Another factor here is the relative growth of the French air forces vs the Germans during the summer of 1940. OTL the GAF lost 700-800 combat aircraft from 10 May to the cease fire. French losses were similar, tho a large portion were older models. Where the difference is the Germans had limited new production, and a relatively small reserve of spare aircraft. The French received some 600 new aircraft from the US between 1 April and the cease fire. The French factories that were finally reorganized and retooled were back in production and delivered a few hundred aircraft as well in May-June.
OTL the French were unable to take advantage of this as their ground forces collapsed before the Allied numbers & new air units could tell. If the campaign drags out through June & is confined to NE France for some weeks, then the situation is against the GAF. Add in the growing British AF and the relative problem increases for Goerings boys. what really aggravates the German losses vs Allied is that both Allied air forces had far more rookie air crew in the training pipeline than Germany. The decision to curtail the pilot schools and send the instructors to battle boosted the up front numbers for the May battles, but left the German AF seriously short vs the planned output of the Allied training of June - September.
At the cease fire in June the effective strength of the Lufwaffe was between 1700 & 2000 operational aircraft. Depends on who's numbers you use. The Allied strength was actually larger at the end of the campaign. If only modern operational aircraft are counted the Allied AFs still have parity with Germany in operational aircraft, and can expect a higher replacement rate in both aircraft and crew through June - August. While there are many variables in this the bottom line is the German AF is not in a position to fight a long attritional campaign in the summer & autumn of 1940. Any plan the OKW brings to the table must win the campaign well before the weight of numbers on the Allied side comes.
OTL the French were unable to take advantage of this as their ground forces collapsed before the Allied numbers & new air units could tell. If the campaign drags out through June & is confined to NE France for some weeks, then the situation is against the GAF. Add in the growing British AF and the relative problem increases for Goerings boys. what really aggravates the German losses vs Allied is that both Allied air forces had far more rookie air crew in the training pipeline than Germany. The decision to curtail the pilot schools and send the instructors to battle boosted the up front numbers for the May battles, but left the German AF seriously short vs the planned output of the Allied training of June - September.
At the cease fire in June the effective strength of the Lufwaffe was between 1700 & 2000 operational aircraft. Depends on who's numbers you use. The Allied strength was actually larger at the end of the campaign. If only modern operational aircraft are counted the Allied AFs still have parity with Germany in operational aircraft, and can expect a higher replacement rate in both aircraft and crew through June - August. While there are many variables in this the bottom line is the German AF is not in a position to fight a long attritional campaign in the summer & autumn of 1940. Any plan the OKW brings to the table must win the campaign well before the weight of numbers on the Allied side comes.