Help needed on ... some sea-mammal research

NoMommsen

Donor
In the german wiki about "Unternehmen Seelöwe" (operation Sealion) there's a section :
Politische Manöver (political maneuvers)

In its last paragraph it mentions a study ordered by the War Cabinet that came to the conclusion :
" ... , dass die Royal Navy als entscheidende Waffe gegen eine deutsche Invasion die Eroberung Englands durch die Wehrmacht nicht würde verhindern können."
(..., that the Royal Navy as decisive weapon against a german invasion the conquering of England by the Wehrmacht NOT would prevent.)

As source for this there's given :

Unfortunatly I don't owe this book or have access to. And (ofc ??) it's nowhere mentioned in the english wiki version ('feasting' more in technical aspects IMHO).

Can anyone 'verify' at least the existence of the mentioned study ?
or
'verify' this quote'
or
produce/quote the mention of this study in the named source ?

... if only to 'convict' the german wiki version author of some ... heavy misinterpretation.;)


THX in advance for your help, folks. :)
 
Unfortunately I do not have this book, nor does the local library or college library - I would have been happy to check for the greater good of a correct Wikipedia entry.

I would point out, though, that some pretty gloomy papers were tabled in War Cabinet after the fall of France. People's confidence in all their existing plans were rattled and Britain had lost its first line of defence. This phrase from you doesn't jog my mind on any specific document but possibly it is one concluding that in the event of France surrendering and British airpower being suppressed the RN could not prevent the Germans from landing troops in Britain, which I would believe. Indeed there are many posters on this board who believe likewise.

I would also point out that memos from the period have a habit of getting interpreted as overtly defeatist -- e.g. I know some people have read British worries about sending cruisers and battleships to repel an invasion as an indication that they did not believe southern England could be defended, whereas it is clear to me in context that the Admiralty believed the invasion attempt so pathetically weak that it could be dispatched easily by local forces and therefore did not want to risk reinforcing success with its most expensive assets.
 
Well its a study from that time, and that study was wrong because Germany simply didn't have the vessels ready to transport an army across the channel, decently protected and supplied. So even if they didn't deem the RN capable of stopping the invasion, no invasion of any respectable caliber would have taken place.
 

Deleted member 94680

Yet, all things considered, the Chiefs of Staff were confident that the naval strength available at home when other essential needs had been met would suffice to outmatch any surface effort that the enemy could bring to bear in the home theatre.

In any case, for reasons already noted--namely, the enemy's preoccupation with events in France and the time needed to assemble shipping--invasion proper was not likely to come for several weeks. On the other hand, the dangers which had seemed so alarming when the fall of Holland was imminent would not be less so if France too collapsed. The Air Staff calculated that fewer than 5,000 parachutists, temporarily paralysing the air defences by attacking seven vital aerodromes in south-east England, might pave the way for bomber raids and landings from troop-carriers, which in turn would carry the enemy well along the road to more ambitious projects. At the same time up to 20,000 troops, accompanied by armoured fighting vehicles carried in special landing-craft from which they could be put ashore on open beaches, might be rushed across the southern part of the North Sea and descend upon us with little or no warning. To keep them out of the country would be difficult, perhaps impossible; for the navy had not nearly enough destroyers or patrol vessels to cover the whole coast from the Wash to Sussex, the local seaward defences of our estuaries and harbours were not proof against fast light surface craft, and the fixed defences were still weak. In favourable weather--or alternatively if German air superiority stifled air reconnaissance--they would have a good chance of getting ashore without effective interference. And if the enemy did gain air superiority, he might conceivably be able to protect their communications in face of our naval power, thus employing a mere raiding force to gain a bridgehead through which invasion proper might be launched.

If the enemy could not be kept out of the country, what were the chances of defeating him once he was in? On the eve of the Dunkirk withdrawal, and while it was in progress, they seemed very slender. The JULIUS CAESAR plan had been overhauled in recent weeks; but on the whole Home Forces were neither equipped nor trained to deal with an enemy well supplied with armour. General Sir Edmund Ironside, succeeding to the command on the day when the withdrawal started, was hampered just as General Kirke had been by scanty physical resources, inadequate mobility, and the legacy of tactical and strategic doctrines which the German success in Europe had already shown to be outmoded. The Local Defence Volunteers, 300,000 strong, were not yet an effective force. With the seven divisions previously training or assigned to special tasks, General Ironside had at the end of May fifteen infantry divisions and the incomplete 2nd Armoured Division. The infantry division averaged less than half their establishment of 15,500 men apiece. Owing to the preference given to the Expeditionary Force they had only about a sixth of the field guns and anti-tank guns to which they were entitled; and many of the field guns, instead of being modern 25-pounders, were older 18-pounders or 4.5-inch. howitzers. Their deficiency in machine-guns was still greater; but of all these shortcomings perhaps the worst from the point of view of a commander who might be confronted by German armour was the lack of antitank guns.
 
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