Yeah. the problem of Soviet interceptors is a tough one. If Im reading the summaries correctly the Germans never reach 4,000 operational aircraft in the east & it was usually less than 3000. Not a large margin of their own fighter planes to fly cover for bombers.
The 9th Air Force found massed bombers were necessary to get effect on the transportation targets. My fathers B26 squadron came to England in the summer of 1943 with the idea squadron size attack groups were sufficient for the targets they'd be attacking. Six months later the 9th Bomber Division was hitting targets like bridges with minimum 36 & 54 plane strike groups, or larger. It wasn't practical to send the entire bomber division against a single target, but the general idea was the larger attack group used the less likely a second mission on the same target would be required.
That suggest just 500 or even 1000 He177 built are not going to provide enough operational aircraft to hit the number of targets needed to collapse or serious degrade Soviet transportation.
the problem is such campaigns against groups of small and decentralised targets are not what massed 4 engine bombers are great at, so it took lot of bombers and much repetition
The 9th Air Force found massed bombers were necessary to get effect on the transportation targets. My fathers B26 squadron came to England in the summer of 1943 with the idea squadron size attack groups were sufficient for the targets they'd be attacking. Six months later the 9th Bomber Division was hitting targets like bridges with minimum 36 & 54 plane strike groups, or larger. It wasn't practical to send the entire bomber division against a single target, but the general idea was the larger attack group used the less likely a second mission on the same target would be required.
That suggest just 500 or even 1000 He177 built are not going to provide enough operational aircraft to hit the number of targets needed to collapse or serious degrade Soviet transportation.