Hitler Attacks the Maginot Line

Another factor here is the relative growth of the French air forces vs the Germans during the summer of 1940. OTL the GAF lost 700-800 combat aircraft from 10 May to the cease fire. French losses were similar, tho a large portion were older models. Where the difference is the Germans had limited new production, and a relatively small reserve of spare aircraft. The French received some 600 new aircraft from the US between 1 April and the cease fire. The French factories that were finally reorganized and retooled were back in production and delivered a few hundred aircraft as well in May-June.

OTL the French were unable to take advantage of this as their ground forces collapsed before the Allied numbers & new air units could tell. If the campaign drags out through June & is confined to NE France for some weeks, then the situation is against the GAF. Add in the growing British AF and the relative problem increases for Goerings boys. what really aggravates the German losses vs Allied is that both Allied air forces had far more rookie air crew in the training pipeline than Germany. The decision to curtail the pilot schools and send the instructors to battle boosted the up front numbers for the May battles, but left the German AF seriously short vs the planned output of the Allied training of June - September.

At the cease fire in June the effective strength of the Lufwaffe was between 1700 & 2000 operational aircraft. Depends on who's numbers you use. The Allied strength was actually larger at the end of the campaign. If only modern operational aircraft are counted the Allied AFs still have parity with Germany in operational aircraft, and can expect a higher replacement rate in both aircraft and crew through June - August. While there are many variables in this the bottom line is the German AF is not in a position to fight a long attritional campaign in the summer & autumn of 1940. Any plan the OKW brings to the table must win the campaign well before the weight of numbers on the Allied side comes.
 
Another factor here is the relative growth of the French air forces vs the Germans during the summer of 1940. OTL the GAF lost 700-800 combat aircraft from 10 May to the cease fire. French losses were similar, tho a large portion were older models. Where the difference is the Germans had limited new production, and a relatively small reserve of spare aircraft. The French received some 600 new aircraft from the US between 1 April and the cease fire. The French factories that were finally reorganized and retooled were back in production and delivered a few hundred aircraft as well in May-June.

OTL the French were unable to take advantage of this as their ground forces collapsed before the Allied numbers & new air units could tell. If the campaign drags out through June & is confined to NE France for some weeks, then the situation is against the GAF. Add in the growing British AF and the relative problem increases for Goerings boys. what really aggravates the German losses vs Allied is that both Allied air forces had far more rookie air crew in the training pipeline than Germany. The decision to curtail the pilot schools and send the instructors to battle boosted the up front numbers for the May battles, but left the German AF seriously short vs the planned output of the Allied training of June - September.

At the cease fire in June the effective strength of the Lufwaffe was between 1700 & 2000 operational aircraft. Depends on who's numbers you use. The Allied strength was actually larger at the end of the campaign. If only modern operational aircraft are counted the Allied AFs still have parity with Germany in operational aircraft, and can expect a higher replacement rate in both aircraft and crew through June - August. While there are many variables in this the bottom line is the German AF is not in a position to fight a long attritional campaign in the summer & autumn of 1940. Any plan the OKW brings to the table must win the campaign well before the weight of numbers on the Allied side comes.
First bold: Most were P-36, which were no match vs. an experienced pilot in a 109E-1 or E-3. Not quite "cannon fodder" but not quite an asset either.
Second: The De520 was the only French machine that could fight the 601 powered 109E on equal terms.The Bloch 152 and Ms406 were similar to the above noted P-36.
Third: On this I agree, as "quantity" has a "quality" of it's own. The Jagdwaffe was an interesting amalgam of VERY experienced pilots (+/-40-50%) and recently trained/operational pilots at this juncture. Looking through the records from the Western campaign (engagements/kills/losses) shows how the strong (Rotten/Kettenfuhrer) generally amassed the bulk of the victories, while the new guys just tried to keep up, and in some cases cleaned up the scraps, when the opportunity presented itself.
Some of these "new guys" would persevere and live through the whole mess.
When I lived in Germany (Canadian Forces Europe; Baden-Soellingen) during the early 1970's we had a guy painting our apartment who was one of these 1940 newbs, he went through the Kanalkampf and remained with JG2 (converting to the Fw-190A) in France until early 1944 when he was wounded. After that he was re-retrained (lol) on the 109-(G) and finished the war flying high cover with II/JG27 in the south of Germany. He had managed 66 victories in the four years he served as a combat pilot. I wish I knew his name. There were a ton of these guys. Never a "superstar"...just a guy.
He said that the Fw-190A-4 was the finest machine he ever had his hands on. He praised the kommandogerat flight management system and said that it felt like a demotion when he had to remuster for ops on the Bf-109G-10. He called it a "dangerous bitch of a machine"...I'll never forget this. He was quite clear about the utter chaos prevalent in the supply network and how they always had more airframes than they could find fuel and ammunition for.
 
If we speak of airpower we must recall that if Hitler strikes the Maginot line and gets into the expected method of attack then we would need to speak of the UK and not just France.

Those planes held in reserve can be freed up as the Nazi's are committing to what would look like a repeated of WWI.

Likewise we must consider how much production can and will change if the French are not knocked out of the war as swiftly, if at all. The differences in fighter ability means little when at this stage numbers are still just as if not more important.
 
First bold: Most were P-36, which were no match vs. an experienced pilot in a 109E-1 or E-3. Not quite "cannon fodder" but not quite an asset either. ...

The French H75 had some differences with the P36. The French thought their version had a better climb rate than the US version (less armor ?) and rated it better at turning than the Me109.

The Jagdwaffe was an interesting amalgam of VERY experienced pilots (+/-40-50%) and recently trained/operational pilots at this juncture. Looking through the records from the Western campaign (engagements/kills/losses) shows how the strong (Rotten/Kettenfuhrer) generally amassed the bulk of the victories, while the new guys just tried to keep up, and in some cases cleaned up the scraps, when the opportunity presented itself.
Some of these "new guys" would persevere and live through the whole mess. ...

There are claims the French had a much higher average flight hours per pilot than the German. The average length of service longer, which is no suprise given most Luftwaffe pilots got their real training after 1936. The difference claimed is the French pilot understood the machine better. I'd want to see some reliable comparisons of the numbers before placing a lot of faith in this. I've also been told the French were using older less efficient tactics, while the German fighter pilots drew from the very recent experience in Spain.

"quantity" has a "quality all its own" What I hope to track down soon are the projections for French aircraft production in the remainder of 1940, & for 41 & 42. It appears the French expected 1200 more aircraft to be delivered from the US production in the next six months, on top of the 600 odd aircraft delivered and taken into action from early April thru to the cease fire. Similar the Germans don't appear to have a 'reserve' of air crew. What the French & Brits had would be a useful number to compare.
 
First bold: Most were P-36, which were no match vs. an experienced pilot in a 109E-1 or E-3.

The Hawk-75 was successful against the Emils, the Hawk 75 Squadrons were among the highest scoring, with fewer losses.

It was similar to a Zero vs P-40 situation, a Me-109 that tries to dogfight, does poorly, as the ME-109 can't out dive, out roll or out turn the H-75, climb is the only real maneuver, zoom and booms, and the Luftwaffe Pilots really didn't expect that.

Werner Mölder found that out, shot down by the French ace Marin-la-Mesle in a Hawk-75
 
Like this debate, but...

...Schwerer Gustav was just one facet of the artillery.

What matters is destroying surface defences so defensive fire is suppressed - deep facilities then turn into isolated POW sites. Of course, you would have to be ready to break through before garrisons could tunnel out. Calls for A LOT of recon and A LOT of prepared artillery positions rapidly put to use. Also Stuka Gruppen using shaped charge bombs and then oil bombs against cloches. Precision targeting and co-ordinated attacks would be important.

Any good ? Looked at this for a book after reading about Fort Drum and thinking about Munroe shaped charges.
 
Like this debate, but...

...Schwerer Gustav was just one facet of the artillery.

What matters is destroying surface defences so defensive fire is suppressed - deep facilities then turn into isolated POW sites. Of course, you would have to be ready to break through before garrisons could tunnel out. Calls for A LOT of recon and A LOT of prepared artillery positions rapidly put to use. Also Stuka Gruppen using shaped charge bombs and then oil bombs against cloches. Precision targeting and co-ordinated attacks would be important.

Any good ? Looked at this for a book after reading about Fort Drum and thinking about Munroe shaped charges.
I doubt it can be accomplished that easily, the positions are tremendously hardened and even the lowest level of protection, Level 1, is supposed to resist 150mm artillery. Level 4 is designed to resist 420mm, the largest guns the Germans historically had. Add in accuracy problems, camouflage, and a lot of the fortified positions being on reverse slopes, and it is extremely difficult to really destroy or suppress all of them, because they are a distributed network of above-ground fortifications. You can doubtless do it eventually, but the French have plenty of their own guns to engage in counter-battery with, and to my understanding French counter-battery fire was one of the strong points for their artillery, which was in turn their army's best element - and if their divisional artillery was handicapped by still being equipped for the most part with 75mm guns in addition to the 155mms, the heavy artillery was numerically much superior. Turning it into an artillery battle is playing to their strengths, and an attrition battle is one which works to the French side time-wise.
 
Interesting...

...However, the resistance to 150 mm implies a weakness to heavier shell and means concentration of artillery and shaped charge bombs on a particular sector, backed up by the heaviest shell on ouvrages could accomplish the task. Only two Schwere Gustavs were built, but many more K-series, as an example.

I fear we have to agree to disagree. Did the Alpine Line on the Franco-Italian border delay Allied forces by much ? It would have been logical for the Germans to use it against Allied forces coming from Italy. Or did the landings in Southern France overrun it beforehand ?
 
Another thing is focusing on the volume of AA on the line. The Belgians lost a major fort due to gliders.

That succeeded because the Belgians were at peace time garrison levels. Instead of a infantry company covering the fortress surface there was a corporals guard. A few sentries and one MG manned. The infantry regiment that was to cover the surrounding terrain was at 40% strength the morning of 10 May. It was only partially mobilized and the Belgian army had released large numbers of men for visits home before they started a training cycle later in May. The internal garrison was in the same condition, with a large portion of the men on home leave, and some reservists not yet called up. Had the Eban Emel fortress been on war footing over forty sentries would have been on the surface, with four MG manned by full crews. A company size counter attack group would have been in the bunkers on the fortress surface and another company in reserve about ten minutes march away.

In addition to the Fortress German commandos had three nearby bridges targeted that morning. One was easily captured, two others had alert sentries, and despite being out numbered inflicted losses on the attackers. The second bridge was captured, tho it could have easily gone the other way. The third bridge directly adjacent to the fort was not captured by the commandos, and some Belgian infantry kept it out of German hands until the 11th. This left the eighty men of the assault group isolated on top of the fortress for near 24 hours.
 
.... Did the Alpine Line on the Franco-Italian border delay Allied forces by much ? It would have been logical for the Germans to use it against Allied forces coming from Italy. Or did the landings in Southern France overrun it beforehand ?

The Italian Army made zero progress in the Alps in June 1940, despite mobilizing a entire army there. In 1944-45 Neither the French or US Armies attempted to move east thru the Maritime Alps on the Franco Italian border. Both sides garrisoned the boundary with second and third rate formations to the end of the war.
 
Drat !

So they just besieged it rather than hammering their way through !

Any data from Germans holding the Czech border fortifications ?
 
Interesting...

...However, the resistance to 150 mm implies a weakness to heavier shell and means concentration of artillery and shaped charge bombs on a particular sector, backed up by the heaviest shell on ouvrages could accomplish the task. Only two Schwere Gustavs were built, but many more K-series, as an example.

I fear we have to agree to disagree. Did the Alpine Line on the Franco-Italian border delay Allied forces by much ? It would have been logical for the Germans to use it against Allied forces coming from Italy. Or did the landings in Southern France overrun it beforehand ?
But that's the thing. That's the absolute weakest that the French had for their fortifications. When your weakest fortification sections are capable of holding out against heavy divisional artillery at the least, then they're tough.
 
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