Hitler invading France in October/November 1939

Dear all,

This is a discussion also ongoing (sort of) on one of the other forums, but I take the chance to raise it here as well, due to the many good quality comments here.

Hitler was determined to invade France (case yellow) in October/November 1939.

1) Would it have been feasible? German logistics after the Polish campaign?

2) BEF was not in position at that time (some 120,000 troops vs. some 350,000 in May 1940)

3) The weather was not so good for another campaign



However: which plan could have been followed: the updated Schlieffen or the new Manstein?

Brooke himself states that if Hitler had invaded in 1939, it would have been disaster for France and England.

Now, calling on all clever people: Could it have been a possibility? What would have changed? Invasion of UK?

Ivan
 
It wasn't operationally possible, plus it was one of the few times the general staff really put their foot down against Hitler. The polish campaign cost them hundreds of tanks and aircraft, and 10's of thousands of casualties which would take time to restore. Also, more than 50 percent of the German army's infantry divisions where not called up or starting to be raised until September 1939, and where critically deficient in a lot of equipment

The airwar would go a lot worse for Germany... their main advantage (since the allies had close to numerical parity) was that they were willing to fly the hell out of their men and machines, as many as 10 sorties a day... you can do this in May when there are 15+ hours of daylight... but not in November

The German army also critically needed time to absorb the lessons from the Polish campaign and redesign their mobile divisions

Going with the original case yellow instead of sickle cut is also a disaster, because it would result in a super gembloux meeting battle which the Germans would probably lose since French tanks where technically superior; as opposed to bypassing the overwhelming majority of France's mobile army and cutting off their supply lines and forcing them to fight front and back
 
I agree with Blair. It is a bad idea for the Germans for several reasons.

1. Bad weather, negating their advantages in tactical air power.
2. They would be doing the updated Schlieffen, which was what the French expected and prepared for.
3. Their stocks of ammunition was not run-out, but low.
4. They would have far less troops far worse equipped - a lot was mobilised and built October 1939-May 1940.
5. They would not have absorbed the experiences of the Polish campaign.

My take of it is that the French and Germans meet in central Belgium, with the Belgian army making a fighting retreat, covering the northern flank of the French forces. The cream of the French army is ground down - but so is the cream of the German mobile forces. The French get worse than they give, but they have far more tanks to draw from, and a bigger production. By January 1940, the French have 3 DLMs and 3 DCRs up to almost full strength again and invade the Saar. The Germans will take more time to get their mobile forces up to strength. Vestning Holland might hold, too, which means the Netherlands fight on - the Germans cannot make the paradrops they did in May 1940. The French probably link up in Zeeland to have a continious front.

In the meantime, the British, Belgians and Dutch have time to mobilise fully, to integrate into an inter-allied cooperation and step up their arms production/purchases to modernize their armies.

Spring 1940, the Germans face 2 000 000 French, 400 000 Brits, 600 000 Belgians, 400 000 Dutch, 100 000 Polish and 50 000 Czechoslovak troops plus ~50 000 ex-Republican Spanish troops in the French Foreign Legion raised from the refugees. All ready, armed, mobilised, integrated and with the experience to have weeded out the worst doctrines and practices.

The French production plans for summer and autumn 1940 were frightful. I wonder if the German can deal with them.
 
Given the total size of the Wehrmacht at the time and the winter conditions...

The army used to invade France OTL @eight months later had almost twice as many tanks as were used to invade Poland and a 60% increase in infantry divisions. In October/November 1939 that increase won't be available and a good portion of the tanks used against Poland may still be undergoing repairs as nearly 50% of the tanks involved were damaged or suffered breakdown from use during the campaign.

Additionally the quality of German panzers increased significantly in terms of armor, firepower and so forth.
 
More or less also my take on it.

Startig a new campaign in October/November would not be my idea of a war, either.

An improved Schlieffen would exactly be what the French were planning for.

A "Manstein" during winter would be a challenge.

HOWEVER: BEF was not fully deployed and was nearly just raw recruits. The French may have been even more demoralised. BEF had nearly nothing in terms of equipment. France had not deployed.

I have read up on Trent's book on Brooke, where Brooke really feared an invasion in October/November as he failed to see that the French army was up to it, based on:

1) France was sort of pulled into the war by Britain (his take on the French sentiment, true or not)

2) Their war preparations were even worse of in October 1939.

Now, I fully agree with the gamble when Germany was basically not ready at all for another campaign, all the good things above.

The question remains: How big a gamble was it really:

Totally impossible? hugh risk?

If we take into account the allieds being totally unprepared and maybe even worse of than Germany, then what?

(I am sort of 70% disaster, 30% maybe it could have gone right)

Ivan
 
The diplomatic factors are Interesting too. The lesser Axis powers/future Axis members will abandon Germany. Romania may be pressured into cutting off oil supplies. Stalin may ship German oil just to keep them fighting Britain and France a bit longer. Or he may turn on German when it’s obvious the Nazis are losing the war.

Mussolini of course will sit on his hands and try to re-establish Italian influence in the Balkans in the aftermath of Hitler’s defeat.
 
Now, that's an interesting thought.

What would Russia do? Especially if Germany got tied up or plainly defeated in France?
 
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