Hitler does not give "stop order" in 1940

Terrion said:
with the clearing of the pocket buying time for more organization, the resulting greater resistance in the south might help strengthen the resolve of the French government and populace. Couple that with no British "abandonment", and the French may be more inclined to fight on from the colonies rather than accept a cease-fire, which has all sorts of implications.
I like it.:cool:

Does this impact the German decision on how to deal with Vichy? Do you see Hitler, or Petain or Darlan (or somebody), making a deal so Vichy is a "junior" ally, comparable to Romania? I'm seeing enormous headaches for the Brits, with attacks out of Syria (frex), plus benefit to Japan, with Vichy IndoChina...:eek:
 
Personally, I think that Churchill's government would have fallen a few weeks later as the dust from the fall of France settled and the British would have sued for peace if they lost a large majority of the BEF. I will point out that this is an important IF, but I'm playing along with the assumption that this is possible.

Yes, the British had the ability to fight on regardless, but you have to factor in the psychological factors. The miracle of Dunkirk is what gave the British the resolve to continue in face of the disaster in France. These soldiers were also vital for pretty much everything the British did to Germany on land until 1944; without them, there's nobody. Even the core of the Free French would be swept away. Nobody to land in Greece, nobody to reinforce Egypt, nobody to teach the Americans rookies the right end of a gun ;)

Because Churchill chose to fight on in a difficult time, we're a bit blinded by the illusion that the British would have fought on 'no matter what', but the truth is that his government was not invincible, and that while HE would not make peace, there sure as hell were people willing to compromise.

Amusingly, given Hitler was already thinking about invading the USSR while the ink was drying on the armistice, you might actually see a logisitically-nightmarish attempt to an invasion of the SU in August in this scenario, where the Germans would be trying to move the whole army back to Poland in under 3 weeks to face an even-more-incompetent and freshly-purged Red army in an autumn campaign. His generals had to talk him down from the notion of a campaign starting tentatively on July 31st in OTL, insisting on the logistical impossibility to be ready for it before September. Even though he justified his invasion with the need to defeat Britain's only hope in OTL, something tells me if you take Britain out, he'll be even more convinced about how invincible his army is and do something stupid.
 
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Personally, I think that Churchill's government would have fallen a few weeks later as the dust from the fall of France settled and the British would have sued for peace if they lost a large majority of the BEF.

I really fail to see why would the loss of the soldiers be such a shock. IIRC the British even planned on the assumption that less than 100.000 would be pulled out. The British were positively relieved that almost everyone got out, but they were prepared to fight on even if everyone was lost. Besides, it really is a certainty that the most important personnel would be evacuated. At least the officers.

Even the core of the Free French would be swept away. Nobody to land in Greece, nobody to reinforce Egypt, nobody to teach the Americans rookies the right end of a gun ;)

During the 1940 and the first half of 1941, negligible amounts of soldiers from Britain actually went to Africa. Sure they sent a lot of equipment, but Dunkirk makes no difference here, as BEF escaped with their bare lives and rifles. Important as BEF was, there were still Canadians, Australians, Indian Army and various colonial forces, not to mention thousands of WWI veterans, who may not have been fit for front line duty, but could swear and curse young recruits into shape within a year...

As for the French - WTH? Almost every French soldier evacuated from Dunkirk was shipped back to France ASAP. The majority of the French forces that eventually formed the Free French were from the bunch evacuated in the final stages of the Battle for France or the escapees that ended up in British colonies. IIRC.

Because Churchill chose to fight on in a difficult time, we're a bit blinded by the illusion that the British would have fought on 'no matter what', but the truth is that his government was not invincible, and that while HE would not make peace, there sure as hell were people willing to compromise.

Who exactly, aside from Mosley and his bunch?

Amusingly, given Hitler was already thinking about invading the USSR while the ink was drying on the armistice, you might actually see a logisitically-nightmarish attempt to an invasion of the SU in August in this scenario, where the Germans would be trying to move the whole army back to Poland in under 3 weeks to face an even-more-incompetent and freshly-purged Red army in an autumn campaign. His generals had to talk him down from the notion of a campaign starting tentatively on July 31st in OTL, insisting on the logistical impossibility to be ready for it before September. Even though he justified his invasion with the need to defeat Britain's only hope in OTL, something tells me if you take Britain out, he'll be even more convinced about how invincible his army is and do something stupid.

Might be correct, but the sheer scale of preparation necessary would probably make Barbarossa on the scale of 1941 one impossible. Besides, cooperation from Romania would in no way be assured in 1940. IIRC, the real trigger to Hitler's decision to attack the USSR was the Besarabia and the unsuccessful meeting with Molotov in November 1940.
 
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Kongzilla

Banned
What would happen if they were all captured and Goring stuck to the origional plan of Destroying airfields and military instilations during the BoB. Could the British have been forced to the Table. And if they are how does that effect the rest of the War, would a later 43-44 barbarossa be in order. How many colonies may turn against the British or at least demand their independence. I can only think of 4 (Egypt, Iran, Iraq and India)
 
When does a pocket become a bridgehead?

If Overlord in 1944 could have created a bridgehead as large as Dunkirk with a port in the Pas de Calais they would have wet themselves with excitement.

Shipping could, and clearly did, reach Dunkir, as did air support (even the FAA were dive bombing.)

Could an outcome not be the vigorous defence of the Dunkirk area? The RAF could include it as part of the UK home defence. Range and existing bases are suitable for the task.

The German forces necessary to cope with this would be unavailable to continue action against other French forces (a great deal of the troops in the Dunkirk area were French) and British forces could still be pushed into Cherbourg.

This would certainly have affected the French view of their options and remarkably little of the French air forces had been committed at this stage whereas the Luftwaffe would have to contend with the RAF for command of the air over Dunkirk and The French air forces over the French front. I think that this could have had France continue the war, even given time for North African forces to be brought over.

Taking the Overlord analogy further, it places the joint Franco-British forces around Dunkirk, supplied from Britain by sea, in the positionof the Anglo Canadian forces locking the prime German forces before Caen whilst the American forces were able to break through the lighter opposition elsewhere.

German troops, horses (key to German army artillery and supplies) and machines were exhausted by the end of May. French tactics had learned how to delay them and, without the forces before Dunkirk, the Germans might have been fought to a standstill.

Now the French can build a new army for a counter attack from existing and North African forces whilst the Franco British forces in the north, supplied by sea from Britain, would be placed to cut off German forces facing the French should they be able to break out later in the year.

I believe the key instrument making this possible would be the imposition of effective Franco-British command, control and intelligence in the Dunkirk area. Material and key troops could have been brought in within single number days by sea.

This commitment to French territorial defence would hearten the French cabinet and lend support to the positive members and commanders.

Troops and commanders would now have experience of modern war and I can see the possibility of defeating the Germans in the west in 1941.

Would we be celebrating the victorious defence of Dunkirk as the saviour of victory instead of an heroic escape?
 
I believe you are not the first one to suggest this. I think the main problem is that the port of Dunkirk (does it merit the name 'port'?) is not enough to sustain the army size of the BEF. IIRC the British used ports as far as Saint Nazair to supply the forces deployed to France. Reducing this to only one port (with a debatable status) is not going to end well.
 
Yeah, it sounds deeply optimistic. Dunkirk is a long way for fighter cover, and after the Luftwaffe reorganises and occupies closer bases, supplies might all have to come in at night. Even then, the port is too vulnerable to degradation by bombing and almost certainly couldn't support the BEF even under peacetime conditions. Even before arrival at Dunkirk, I think many units had become combat-ineffective through loss of equipment and would have to be evacuated to refit anyway.
 
When does a pocket become a bridgehead?

If Overlord in 1944 could have created a bridgehead as large as Dunkirk with a port in the Pas de Calais they would have wet themselves with excitement.

Shipping could, and clearly did, reach Dunkir, as did air support (even the FAA were dive bombing.)

Could an outcome not be the vigorous defence of the Dunkirk area? The RAF could include it as part of the UK home defence. Range and existing bases are suitable for the task.

The German forces necessary to cope with this would be unavailable to continue action against other French forces (a great deal of the troops in the Dunkirk area were French) and British forces could still be pushed into Cherbourg.

This would certainly have affected the French view of their options and remarkably little of the French air forces had been committed at this stage whereas the Luftwaffe would have to contend with the RAF for command of the air over Dunkirk and The French air forces over the French front. I think that this could have had France continue the war, even given time for North African forces to be brought over.

Taking the Overlord analogy further, it places the joint Franco-British forces around Dunkirk, supplied from Britain by sea, in the positionof the Anglo Canadian forces locking the prime German forces before Caen whilst the American forces were able to break through the lighter opposition elsewhere.

German troops, horses (key to German army artillery and supplies) and machines were exhausted by the end of May. French tactics had learned how to delay them and, without the forces before Dunkirk, the Germans might have been fought to a standstill.

Now the French can build a new army for a counter attack from existing and North African forces whilst the Franco British forces in the north, supplied by sea from Britain, would be placed to cut off German forces facing the French should they be able to break out later in the year.

I believe the key instrument making this possible would be the imposition of effective Franco-British command, control and intelligence in the Dunkirk area. Material and key troops could have been brought in within single number days by sea.

This commitment to French territorial defence would hearten the French cabinet and lend support to the positive members and commanders.

Troops and commanders would now have experience of modern war and I can see the possibility of defeating the Germans in the west in 1941.

Would we be celebrating the victorious defence of Dunkirk as the saviour of victory instead of an heroic escape?

https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=232056

And I though I was the only one. One day I'll just have to wargame it to see if it really is doable.
I nominate Alam Brooke for GOC the allied forces in "operation Corunna"
 
The French were incapable of launching any kind of sustained offensive. Given this, the Germans could have brought overwhelming forces to bare against the troops in the Dunkirk pocket and still keep sufficient numbers to ward off any French probing attacks to the south.

Therefore, I very much doubt a stand there is in any way feasible.
 
What I've allways talked about was the allies realising in time that they were about to be cut off, and securing a defensible line. In this line would be left a 12 to 16 division force, assuming my line, a smaller bastion would require less forces) with all the AT Guns and ammo supplies avaiable. (non essential forces would be evacuated and relocated)
This could be a WW2 Corunna, with the allied force engaging the Germans to gain time and reducing their strengh before being evacuated, or a WW2 Cadiz.
 
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What I've allways talked about was the allies realising in time that they were about to be cut off, and securing a defensible line. In this line would be left a 6 to 10 division force, with all the AT Guns and ammo supplies avaiable.
This could be a WW2 Corunna, with the allied force engaging the Germans to gain time and reducing their strengh before being evacuated, or a WW2 Cadiz.


How "in time" are we talking about here ? because they were always a couple of steps behind the Germans:

French HQ: a few dozen German soldiers have crossed at Sedan
reality: the entire defense was falling apart

French HQ: The Germans have a small bridgehead. No problem, that's what Huntzinger and his units are in the area for. We'll just contain them.
reality: the Germans were blocking Hutzinger at Stonne and were rapidly advancing westward

French HQ: The Germans are advancing. Can't be very fast now can it ? No worries, we'll launch a counterattack and cut them off
reality: The Germans had advanced way further than expected and French reserves and doctrine were totally inaqdequate for a counterattack.

By the time the counterattacks had failed (DeGaulle, Arras, take your pick) it would already be way, way too late. Realizing this any sooner would have meant disregarding their entire strategy (advance into Belgium, fight a war of atrition, contain any local breakthroughs)
 
I do not suggest a French counter offensive but a grinding delay that will bring the Germans to a halt. In fact, despite losses in the 100,000 casualty range France had yet to commit many of the existing troops and reserves let alone North African units and the bulk of the French Air Force was still in existence. So impressed were the Germans with the tactics used by the French in the latter part of the Battle for France that they became the tactics they used against the allies in 1944 to the same end. Not to defeat but to delay.

Nor do I propose a last ditch defence of Dunkirk by ragged desperate survivors but a positive transformation into an aggressive bridgehead. The port was well able to take in enough to sustain the immediate needs of the troops ie rations, ammunition, weapons and medical supplies. Troops on the short voyages can double up with the supplies and wounded be removed in the same vessels.

British troops were still being pumped into Cherbourg right up to the French collapse so there are still resources and troops to call upon.

Northern France, as a whole is too much for the RAF to cover but the Luftwaffe would have to come to battle and perhaps it is better over there than over the RAF bases. I must point out that the RAF did attack Calais with Hawker Hectors and the FAA the Dunkirk perimeter with Swordfish so it is well with range for all types.

Most troops reaching Dunkirk were not isolated stragglers. They were in small unit packets by and large and carrying their small arms and ammunition. My own father in the BEF reached Dunkirk near the end with an ad hoc platoon he had gathered along the way from stragglers. Given a military structure and clear orders they were ready to fight. Given that the decision had been made to evacuate, then the commmand and control structure was, correctly, devoted to an orderly evacuation with a light screen to delay the enemy.

Change the decision to one of determined defence and development of the bridgehead and effective command and control to that end then the troops would have responded.

My grandfather was in the BEF in 1914 and told of the relief of his soldiers when they were able to stand and then attack after days of a fighting withdrawal. I do not see the men of 1940 being any less than those of 1914 and the French troops were defending their own territory.

The english speaking world (and Americans in particular for some weird reason) view the French troops of 1940 as weak and unwilling to fight but tens of thousands were casualties from brave fighting. My own uncle, in the Chasseurs Alpine, with his comrades coped quite easily with the Italians even without significant support from the French High Command and was convinced that they could have pushed them back out of France given time. My father found them a hard enemy in Syria the following year.

Look at the stories told by the men on the ground. They speak of confusion not despair. They only wanted clear direction so that they would know how they could do their duty.
 
All it would take would be a crisis meeting round May 11 in wich a realist appraisal of the situation prevailed. Actually, one of the great military minds of the century, the then captain, future General, Beufre was at the May 14 meeting sere General Georges lost it.
A nice POD would have him as the spark that ignited the allied plan. Just have the Brits appoint one man to go to the meeting with powers to commit to a plan, and let's make it Alam Brooke. They can have a Shiloh moment (as in "we lost a battle today but we can win another tomorrow")
 
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