Hitler holds back to finish off Britain

perfectgeneral

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Air mobile armour

Shortly after the surrender of Rotterdam, General Student became wounded by friendly fire, being accidentally shot in the head by soldiers of Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler. While he recovered, the command of the division was temporarily assumed by General Putzier.
- You know how it is...
At the start of 1941, the OKW decided to create the German XI Air Corps, which would include the 7th Flieger Division. This Corps would be under the command of General Student, and General Süssmann would become the new commander of the 7th Flieger Division.

German XI
Flieger Corps (Student)

7th Flieger Division
(Süssmann)
1st Fallschirmjäger Assault battalion (4 companies) in Kübelwagens(Type 82/3) fitted with machine gun turret and tow hitch for 37 PAK (37mm L/48) gun
37mmpak36.jpg
Mix of AP and (mostly) HX rounds
Fallschirmjäger Aufklärungs Abteilung (Recce Motorcycle Battalion)
1st battalion 1st Fallschirmjäger regiment (light motorised)
2nd battalion 1st Fallschirmjäger regiment (light motorised)
1st battalion 2nd Fallschirmjäger regiment (light motorised)
2nd battalion 2nd Fallschirmjäger regiment (light motorised)
1st battalion 3rd Fallschirmjäger regiment (light motorised)
2nd battalion 3rd Fallschirmjäger regiment (light motorised)
1st Fallschirmjäger Artillery regiment (light motorised) truck towed 75mm le. IG 18 L / 11.2 gun and 210mm Nebelwerfer 42 (available march 1942)
75mmig18.jpg
nebelwerfer.jpg

FlaK-Regiment 8.8 cm FlaK 37 (mot)
88mmflak36.jpg

Pionier-Battalion 1 (pioneer/engineer battalion)
Nachrichten-Abteilung 1 (signals battalion)
Sanitäts-Abteilung 1 (medical battalion)
1st Fallschirm Panzer Division (Oberst Paul Conrath)
100px-FPD_HG_Symbol.jpg

plus

22nd Luftlande-Infanterie Division (Generalmajor Heinrich Kreipe)
  • Divisionstab
  • 47.Infanterie-Regiment
  • 16.Infanterie-Regiment
  • 65.Infanterie-Regiment
  • 22.Artillerie-Regiment
  • 22.Panzerabwehr-Abteilung (tank destroyer battalion)
  • 22.Aufklärungs-Abteilung (Recce batallion)
  • 22.Feldersatz-Battalion
  • 22.Nachrichten-Battalion
  • 22.Pionier-Battalion
A second Fallschirmjäger Division is planned for 1943 (probably from veterans of the 22nd), although if this assault succeeds then it's role will be largely deterrent.

Pictures of guns: http://www.tarrif.net/cgi/production/all_artillery_adv.php
 
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AFAIK, Britain was doing something during OTL 1940-1941, wasn't it?

Oh yes, defeated the Luftwaffe in the BoB, sank the Bismark, disabled the Gneisenau, destroyed over half the Italian Navy in three engagements, destroyed the heavy water facility in Norway as well as conducting many other commando raids and pushed the combined Axis forces in North Africa back to El Agheila.
 

Markus

Banned
S

MAC ships? not a threat to a full squadron of fighters and didn't leave the drawing board until June of 1942. Mosquitoes will arrive late if they arrive at all. These convoy attacks will be intended for outside the range of most land based fighters, where possible. Radar won't offer much warning of incoming formations intent on supporting a U-boat attack. A radio alert from the convoy will be the point that Mosquitoes take off.

Assuming the British will NOT react to the German action you are right, but that is the problem: Not taking into consideration the other sides reaction.

edit: Regarding the german paras, they were almost destroyed by forces that were much worse equipped than anything you will find in the UK in 1941.


First off, we must remember that the British historically believed that there was a severe danger of invasion so I doubt there would be major changes prior to start of 1941.


Wouldn´t ULTRA give the secret away? Or the smaller than in OTL dissolution of the invasion fleet? And that fleet is the key factor, it needs to land the first wave, keep it supplied and land a second wave. That will be challanging. Around the time of the de facto cancelation of S...n the RAF and RN began effective attacks on the assembly ports. These will begin again once ships are movd into the Channel ports.
British rail and road logistics are better and harder to interdict and with almost 40 divisions in the UK, there are enough decent troops to stall the first wave and good ones to counterattack.

I still say ignore the Brits and try to defeat the USSR as long as it is (or looks) weak and the US is not in the war.
 
British rail and road logistics are better and harder to interdict and with almost 40 divisions in the UK, there are enough decent troops to stall the first wave and good ones to counterattack.

Yes, the ground fight would be very hard but then again a land fight was something in which 1941 German Army excelled against 1941 British Army.

I still say ignore the Brits and try to defeat the USSR as long as it is (or looks) weak and the US is not in the war.

Yes, that makes sense but on the other hand if Nazi leadership really had sense they would have focused on producing Volkswagens to conquer the worlds car markets instead of trying to conquer half of the world...

On the other hand, beating Britain would also bring benefits for a fight against Soviet Union, assuming that the campaign can be finished before Barbarossa of 1942. Let's consider two options. First is a truce between UK and Germany, second is a de facto or de jure surrender.

In both options the Western threat has disappeared, meaning that whole of the Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine can be brought against Soviet Union. In both options as well the Mediterranean can be used as a supply route to keep the Italian economy going and creating a new line of supply through Mediterranean and Black Sea. This means German lines of communication in Southern Soviet Union are radically shortened. Additional Kriegsmarine strength helps both Black Sea and Baltic Sea campaigns slightly. Curtailment of KM activities will help fuel situation.

If there has been a de facto or de jure surrender of UK, this brings additional advantages. I'd imagine somekind of deal is brought to deliver oil supplies for Germany, expanding possibilities of motorization. A de facto or de jure surrender also means that British vehicles are available for further mechanization of Wehrmacht. Historically French vehicles and fuel supplies were very important to Barbarossa.
 
Hitler was stated to be willing to let Britain off light and with no prospects of being able to fight on against both Germany and Italy alone, you could very well see Churchill get a vote of no confidence and a new Prime Minister put in to negotiate a peace treaty.

This is spot on in that a Mediterranean strategy is the only real option Hitler has of forcing some sort of peace. Unfortunately, when you consider how horrendously unlikely are the alternatives, that's not saying much. If Churchill is forced out as a result of the fall of Cairo, (and that is more than possible) then by that point you would simply get someone equally committed to continuing the war. By '41/'42, there was absolutely nobody in Britain other than BUF members who would have signed a peace treaty with Germany - this scenario is really just a re-run of Asquith in 1916 rather than anything approaching 1940. A change in how the war is fought, rather than the question of whether the war should be fought at all.

Really, it all comes back to the same point: Hitler needed Halifax-as-PM for even the slightest prospect of a treaty, and that simply didn't happen.
 
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Yes, the ground fight would be very hard but then again a land fight was something in which 1941 German Army excelled against 1941 British Army.

That's not quite accurate, in '41 with Operation Crusader the British Army pushed the combined Axis forces back in disarray to El Agheila.
 
That's not quite accurate, in '41 with Operation Crusader the British Army pushed the combined Axis forces back in disarray to El Agheila.

It wasn't even an Army but rather a Corps level operation in which this happened. In case of hypothetical 1941 Sealion it isn't picked formations of Western Desert doing the fighting but the whole British Army including those formation formed recently and probably having about as much combat value as German VG divisions had in 1945.
 
It wasn't even an Army but rather a Corps level operation in which this happened. In case of hypothetical 1941 Sealion it isn't picked formations of Western Desert doing the fighting but the whole British Army including those formation formed recently and probably having about as much combat value as German VG divisions had in 1945.

Don't forget the 1.5 Million or so Grandpa's in the Home Guard. :)
 
Jukra; said:
It wasn't even an Army but rather a Corps level operation in which this happened. In case of hypothetical 1941 Sealion it isn't picked formations of Western Desert doing the fighting but the whole British Army including those formation formed recently and probably having about as much combat value as German VG divisions had in 1945.

With the butterflies from this Axis "holding back" there would not be the units from OTL in the UK. There could be more from the far east without the conflict with Japan. Australian , New Zealand and Indian maybe even Gurkhas could be available as well as British and Canadian.

A lot of those VG units put up an exceedingly good fight.

Don't forget the 1.5 Million or so Grandpa's in the Home Guard. :)

A lot of them had already beaten the German Army before at Amiens in 1918.
 
Astrodragon, I think you are being rude.

Do you believe what you are saying or is this humour?

Some of it sounds quite close to a valid point of view. If you didn't dress it up with so much insolence, I might take it seriously. As it is I'm going to use my ignore option if you don't treat other posters (no matter how 'wrong') with a little more respect.

The fact that you haven't started a thread after 411 posts shows deconstructive attitude, which can be helpful...or hostile.

Its criticism of what is an idea with many dumb points.
If you think that people who criticise your ideas are rude, tough. Thats one of the purposes of this board.
 

perfectgeneral

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Monthly Donor
If you read the post where I address your points (after an appeal to the better half of my nature), you will see that I have low lighted the rudeness in your text to show that you could have made your point without being rude. Criticising is a key part of this board. Being rude is just being rude and there is no excuse for it. It doesn't make your point any more valid nor mine any less. Please take this criticism as friendly. If I didn't care if you looked rude I wouldn't bother (I'd have put you straight onto the ignore list).

Have you read the reply? I'd like your further views on the subject.
 
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You think that is 'rude' !??

Slightly sarcastic maybe - borne probably out of exasperation - but it highlights valid points.

In any Sealion scenairo RAF Bomber and Coastal Comand aircraft are not going to be attacking ships at sea - they will more likely be concentrating on those at harbour - either on the Continent, or while (trying to) un-load at the invasion beaches.
What is at sea, belongs to the Royal Navy - and the sea itself - the German barges needed calm weather to stop them being swamped.

Though, no doubt personnel got fatigued by constant bombing - when 11 Group Airfields were under attack, it didn't cripple them in maintaining operations. I think the Station Commander at Biggin Hill blew up one of the hangars - because it was too much of a target! It wasn't a shortage of aircraft that was the problem, it was a shortage of pilots.
In '41 neither will be a problem.

Oddly, enough in any 'round two' the Germans will have one advantage - Leigh-Mallory is in-charge not Park!!
 

Redbeard

Banned
In 1940 the British Home Army was in shambles and hardly capable of operating by Divisions (see Alanbrooke's war diary). A handful of German divisions across the Channel would have been enough to establish a substantial bridgehead incl. ports. But the problem for the Germans was they were so far from even approaching a situation where they could have achieved the necessary sea control long enough to establish a serious foothold on the British Isles. Not even if they had won the BoB (gained airsuperirority over the Channel and English south coast) it would have made it possible for them to stop the RN from intervening in the Channel. Luftwaffe tactics, weaponry and training simply were not up to taking on large naval forces. Logistics were not the problem, sea control was.

By 1941 the RAF kept more than 100 fighter squadrons in UK, double of what was considered necessary in 1940. On top of that the Imperial training programme had gained momentum spitting out well trained pilots in more than adequate numbers.

The British Home Army was a trizillion times stronger in 1941 than in 1940, not so much by numbers but by being able to actually operate coherently and well equipped. So where a 1940 British Home Army would be defeated battalion by battalion the 1941 one would be capable of focussing enough force anywhere to make it practicable impossible to get enough forces across fast enough to establish and maintain a bridgehead.

The emergency programmes initiated just before and after the DoW started to be seen in the active RN numbers and the ships in service were much better equipped and trained vs. airthreat by 1941 than by 1940. Even more so by 1942.

By 1940 USA had serious doubts about GB's will and ability to carry on the war, by 1941 FDR had suceeded to set USA on a course that would eventually bring USA into the war against Germany and already provided GB with an inexhaustible source of supplies and equipment.

In 1941 GB alone (excl. Empire) produced more tanks, planes, guns or whatever than Germany, Italy and Japan combined. Add to that US supplied stuff.

All in all I must conclude that in 1941-42 anything but a British government more stupid than most doors will have all cards available to counter anything the Germans can come up with in an invasion scenario. Even if we go to 1944, which was the time the Germans in their Z-plan thought they were strong enough to take on the British, they will still be hopelessly behind. The British had no problems outbuilding Germany in naval terms.

Sacking Göring or any other 1940 PoD won't change that - the British simply are too strong by 1941-42 - and as perfectly located as ever - to be threatened by invasion.

Personally I think the Germans had a slight chance in 1940 however - if we somehow can institute a some prewar PoDs:

  1. Luftwaffe has 1st class naval strike capacity - i.e. most of the level bombers must be able to perform torpedoattack - under fighter escort, and the divebombers need heavy armour pirecing bombs and naval training.
  2. KM focus on gaining seacontrol of the English Channel - i.e. no need for battleships, heavy cruisers or seagoing subs - but plenty of light cruisers, coastal subs, destroyers, torpedoboats and first of all minelayers and mine sweepers.
  3. The Wehrmacht has prewar plans for transporting and supplying at least five Divisions across the Channel - i.e. confiscating ferries and prefabricating ramps etc. Realistically the plans would have to go for ten Divisions, as nobody could plan for the British Army being so teethless as in OTL second half of 1940.

The last is not hard to fullfil, but the first seriously risk taking Luftwaffe focus away from army support - and that may easily mean disaster in France in May and June 1940. The second is probably possible to perform, but will be easily recognisable and the British will of course react accordingly - probably by supporting the French in having a go at Hitler in 1935 or 1938 or at least by having a RN that can meet the challenge.

So still - that sea mammal/monster is damned difficult to keep alive. I guess even Hagrid would be unsuccessful.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard
 
By 1941 the RAF kept more than 100 fighter squadrons in UK, double of what was considered necessary in 1940. On top of that the Imperial training programme had gained momentum spitting out well trained pilots in more than adequate numbers.

Sholto Douglas said:

http://www.spitfiresite.com/history/articles/2008/05/1941-difficult-year-01.htm
At the end of the Battle of Britain, that is to say at the beginning of November, 1940, the strength of the day fighter force amounted to 55½ squadrons, including three and a half squadrons in the process of formation. On paper this was a substantially larger force than the Command had possessed at the beginning of the battle; but really the force available was weaker. Many of our best pilots had been killed, and quantitatively the casualties had proved greater than the training organisation could make good, so that despite such expedients as the transfer of pilots from other Commands, the squadrons were short of their proper establishment of pilots.
[A number of long-term measures were] taken within the Command to ameliorate this situation. In the meantime the position was such as to give some ground for anxiety. Of the 52 operational day squadrons in the Command at the beginning of November, only 26 were, in the strictest sense, first-line squadrons. Another two squadrons were being kept up to operational strength so that they could act as relief in an emergency. The remainder, apart from a half-squadron employed as spotters, had only a few operational pilots apiece and were suitable only for employment in quiet sectors.
...
When April came, this figure had been duly reached. However, once again the position was less strong than it appeared on paper. Of the 64 day squadrons shown in the Order of Battle, two and a half were still in process of formation and two, although formed, were temporarily out of the line. The effective strength amounted, therefore, to 59 and a half squadrons. Many of them had considerably less than their established complement of pilots, and the general level of experience was substantially below that of the previous autumn.
 
Jukra:
Sure the RAF had lost many experienced pilots. But, and it's a big but, that also applies to the Luftwaffe!! Moreover, the effect is going to be greater, whilst the RAF aircraft that were shot down, could make use of the recovered airman, the Lw could not apart from some rescued at sea.
The Lw lost 2,698 airmen, Fighter Command 544.
Whilst, Downing could send his tired squadrons up north for a 'rest' not so the Lw. And they always had the worry of the 'Channel' - to quote Bungay p.303:
'There were hardly any of us who had not had to ditch with a shot-up machne or an empty tank' wrote Oberleutnant von Hahn of I./JG3.
Then there was the excuses - missions aborted - hot engines,oil pressure, and instrument failure. If not machines - then appendicitis - Generan Battle of Britain veterns used to ask to see each others scar.
"It did not happen to the fighters. Not for nothing did Milch find 25% of the crews of I./KG2 in the sick bay."
 

King Thomas

Banned
To take Britian, the Kreigsmarine needs to be as good as the other armed forces, and big battleships and the like are hard to keep hidden, so the British will see it, get scared and build an even bigger fleet.

What if Hitler had served in the German Navy in WW1? Then he might do something like that.
 
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