Hirohito stops Pearl Harbor

SsgtC

Banned
I don't think the US could or should have based much more than submarines in Manila, I fully agree that it would have been a bit dangerous to have large ships stationed there.
Agreed with this completely. Submarines, destroyers, patrol craft and maybe one or two CLAAs for both air defense and to serve as fleet flagship. But nothing larger. Not until Japanese air power has been neutralized
 
snip
Japan was on a short clock and knew it.
So what would have happened if there was an accident on, say, Nov 9, involving one of the carriers suffering a magazine explosion that blew the ships to pieces and the blast/debris causes one of the now remaining 5 to be a total constructive loss and/or another to be damaged enough to require weeks to repair?

Would they have gone with a depleted strike force of 3 or 4 carriers?
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
So what would have happened if there was an accident on, say, Nov 9, involving one of the carriers suffering a magazine explosion that blew the ships to pieces and the blast/debris causes one of the now remaining 5 to be a total constructive loss and/or another to be damaged enough to require weeks to repair?

Would they have gone with a depleted strike force of 3 or 4 carriers?
Three decks no chance. That means to complete two strike waves (which was the minimum expected to be effective against the harbor and the airfields) the strike force will have to sit off Oahu for the entire day, recovering the second wave around sunset. Instead of the two waves being more or less continuous (1st Wave arrived at ~07:55, second wave arrived at ~08:40 IOTL making the attack seem almost nonstop), there will be a minimum 3.5, more likely 4.5 hours gap between the waves. That puts the second wave over Pearl around noon, IOTL the second wave took most of the losses, and tht was with everything being in a mad scramble. Coming back four hours later means ALL the Army AAA, the AAA on the undamaged ships (including several battleships and cruisers) and undamaged fighters (3 F4F, 27 P-40, 16 P-36, and, God spare them, 14 P-26) are ready and waiting.

Four decks is unlikely, but on the outer edge of possible, for much the same reasons laid out above, although an extra deck allows two weaker waves with the same sort of timing as IOTL. Damage is likely to be far less severe two two under strength waves (as was only 8 of 49 converted 14" shells managed to hit a ship during the first wave, 1/3 fewer aircraft mean the early AAA has fewer targets to deal with, and the second wave runs into a relative buzzsaw).

Almost as important is the fact that the Kido Butai had additional tasks, including supporting the landings on Rabaul. Although not part of the original IJN planning, two-three fewer decks means the second attempt at Wake either doesn't happen or fails when the U.S. relief force shows up. The damage that does to the Japanese war plan is enormous.
 

SsgtC

Banned
Almost as important is the fact that the Kido Butai had additional tasks, including supporting the landings on Rabaul. Although not part of the original IJN planning, two-three fewer decks means the second attempt at Wake either doesn't happen or fails when the U.S. relief force shows up. The damage that does to the Japanese war plan is enormous.
Out of curiosity, how badly would Japan be affected by a failure at Wake? I don't mean the OTL failure, but a total failure to secure the island with it remaining in American hands throughout the war
 

trurle

Banned
So what would have happened if there was an accident on, say, Nov 9, involving one of the carriers suffering a magazine explosion that blew the ships to pieces and the blast/debris causes one of the now remaining 5 to be a total constructive loss and/or another to be damaged enough to require weeks to repair?

Would they have gone with a depleted strike force of 3 or 4 carriers?
Such incident is likely to be blamed to US spies, and the entire war is subsequently postponed until Japanese internal security re-evaluate staff and examine the debris. Most likely, several months of delay. Full cancellation of offensive is also possible.

By the way, worst-case disaster (collateral damage to several carriers) was technically challenging in 1941 because IJN doctrine required carriers to have a wide (several kilometers) separation in sea - to perform more effective lookout service and to do not compromise torpedo evasion.
 
If Japan can pull off a same foreign policy, avoids Indochina and makes nice with the Dutch in the East Indies their economy might be able to limp to the end of the war bruised but functioning. And if the Cold War starts as per OTL and Japan hasn't totally pissed away their position in East Asia America may decide they're a better friend than an enemy.

There are a lot of ifs in this scenario.
 
Could he have made the attempt? In theory yes.
Would he have succeeded? Maybe.
Would he have survived it, success or failure? Probably not.

It must be kept in mind that Hirohito both had personally grown up ina time which witnessed the destruction of the Eurasian monarchies from Germany to China and the propensity of the IJA/IJN to assassinate those who opposed their designs. These matters heavily conditioned his actions and/or inactions.
 
You realise that the "exclusion zone" extended halfway across the Atlantic, right? So trying to say it was in "defense of near US waters" is laughable.
But starting from the US coast, and stopping far short of Europe. It was justifiable (barely) as a measure to keep war away from the US, and thus keep the US out of war. Anyone entering those waters from the east was heading toward the US.

The Philippines were a US Territory.

But not part of the US. Americans didn't want America to get entangled in any foreign war, so FDR could "exclude" warships that might attack Americans from coming toward America. But that policy could hardly extend to enforcing peace in a remote part of the world because the US (against the desires of a very large part of the US public) taken temporary possession of land in that region.

Japanese shipping had to get within a few miles of them on their way to and from the DEI.

In what world is 300 miles "a few"? This is not like passage through the Turkish straits, or between Japan and Japanese-owned Sakhalin. These are unquestionably open seas. For the US to assert unilateral authority to block Japanese ships there would be an act of war. And FDR did not have the authority or the political strength to initiate such acts.

All the US has to say is military supplies are not allowed through their exclusion zone. It's really not that difficult. And honestly, if they're using subs to sink Japanese merchants, that gives the US plausible deniability.

So the US is going to announce an aggressive and provocative policy, use violence to enforce it, and then pretend it's not actually doing it? This is about as plausible as a drag queen with a full beard.
 

SsgtC

Banned
So the US is going to announce an aggressive and provocative policy, use violence to enforce it, and then pretend it's not actually doing it? This is about as plausible as a drag queen with a full beard
You know how many drag queens with full beards I've seen? Lol. The US adopting an aggressive foreign policy that borders (or is) an act of war IS plausible. Because that is exactly the type of foreign policy FDR pursued IOTL. The US enforcing an exclusion zone out to 300 miles actually makes sense if you think about it. 300 miles was well within the combat radius of pretty much every aircraft in the world at that time. The US could essentially declare that any foreign shipping passing through their exclusion zone is subject to inspection, then selectively enforce it. Strict with the Japanese, and "missing" British, French and Dutch shipping.

Look, in no world is this nuetral. But it does match up with things that the US actually did IOTL.
 
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