Moscow or Kiev Pt. #3
Pt #3
Counter-Arguments : There's a case to be made to the contrary. Quoting from Wikipedia, in the words of historian David M. Glantz, "Some claim that had Hitler launched Operation Typhoon in September rather than October, the Wehrmacht would have avoided the terrible weather conditions & reached & captured Moscow before the onset of winter. This argument too does not hold up to close scrutiny."
The proposal in this paper is for Hitler to have launched Operation Typhoon on 25 Aug, not in Sep. but the argument is essentially similar in either case.
"Had Hitler launched Operation Typhoon in September, Army Group Center would have had to penetrate deep Soviet defenses manned by a force that had not squandered its strength in fruitless offensives against German positions east of Smolensk."
True, but by Sep 1941 the German Wehrmacht had been demonstrating its ability to penetrate deep enemy defenses manned by fresh forces for 2 years in Poland, Denmark, Belgium, France, Greece, North Africa, & Russia itself. There is no reason to believe that the defenses around Moscow would have fared any better than the defenses around Kiev did in the historical campaign.
"Furthermore, Army Group Center would have launched its offensive with a force of more than 600,000 men threatening its ever-extending right flank &, in the best reckoning, would have reached the gates of Moscow after mid-October just as the fall rainy season was beginning."
First, excessive concern about flanks is the very antithesis of blitzkrieg. In the words of Gen. Patton, "Let the enemy worry about his flanks!"
Second, as shown above, Moscow would have fallen as early as 16 September-- not after mid-October. With fresh panzer formations, & absent the transfer of Siberian divisions, tanks, & aircraft, possibly even earlier than that.
Third, the speed with which Moscow would have fallen would have made any threat to the exposed German flank chimerical. Even if the campaign had lasted an extra 2 weeks, until around 1 Oct, this was still 6 weeks before the Soviets fielded their first large formations of T-34 tanks. Absent large formations of T-34 tanks, & in light of continuing pressure from von Rundstedt's HGS, the Soviet forces in the vicinity of Kiev would have been unable to pose much of a threat to HGZ.
"Finally, the Stavka saved Moscow by raising & fielding 10 reserve armies that took part in the final defense of the city, the December 1941 counterstrokes, & the January 1942 counteroffensive. These armies would have gone into action regardless of when Hitler launched Operation Typhoon. While they effectively halted & drove back the German offensive short of Moscow as the operation actually developed, they would also have been available to do so had the Germans attacked Moscow a month earlier."
The difference being that in our hypothetical scenario the Germans would have been defending Moscow, possibly having captured large numbers of senior government officials, their staffs & files, STAVKA & its files, & even Stalin himself. Fighting on the defensive, with good interior routes, the Wehrmacht would possess strong advantages against the Siberian reinforcements, which would have been bogged down by the mud & more seriously affected by the winter weather. Furthermore, it would have been crystal clear to every German general & soldier that as long as they held Moscow they had roads & warm buildings to seek shelter in, while the moment they relinquished the city they'd be in the open countryside. HGZ in Operation Typhoon had been reinforced to 3 panzer armies. The ability of the Siberian reinforcements to dislodge HGZ from Moscow under these conditions is doubtful.
"Furthermore, if the latter were the case, they would have been able to operate in conjunction with the 600,000 plus force of Army Group Center’s overextended right flank."
As noted above, the 600,000 Soviets in the Kiev region would have been under pressure from HGS, as well as restricted by the weather. Their ability to attack an objective 400 miles north is highly questionable, especially under conditions of deep mud & severe winter weather.
In addition, there is 1 salient factor not alluded to by Mr. Glantz. It's true that thru early Sep Japan had refused German requests to invade Siberia, but in Richard Sorge's report revealing the Japanese intention to attack the U.S. instead Sorge listed 3 factors, any 1 of which could still lead to a Japanese attack on Siberia. 1st was if the Germans took Moscow, 2d was if the Japanese Kwantung Army outnumbered Soviet forces in Siberia by 3-to-1, & 3d was in the event of a civil war in Siberia.
In 1941 the Kwantung Army reached a strength of 700,000 men. Near the end of the year, when Stalin transferred 34 divisions west (21 of which ended up defending Moscow), that represented a shift of 425,000 to 600,000 men-- virtually the entire Siberian army. This certainly left 233,000 or fewer troops remaining to defend Siberia, which fulfilled the 2d condition listed by Sorge.
But either way, a German conquest of Moscow would have fulfilled the 1st condition, exposing Siberia to invasion by Japan. Note that this condition would have been fulfilled in late Sep, over 2 months before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Thus Japan might have been drawn into a land war against the Soviet Union instead of a naval war against the U.S. & Britain, which might have prevented the U.S. from being drawn into the war until well into 1942. The long-term effect of this change on the outcome of the war strongly favors an Axis victory.