy, thus putting even more of a strain on the already lumber port facilities.
 

Deleted member 1487

The issue is that expanding the railway reduces the viable army size. Why? Because without a rail-manufacturing facility in Libya, all the rails have to be brought in from Italy, thus putting even more of a strain on the already lumber port facilities.

Considering how much of it was nearly useless, this isn't a problem; its better to have fewer and better units than lots of undersupplied ones.
 
Yes, this is the salient point, but with one reservation. An Axis Med strategy might not influence Germany's main threat axis (which was across the Atlantic, in the form of American airpower), but it could influence the disposition of the USSR. You write,

The simple fact is that Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union won because they outproduced Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Militarist Japan. There is nothing Hitler, Mussolini, Tojo or any other Axis leader can really do to change that.

But there was something the Axis could do about the disparity - the "and the Soviet Union" part. A Med strategy is related to the wartime coalition of the US, USSR and Britain. If the strategy creates or reinforces that alliance, then game over for the Axis. If the strategy were to break up that coalition, then it might be a different story.

The problem is that Hitler will attack the Soviets, even if the Mediterranean operations force him to push it back to '42 he will do it. As long as Hitler (or anyone remotely Prussian for that matter) is in charge, the Germans will open an eastern front.
 
Its a lot easier to build a coastal rail road from Benghazi; work already started pre-war and its much easier to link up to Tobruk. Below is the map showing lines radiating out of Benghazi

Hmm... given the weather difficulties, the terrain, and the isolation of the area how long would that take? Especially in the face of the inevitable British attempts to interfere with construction? A coastal railway of that length would be vulnerable to repeated severing not just from aircraft, but from naval ships and by saboteur teams either sneaking in over the desert with the armored car raiders or getting inserted (and extracted) by sea... lots of landing spots for those on the Libyan coast as well. That would have to be factored in as well.

Considering how much of it was nearly useless, this isn't a problem; its better to have fewer and better units than lots of undersupplied ones.

Unless having fewer units means the British crush you faster.
 
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