Hirohito stops Pearl Harbor

The United States was not at war with Germany either in 1940 or for most of 1941. But US Navy warships still escorted British convoys and attacked German warships on sight in International waters with no warning issued. I have a very strong suspicion that Roosevelt would have done the same thing to Japan. And the Japanese likely knew it.
But Roosevelt and most interventionists considered Japan a minor enemy- thus, the 'Germany First' Policy.

Plus, how much increase in naval expenditure could Roosevelt approve before the US public started to raise eyebrows?

There are two 'risks' here: either wake the American monster, and hope you incapacitate enough of the American Navy at Pearl Harbor, or accept the 5-10% likely loss of oil convoys from the DEI.
 

SsgtC

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But Roosevelt and most interventionists considered Japan a minor enemy- thus, the 'Germany First' Policy.

Plus, how much increase in naval expenditure could Roosevelt approve before the US public started to raise eyebrows?

There are two 'risks' here: either wake the American monster, and hope you incapacitate enough of the American Navy at Pearl Harbor, or accept the 5-10% likely loss of oil convoys from the DEI.

Far more than 5-10% loses. In an undeclared naval war with Japan, the primary resource for the USN is going to be submarines. Meaning you don't need a massive increase in naval spending. And with being able to use Cavit Naval Base your subs are going to be far more effective (once the torpedo issues are fixed) than in OTL where USN fleet boats had long transit times to and from their patrol areas. Meaning fewer boats can accomplish the same thing.
 

CalBear

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But Roosevelt and most interventionists considered Japan a minor enemy- thus, the 'Germany First' Policy.

Plus, how much increase in naval expenditure could Roosevelt approve before the US public started to raise eyebrows?

There are two 'risks' here: either wake the American monster, and hope you incapacitate enough of the American Navy at Pearl Harbor, or accept the 5-10% likely loss of oil convoys from the DEI.
The entire U.S. building program was ALREADY approved.

The 1940 Two Oceans Navy Act (Vinson-Walsh Act) passed in the Summer of 1940, after Hitler put the fear of God into the U.S. Congress. It approved the construction of:

7 fast BB (two additional Iowas and five Montanas)

18 (!) fleet carriers

27 cruisers

115 destroyers

43 submarines

15,000 aircraft

$50 million for light patrol vessels

$65 million for munitions

This was on top of the authorization from the Navy 1938 for the construction of 135,000 tons of capital ship construction (that turned into four Iowa class BB), 68,754 tons of new cruiser tonnage to a total of 412,000 tons, 38,000 tons of new DD tonnage up to 228,000 tons and the 1934 & 1936 Navy Acts that had approved six new fast BB (the North Carolina and South Dakota classes).

The USN that pureed the Japanese fleet was 100% approved and funded by 1940. That was WHY the Japanese attack the U.S. as soon as they had the six decks available that the attack plan required (Zuikaku finished an abbreviated shakedown cruise on November 7th, on November 18th she sail into Hittokappu Bay to join the strike force). Japan was on a short clock and knew it.
 
Far more than 5-10% loses. In an undeclared naval war with Japan, the primary resource for the USN is going to be submarines...
Do you really imagine that Roosevelt would order US warships to attack foreign merchant ships in neutral waters, far from the US, without warning? This was exactly what we declared war over in 1917. And it's much worse, because the US has not even declared a blockade. And without a declaration of war??? Or that such operations could be kept secret???

The "exclusion zone" in the Atlantic is not comparable: that was defense of (more or less) near-US waters against intruding warships.

Which is not to say the Japanese would not expect such maneuvers, but they utterly failed to understand the US.
 
Do you really imagine that Roosevelt would order US warships to attack foreign merchant ships in neutral waters, far from the US, without warning? This was exactly what we declared war over in 1917. And it's much worse, because the US has not even declared a blockade. And without a declaration of war??? Or that such operations could be kept secret???
Do they even need to be USN subs?

Cant Roosevelt simply allow GB and Dutch to "refuel" subs in Cavit after all we let RN ships refuel and get rebuilt in the US and what's wrong with the all USN/UAAF training flights from the Phiilapeans radioing positions of any ships they sight?
 

SsgtC

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Do you really imagine that Roosevelt would order US warships to attack foreign merchant ships in neutral waters, far from the US, without warning? This was exactly what we declared war over in 1917. And it's much worse, because the US has not even declared a blockade. And without a declaration of war??? Or that such operations could be kept secret???

The "exclusion zone" in the Atlantic is not comparable: that was defense of (more or less) near-US waters against intruding warships.

Which is not to say the Japanese would not expect such maneuvers, but they utterly failed to understand the US.

You realise that the "exclusion zone" extended halfway across the Atlantic, right? So trying to say it was in "defense of near US waters" is laughable. If anything, that same tactic would work even better in the Pacific. The Philippines were a US Territory. Japanese shipping had to get within a few miles of them on their way to and from the DEI. All the US has to say is military supplies are not allowed through their exclusion zone. It's really not that difficult. And honestly, if they're using subs to sink Japanese merchants, that gives the US plausible deniability.
 
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CalBear

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You realise that the "exclusion zone" extended halfway across the Atlantic, right? So trying to say it was in "defense of meat US waters" is laughable. If anything, that same tactic would work even better in the Pacific. The Philippines were a US Territory. Japanese shipping had to get within a few miles of them on their way to and from the DEI. All the US is say military supplies are not allowed through their exclusion zone. It's really not that difficult. And honestly, if they're using subs to sink Japanese merchants, that gives the US plausible deniability.
Laughable? Very much so. Saleable? Again, very much so.
 
And if an exclusion zone isn't enough, then see how Japan reacts to US aircraft and warships following Japanese vessels and convoys, broadcasting their location in clear to British and Dutch subs.

There are so many options for the US in a no-war situation, and they are all still intolerable for Japan and lead to war almost immediately.
 
Not attacking Pearl Harbor is not the same as not going to war with the USA. Emperor Hirohito could, in theory at least, not approve the Pearl Harbor attack, yet say yes on the rest of Japan's attacks against the USA.
 
Not attacking Pearl Harbor is not the same as not going to war with the USA. Emperor Hirohito could, in theory at least, not approve the Pearl Harbor attack, yet say yes on the rest of Japan's attacks against the USA.

How does WWII in the Pacific go with no sneak attack, but Dugout Doug still getting whomped after a DoW?

The USN Standards will be of little use in the Pacific, except for shore bombardment where there is air superiority
 

CalBear

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How does WWII in the Pacific go with no sneak attack, but Dugout Doug still getting whomped after a DoW?

The USN Standards will be of little use in the Pacific, except for shore bombardment where there is air superiority
The actual danger is that the political pressure on FDR and the Navy to send a relief force to Luzon since the Battle Force is undamaged could become overwhelming, especially once the MacArthur media machine turned on. That would undoubtedly be a disaster.
 
The USN Standards will be of little use in the Pacific, except for shore bombardment where there is air superiority

They are also useful to fight the Japanese battle line; carriers have times (like nighttime) when they can't function. They also can escort convoys; cruiser raiders are a possibility, and the prospect of a battleship being with a convoy gives a raider captain bad dreams.
 

CalBear

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They are also useful to fight the Japanese battle line; carriers have times (like nighttime) when they can't function. They also can escort convoys; cruiser raiders are a possibility, and the prospect of a battleship being with a convoy gives a raider captain bad dreams.
The Standards were simply too slow.

That was one of the problems with what was a fairly clever idea, build everything to the same speed. The issue showed up when the speed of advance for a battle line jumped from 21 knots to 27 and then 30 for the carrier TF. Instead of having to screw with four ships that were too slow, you had to deal with ALL of them being too slow (even if the original South Dakota class had been completed instead of falling victim to the WNT, the U.S. BB force would still have capped out at 23 knots). They are useful as a convoy escort, but they are also WAY to valuable, both in manpower at risk and propaganda value to be risked without a substantial DD escort of their own.
 

trurle

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What was the extent of Hirohitos power, could he have stopped Japan's strike on Pearl Harbor? If, yes, what would the 40s or 50s look like for fascist Japan if it hypothetically averted Pearl Harbor.

This is to see how the war with China plays out and how Japan navigates the Cold War, and if Hirohito could have stopped Pearl Harbor had he wanted
Quite possible, but such action is not guaranteed to prevent or even delay the war with the US. Especially if decided late. By 1st December 1941, the US has enough intelligence data to assume imminent war with Japan, therefore situation may become irreversible by that time, even if Japan will abstain of any act of aggression.
http://ibiblio.org/pha/timeline/411201afns.html

To radically derail OTL, the decision should be done even before 24 July 1941 - before capture of Southern French Indochina which radically raised tensions in US-Japanese relations.
 
They are also useful to fight the Japanese battle line; carriers have times (like nighttime) when they can't function. They also can escort convoys; cruiser raiders are a possibility, and the prospect of a battleship being with a convoy gives a raider captain bad dreams.

what Japanese raiders?
 
They could just ignore the Philippines for now- as long as they don't piss off the USA too much, they have some time to fight into an overland route in China to secure a 'backup route' that ignored the Philippines. They did make a overland China route OTL, after all, while fighting the USA.

I did a timeline with the scenario of trying to delay the war with the US. What I felt as I looked into the topic is below:

The risk for Japan is that the US heavily builds up in the Phillipines whilst Japan goes after the British and Dutch. Japan then faces a major obstacle along its supply lines and cannot easily ship the oil home, furthermore taking the Phillipines becomes something of an ordeal.

Worst of all is that the US is probably not behaving entirely neutrally, and Japan runs then runs the risk of the US finding a reason to join the war at time not of Japan’s choosing.

I don’t think there was an economically viable means to ship the oil and other resources back to Japan except by sea.
 
I did a timeline with the scenario of trying to delay the war with the US. What I felt as I looked into the topic is below:

The risk for Japan is that the US heavily builds up in the Philippines whilst Japan goes after the British and Dutch. Japan then faces a major obstacle along its supply lines and cannot easily ship the oil home, furthermore taking the Phillipines becomes something of an ordeal.

Worst of all is that the US is probably not behaving entirely neutrally, and Japan runs then runs the risk of the US finding a reason to join the war at time not of Japan’s choosing.

I don’t think there was an economically viable means to ship the oil and other resources back to Japan except by sea.
The issue with Chinese Rail is not the economics. Rail is only slightly more expensive than ship travel in terms of energy. The issue is getting the rail in the first place, and the rail lines being a transportation bottleneck.

The Philippines were surrounded by Japanese Islands and Japanese-dominated Naval space. Even if the US Navy obliterated the Japanese Navy in the Philippines- logistics would be an absolute nightmare. The closest waypoint is Guam, assuming it isn't already controlled by the Japanese at this point.

The Philippines were entirely indefensible- and were much closer to Japan, thus allowing for the Japanese AF to conduct bombing raids directly from Indochina. Imagine Pearl Harbor, multiple times.

There is a reason the US Navy wasn't stationed in the Philippines, and US Army planning conceded the loss of the islands in the event of a war with the Japanese.
 
The issue with Chinese Rail is not the economics. Rail is only slightly more expensive than ship travel in terms of energy. The issue is getting the rail in the first place, and the rail lines being a transportation bottleneck.

The Philippines were surrounded by Japanese Islands and Japanese-dominated Naval space. Even if the US Navy obliterated the Japanese Navy in the Philippines- logistics would be an absolute nightmare. The closest waypoint is Guam, assuming it isn't already controlled by the Japanese at this point.

The Philippines were entirely indefensible- and were much closer to Japan, thus allowing for the Japanese AF to conduct bombing raids directly from Indochina. Imagine Pearl Harbor, multiple times.

There is a reason the US Navy wasn't stationed in the Philippines, and US Army planning conceded the loss of the islands in the event of a war with the Japanese.

I would argue the rail issue is also one of a lack of capacity and an incomplete network, which means it would take time to adjust it to transporting fuel. Of course assuming it focuses on transporting fuel (presumably using coal) it can do less of the logistics of supporting the invasion of china, which means a need for more trucks (increased fuel consumption) for the military. I think it would take many months before the rail is in a position to be used to shift fuel, in the meantime the Japanese would have to use the sea.

The Philippines are clearly untenable long term, however if the war is delayed the US would have a large air force in place that could take several months to subdue (assuming they manage to avoid destruction on day 1), and an army that would be much more challenging to overcome. The Japanese supply of replacement aircraft was quite low, as was their production, which meant that had the US managed to get their strike in first on Formosa, the morning fog there made that a real risk, then the Japanese might have been delayed still further.

It is worth remembering that although the Philippines are close to Japan and a long way from the US, they are still far away enough from pre-war Japanese airfields to cause some range issues for the Japanese fighters. This meant Japan could not bring to bear all the force it would have liked. I don't think the US could or should have based much more than submarines in Manila, I fully agree that it would have been a bit dangerous to have large ships stationed there.
 
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