Hitler was right or was he?

Commissar

Banned
Two nice examples for you:


2) He was wrong at Stalingrad where he issued the same order because Goering told him the Luftwaffe could resupply the Sixth Army by air (which it couldn't).

Actually that was the correct decision. Remember when this attack occurred the Soviets were also launching Mars, a massive blow at relieving Leningrad, and yet another in the Caucasus. Torch and Dieppe before that had also drawn off quite a lot of reserves and Hitler was caught in a dilemma.

If Sixth Army tried to run for it, the Soviet attack could flatten out allowing it to swing into the rear of Army Group B in the Caucasus or swing North to assist the thrust against Army Group Center.

Till the reserves could bolster the shattered Army Group A sector and allow AGB to get out of the Caucasus, Sixth had to hold fast.
 
So we have established that the British have much further to go to supply their troops.
Now you try doing that in face of Axis air superiority.
In late 1941 in OTL the Italians were unloading 72,000 tons a month in Libya that was more than enough to supply the Axis forces there.
In this TL with Malta captured and greater air superiority early on plus the extra Italian trucks lost in the Balkans the logistical situation will be even better with that of the British being worse.

Wow, don't worry about it.
 

Graehame

Banned
Moscow or Kiev (Pt #1)

Pt. #1
You're right that Hitler was often correct, especially in the early years of the war. His decision to invade France, for example, was dead on.
You're dead wrong, however, to cite Hitler's decision to strip Army Group Center (HGZ) of its 2 panzergruppes in late Aug 1941 as an example. That decision cost him the war. The plan for the fall campaign on the Russian Front was a pivotal moment in world history, where-- had the German High Command made the right decision-- the balance of history would have tipped so strongly in favor of an Axis victory that the Allies probably could not have recovered.
On 18 Aug the Army High Command (OKH) presented Hitler with its plan for the autumn campaign, which designated Moscow as the key objective. On 22 Aug, however, Hitler rejected the OKH plan & decided instead to strip HGZ of both of its panzer armies, sending one to support HGN & the other to support HGS. These new dispositions were in effect by 25 Aug. HGN arguably made no more progress with 2 panzer armies than it could have with only 1, but HGS won one of the largest encirclement battles of the war, took the city of Kiev, captured over 450,000 Soviet troops, & positioned itself for a thrust all ther way to the Don River & the southern city of Rostov, which it captured before the end of the year.
Taking Gen. Guderian's 2d Panzer Army (2PzA) as an example, between 25 Aug & the beginning of Oct the 2PzA drove 300 miles to Kiev, 300 miles back to Smolensk, & spent perhaps another 200 miles in tactical manuvering-- 36 days of exhausting combat for the men, & at least 800 miles of wear & tear on the vehicles, not counting losses, injuries, & battle damage. The experience of General Hoth's 3PzA with HGN was similar. These 2 Panzer Armies, worn down as they were, then spearheaded the attack on Moscow.
On 25 Aug, & again at the beginning of Oct, Moscow was located 200 miles east-northeast of the German salient at Smolensk. On 2 October German forces were in position to begin Operation Typhoon, the campaign against Moscow. Within days the Wehrmacht captured the 3d, 13th, 19th, 20th, 24th, & 32d Soviet Armies, capturing over 670,000 prisoners & leaving only 90,000 men & 150 tanks available for the defense of Moscow. On 13 Oct, 12 days into the campaign, 3PzA penetrated within 90 miles of Moscow, having traversed 110 miles from its start-point. The doom of the Siviet Union appeared to have been sealed.
But on 18 Oct rain began turning the roads into a thick gumbo of mud in which trucks couldn't move unless they were towed by tanks. Aircraft couldn't take off except from paved runways-- but there were almost no paved runways. A plane could land in the mud only on its belly, or its landing gear would snag & cause it to crash. On 30 Oct, when the mud grew so thick even the tanks could hardly move, the offensive was halted on orders from Hitler. This respite in front of Moscow enabled Stalin to build fortifications & reinforce the units defending his capital.
On 15 Nov the ground froze sufficiently to allow the Germans to resume their offensive. Three days later Stalin began his first tentative probing attacks, for the first time using his new T-34 tanks in large formations, & by the end of the month it was becoming obvious that Russia was in the beginnings of one of its worst winters on record. Despite all these disadvantages German troops fought their way to within artillery range of the Kremlin by 2 Dec. In blizzard conditions the Battle of Moscow raged for 3 days before the incredibly severe weather & the withering away of his troops & equipment caused Hitler to order disengagement.
On 6 Dec Stalin launched his first winter offensive. The Germans hadn't prepared any fortifications for the winter, so they suffered heavy losses while being driven halfway back to their starting positions. Raging with fury, Hitler purged his army that winter of over 100 senior generals.
During the entire war the Axis never came closer to victory than they did between 2 & 5 Dec 1941.
(more follows)
 

Graehame

Banned
Moscow or Kiev Pt #2

Pt #2
During Operation Typhoon the German Wehrmacht enjoyed 16 days of good weather (2-18 Oct), 12 days of worsening weather (18-30 Oct), followed by 15 more days of impossible weather (31 Oct-14 Nov). This was followed by about 12-14 days of marginal weather (14 thru 26 or 28 Nov, when the ground was frozen), followed by 7 to 9 days of worsening weather which by 5 Dec became impossible. Thus the campaign included a total of 16 days of good weather, 33 days of marginal weather, & 15 days of impossible weather, during which the German Wehrmacht, with exhausted panzer crews, fought its way to within artillery range of the Kremlin.
What would have been the situation had Hitler not interfered, & allowed the OKH plan for the autumn campaign to stand?
Between 25 Aug and 17 Oct there were 53 days of good weather. This favored the Germans, who needed good weather to make full use of their aircraft, artillery, & mobility. This is greater than the 49 total days of combined good & marginal weather encountered in the actual campaign, which argues strongly, absent other factors, that under the OKH plan the German Wehrmacht would have reached Moscow as early as 16 September-- a mere 24 days into the campaign.
For the first 12 days progress might have been similar in both scenarios, since good weather was enjoyed in both. For the next 12 days, however, Operation Typhoon encountered 4 days of good weather & 8 days of worsening weather, while in our hypothetical scenario the weather would remain good. Let us assume that in our hypothetical scenario the pace during this period would be similar to that achieved in the first 12 days. Since 3PzA penetrated within 90 miles of Moscow in the first 12 days, having covered over half the distance from its start-point, it's reasonable to assume, absent other factors, that the Wehrmacht could have reached Moscow within 24 days. This would leave 29 days of good weather to consolidate these gains & continue the offensive.
However, these assumptions are "absent other factors." There are 2 other factors that shorten the time-frame even further.
First is the effect of the Leningrad & Kiev campaigns on the panzers & their crews. Fresher panzer formations, absent the losses in the Leningrad & Kiev campaigns, might have arguably made faster progress.
And second, on 14 Sep 1941 Stalin's agent in Japan, Richard Sorge, reported that the Japanese intended to attack the United States instead of Siberia. Acting on this information Stalin brought 34 elité divisions of the Siberian Army, over 1000 tanks, & over 1000 aircraft to defend Moscow. These forces were in place by mid-November, & represented the main defense that slowed & ultimately defeated the historical offensive. Had the attack been launched on 25 Aug instead of 2 Oct, then the Germans would have entered Moscow on or before 16 Sep-- only 2 days after Sorge's report & long before the transfer of any Siberian divisions could take place.
There is also 1 other factor that would have increased the impact of the capture of Moscow. During Operation Typhoon Stalin remained in Moscow himself, he issued orders that no one was to evacuate, & he threatened to shoot anyone who tried to leave. Had these orders been in effect during our hypothetical scenario then the Germans might have captured not only many senior Soviet government officials & their staffs & files, but also STAVKA, the Soviet High Command, & its files, & even Stalin himself.
Even absent this particular consideration, the consequences of a German conquest of Moscow would have been enormous. Moscow was much more than the administrative nerve-center of a totalitarian state. It was also the road & rail hub of European Russia, & one of its largest manufacturing complexes. Moscow had long been the seat of Great Russian chauvinism. If Russian resistance had continued at all past the fall of Moscow, then it would have been a resistance infected with gnawing self-doubts. The Germans might have been able to continue their campaign--successfully-- while greatly reducing their forces.
(more follows)
 

Graehame

Banned
Moscow or Kiev Pt. #3

Pt #3
Counter-Arguments : There's a case to be made to the contrary. Quoting from Wikipedia, in the words of historian David M. Glantz, "Some claim that had Hitler launched Operation Typhoon in September rather than October, the Wehrmacht would have avoided the terrible weather conditions & reached & captured Moscow before the onset of winter. This argument too does not hold up to close scrutiny."
The proposal in this paper is for Hitler to have launched Operation Typhoon on 25 Aug, not in Sep. but the argument is essentially similar in either case.
"Had Hitler launched Operation Typhoon in September, Army Group Center would have had to penetrate deep Soviet defenses manned by a force that had not squandered its strength in fruitless offensives against German positions east of Smolensk."
True, but by Sep 1941 the German Wehrmacht had been demonstrating its ability to penetrate deep enemy defenses manned by fresh forces for 2 years in Poland, Denmark, Belgium, France, Greece, North Africa, & Russia itself. There is no reason to believe that the defenses around Moscow would have fared any better than the defenses around Kiev did in the historical campaign.
"Furthermore, Army Group Center would have launched its offensive with a force of more than 600,000 men threatening its ever-extending right flank &, in the best reckoning, would have reached the gates of Moscow after mid-October just as the fall rainy season was beginning."
First, excessive concern about flanks is the very antithesis of blitzkrieg. In the words of Gen. Patton, "Let the enemy worry about his flanks!"
Second, as shown above, Moscow would have fallen as early as 16 September-- not after mid-October. With fresh panzer formations, & absent the transfer of Siberian divisions, tanks, & aircraft, possibly even earlier than that.
Third, the speed with which Moscow would have fallen would have made any threat to the exposed German flank chimerical. Even if the campaign had lasted an extra 2 weeks, until around 1 Oct, this was still 6 weeks before the Soviets fielded their first large formations of T-34 tanks. Absent large formations of T-34 tanks, & in light of continuing pressure from von Rundstedt's HGS, the Soviet forces in the vicinity of Kiev would have been unable to pose much of a threat to HGZ.
"Finally, the Stavka saved Moscow by raising & fielding 10 reserve armies that took part in the final defense of the city, the December 1941 counterstrokes, & the January 1942 counteroffensive. These armies would have gone into action regardless of when Hitler launched Operation Typhoon. While they effectively halted & drove back the German offensive short of Moscow as the operation actually developed, they would also have been available to do so had the Germans attacked Moscow a month earlier."
The difference being that in our hypothetical scenario the Germans would have been defending Moscow, possibly having captured large numbers of senior government officials, their staffs & files, STAVKA & its files, & even Stalin himself. Fighting on the defensive, with good interior routes, the Wehrmacht would possess strong advantages against the Siberian reinforcements, which would have been bogged down by the mud & more seriously affected by the winter weather. Furthermore, it would have been crystal clear to every German general & soldier that as long as they held Moscow they had roads & warm buildings to seek shelter in, while the moment they relinquished the city they'd be in the open countryside. HGZ in Operation Typhoon had been reinforced to 3 panzer armies. The ability of the Siberian reinforcements to dislodge HGZ from Moscow under these conditions is doubtful.
"Furthermore, if the latter were the case, they would have been able to operate in conjunction with the 600,000 plus force of Army Group Center’s overextended right flank."
As noted above, the 600,000 Soviets in the Kiev region would have been under pressure from HGS, as well as restricted by the weather. Their ability to attack an objective 400 miles north is highly questionable, especially under conditions of deep mud & severe winter weather.
In addition, there is 1 salient factor not alluded to by Mr. Glantz. It's true that thru early Sep Japan had refused German requests to invade Siberia, but in Richard Sorge's report revealing the Japanese intention to attack the U.S. instead Sorge listed 3 factors, any 1 of which could still lead to a Japanese attack on Siberia. 1st was if the Germans took Moscow, 2d was if the Japanese Kwantung Army outnumbered Soviet forces in Siberia by 3-to-1, & 3d was in the event of a civil war in Siberia.
In 1941 the Kwantung Army reached a strength of 700,000 men. Near the end of the year, when Stalin transferred 34 divisions west (21 of which ended up defending Moscow), that represented a shift of 425,000 to 600,000 men-- virtually the entire Siberian army. This certainly left 233,000 or fewer troops remaining to defend Siberia, which fulfilled the 2d condition listed by Sorge.
But either way, a German conquest of Moscow would have fulfilled the 1st condition, exposing Siberia to invasion by Japan. Note that this condition would have been fulfilled in late Sep, over 2 months before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Thus Japan might have been drawn into a land war against the Soviet Union instead of a naval war against the U.S. & Britain, which might have prevented the U.S. from being drawn into the war until well into 1942. The long-term effect of this change on the outcome of the war strongly favors an Axis victory.
 
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