Hitler's Alternate WWII Strategy

Suppose Hitler, after the conquest of France, had not chosen to focus on invading Britain but re-deployed his air force and army to seize the Mediterranean. Surely German forces between June of 1940 and spring of 1941 would have easily finished off the British in North Africa, seized malta, and perhaps taken Gibraltar (although that would have been somewhat problematical).

By turning the Mediterranean Sea into an Axis lake, the canal cut, and German forces in Palestine at the very least British logistical traffic from/to Iran and the Gulf oil fields would have to go around the horn (although perhaps this was always so...I am not sure).

Without a southern front, that might have freed much of the German occupation force in Greece, Yugoslavia (etc) for use in the invasion of the Soviet Union, and the Germans would never have had to defend Italy. So would there have been a realistic strategy in advancing on Iran, through it to the Soviet oil fields in the Caucuses?
 
Suppose Hitler, after the conquest of France, had not chosen to focus on invading Britain but re-deployed his air force and army to seize the Mediterranean. Surely German forces between June of 1940 and spring of 1941 would have easily finished off the British in North Africa, seized malta, and perhaps taken Gibraltar (although that would have been somewhat problematical).

Only if we completely ignore that the Libyan port and ground infrastructure was insufficient to support any more forces.
 
Only if we completely ignore that the Libyan port and ground infrastructure was insufficient to support any more forces.

Anymore? The facilities were apparently more than enough to support the Italian 10th Army, whose size was at least 5 or 6 times the size of the British in 1940; before they were killed and captured. As the first ad hoc motorized German unit did not arrive till Feb 1941, and whose size and orders were to merely hold the line, it seems to me that had the Germans spent 1940 in in a major force buildup of German units in North Africa the outcome would have been certain.

Of course there were supply problems much later in the war, AFTER the British committed far larger forces, but July 1940 to June 1941 was the critical period in which the Germans could have made a southern front moot.
 
Anymore? The facilities were apparently more than enough to support the Italian 10th Army, whose size was at least 5 or 6 times the size of the British in 1940; before they were killed and captured.

Ah, my apologies. I figured you were referring to the somewhat more repeated idea the Germans could somehow funnel in more troops and equipment then they ultimately did IOTL and succeed in advance all the way out into Egypt. I guess I saw the words "seize the Mediterranean" in the first sentence caused me to leap to that conclusion.

In any case, the same answer does still apply in a somewhat different way. The major deployment of German forces to North Africa and efforts against Malta would basically obviate the Battle of Britain (the Luftwaffe does not have enough resources to do both things at once) and be a clear signal to the British that there is no invasion coming so they are also free to transfer major forces to North Africa. In the mean time, the logistical constraints will set in as the Germans advance towards Alexandria will still cause them to stall-out before they can reach the city. By the time the ITTL Afrika Corps can stockpile enough supplies in forward depots, the British reinforcements will have have arrived and counter-attacked the overextended Germans and Italians.
 
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Ah, my apologies. I figured you were referring to the somewhat more repeated idea the Germans could somehow funnel in more troops and equipment then they ultimately did IOTL and succeed in advance all the way out into Egypt. I guess I saw the words "seize the Mediterranean" in the first sentence caused me to leap to that conclusion.

In any case, the same answer does still apply in a somewhat different way. The major deployment of German forces to North Africa and efforts against Malta would basically obviate the Battle of Britain (the Luftwaffe does not have enough resources to do both things at once) and be a clear signal to the British that there is no invasion coming so they are also free to transfer major forces to North Africa. In the mean time, the logistical constraints will set in as the Germans advance towards Alexandria will still cause them to stall-out before they can reach the city. By the time the ITTL Afrika Corps can stockpile enough supplies in forward depots, the British reinforcements will have have arrived and counter-attacked the overextended Germans and Italians.

Hmmmm...you may be correct.
 
there is merit in this thought but with any strategy one cannot assume the enemy will simply do what they did OTL and not respond to the new threat. The difficulty with the UK was that hey controlled the sea lanes so could deposit troops and planes wherever they leased.
 
If Hitler really wanted to hobble the British war effort, he would've gotten Franco to join the Axis shortly after France fell. Jointly seizing Gibraltar and Portugal with the Spanish would require around twelve divisions (Operation Felix called for two divisions while Operation Gisella called for ten) - Germany had around 30 divisions stationed in occupied France, surely a few of those could be spared. Combine that with the 2,550 German and Italian aircraft used in the Battle of Britain OTL and you have more than enough resources to take Portugal and Gibraltar. Seizing Portugal and Gibraltar would've done alot more damage to the British war effort than the Battle of Britain ever did. Closing the straits of Gibraltar would force the British to route their convoys from India and the Middle East around the Cape of Good Hope. Even then, U-boats stationed in the ports of Cadiz, Lisbon, Porto and A Coruña could make things dicey.
 
If Hitler really wanted to hobble the British war effort, he would've gotten Franco to join the Axis shortly after France fell. .

But Franco wouldn't join the Axis. See: Civil War, Spanish; Francisco, Franco.

J
ointly seizing Gibraltar and Portugal with the Spanish would require around twelve divisions (Operation Felix called for two divisions while Operation Gisella called for ten) - Germany had around 30 divisions stationed in occupied France, surely a few of those could be spared.

Spain/Portugal aren't France/Poland. Three words: Mountains & Shi*ty Roads. Also, again--your over-estimating the capacity of Spanish logistics. Like I said, see: Civil War, Spanish. Not to sound overtly the pedant, but lets remember that its not a board game or an RTS--its one thing to have the forces, another thing entirely to move, equip and use them effectivly.


Combine that with the 2,550 German and Italian aircraft used in the Battle of Britain OTL and you have more than enough resources to take Portugal and Gibraltar.

As above: no BoB--lots of strategic flexibility for both the RAF and and the RN; No life or death island struggle means opportunity to switch priorities

Seizing Portugal and Gibraltar would've done alot more damage to the British war effort than the Battle of Britain ever did.

Maybe. I dunno why Portgual would be all that important but thats *if* they capture The Rock, and why they would bother invading Portugal when it was neutral(ish) and they would cause another nation to join the Allies? :confused:
Closing the straits of Gibraltar would force the British to route their convoys from India and the Middle East around the Cape of Good Hope. Even then, U-boats stationed in the ports of Cadiz, Lisbon, Porto and A Coruña could make things dicey

I really, really doubt the ability of the KM and Regio Marina (?) of "clos(ing) the straights" considering they didn't even come close OTL. and more U-boat ports in the strategic sense arent going to be a game-changer. Seeing as they had perfectly good French ports i.e Lorient, Cherbourg and St.Nazaire to name a few, which in themselves attributed to a greater length to the U-boat arm; which was doomed in the long run anyway thanks to improved and increasing Allied (UK.Canada and post 12.7.41 US) ASW and Escort Carriers
 
Suppose Hitler, after the conquest of France, had not chosen to focus on invading Britain but re-deployed his air force and army to seize the Mediterranean. Surely German forces between June of 1940 and spring of 1941 would have easily finished off the British in North Africa, seized malta, and perhaps taken Gibraltar (although that would have been somewhat problematical).

By turning the Mediterranean Sea into an Axis lake, the canal cut, and German forces in Palestine at the very least British logistical traffic from/to Iran and the Gulf oil fields would have to go around the horn (although perhaps this was always so...I am not sure).

Without a southern front, that might have freed much of the German occupation force in Greece, Yugoslavia (etc) for use in the invasion of the Soviet Union, and the Germans would never have had to defend Italy. So would there have been a realistic strategy in advancing on Iran, through it to the Soviet oil fields in the Caucuses?

here you go: https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=306868

The thing is, commiting ressources to the area prevents them from being used elsewhere (i.e. Russia), and the distances involved means a huge strain on trucks, but also other machines necessary to support such an advance.

Meanwhile, the geography of the place means the British will always have a place to fall back to.

Lastly, I think going in via Syria as early and as determined as possible is about the only way such an advacne could be achieved, if that.
 
Honestly, I'm more familiar with the political and diplomatic side of WWII than I am with the military, so I'm going to try and respond to these questions as best as I can.

But Franco wouldn't join the Axis. See: Civil War, Spanish; Francisco, Franco.
There were three main reasons Franco didn't join the Axis:

a) Hitler sent Canaris to Spain as an envoy to convince Franco to join the Axis. However, Canaris deliberately sabotaged Hitler's efforts by telling Franco that an alliance with Hitler would be a bad idea, since he was secretly a member of the German resistance. Send someone like Ribbentrop to do business with Franco and he might leave with a very different attitude towards an alliance with the Germans.

b) If Franco joined the Axis, he wanted Hitler to guarantee Spanish control of Gibraltar, Portugal and French Morocco. While Hitler could guarantee Spanish control of Gibraltar and Portugal, Hitler didn't want to let Franco have control of French Morocco, for fear of offending Vichy. Either have Hitler decide that an alliance with Spain is worth offending Vichy or have Hitler offer something to Franco in exchange for him putting off his Moroccan aspirations until after Britain has been defeated.

c) Hitler waited too long to court Franco. Franco seemed most interested in joining the Axis either shortly before or directly after France fell. Hitler was so confident that the German victory in France would lead to Britain surrendering that he didn't pay any attention to Franco's interest. By the time he wised up and realized that a belligerent Spain could be worthwhile, Franco's interest had cooled, since it became apparent that Britain wasn't going to fall any time soon (Franco told Hitler in a letter that he wasn't going to join the Axis until he was absolutely sure Britain was on the verge of collapse). It would've been much easier for Hitler to get Franco to join the Axis directly after the fall of France, since prior to Britain's success in repelling the Luftwaffe during the Battle of Britain, most people thought a British surrender was a matter of "when," not "if."

Spain/Portugal aren't France/Poland. Three words: Mountains & Shi*ty Roads. Also, again--your over-estimating the capacity of Spanish logistics. Like I said, see: Civil War, Spanish. Not to sound overtly the pedant, but lets remember that its not a board game or an RTS--its one thing to have the forces, another thing entirely to move, equip and use them effectivly.
Blame the Germans for over-estimating Spanish logistics, not me. The strategy I'm suggesting is based off of actual German plans for the Iberian Peninsula.

As above: no BoB--lots of strategic flexibility for both the RAF and and the RN; No life or death island struggle means opportunity to switch priorities
The fact was that Hitler was never going to be able to invade Britain because he didn't have the surface fleet necessary for such an undertaking. If he'd allied with Spain and then taken Gibraltar and Portugal, it would make it much easier for German U-Boats to strike British convoys from India and the Middle East. Taking Gibraltar also would've improved the Regia Marina's strategic position in the Mediterranean.

With Gibraltar captured, Malta can only be supplied from one direction, meaning that the Regia Marina and Kriegsmarine can concentrate all their forces in the eastern Mediterranean. The capital ships of the Regia Marina were newer than the Alexandria Fleet and outnumbered them two to one. After Malta is captured, the Axis can use it as a base for their fighters, providing air cover to Italian convoys and making it more difficult for the British to sink them. Better yet, control of Malta gives the Axis a secure supply line to Tripoli and North Africa.

Maybe. I dunno why Portgual would be all that important but thats *if* they capture The Rock, and why they would bother invading Portugal when it was neutral(ish) and they would cause another nation to join the Allies? :confused:
Dolfy didn't seem to mind invading neutral countries, even if it meant that they would inevitably end up joining the Allies - see Yugoslavia.

I really, really doubt the ability of the KM and Regio Marina (?) of "clos(ing) the straights" considering they didn't even come close OTL. and more U-boat ports in the strategic sense arent going to be a game-changer. Seeing as they had perfectly good French ports i.e Lorient, Cherbourg and St.Nazaire to name a few, which in themselves attributed to a greater length to the U-boat arm; which was doomed in the long run anyway thanks to improved and increasing Allied (UK.Canada and post 12.7.41 US) ASW and Escort Carriers
Honestly, even in a scenario where Hitler gets more nations to join the Axis, he's going to lose. If AH.com has taught me anything, it's that a German victory is impossible with Hitler and the Nazis in charge.
 
Leaving aside other reasoned and reasonable objections, this thread fails in that up until now, nobody has used the following word: Mussolini.

The OP posits Hitler can do what he wants in an Italian colony, from/to Italian ports, and with, at least in part, Italian troops and ships, without ever considering that Mussolini might have an opinion about that.

Mussolini's opinion was: we don't need your help, thank you. That holds true unitl Graziani's defeat, therefore way too late for a POD that should be immediately after the fall of France.
 
You take Spain and Portugal and in some ways you improve the British position.

Convoys already went round the Cape anyway in OTL so no change there and the Brits will take the Canaries before the Germans can get defenses in place and the Portuguese will invite the Brits into the Azores.

You've just gifted the Brits the perfect bases to stage ASW missions out of.

(The Azores especially appear to be in a very useful position)
 

gaijin

Banned
Not to mention that Portugal was a major source/import point of strategic metals for the Germans. As soon as the Germans accept Portugal they loose this pipeline.

Real life war is a lot more complicated than drawing arrows on a map.
 
Leaving aside other reasoned and reasonable objections, this thread fails in that up until now, nobody has used the following word: Mussolini.

The OP posits Hitler can do what he wants in an Italian colony, from/to Italian ports, and with, at least in part, Italian troops and ships, without ever considering that Mussolini might have an opinion about that.

Mussolini's opinion was: we don't need your help, thank you. That holds true unitl Graziani's defeat, therefore way too late for a POD that should be immediately after the fall of France.

Worse yet, any PoD that kills Mussolini before the Fall of France (or immediately thereafter) will in all probability put Italo Balbo in power, who will flatly reject Hitler's ideas after recovering from his fit of convulsive laughter.
 
Suppose Hitler, after the conquest of France, had not chosen to focus on invading Britain but re-deployed his air force and army to seize the Mediterranean. Surely German forces between June of 1940 and spring of 1941 would have easily finished off the British in North Africa, seized malta, and perhaps taken Gibraltar (although that would have been somewhat problematical).

Germany's problem was the USAAF and the fact that by 1944 US industry could manufacture 100,000 aircraft per year, or about 3 times German production, (even greater when measured by weight of aircraft). Nothing in the Med, one way or another, could change this problem.
 
Only if we completely ignore that the Libyan port and ground infrastructure was insufficient to support any more forces.

Seizing Tunisia would have secured the necessary additional port space at Bizerte and Tunis. Ground infrastructure I would think sufficient, given the dry climatic conditions.
 
Seizing Tunisia would have secured the necessary additional port space at Bizerte and Tunis.

And an extra several hundred kilometers over equally roads as equally bad as eastern Libya and (if I recall correctly) no rail lines. That is not conducive to improving the supply situation.

Ground infrastructure I would think sufficient, given the dry climatic conditions.
It certainly didn't IOTL for a smaller force compared to what the proposed alternate Med strategy would require.
 
Leaving aside other reasoned and reasonable objections, this thread fails in that up until now, nobody has used the following word: Mussolini.

Seizing Marseilles and Tunisia would give the Germans 600,000 additional tons of shipping and Tunisia, which presumably would allow the necessary LOC in Libya without undue Italian interference.
 
And an extra several hundred kilometers over equally bad roads and (if I recall correctly) no rail lines.
That is not conducive to improving the supply situation.

The destination port capacity was the main issue, and Tunisia would solve
it.

The road network would be repaired - the German army did not keep tens of thousands of engineers on staff for decoration.

The distance by road (about 480 miles), and that simply defines the amount of supply landed in Tunisia that is consumed in the move to Tripoli. A rough and ready figure might be 25%.
 
Germany's problem was the USAAF and the fact that by 1944 US industry could manufacture 100,000 aircraft per year, or about 3 times German production, (even greater when measured by weight of aircraft). Nothing in the Med, one way or another, could change this problem.
Exactly. Even if Nazi Germany were to seize Gibraltar and Portugal with Spanish help and secured (tenuous) control of the Mediterranean, they would still end up losing once they went to war with the United States and the Soviet Union. The simple fact is that Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union won because they outproduced Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Militarist Japan. There is nothing Hitler, Mussolini, Tojo or any other Axis leader can really do to change that.
 
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