Heinkel He 177 Germany's succesful longrange bomber

[Parma]

Although I do not believe that one weapon system could make a difference, never the less; what effect would be on a more successful Heinkel HE 177 bomber.

Heinkel He 177 Greif - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Let assume, due to some one , very high in the top of Nazi Germany, it is realised that the odd requirement of dive bombing did not make sense and above that , this high ranking official, ordered to build five more prototypes. This serie of prototypes with four individual engines. This engines would be the proven BMW 801- or Jumo 213E-,with an increase wing span and wing surface. This type would be as OTL He 177 B-6
This all took place in the prototype stage of this airplane between 1939 and 1942.
The He 177-B6 with its four separate engine version was much more reliable than the tandem engine version albeit increased drag of the four propellors and a slightly smaller payload.
In 1942, the production started of the He 177-B6
From January 1942 up to January 1943 more than 377 machines were build, nearly all used at the East front.
( OTL 130 A1 and 247 A3)

 

[I lurk therefore I am]

Although I do not believe that one weapon system could make a difference, never the less; what effect would be on a more successful Heinkel HE 177 bomber.

Heinkel He 177 Greif - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Let assume, due to some one very high at the top of Nazi Germany it is realised that the odd requirement of dive bombing did not make sense and above the hel ordered to build five more prototypes, this time with four individual engines. This would be the proven engines BMW 801- or Jumo 213E-,with an increase wing span and wing surface. This type would be as OTL He 177 B-6
This all took place in the prototype stage of this airplane between 1939 and 1942.
The He 177-B6 with its four separate engine version was much more reliable than the tandem engine version albeit increased drag of the four propellors and a slightly smaller payload.
In 1942, the production started of the He 177-B6
From January 1942 up to January 1943 more than 377 machines were build, nearly all used at the East front.
( OTL 130 A1 and 247 A3)

Could you stick with two engine pods, but with a separate engine at either end (a bit like the layout of the Do. 335) - that would still cut down the frontal area but get rid of the overly cramped OTL engine installation?

Edit - Dornier already had made seaplanes with this configuration - like the Do.26

Dornier Do 26 - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[Aghasverov]

Could you stick with two engine pods, but with a separate engine at either end (a bit like the layout of the Do. 335) - that would still cut down the frontal area but get rid of the overly cramped OTL engine installation?

Edit - Dornier already had made seaplanes with this configuration - like the Do.26

Dornier Do 26 - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Agree... the push-pull arrangement could've been made to work; alternately, just design it as a conventional four right from the beginning. It wasn't a bad airframe design.
Oh, and drop the loony dive-bombing requirement and stick a tailgunner position where the stupid dive brake was...
Problem was that most strategic-bombing thinking died with Wever, and no one stepped up to take his place. For all of Goering's pretensions, the Luftwaffe continued to be viewed as basically an adjunct to the Heer....

 

[Garrison]

Agree... the push-pull arrangement could've been made to work; alternately, just design it as a conventional four right from the beginning. It wasn't a bad airframe design.
Oh, and drop the loony dive-bombing requirement and stick a tailgunner position where the stupid dive brake was...
Problem was that most strategic-bombing thinking died with Wever, and no one stepped up to take his place. For all of Goering's pretensions, the Luftwaffe continued to be viewed as basically an adjunct to the Heer....

But that did make sense in terms of the needs of the German military in the 1930s. They needed an air force that could provide CAS and carry out tactical bombing first and foremost and when you add in the fact that everyone overestimated the potential effectiveness of strategic bombing, meaning they thought medium bombers could get the job done, its no surprise they made the choices they did. I suspect Wever would just have gone down the same dead end as Harris and LeMay, convinced the strategic bombers could win the war all by themselves and ignoring the needs of close air support. The RAF insisting on conducting its own separate campaign was a big problem for the BEF in 1940, if the Luftwaffe shows a similar disdain for CAS then the Heer is in big trouble.

 

[tonycat77]

Retiring the do-17, He-111 and do-215 earlier would be a major positive gain.
He-177 seems to me to be a perfectly non used Patrol/naval bomber, faster, heavier defensive armament than the FW-200, no bending during hard landings, etc.
Transport too, put it's wings and engine and rear fuselage on a bulged front one for transport, like the boeing 377.

 

[marathag]

y did. I suspect Wever would just have gone down the same dead end as Harris and LeMay,

LeMay was willing to change tactics. Harris never did.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

But that did make sense in terms of the needs of the German military in the 1930s. They needed an air force that could provide CAS and carry out tactical bombing first and foremost and when you add in the fact that everyone overestimated the potential effectiveness of strategic bombing, meaning they thought medium bombers could get the job done, its no surprise they made the choices they did. I suspect Wever would just have gone down the same dead end as Harris and LeMay, convinced the strategic bombers could win the war all by themselves and ignoring the needs of close air support. The RAF insisting on conducting its own separate campaign was a big problem for the BEF in 1940, if the Luftwaffe shows a similar disdain for CAS then the Heer is in big trouble.

It would be more accurate to say the German doctrine was one of "Strike" bombing. A US Army Air Corps term from the 1920s. The idea was one of concentrated air power in support of the ground operations, but not necessarily aimed at the enemy front line. In that context twin engined or four engined bombers of medium range were appropriate for attacking railways, bridges, airfields, march columns on roads, assembly areas, supply dumps, HQ, artillery groups, reserve assembly. When you hit targets like that you want to punch them not slap them, so large bomb loads are desired. ie: When the RAF hit Geyer von Shweppenbergs HQ of Pz Group West 10 June 1944 they dropped 450 tons on the HQ site. Not just a flight or squadron of Typhoons with a volley of rockets. The German air strike at Sedan on 13 may 1940 was another example. Several hundred bombers made attacks on suspected French artillery, HQ, reserves, and forward defenses hours ahead of the assault across the river. The control was by the air commanders & not directly by anyone on the ground.

In the context of this Strike doctrine the He 177 still makes sense however the engines are configured. Speed and payload are desired. Range & altitude are much less important in the context of operational or tactical strikes.

True CAS did not come to the Germans until 1941-42. They, like others had the idea of a air controller in the battle zone directing bombers via radio, but like most others it did not come into common use for a few years. There was some attempt at it in the Great War. The Brits experimented with it on a informal basis on the NW Frontier in the 1920s. The US Marines used it in Nicaragua. Others dabbled in it. But, as a official doctrine & in common use true CAS did not appear until 1941 & hit its stride in 1942.

 

[Aghasverov]

But that did make sense in terms of the needs of the German military in the 1930s. They needed an air force that could provide CAS and carry out tactical bombing first and foremost and when you add in the fact that everyone overestimated the potential effectiveness of strategic bombing, meaning they thought medium bombers could get the job done, its no surprise they made the choices they did. I suspect Wever would just have gone down the same dead end as Harris and LeMay, convinced the strategic bombers could win the war all by themselves and ignoring the needs of close air support. The RAF insisting on conducting its own separate campaign was a big problem for the BEF in 1940, if the Luftwaffe shows a similar disdain for CAS then the Heer is in big trouble.

This is true as well... the philosophies of Harris and LeMay would not, alone, have won the war. I suppose it's a question of balance, and no one was really adept at balancing strategic goals with tactical needs at the time...
I think that the RAF and the USAAF had a big advantage in that, by late '43-early '44, they had a considerable number of aircraft that were well-suited for the CAS role, even if not designed for it... Typhoon, Tempest, P-47 and others... The Germans had the Fw 190, and a rapidly dwindling number of specialized CAS aircraft - the painfully obsolete Ju 87, the Hs 129...
But yes, in the late '30's the LW was well-suited for its intended role... also given limited resources, the Germans couldn't have reasonably built huge numbers of a large and expensive aircraft like an (improved) He 177, without causing grave deficiencies elsewhere...

 

[Ramontxo]

https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&url=https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fairey_Gannet&ved=2ahUKEwipsZvSwLr5AhUYwIUKHYatBbsQmhN6BAgIEAI&usg=AOvVaw2VCq_p_lpLSUbD728Tawyr

Fairey Gannet. Arrangement previously
proposed for ICE engines. Each engine drives its own propeller. But far more easier than that. Each engine in its own nacelle and forget about making the plane able to dive bomb

 

[mudhead]

This would be the proven engines BMW 801- or Jumo 213E-,with an increase wing span and wing surface.

I don't think these were proven engines in the timeframe of He177 development - the latter didn't appear until after mid-war.

 

[jsb]

In the context of this Strike doctrine the He 177 still makes sense however the engines are configured. Speed and payload are desired. Range & altitude are much less important in the context of operational or tactical strikes.

Are He 111/do-17 not very cheap due to the old development and even the other later twins not still relatively cheap? Also was LW not mostly wanting to operate off less/unprepared forward airfields, so lighter bombers would appeal far more than a large heavy bomber that might need a concrete runway rather than grass?

 

[farmerted555]

IMHO, the He-177 should have been a traditional one prop per engine plane.

 

[hammo1j]

Could it have bombed Soviet industries in the Urals? With four engines it may have had the superiority of the Lancaster when compared to the Manchester, which was huge.

Again to destroy some of industry it would have to be a day bomber and as the Americans found out unescorted bombers just didn't work.

The armament on the HE177 was more like the flying fortress with lots of 0.5 inch guns

 

[Riain]

If the He177 was conventional and successful i suspect it would displace a bunch of older aircraft in production, over 2100 He111 were produced in 1943-44 which instead might have been 1000 He177s in addition to the ~1200 produced IOTL.

Such numbers might produce significant effects on the theatre level. They aren't going to stop, or even effect, British war production, but it might do something like bomb the Seuz canal or Alexandria, or the assemble areas for the Sicily invasion or beachheads like Salerno, or equivalent on the Eastern front.

 

[thaddeus]

the LRMP role would be a notable change, the LW had some initial success with the FW-200 but there were few evolutionary changes and quite a gap until (the very few) JU-290s appeared.

the arrival of the HE-177 would free the FW-200s to be used as transports (save them to be used as transports as so many were lost)

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

the LRMP role would be a notable change, the LW had some initial success with the FW-200 but there were few evolutionary changes and quite a gap until (the very few) JU-290s appeared.

the arrival of the HE-177 would free the FW-200s to be used as transports (save them to be used as transports as so many were lost)

This is a great idea. But the Germans were progressively declining in their ability to execute great ideas. The numbers of VLR patrol planes had to do with poor cooperation and joint strategy between the Navy & Air Force. Replacing 100 FW200 with 100 He177 will be better, but not so much that it changes the Battle of the Atlantic.

 

[Parma]

The He 177 is most well known of the use of the glide bombs on naval targets. However it was the East Front were it was mostly used as bomber on long ranges. The purpose of the He177 was to deliver bomb loads at a lager distance than the He 111 or other German bombers of simmilar class could do. In other words long range strategical bombing.
So a production version of the He177, with four separate engines, which would solve the major flaw in the desing, (and skipping the dive bomb capacity) Would it have some effect on the course of battle at the East front.
Given that there were mid 1942 some 180 machines operational and increasing up to nearly 400 at the start of 1943.
And due to the succes of the He177 the production capacity will be increasd at the cost of the production capacity of the He111.

As example a He 177 with four separate engines. This supposed to be a He-177 B6 OTL?

 

[Lindseyman]

Well they did try with the 274 and the proposed 277 but events seem to have got in the way somewhat. Wikipedia articles I know, but they seem to be fairly good summaries.

 

[CaptainCalvert]

I think the idea of the He 177 as a longer range bomber and maybe as a high payload shorter range bomber in the east is quite reasonable.
The 1930s concept was a series of fast wars because Germany knew it couldn't manage a long war, which removed the driver for true strategic bombers.
The role(s) proposed in the east give the He177 a purpose it can fulfil. It doesn't hurt that these also allow it to be useful in modest numbers, whereas true strategic bombers really need much greater numbers to be effective

 

[TDM]

The problem with the idea of long-range bombing for Germany is:

1), their plan was never to long range bomb opponents into defeat, but to beat them in the field quickly with fast moving armies, and that's were they concentrated their resources (and air forces). And to be fair they ended up with a very good army that was well supported and co-ordinated with their air force.

Take the Blitz that was never the long term plan, it came about from Germany finding itself in a situation in May 1940 id didn't really think it would be even a year before hand let alone the development period of a bomber force, and then realising it needed to do something and Goering riding high on sucess saying "I got this".

Or the idea of better and more long range bombing in teh USSR to disrupt the industries that had been evacuated further east and generally infrastructure out of tank reach. Only they never thought they would have to do that because they thought they'd win on the field of battle in 3 months and within the first 300 miles of Soviet territory



2). It turns out that countries don't collapse to their knees the first time a few 4 engine bombers appear overhead. So the wallies as the only combatants seriously investing in long-range strategic bombing campaigns beefed up their bomber fleets to thousands and thousands of 4 engine bombers to try and make it work, and even then the overall effect of that is still up for debate.

There is no way Germany can play that game, and they know it. Especially as pretty soon a big chunk of their aeronautics resources is being spent to combat al those 4 engine bombers not to mention all the air support role for the army that still seemed to be fighting a huge war in the east against an increasing large and effective airforce and is very far behind the victory schedule!


Germany made 9,092 bombers in total, 6,500 of them were single engine Stukas, 1,189 we two engine M 410's

Britain by itself made 44,391 bombers, of which 13,000 were four engine

US production of 4 engine bombers is what almost 3x the British!

(all figs from wiki)



so TL;DR the Germany are not going to get into 4 engine bombers because it's not consistent with the plan, and even once the plan fails they can't do so on a meaningful level anyway